Tuesday, August 2, 2016

Oslo I Accord - was an attempt in 1993 and 1995 - are now null and void


 Oslo I Accord 
The Oslo I Accord or Oslo I, officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements[1] or short Declaration of Principles (DOP), was an attempt in 1993 to set up a framework that would lead to the resolution of the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It was the first face-to-face agreement between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Negotiations concerning the agreement, an outgrowth of the Madrid Conference of 1991, were conducted secretly in Oslo, Norway, hosted by the Fafo institute, and completed on 20 August 1993; the Oslo Accords were subsequently officially signed at a public ceremony in Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993,[2] in the presence of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and U.S. President Bill Clinton. The documents themselves were signed by Mahmoud Abbas for the PLO, foreign Minister Shimon Peres for Israel, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher for the United States and foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev for Russia.
The Accord provided for the creation of a Palestinian interim self-government, thePalestinian National Authority (PNA). The Palestinian Authority would have responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control. The Accords also called for the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
It was anticipated that this arrangement would last for a five-year interim period during which a permanent agreement would be negotiated (beginning no later than May 1996). Remaining issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security and borders would be part of the "permanent status negotiations" during this period.
In August 1993, the delegations had reached an agreement, which was signed in secrecy by Peres while visiting Oslo. In the Letters of Mutual Recognition, the PLO acknowledged the State of Israel and pledged to reject violence, and Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and as partner in negotiations. Yasser Arafat was allowed to return to the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In 1995, the Oslo I Accord was followed by Oslo II. Neither promised Palestinian statehood.[3]
Principles of the Accords
In essence, the accords called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and affirmed a Palestinian right of self-government within those areas through the creation of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority. Palestinian rule was to last for a five-year interim period during which "permanent status negotiations" would commence in order to reach a final agreement.
The negotiations would cover major issues such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees,Israeli settlements, and security and borders were to be decided at these permanent status negotiations (Article V). Israel was to grant interim self-government to the Palestinians in phases.
Along with the principles, the two groups signed Letters of Mutual Recognition—theIsraeli government recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, while the PLO recognized the right of the state of Israel to exist and renounced terrorism as well as other violence, and its desire for the destruction of the Israeli state.
The aim of Israeli–Palestinian negotiations was to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, an elected Council, for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242and 338, an integral part of the whole peace process.
In order that the Palestinians govern themselves according to democratic principles, free and general political elections would be held for the Council.
Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council would cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except for issues that would be finalized in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides viewed the West Bank and Gaza as a single territorial unit.
The permanent status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians would start "not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period"; the interim period would "begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area".[4]That withdrawal began with the signing of the Gaza–Jericho Agreement on 4 May 1994,[3] thus the interim period would end on 4 May 1999.[5]
The five-year transitional period would commence with Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. There would be a transfer of authority from the Israel Defense Forces to the authorized Palestinians, concerning education and culture,health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Council would establish a strong police force, while Israel would continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats.
An Israeli–Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee would be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols.
The Declaration of Principles would enter into force one month after its signing. All protocols annexed to the Declaration of Principles and the Agreed Minutes pertaining to it were to be regarded as a part of it.
Content of the Oslo I Accord
Main articles
The Oslo I Accord contains 17 articles.
Annexes
The Oslo I Accord contains four annexes:
Annex 1: Conditions of Palestinian Elections
This annex covered election agreements, a system of elections, rules and regulations regarding election campaigns, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a TV station.
Annex 2: Withdrawal of Israeli forces
An agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip andJericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal. Internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.
  • A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.
  • Establishment of a joint Palestinian–Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.
  • Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
  • Arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages: Gaza–Egypt; and Jericho–Jordan.
Annex 3: Economic cooperation
The two sides agree to establish an Israeli–Palestinian continuing Committee for economic cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:
  • Cooperation in the field of water
  • Cooperation in the field of electricity
  • Cooperation in the field of energy
  • Cooperation in the field of finance
  • Cooperation in the field of transport and communications
  • Cooperation in the field of trade and commerce
  • Cooperation in the field of industry
  • Cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations
  • Cooperation in social welfare issues
  • An environmental protection plan
  • Cooperation in the field of communication and media
Annex 4: Regional development
The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G7 countries.
