Wednesday, August 26, 2015

San Remo Resolution-Palestine Mandate 1920 April 25, 1920


San Remo Resolution-Palestine Mandate 1920 April 25, 1920

INTRODUCTION
There are several "San Remo Conferences" and "San Remo Conventions" and documents that are called "San Remo Convention" but may not be related to the San Remo Conference of 1920.
The San Remo Conference was one of the conferences between the allies held following World War I. Its participants consisted of the four members of the Allied Supreme Council. It held in San Remo, Italy, from 19 to 26 April 1920. It was attended by the representatives of the four Principal Allied Powers of World War I who were represented by the prime ministers of Britain (David Lloyd George), France (Alexandre Millerand) and Italy (Francesco Nitti) and by Japan's Ambassador K. Matsui. It determined the allocation of Class "A" League of Nations mandates for administration of the lands formerly ruled by the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East.
The precise boundaries of all territories were left unspecified, to "be determined by the Principal Allied Powers"  and were not finalized until several years later. The conference's decisions were the basis of the never-implemented Treaty of Sèvres (Section VII, Art 94-97). Turkey rejected this treaty, after Kemal Ataturk revolted, overthrew the Sultan and  produced "facts on the ground" that nullified grants of territory to the Greeks and other concessions. The allies also quarreled over the mandates and their jurisdiction. The conference's decisions were finally confirmed, after considerable modification, by the Council of the League of Nations on 24 July 1922, and when Turkey accepted the terms of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
This document, called "San Remo Resolution," refers primarily to the contemplated mandate over Palestine in some detail, with only summary references to other areas. Though it refers to the Balfour declaration, the document does not envision a British mandate necessarily. The San Remo Resolution is the first international recognition of the right of the Jewish people to a "national home." Class "A" mandates were mandates that were presumed to eventually become self governing and independent.
Significantly, Syria was envisioned as an independent country rather than a French Mandate. The French soon evicted the Arab government of Feisal however, and a French Mandate was established over Syria. The document below refers to Turkish agreement to its provisions, but it is not clear that Turkey was represented at the conference. The Italians noted that they reserve approval of the document pending settlement of Italian interests in Asiatic Turkey.  This document is the first of several agreements that evolved into the  British Mandate for Palestine.  
This document should not be be confused with the document that is called the "San Remo Convention" and that appears in many places on the Web. That document, as it states, was actually promulgated and signed in London in 1922 by the Council of the League of Nations. It appears to be identical in every respect with the The British Mandate for Palestine of the League of Nations, and may have been mislabeled at some time.
MidEastWeb assumes no responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the document below. The original Web site that posted it is no longer functioning and only archived copies are available online. It should be checked against archived hard copy sources.
Ami Isseroff (June 23, 2010)

Corrected October 17, 2010

San Remo Resolution - April 25, 1920
This resolution, consisting of the Balfour Declaration and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, is the basic document upon which the Mandate for Palestine was constructed. The San Remo Resolution concerning Palestine and the Jewish National Home was adopted at the San Remo Peace Conference on April 25, 1920 by the four Principal Allied Powers of World War I who were represented by the Prime Ministers of Britain (David Lloyd George), France (Alexandre Millerand) and Italy (Francesco Nitti) and by the Ambassador of Japan (K. Matsui). The Resolution was a binding agreement between these Powers to reconstitute the ancient Jewish State within its historic borders “from Dan to Beersheba”, an agreement that was incorporated into the Treaty of Sevres and the Mandate for Palestine.

הדפסה | גרסת ®MS-Word | שלח מאמר

It was agreed –

(a) To accept the terms of the Mandates Article as given below with reference to Palestine, on the understanding that there was inserted in the proces-verbal an undertaking by the Mandatory Power that this would not involve the surrender of the rights hitherto enjoyed by the non-Jewish communities in Palestine; this undertaking not to refer to the question of the religious protectorate of France, which had been settled earlier in the previous afternoon by the undertaking given by the French Government that they recognized this protectorate as being at an end.

(b) that the terms of the Mandates Article should be as follows:

The High Contracting Parties agree that Syria and Mesopotamia shall, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations), be provisionally recognized as independent States, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The boundaries of the said States will be determined, and the selection of the Mandatories made, by the Principal Allied Powers.