Agreed Minutes
The Oslo I Accord contains some explanations of a number of articles in the Accord, with understandings the parties had agreed on:
General understandings
Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians through the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in the agreed minutes below.
Specific understandings
Article IV
It was to be understood that: Jurisdiction of the Council would cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that would be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
Article V
Permanent status negotiations issues
It was understood that several issues were postponed to permanent status negotiations, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and co-operation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest. The outcome of these permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or pre-empted by the parties.
Article VI (2)
Transferring authority
It was agreed that the transfer of authority would be as follows: The Palestinians would inform the Israelis of the names of the authorized Palestinians who would assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that would be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.
Article VII (2)
Cooperation
The Interim Agreement would also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.
Article VII (5)
Israel's powers
The withdrawal of the military government would not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
Article VIII
Police
It was understood that the Interim Agreement would include arrangements for cooperation and coordination. It was also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police would be accomplished in a phased manner. The accord stipulated that Israeli and Palestinian police would do joint patrols.
Article X
Designating officials
It was agreed that the Israeli and Palestinian delegations would exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli–Palestinian Liaison Committee which would reach decisions by agreement.
Article XI
Israel's continuing responsibilities
It was understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel would continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order ofsettlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians would be allowed to continue using roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.
Reaction
In Israel, a strong debate over the accords took place; the left wing supported them, while the right wing opposed them. After a two-day discussion in the Knesset on the government proclamation in the issue of the accord and the exchange of the letters, on 23 September 1993, a vote of confidence was held in which 61 Knesset members voted for the decision, 50 voted against and 8 abstained.
Palestinian reactions were also divided. Fatah, the group that represented the Palestinians in the negotiations, accepted the accords. But Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine objected to the accords.
On both sides, there were fears of the other side's intentions. Israelis suspected that the Palestinians were entering into a tactical peace agreement, and that they were not sincere about wanting to reach peace and coexistence with Israel. They saw it as part of the PLO's Ten Point Program which calls for a national authority "over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated" until "the liberation of all Palestinian territory" and understood it as an attempt to justify the signing of the accords as a step to reach a final goal.
Jerusalem's new mayor and later Prime Minister Ehud Olmert opposed the agreement and called it a "dark cloud over the city". He favored to bring more Jews to East Jerusalem and expand Jerusalem to the east.[6]
Many Palestinians feared that Israel was not serious about dismantling their settlements in the West Bank, especially around Jerusalem. They feared they might even accelerate their settlement program in the long run, by building more settlements and expanding existing ones.[7]
Nobel Peace Prize
Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat receiving the Nobel Peace Prize following the Oslo Accords
In 1994 Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat received the Nobel Peace Prize following the signing on the Oslo Accords,[8] "for their efforts to create peace in the Middle East".[9]
Remarks from Benjamin Netanyahu
In a 2001 video, Netanyahu, reportedly unaware he was being recorded, said: "They asked me before the election if I'd honor [the Oslo accords]... I said I would, but [that] I'm going to interpret the accords in such a way that would allow me to put an end to this galloping forward to the '67 borders. How did we do it? Nobody said what defined military zones were. Defined military zones are security zones; as far as I'm concerned, the entire Jordan Valley is a defined military zone. Go argue."[10] [11]Netanyahu then explained how he conditioned his signing of the 1997 Hebron agreement on American consent that there be no withdrawals from "specified military locations", and insisted he be allowed to specify which areas constituted a "military location"—such as the whole of the Jordan Valley. "Why is that important? Because from that moment on I stopped the Oslo Accords", Netanyahu affirmed.[12]However, this is clearly consistent with Yitzhak Rabin's October 1995 statement to the Knesset on the ratification of the interim Oslo agreement: "B. The security border of the State of Israel will be located in the Jordan Valley, in the broadest meaning of that term."[13] [14]
Additional agreements
In addition to the first accord, the parties concluded:
After 1995, a number of additional agreements were concluded to implement the Oslo Accords.
Consequences of the accord
In 2013 the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation stated, "The Oslo Accord divided the metropolis of Hebron—in two. In a small, fortified area of its old city quarters—a small group of Israeli settlers reside, surrounded by more than 120,000 Palestinians".[15]
See also
Issues
People
References
  1. "Text: 1993 Declaration of Principles". Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (BBC). 29 November 2001.
  2. "Encyclopedia of the Palestinians - Google Books". Books.google.com. Retrieved2013-10-30.
  3. Mideast accord: the overview; Rabin and Arafat sign accord ending Israel's 27-year hold on Jericho and the Gaza Strip. Chris Hedges, New York Times, 5 May 1994. "Israel and the P.L.O. signed an agreement today that formally begins Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area of the West Bank -- lands occupied for 27 years -- and grants Palestinians a measure of self-government for the first time, though not sovereignty." Quote of Yitzhak Rabin: "We do not accept the Palestinian goal of an independent Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan. We believe there is a separate Palestinian entity short of a state."
  4. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), 13 September 1993. From the Knesset website Article V: 1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.; 2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
  5. 4 May 1999 and Palestinian Statehood: To Declare or Not to Declare?. Azmi Bishara, Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter, 1999), pp. 5-16
  6. Jerusalem's New Mayor Adopts Begin-Shamir Settlement Policies. FMEP, Settlement Report | Vol. 4 No. 2 | March–April 1994
  7. [1] Archived 6 January 2011 at the Wayback Machine.
  8. "Press Release - The Nobel Peace Prize 1994". Nobelprize.org. 1994-10-14. Retrieved 2013-10-30.
  9. "The Nobel Peace Prize 1994". Nobelprize.org. Retrieved 2013-10-30.
  10. Wong, Curtis (16 July 2010). "Netanyahu In 2001: 'America Is A Thing You Can Move Very Easily'". The Huffington Post.
  11. Glenn Kessler (16 July 2010). "Netanyahu: 'America is a thing you can move very easily'". The Washington Post.
  12. Gideon Levy (15 July 2010). "Tricky Bibi". Haaretz. Retrieved 23 September 2011.
  13. Yitzhak Rabin (5 October 1995). "Ratification of the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement". Speech to Knesset. MFA Library. Retrieved 23 September 2011.
  14. "Netanyahu: to the left of Rabin". Israeli Uncensored News. 11 March 2011. Retrieved 17 March 2013.
  15. "I Hebron går hatet i arv" [In Hebron the hatred is handed down as inheritance].NRK (in Norwegian). 2013-09-15.
Bibliography
  • Bregman, Ahron Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America.
  • Clinton, Bill (2005). My Life. Vintage. ISBN 1-4000-3003-X.
  • Eran, Oded. "Arab–Israel Peacemaking". The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002.
External links
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Category:Oslo Accord.
Wikisource has original text related to this article:

Oslo II Accord 
The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip commonly known as Oslo II or Oslo 2, was a key and complex agreement in the Israeli–Palestinian Peace process. Because Oslo II was signed in Taba, it is sometimes called the Taba Agreement. The Oslo Accordsenvisioned the establishment of a Palestinian interim self-government in the Palestinian territories, but fell short of the promise of an independent Palestinian state. Oslo II created the Areas A, B and C in the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority was given some limited powers and responsibilities in the Areas A and B and a prospect of negotiations on a final settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The Accord was officially signed on 28 September 1995.
Historical context
The Oslo II Accord was first signed in Taba (in the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt) by Israeland the PLO on 24 September 1995 and then four days later on 28 September 1995 by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and witnessed by US President Bill Clinton as well as by representatives of Russia,Egypt, Jordan, Norway, and the European Union in Washington, D.C.
The agreement is built on the foundations of the initial Oslo I Accord, formally called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, which had been formally signed on 13 September 1993 by Israel and the PLO, with Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat in Washington, D.C. shaking hands, and officially witnessed by the United States and Russia.
It supersedes three earlier agreements:
The Oslo II Accord is called an interim agreement because it was supposed to be the basis for subsequent negotiations, and the preliminary of an eventual comprehensive peace agreement. Several additional agreements were concluded following Oslo II, but negotiations did not produce a final peace agreement. The 2002 Road map for peace abandoned the Oslo Accords and envisioned a rather loose scheme of withdrawal.