The High Contracting Parties agree to entrust, by application of the provisions of Article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a Mandatory, to be selected by the said Powers. The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 8, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

La Puissance mandataire s’engage a nommer dans le plus bref delai une Commission speciale pour etudier toute question et toute reclamation concernant les differentes communautes religieuses et en etablir le reglement. Il sera tenu compte dans la composition de cette Commission des interets religieux en jeu. Le President de la Commission sera nomme par le Conseil de la Societe des Nations.

The terms of the mandates in respect of the above territories will be formulated by the Principal Allied Powers and submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for approval.

Turkey hereby undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of Article [132 of the Treaty of Sevres] to accept any decisions which may be taken in this connection.

(c) Les mandataires choisis par les principales Puissances allies sont: la France pour la Syrie, et la Grand Bretagne pour la Mesopotamie, et la Palestine.

In reference to the above decision the Supreme Council took note of the following reservation of the Italian Delegation:

La Delegation Italienne en consideration des grands interets economiques que l’Italie en tant que puissance exclusivement mediterraneenne possede en Asie Mineure, reserve son approbation a la presente resolution, jusqu’au reglement des interets italiens en Turquie d’Asia.

The Palestine Mandate of the League of Nations

Introduction
The Palestine Mandate was born out of the ambitions of the British and their promises to the French, the Arabs and the Zionists, as set forth in the Balfour declaration, the Sykes Picot Agreement and the McMahon Correspondence. The background is discussed extensively by David FromkinA Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East, 1990 (Owl books, 2001) and also by Michael J. Cohen in The Origins and Evolution of the Arab-Zionist Conflict  1987. Cohen wrote:
"..But once the United States abdicated any further role in the new European order after the summer of 1919, it was left to Britain and France to divide the Middle East between them. It cannot be said that either power displayed any great altruism when it came to deciding whether the indigenous peoples of the area were mature enough to be granted their independence. In April 1920, in the small Italian town of San Remo, Britain and France divide the Middle East into mandates while the American ambassador read his newspaper in the garden. Britain obtained Palestine, Transjordan 6 and Iraq; the French acquired Syria.
6. (footnote) - Palestine and Transjordan remained a single administrative unit until 1946, but in 1922, Transjordan was detached from the area to which the Balfour Declaration applied. This has remained a grievance with the Zionist side, but it should be remembered that the area to the east of the river Jordan was definitely included in the area promised to Husayn in 1915; the linking of Palestine and Transjordan had been an administrative convenience for Britain and did not indicate any recognition of Zionist claims to the East Bank of the Jordan.
Michael J. Cohen - The origins and Evolution of the Arab-Zionist Conflict, University of California Press, 1987 page 64 and footnote.
The League Mandate system was tailored to match the colonialist ambitions of the British and French in fact, while paying lip service to the American wishful thinking about self-determination. In accordance with the principles of the Balfour Declaration and Article 22 of the League Convenant,  the League of Nations drew up the Mandate for Palestine. The document underwent several transformations. Arab pressure and riots in Palestine had brought about the Churchill White Paper of 1922, which again reiterated the right of the Jews to a Homeland in Palestine. At this time, Britain detached all of the area east of the Jordan river from Palestine and gave it to the Hashemi family as an independent Arab state. Many historians believe that this was a sop to the Hashemites, who had lost Syria to the French and Saudi Arabia to ibn Saud. As noted above, others believe that Transjordan was never a part of Palestine. Maps drawn by the Zionists and presented for consideration during deliberations regarding the mandate included a part of  the territory that was allocated to Transjordan. Article 25 states:
ART. 25. In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.
Therefore, it is not possible to claim that the Mandate did not include those territories, but they had a special status. The article provides that " no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18." The establishment of Transjordan ultimately violated the provisions of Article 15, since Jews were not allowed to buy land or live there, and subsequent British restrictions on immigration of Jews and of Arabs also violated  provisions of Article 15, That article states:
ART. 15. The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.  
While the Mandate was derived from the Balfour Declaration and based on it, it amplified and interpreted the declaration beyond the meaning of the original wording, perhaps unintentionally. In particular, Article 6 reads:
ART. 6. The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced,
The Balfour declaration had stated:
it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."
While it could be possible to develop a Jewish national home while respecting the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities, it would be totally impossible to develop a Jewish national home without prejudicing the position of the Arabs of Palestine, who had been a majority and would become a minority as the result of Jewish immigration. So interpreted,  the mission of the Mandatory would become impossible. The British subsequently interpreted this clause to mean at least that Arabs must have economic parity with Jews, and that the Jewish sector of Palestine could not develop unless the Arab sector developed (see Passfield White Paper ).

Note: A document having wording identical to the League of Nations British Mandate for Palestine, has been posted in several places on the Web under the name "San Remo Convention." This is evidently a misidentification. The San Remo conference of 1920 produced the San Remo Resolution, which was the basis of the final League of Nations Mandate resolution, but was a very general document that discussed all Middle East mandates. It referred to the Balfour Declaration, but did not assign the mandate specifically to Great Britain.



Introduction
In the wake of the Arab riots of 1929, simultaneously with the Hope-Simpson report and based on its recommendations, the British responded with the Passfield White Paper of 1930. This document was construed  as the first attempt to limit Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Passfield White Paper  evoked considerable opposition from the Zionist movement. In his memoirs, Chaim Weizmann note that he had met with Lord Passfield and other officials. At that meeting, wrote Weizmann, "In a very polite way I charged Passfield openly with a breach of faith. " (Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error, 1949, p 412).
Weizmann wrote of the White Paper, "... it was considered by all Jewish friends of the National Home, Zionist and non-Zionist alike, and by a host of non-Jewish well-wishers, as rendering, and intending to render, our work in Palestine impossible. There was noting left for me but to resign my position as President of the Jewish Agency. " (Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error, 1949, p 413)
The Mandate was based on the Balfour declaration and stated
it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."
The White paper did not establish that there would be no more immigration in so many words. It  asserted that the condition of the mandate regarding safeguarding the rights of the indigenous population was of equal importance with that of creating a Jewish Homeland, and implied that immigration was inimical to safeguarding the rights of the indigenous population. It did say, on the basis of the Hope Simpson Report, that there were no more land reserves available to cultivation. It further stated that the "temporary" suspension of immigration certificates undertaken the previous April was justified and would continue, and it did not state when it would end.
The White paper notes:
. The next point, therefore, which His Majesty's Government feel it necessary to emphasise, in the strongest manner possible, is that in the words of the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons on the 3rd April last, "a double undertaking is involved, to the Jewish people on the one hand and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the other."
and goes on to say:
His Majesty's Government have reason to think that one of the reasons for the sustained tension and agitation on both sides has been the creation by misguided advisers of the false hope that efforts to intimidate and to bring pressure to bear upon His Majesty's Government would eventually result in forcing them into a policy which weighted the balances in favour of the one or the other party.
The report also notes
that in estimating the absorptive capacity of Palestine at any time account should be taken of Arab as well as Jewish unemployment in determining the rate at which immigration should be permitted.
and:
25. The finances of Palestine have been severely strained by the necessity of providing for large increases in its security forces. These increases have been deemed essential in the light of the events of the autumn of 1929, and it is not possible to forecast the time that must elapse before it will be thought safe to reduce expenditure on this account. That must largely depend on the success of the policy now envisaged, and on the extent of the improvement in mutual relations between Arabs and Jews which His Majesty's Government hope will be one of its results.
It is part of the general policy of His Majesty's Government that Palestine should be self-supporting. The improvement of agricultural conditions contemplated will not only take time, but will involve considerable expenditure, though it is to be hoped that part of the outlay will prove to be recoverable. His Majesty's Government are giving earnest consideration to the financial position which arises out of this situation, and steps are being taken to concert the necessary measures to give effect to their policy.
The British government now claimed that the Balfour declaration and the Mandate had twin purposes of equal importance - to create a national home for the Jewish people, and to protect the rights and position of the existing inhabitants. It is difficult to argue that this is the case, since in both the Mandate and the Balfour declaration, the purpose as declared is to create a homeland, while the safeguarding of rights is a modifying condition of the same purpose. If safeguarding the rights of the existing inhabitants were a major purpose of the Mandate or the Balfour declaration, then there would be no need for a separate mandate in Palestine. All of the land could be part of mandate Syria or an Arab kingdom.  In any case, when the British tried to use this logic to stop Jewish immigration, the League declared their actions contrary to the mandate.
The British took the mandate provision of protecting the rights and position of the existing inhabitants, to mean that the economic development of the Jewish sector must be conditional on the development of the Arab sector. This was reinforced by the conclusions of the Hope-Simpson report. But only the Jews were investing in Palestine, and the British insisted that the Mandate should be economically self-sufficient. In practical terms, this meant that the British would insist that the Jews subsidize the economic development of the much larger Arab population.
Weizmann took particular exception to paragraph 10, which stated "It must be clearly understood that incitements to disorder or disaffection, in whatever quarter they may originate, will be severely punished "which ignored the fact that according to Weizmann, the Arabs had been solely responsible for the disturbances, and likewise ignored the indisputable fact that the Mandate government had been totally unprepared for the violence and had met it with inadequate forces.
The Passfield White paper  was rescinded effectively in a letter issued to Chaim Weizmann by PM Ramsay Macdonald.  The letter was read by the PM in the House of Commons and reprinted in the Hansard.  Macdonald did not rescind the Passfield White Paper. He simply denied that it had been the intention of the government to stop immigration, and in fact, in subsequent years, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased significantly. However the provision of the Balfour declaration and the mandate regarding protection of the rights of the existing population, originally inserted as an afterthought by anti-Zionists, became increasingly important in future British attempts to justify limitations on Jewish immigration.