Aim of the agreement
The preamble of the agreement speaks of peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing the mutual legitimate and political rights of the parties. The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
As soon as possible but not later than 4 May 1996, negotiations on the permanent status would be started, leading to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and settling all the main issues.[1]
The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared the main object of the Interim Agreement ″to broaden Palestinian self-government in the West Bank by means of an elected self-governing authority [to] allow the Palestinians to conduct their own internal affairs, reduce points of friction between Israelis and Palestinians, and open a new era of cooperation and co-existence based on common interest, dignity and mutual respect. At the same time it protects Israel's vital interests, and in particular its security interests, both with regard to external security as well as the personal security of its citizens in the West Bank″.[2]
Content of the agreement
The Interim Agreement comprises over 300 pages containing 5 "chapters" with 31 "articles", plus 7 "annexes" and 9 attached "maps". The agreement has a "preamble" acknowledging its roots in earlier diplomatic efforts of UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and UN Security Council Resolution 338 (1973) the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the other prior agreements that came before it. Most significantly the agreement recognizes the establishment of a "Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority," that is an elected Council, called "the Council" or "the Palestinian Council".
Chapter 1: The Palestinian Council
Consisting of Articles I–IX: The role and powers of a governing Palestinian "council" and committee dealing with civil affairs and the transfer of power from Israel to the Palestinian Council. The holding of elections, the structure of the Palestinian Council, and that it should contain 82 representatives, the executive authority of the Council, various other committees, that meetings of the council should be open to the public, and outlining the powers and responsibilities of the Council.
Chapter 2: Redeployment and security arrangements
Consisting of Articles X–XVI: Phases of the redeployment of the Israel Defense Forces, roles of the Israeli Security Forces and the Israeli police, perspectives on the land of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, definition of the Areas A, B and C dividing the West Bank, arrangements for security and public order, prevention of hostile acts, confidence building measures, and the role of the Palestinian police:
Chapter 3: Legal affairs
Consisting of Articles XVII–XXI: The scope of the Palestinian Council's authority and jurisdiction and the resolution of conflicts, the legislative powers of the Council, that "Israel and the Council shall exercise their powers and responsibilities ... with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and therule of law", the various rights, liabilities and obligations with the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its civil administration to the Palestinian Council, dealing with financial claims, and the settlement of differences and disputes.
Chapter 4: Cooperation
Consisting of Articles XXII–XXVIII: Relations between Israel and the Council:
... shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other ... that their respective educational systems contribute to the peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples and to peace in the entire region, and will refrain from the introduction of any motifs that could adversely affect the process of reconciliation ... cooperate in combating criminal activity which may affect both sides, including offenses related to trafficking in illegal drugs and psychotropic substances, smuggling, and offenses against property ...
The rules for economic relations as set out in the Protocol on Economic Relations, signed in Paris on April 29, 1994, cooperation programs that will hopefully be developed, the role and functioning of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee set up as part of the Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accords 1993 and the setting up of a Monitoring and Steering Committee, liaison and cooperation withJordan and Egypt, and locating and returning missing persons and soldiers missing in action.
Chapter 5: Miscellaneous provisions
Consisting of Articles XXIX–XXXI: Arrangements for safe passage of persons and transportation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, coordination between Israel and the Council regarding passage to and from Egypt and Jordan as well as any other agreed international crossings, and then the final clauses dealing with the signing of the agreement, its implementation, that the Gaza–Jericho Agreement(May 1994), the Preparatory Transfer Agreement (August 1994), and the Further Transfer Protocol (August 1995) will be superseded by this agreement, the need and timing of permanent status negotiations, and that:
The PLO undertakes that, within two months of the date of the inauguration of the Council, the Palestinian National Council will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the letters signed by the Chairman of the PLO and addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994.
Discussion about the release of Palestinian prisoners, agreement about the attached annexes and maps, and commencement of Israel's redeployment.
See also
References
  1. 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement. Text of the Accord
  2. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement-Main Points. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 September 1995
External links


 Oslo Accords 
e
The Oslo Accords are a set of agreements between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): the Oslo I Accord, signed in Washington, D.C., in 1993[1] and the Oslo II Accord, signed in Tabain 1995.[2] The Oslo Accords marked the start of the Oslo process, a peace process that is aimed at achieving a peace-treaty based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, and to fulfill the "right of the Palestinian people to self-determination." The Oslo process started after secret negotiations in Oslo, resulting in the recognition by the PLO of the State of Israel and the recognition by Israel of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and as a partner in negotiations.
The Oslo Accords created the Palestinian Authority, whose functions are the limited self-governance over parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and, it acknowledged that the PLO is now Israel's partner in permanent status negotiations about the remaining issues. The most important issues are the borders of Israel and Palestine, the Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem, the question of Israel's military presence in and control over the remaining territories after the recognition of the Palestinian autonomy by Israel, and the Palestinian right of return. The Oslo Accords, however, did not create a Palestinian state.[3]
The Oslo process
The Oslo process is the "peace process" that started in 1993 with secret talks between Israel and the PLO. It became a cycle of negotiations, suspension, mediation, restart of negotiations and suspension again. A number of agreements were reached, until the Oslo process ended after the failure of the Camp David Summit in 2000 and the outbreak of the Second Intifada.[4] [5]
During the Second Intifada, the Roadmap for Peace was introduced, which explicitly aimed at a two-state solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The Roadmap, however, soon entered a cycle similar to the Oslo process, but without producing any agreement.
Background
The Oslo Accords are based on the 1978 Camp David Accords and show therefore considerable similarity with those Accords.[A] The Camp David's "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" envisioned autonomy for the local, and only for the local, (Palestinian) inhabitants of West Bank and Gaza. At the time, there lived some 7,400 settlers in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem),[6] and 500 in Gaza,[7] with the number in the West Bank, however, rapidly growing. As Israel regarded the PLO a terrorist organisation, it refused to talk with the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Instead, Israel preferred to negotiate with Egypt and Jordan, and "elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza".[A] Like the 1978 Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accords were an interim agreement, allowing first steps, followed by negotiations to complete within five years. The main difference was that the final goal in Camp David was a "peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza", while the Oslo Accords aimed at a peace treaty with the Palestinians.[A] Indeed, anIsrael–Jordan peace treaty was concluded, but only on 26 October 1994, after the Oslo I Accord, and without the Palestinians.
Both plans had in common that, possibly intentionally, they did not have a "Plan B" in case a final agreement would not be reached within the set period.
Negotiation partners
Only after Israel's acceptance of the PLO as negotiation partner could serious negotiations start. In their Letters of Mutual Recognition of 9 September 1993, days before the signing of the Oslo I Accord, each party agreed to accept the other as a negotiation partner.[8] The PLO recognized the State of Israel. Israel recognized the PLO as "the representative of the Palestinian people".
Outline of the peace plan
Stated goals of the Oslo Accords were among other things, Palestinian interim Self-Government (not the Palestinian Authority, but the Palestinian Legislative Council)[9]and a permanent settlement (of unresolved issues) within five years, based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Although the agreements recognize the Palestinian "legitimate and political rights," they remain silent about their fate after the interim period. The Oslo Accords neither define the nature of the post-Oslo Palestinian self-government and its powers and responsibilities, nor do they define the borders of the territory it eventually would govern.
A core issue of the Oslo Accords was the withdrawal of the Israeli military from Palestinian territories. The plan was a withdrawal in phases and a simultaneous transfer of responsibilities to the Palestinian authorities for maintaining security. Oslo II, Article X.2 reads:
"Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence after the inauguration of the Council and will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian Police ..."
And Article XI.2.e:
"During the further redeployment phases to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, powers and responsibilities relating to territory will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations."[10]
The first phase included the withdrawal from the Areas A and B. Redeployments from Area C would follow in subsequent phases. Article XI.3 states:
"″Area C″ means areas of the West Bank outside Areas A and B, which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in accordance with this Agreement."[10]
The issues that will be negotiated, according to Article XVII.1, are:
"Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis; and ... powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council."
By excluding Jerusalem and the settlements from the areas to be transferred to the Palestinians, Israeli presence, including the military to protect them, would not change without a negotiated agreement. The Accords also preserve Israel's exclusive control of the borders, the airspace and the territorial Gaza waters. Oslo II, Article XII:
"In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council shall establish a strong police force as set out in Article XIV below. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense against external threats, including the responsibility for protecting the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, and for defense against external threats from the sea and from the air, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and Settlements, for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will have all the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility."[10]
The first step was a partial Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho[3] and transfer of some powers and responsibilities on civil matters to the interim Palestinian Authority. All to agree upon within two months from October 1993 (Oslo I, Annex II).