Introduction
Following the Hope-Simpson report and based on its recommendations the British responded with the Passfield White Paper of 1930, which was the first attempt to limit Jewish immigration to Palestine. The Passfield White Paper  evoked considerable opposition from the Zionist movement and was rescinded effectively in a letter issued to Haim Weizmann by PM Ramsay Macdonald. The letter was read by the PM in the House of Commons and reprinted in the Hansard.  Macdonald did not rescind the Passfield White Paper. He simply denied that it had been the intention of the government to stop immigration, and in fact, in subsequent years, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased significantly.

The MacDonald Letter
13 February 1931
Dear Dr. Weizmann:
In order to remove certain misconceptions and misunderstandings which have arisen as to the policy of his Majesty’s Government with regard to Palestine, as set forth in the White Paper of October, 1930, and which were the subject of a debate in the House of Commons on Nov. 17, and also to meet certain criticisms put forward by the Jewish Agency, I have pleasure in forwarding you the following statement of our position, which will fall to be read as the authoritative interpretation of the White Paper on the matters with which this letter deals.
It has been said that the policy of his Majesty’s Government involves a serious departure from the obligations of the mandate as hitherto understood; that it misconceives the mandatory obligations, and that it foreshadows a policy which is inconsistent with the obligations of the mandatory to the Jewish people.
His Majesty’s Government did not regard it as necessary to quote in extenso the declarations of policy which have been previously made, but attention is drawn to the fact that, not only does the White Paper of 1930 refer to and endorse the White Paper of 1922, which has been accepted by the Jewish Agency, but it recognizes that the undertaking of the mandate is an undertaking to the Jewish people and not only to the Jewish population of Palestine. The White Paper places in the foreground of its statement my speech in the House of Commons on the 3rd of April, 1930, in which I announced, in words that could not have been made more plain, that it was the intention of his Majesty’s Government to continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the terms of the mandate as approved by the Council of the League of Nations. That position has been reaffirmed and again made plain by my speech in the House of Commons on the 17th of November. In my speech on the 3rd of April, I used the following language:
His Majesty’s Government will continue to administer Palestine in accordance with the terms of the mandate as approved by the Council of the League of Nations. This is an international obligation from which there can be no question of receding.
Under the terms of the mandate his Majesty’s Government are responsible for promoting the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
A double undertaking is involved, to the Jewish people on the one hand and to the non-Jewish population of Palestine on the other; and it is the firm resolve of his Majesty’s Government to give effect, in equal measure, to both parts of the declaration and to do equal justice to all sections of the population of Palestine. That is the duty from which they will not shrink and to discharge of which they will apply all the resources at their command.
That declaration is in conformity not only with the articles but also with the preamble of the mandate, which is hereby explicitly reaffirmed.
In carrying out the policy of the mandate the mandatory cannot ignore the existence of the differing interests and viewpoints. These, indeed, are not in themselves irreconcilable, but they can only be reconciled if there is a proper realization that the full solution of the problem depends upon an understanding between the Jews and the Arabs. Until that is reached, considerations of balance must inevitably enter into the definition of policy.
A good deal of criticism has been directed to the White Paper upon the assertion that it contains injurious allegations against the Jewish people and Jewish labor organizations. Any such intention on the part of his Majesty’s Government is expressly disavowed. It is recognized that the Jewish Agency have all along given willing cooperation in carrying out the policy of the mandate and that the constructive work done by the Jewish people in Palestine has had beneficial effects on the development and well-being of the country as a whole. His Majesty’s Government also recognizes the value of the services of labor and trades union organizations in Palestine, to which they desire to give every encouragement.