Then, Israeli troops to withdraw from populated Palestinian areas to pave the way for Palestinian elections to establish the Council. The Council would replace the PA, and the Israeli Civil Administration in the West Bank would be dissolved (Oslo II, Article I). Further redeployments of Israeli troops would follow upon the inauguration of the Council, as detailed in the Protocol, Annex I of the Accord.[11]Article I, 5. of Oslo II reads:
"After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration in the West Bank will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government shall be withdrawn...."[10]
Twenty years later, however, the withdrawal of Israeli troops did not take place, and the Civil Administration still has permanent military presence in more than 80% of the West Bank (Area B and C).[12]
Permanent status negotiations about remaining issues would start not later than May 1996 (two years after the signing of the Gaza–Jericho Agreement; Oslo I, Article V) and be concluded before May 1999 (end of 5 year interim period). A peace treaty would end the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
Palestinian Authority and Legislative Council
When the Oslo I Accord was signed in 1993, neither a government, nor a parliament existed for the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian Authority (PA or PNA) was created by the 1994 Gaza–Jericho Agreement. Article III.1 reads:
"Israel shall transfer authority as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian Authority, hereby established, in accordance with Article V of this Agreement, except for the authority that Israel shall continue to exercise as specified in this Agreement."
The PA temporarily executed some powers and responsibilities until the establishment of the Council. Article I.1-2 of the Oslo II Accord read:
"1. Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council in accordance with this Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transferred.
2. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the powers and responsibilities transferred to the Council shall be exercised by the Palestinian Authority established in accordance with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which shall also have all the rights, liabilities and obligations to be assumed by the Council in this regard. Accordingly, the term 'Council' throughout this Agreement shall, pending the inauguration of the Council, be construed as meaning the Palestinian Authority."[10]
The first elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) were on 20 January 1996. The governments elected by the PLC retained the name "Palestinian National Authority."
Transitional Period
The Transitional Period is commonly known as the interim period (Oslo I, Article V) or interim phase.[13] Hence the name "Interim Agreement" for the Oslo II Accord and the term "Interim Self-Government Authority" (Oslo I, Article I). The interim period was designed to bridge the period between the establishment of the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority and the Palestinian Legislative Council, and the end of the permanent status negotiations, "leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338" (Oslo I, Article I). The permanent settlement was not defined. The interim period ended on 4 May 1999,[13] five years after the signing of the Gaza–Jericho Agreement.
Article V of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP or Oslo I) reads:
Transitional Period and Permanent Status Negotiations
1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people's representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.[1]
End of the interim period
In May 1999, the five years interim period ended without reaching a comprehensive peace agreement, but elements of the Oslo Accords remained. The interim Palestinian Authority became permanent, and a dominant factor of the PLO. The West Bank remained divided into Areas A, B and C, the latter some 60% of the West Bank and under exclusive military and civilian control. Less than 1% of area C is designated for use by Palestinians, who are also unable to build in their own existing villages in area C due to Israeli restrictions.[14] The Israeli Civil Administration, part of a larger entity known as Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories(COGAT), which is a unit in the Defense Ministry of Israel, is still functioning in full. The Israeli–Palestinian Joint Water Committee also still exists.
At the 2000 Camp David Summit, the US tried to save the Accords by reviving the negotiations. After the failure of the Summit, the Second Intifada broke out and the "peace process" reached deadlock.
Implementation of the Israeli withdrawal
Following the Gaza–Jericho Agreement and prior to the first Palestinian Authority elections, Israel withdrew in 1994 from Jericho and from most of the Gaza Strip. In accordance with the Hebron Protocol, Israel withdrew from 80% of Hebron in January 1997. With stalled negotiations, further redeployments did not take place. By March 1998, none of the withdrawals had occurred In October 1998, the parties signed the Wye River Memorandum, promising resumption of the redeployments, but only the first stage was implemented. While Netanyahu faced opposition within his cabinet, additional withdrawals were delayed. During the Second Intifada, in 2002, the Israeli military re-occupied many of the areas previously turned to Palestinian control.[9]
Key agreements
Key agreements in the Oslo process were:
  • Israel–PLO letters of recognition (1993). Mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO.
  • The Oslo I Accord (1993). The "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements" (DOPOISGA or DOP),[15] which declared the aim of the negotiations and set forth the framework for the interim period. Dissolution of the Israeli Civil Administration upon the inauguration of the Palestinian Legislative Council (Article VII).
  • The Gaza–Jericho Agreement or Cairo Agreement (1994). Partial Israeli withdrawal within three weeks from Gaza Strip and Jericho area, being the start of the five-year transitional period (Article V of Oslo I). Simultaneously transfer of limited power to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which was established in the same agreement.[5] Part of the Agreement was the Protocol on Economic Relations (Paris Protocol), which regulates the economic relationship between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but in effect integrated the Palestinian economy into the Israeli one.[16] This agreement was superseded by the Oslo II Accord, except for Article XX (Confidence-Building Measures). Article XX dictated the release or turn over of Palestinian detainees and prisoners by Israel. The Paris Protocol was incorporated in Article XXIV of Oslo II.
  • The Oslo II Accord (1995). Division of the West Bank into Areas, in effect fragmenting it into numerous enclaves and banning the Palestinians from some 60% of the West Bank. Redeployment of Israeli troops from Area A and from other areas through "Further Re-deployments." Election of the Palestinian Legislative Council (Palestinian parliament, PLC), replacing the PA upon its inauguration. Deployment of Palestinian Police replacing Israeli military forces in Area A. Safe passage between West Bank and Gaza. Most importantly, start of negotiations on a final settlement of remaining issues, to be concluded before 4 May 1999.
All later agreements had the purpose to implement the former three key agreements.
Additional agreements
Additional Israeli-Palestinian agreements related to the Oslo Accords are:
This agreement was signed on 27 August 1995 at Cairo.[22] It is also known as Further Transfer Protocol. Superseded by Oslo II.
Criticism
Continued settlement expansion
While Peres had limited settlement construction at the request of US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright,[23] Netanyahu continued construction within existing Israeli settlements,[24] and put forward plans for the construction of a new neighborhood, Har Homa, in East Jerusalem. However, he fell far short of the Shamir government's 1991–92 level and refrained from building new settlements, although the Oslo agreements stipulated no such ban.[23] Construction of Housing Units Before Oslo: 1991–92: 13,960, After Oslo: 1994–95: 3,840, 1996–1997: 3,570.[25]
Norway's role
Norwegian academics, including Norway's leading authority on the negotiations,Hilde Henriksen Waage, have focused on the flawed role of Norway during the Oslo process. In 2001, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had been at the heart of the Oslo process, commissioned Waage to produce an official, comprehensive history of the Norwegian-mediated back channel negotiations. In order to do the research, she was given privileged access to all relevant, classified files in the ministry's archives. Waage was surprised to discover "not a single scrap of paper for the entire period from January to September 1993—precisely the period of the back channel talks." Involved persons kept documents privately and refused to hand them over. Waage concluded that "there seems no doubt that the missing documents ... would have shown the extent to which the Oslo process was conducted on Israel’s premises, with Norway acting as Israel’s helpful errand boy." Norway played a mediating role as a small state between vastly unequal parties and had to play by the rules of the stronger party, acting on its premises. "Israel’s red lines were the ones that counted, and if the Palestinians wanted a deal, they would have to accept them, too.... The missing documents would almost certainly show why the Oslo process probably never could have resulted in a sustainable peace. To a great extent, full documentation of the back channel would explain the disaster that followed Oslo."[26]
Alternatives to the Oslo Accords
Although not an alternative to the accords themselves, a one-state solution would be an alternative to the two-state solution envisaged in the accords. This would combine Israel and the Palestinian territories into a single state with one government. An argument for this solution is that neither side can justly claim a state on all of the land.[27] An argument against it is that it would endanger the safety of the Jewish minority.[28]
Note
  1. From the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, part of the 1978 Camp David Accords and blueprint for the Oslo Accords:
    • Egypt and Israel agree that, ... there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government.
    • Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.
    • When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. (See JimmyCarterLibrary, The Framework for Peace in the Middle East (1978). Accessed December 2013)
References
  1. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), 13 September 1993. From the Knesset website
  2. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28 September 1995. From the Knesset website
  3. Mideast accord: the overview; Rabin and Arafat sign accord ending Israel's 27-year hold on Jericho and the Gaza Strip. Chris Hedges, New York Times, 5 May 1994. Quote of Yitzhak Rabin: "We do not accept the Palestinian goal of an independent Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan. We believe there is a separate Palestinian entity short of a state."