A question has arisen as to the meaning to be attached to the words “safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of race and religion” occurring in Article II, and the words “insuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced” occurring in Article VI of the mandate. The words “safeguarding the civil and religious rights” occurring in Article II cannot be read as meaning that the civil and religious rights of individual citizens are unalterable. In the case of Suleiman Murra, to which reference has been made, the Privy Council, in construing these words of Article II said “It does not mean … that all the civil rights of every inhabitant of Palestine which existed at the date of the mandate are to remain unaltered throughout its duration; for if that were to be a condition of the mandatory jurisdiction, no effective legislation would be possible.” The words, accordingly, must be read in another sense, and the key to the true purpose and meaning of the sentence is to be found in the concluding words of the article, “irrespective of race and religion.” These words indicate that in respect of civil and religious rights the mandatory is not to discriminate between persons on the ground of religion or race, and this protective provision applies equally to Jews, Arabs and all sections of the population.
The words “rights and position of other sections of the population,” occurring in Article VI, plainly refer to the non-Jewish community. These rights and position are not TO BE prejudiced; that is, are not to be impaired or made worse. The effect of the policy of immigration and settlement on the economic position of the non-Jewish community cannot be excluded from consideration. But the words are not to be read as implying that existing economic conditions in Palestine should be crystallized. On the contrary, the obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land remains a positive obligation of the mandate and it can be fulfilled without prejudice to the rights and position of other sections of the population of Palestine.
We may proceed to the contention that the mandate has been interpreted in a manner highly prejudicial to Jewish interests in the vital matters of land settlement and immigration. It has been said that the policy of the White Paper would place an embargo on immigration and would suspend, if not indeed terminate, the close settlement of the Jews on the land, which is a primary purpose of the mandate. In support of this contention particular stress has been laid upon the passage referring to State lands in the White Paper, which says that “it would not be possible to make available for Jewish settlement in view of their actual occupation by Arab cultivation and of the importance of making available suitable land on which to place the Arab cultivators who are now landless.”
The language of this passage needs to be read in the light of the policy as a whole. It is desirable to make it clear that the landless Arabs, to whom it was intended to refer in the passage quoted, were such Arabs as can be shown to have been displaced from the lands which they occupied in consequence of the land passing into Jewish hands, and who have not obtained other holdings on which they establish themselves, or other equally satisfactory occupation. The number of such displaced Arabs must be a matter for careful inquiry. IT is to landless Arabs within this category that his Majesty’s Government feels itself under an obligation to facilitate their settlement upon the land. The recognition of this obligation in no way detracts from the larger purposes of development which his Majesty’s Government regards as the most effectual means of furthering the establishment of a national home for the Jews …
Further, the statement of policy of his Majesty’s Government did not imply a prohibition of acquisition of additional lands by Jews. It contains no such prohibition, nor is any such intended. What it does contemplate is such temporary control of land disposition and transfers as may be necessary not to impair the harmony and effectiveness of the scheme of land settlement to be undertaken. His Majesty’s Government feels bound to point out that it alone of the governments which have been responsible for the administration of Palestine since the acceptance of the mandate has declared its definite intention to initiate an active policy of development, which it is believed will result in a substantial and lasting benefit to both Jews and Arabs.
Cognate to this question is the control of immigration. It must first of all be pointed out that such control is not in any sense a departure from previous policy. From 1920 onward, when the original immigration ordinance came into force, regulations for the control of immigration have been issued from time to time, directed to prevent illicit entry and to define and facilitate authorized entry. The right of regulation has at no time been challenged.
But the intention of his Majesty’s Government appears to have been represented as being that “no further immigration of Jews is to be permitted as long as it might prevent any Arab from obtaining employment.” His Majesty’s Government never proposed to pursue such a policy. They were concerned to state that, in the regulation of Jewish immigration, the following principles should apply: viz., that “it is essential to insure that the immigrants should not be burden on the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment.” (White Paper 1922.)