  4. Just Vision, Oslo Process. Retrieved December 2013
  5. MEDEA, Oslo peace process. Retrieved December 2013
  6. By Hook and by Crook—Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank, p. 90. B’Tselem, July 2010
  7. Israeli Settlements in Occupied Arab Lands: Conquest to Colony, p. 29. Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Winter, 1982), pp. 16-54. Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies
  8. Israel-PLO Recognition: Exchange of Letters between PM Rabin and Chairman Arafat, 9 September 1993
  9. Tom Lansford, Political Handbook of the World 2014, pp. 1627, 1630-1631. CQ Press, March 2014. pp.1629-1630: ", and 18 months after the election of the Palestinian Council, which was designated to succeed the PNA as the primary Palestinian governmental body."
  10. 1995 Oslo Interim Agreement, 28 September 1995. On ProCon website.
  11. Annex I: Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements, Article I Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces and Transfer of Responsibility. Annex I to the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II)
  12. What is Area C?. B'Tselem, 9October 2013
  13. 4 May 1999 and Palestinian Statehood: To Declare or Not to Declare?. Azmi Bishara, Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter, 1999), pp. 5-16
  14. "West Bank and Gaza - Area C and the future of the Palestinian economy". World Bank. 2 October 2013. p. 4. Less than 1 percent of Area C, which is already built up, is designated by the Israeli authorities for Palestinian use; the remainder is heavily restricted or off-limits to Palestinians, 13 with 68 percent reserved for Israeli settlements, 14 c. 21 percent for closed military zones, 15 and c. 9 percent for nature reserves (approximately 10 percent of the West Bank, 86 percent of which lies in Area C). These areas are not mutually exclusive, and overlap in some cases. In practice it is virtually impossible for Palestinians to obtain construction permits for residential or economic purposes, even within existing Palestinian villages in Area C: the application process has been described by an earlier World Bank report (2008) as fraught with "ambiguity, complexity and high cost".
  15. The Discourse of Palestinian-Israeli Relations: Persistent Analytics and Practices, p. 5. Sean F. McMahon, Routledge, 2009
  16. Will we always have Paris?. Gaza Gateway, 13 September 2012
  17. Text on Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website
  18. Text on UNISPAL
  19. Palestinians in the West Bank chafe under `early empowerment′.
  20. Arnon, Arie, The Palestinian economy: between imposed integration and voluntary separation, p. 216
  21. Aruri, Naseer Hasan, Dishonest broker: the U.S. role in Israel and Palestine, p. 98
  22. Text on Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website
  23. Serge Schmemann (December 5, 1997). "In West Bank, 'Time' for Settlements Is Clearly Not 'Out'". The New York Times. Retrieved December 18, 2007.
  24. "Extraordinary Increase in Settlement Construction as Diplomacy Falters". Settlement Report (Foundation for Middle East Peace) 8 (2). March–April 1998.
  25. "Housing Starts in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip Settlements*, 1990-2003".Foundation for Middle East Peace. Archived from the original on November 18, 2008. Retrieved November 13, 2011.
  26. Postscript to Oslo: The Mystery of Norway's Missing Files. Hilde Henriksen Waage, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1 (Autumn 2008), pp. 54–65; ISSN 1533-8614 "Had the missing documents ... been accessible at the time of writing, there seems no doubt that the findings of my report would have shown even more starkly the extent to which the Oslo process was conducted on Israel’s premises, with Norway acting as Israel’s helpful errand boy .... Given the overwhelming imbalance of power between the Israelis and the Palestinians, Norway probably could not have acted otherwise if it wanted to reach a deal—or even if it wanted to play a role in the process at all. Israel’s red lines were the ones that counted, and if the Palestinians wanted a deal, they would have to accept them, too .... The missing documents would almost certainly show why the Oslo process probably never could have resulted in a sustainable peace. To a great extent, full documentation of the back channel would explain the disaster that followed Oslo."
  27. Truth and reconciliation Al-Ahram Weekly, 14–20 January 1999, Issue 412
  28. David Remnick (November 17, 2014). "The One-State Reality". The New Yorker. Retrieved 3 August 2015.
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