In one aspect, his Majesty’s Government have to be mindful of their obligations to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land; in the other aspect, they have to be equally mindful of their duty to insure that no prejudice results to the rights and position of the non-Jewish community. It is because of this apparent conflict of obligation that his Majesty’s Government have felt bound to emphasize the necessity of the proper application of the absorptive principle.
That principle is vital to any scheme of development, the primary purpose of which must be the settlement both of Jews and of displaced Arabs on the land. It is for that reason that his Majesty’s Government have insisted, and are compelled to insist, that government immigration regulations must be properly applied. The considerations relevant to the limits of absorptive capacity are purely economic considerations.
His Majesty’s Government did not prescribe and do not contemplate any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish immigration in any of its categories. The practice of sanctioning a labor schedule of wage-earning immigrants will continue. In each case consideration will be given to anticipated labor requirements for works which, being dependent upon Jewish or mainly Jewish capital, would not be or would not have been undertaken unless Jewish labor was available. With regard to public and municipal works failing to be financed out of public funds, the claim of Jewish labor to a due share of the employment available, taking into account Jewish contributions to public revenue, shall be taken into consideration. As regards others kinds of employment, it will be necessary in each case to take into account the factors bearing upon the demand for labor, including the factor of unemployment among both the Jews and the Arabs.
Immigrants with prospects of employment other than employment of a purely ephemeral character will not be excluded on the sole ground that the employment cannot be guaranteed to be of unlimited duration.
In determining the extent to which immigration at any time may be permitted it is necessary also to have regard to the declared policy of the Jewish Agency to the effect that “in all the works or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency it shall be deemed to be a matter of principle that Jewish labor shall be employed.” His Majesty’s Government do not in any way challenge the right of the Agency to formulate or approve and endorse this policy. The principle of preferential, and indeed exclusive, employment of Jewish labor by Jewish organizations is a principle which the Jewish Agency are entitled to affirm. But it must be pointed out that if in consequence of this policy Arab labor is displaced or existing unemployment becomes aggravated, that is a factor in the situation to which the mandatory is bound to have regard.
His Majesty’s Government desire to say, finally, as they have repeatedly and unequivocally affirmed, that the obligations imposed upon the mandatory by its acceptance of the mandate are solemn international obligations from which there is not now, nor has there been at any time, an intention to depart. To the tasks imposed by the mandate, his Majesty’s Government have set their hand, and they will not withdraw it. But if their efforts are to be successful, there is need for cooperation, confidence, readiness on all sides to appreciate the difficulties and complexities of the problem, and, above all, there must be a full and unqualified recognition that no solution can be satisfactory or permanent which is not based upon justice, both to the Jewish people and to the non-Jewish communities of Palestine.
Ramsay MacDonald

The League of Nations Mandate System
Introduction
Following WWI, the League of Nations established a system of "Mandates." In theory, the Mandate system had the benevolent intention of preparing the "natives" of various regions for self government. In practice, the granting of mandates often represented nothing more than the granting of spoils to the different victorious allied governments. The basis of the mandate system was Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which gave broad authority to the mandate powers regarding preparation for self-rule. The document is reproduced below.

It is noteworthy that the Mandate provision allowed the widest possible latitude in execution of individual mandates: "The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances." The terms of each mandate were accordingly to be worked out on a per-country basis. This provision of the League Covenant formed the basis of the Mandate for Palestine of 1922.

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 28 June 1919
Article 22. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the formance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of Mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.


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