A GUIDE TO THE Arab-Israeli Conflict by Mitchell G. Bard, Part 1 - Draiman

A GUIDE TO THE Arab-Israeli Conflict by Mitchell G. Bard - Part 1

“The great enemy of truth is very often not the lie—deliberate, contrived and dishonest—but the myth—persistent, persuasive and repeated.” —President John F. Kennedy*

I am often asked to name the most prevalent myth about the Middle East. The answer is the suggestion, in one form or another, that Israelis do not want peace. No one craves peace more desperately than Israelis, who have lived through seven wars and an ongoing campaign of terror for nearly six decades. This is why, as this book discusses, Israel has repeatedly sought compromises, often at great risk, that would bring an end to the conflict. Each time a new peace initiative is launched, our hopes are raised that we will not need to publish another edition of Myths and Facts, which was first printed more than 40 years ago. We remain optimistic that Israel’s neighbors will accept a Jewish state in their midst. In the meantime, old myths, including ancient blood libels, continue to be recycled and new calumnies promulgated. These must not be allowed to go unanswered. Myths and Facts pulls no punches when it comes to addressing Israel’s responsibility for events and policies that tarnish its image. Friends of Israel do not try to whitewash the truth, but they do try to put events in proper context. That is also our goal. When friends criticize Israel, it is because they want the country to be better. Israel’s detractors do not have that goal; they are only interested in delegitimizing the country, placing a wedge between Israel and its allies, and working toward its destruction. This new edition covers the basics of the history of the conflict and offers documented facts to respond to the most common myths. To learn more, visit our Jewish Virtual Library (www.JewishVirtualLibrary. org), where we continually update the online edition of Myths, archive material we could not fit in the book, and present key original documents. AICE is also pleased to offer Spanish, German, Portuguese, Russian, French, Swedish and Hebrew translations online. In addition, we have a listserv for weekly myths/facts and other periodic updates. To sign up, visit the News section of the Library. *President John F. Kennedy, Commencement Address at Yale University, (June 11, 1962). I would like to acknowledge the contributions of the distinguished group of past editors: Sheila Segal, Wolf Blitzer, Alan Tigay, Moshe Decter, M.J. Rosenberg, Jeff Rubin, Eric Rozenman, Lenny Davis and Joel Himelfarb. I would also like to thank Rafi Danziger, Rebecca Weiner, Isaac Wolf, David Shyovitz, Alden Oreck, Elihai Braun, Sarah Szymkowicz, Avi Hein, Joanna Sloame, Stephanie Persin, Ariel Scheib, and David Krusch for their invaluable assistance in the AICE editions. AICE is especially grateful to the sponsors of this edition: the Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Foundation, and Evelyn and Dr. Shmuel Katz from Bal-Harbour Florida, who contributed in loving memory of the AUSCH and KATZ family members O.B.M. H.Y.D. who perished during the Holocaust in Europe. May their greatness be an inspiration to all people of good will? “Facts are stubborn things,” observed John Adams, “and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.” The following pages lay out the stubborn facts about the Arab- Israeli conflict. They are the best weapons we have to insure that truth triumphs over myth. 

Mitchell G. Bard January 2006

1. Israel’s Roots MYTH “The Jews have no claim to the land they call Israel.” FACT A common misperception is that all the Jews were forced into the Diaspora by the Romans after the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem in the year 70 C.E. and then, 1,800 years later suddenly returned to Palestine demanding their country back. In reality, the Jewish people have maintained ties to their historic homeland for more than 3,700 years. The Jewish people base their claim to the Land of Israel on at least four premises: 1) the Jewish people settled and developed the land; 2) the international community granted political sovereignty in Palestine to the Jewish people; 3) the territory was captured in defensive wars and 4) God promised the land to the patriarch Abraham. Even after the destruction of the Second Temple in Jerusalem, and the beginning of the exile, Jewish life in the Land of Israel continued and often flourished. Large communities were reestablished in Jerusalem and Tiberius by the ninth century. In the 11th century, Jewish communities grew in Rafah, Gaza, Ashkelon, Jaffa and Caesarea. The Crusaders massacred many Jews during the 12th century, but the community rebounded in the next two centuries as large numbers of rabbis and Jewish pilgrims immigrated to Jerusalem and the Galilee. Prominent rabbis established communities in Safed, Jerusalem and elsewhere during the next 300 years. By the early 19th century—years before the birth of the modern Zionist movement—more than 10,000 Jews lived throughout what is today Israel.1 The 78 years of nation-building, beginning in 1870, culminated in the reestablishment of the Jewish State. Israel’s international “birth certificate” was validated by the promise of the Bible; uninterrupted Jewish settlement from the time of Joshua onward; the Balfour Declaration of 1917; the League of Nations Mandate, which incorporated the Balfour Declaration; the United Nations partition resolution of 1947; Israel’s admission to the UN in 1949; the recognition of Israel by most other states; and, most of all, the society created by Israel’s people in decades of thriving, dynamic national existence. 2  “Nobody does Israel any service by proclaiming its ‘right to exist.’ Israel’s right to exist, like that of the United States, Saudi Arabia and 152 other states, is axiomatic and unreserved. Israel’s legitimacy is not suspended in midair awaiting acknowledgement. . . . There is certainly no other state, big or small, young or old, that would consider mere recognition of its ‘right to exist’ a favor, or a negotiable concession.” —Abba Eban2 MYTH “Palestine was always an Arab country.” FACT The term “Palestine” is believed to be derived from the Philistines, an Aegean people who, in the 12th Century B.C.E.*, settled along the Mediterranean coastal plain of what are now Israel and the Gaza Strip. In the second century C.E., after crushing the last Jewish revolt, the Romans first applied the name Palaestina to Judea (the southern portion of what is now called the West Bank) in an attempt to minimize Jewish identification with the land of Israel. The Arabic word “Filastin” is derived from this Latin name.3 The Hebrews entered the Land of Israel about 1300 B.C.E., living under a tribal confederation until being united under the first monarch, King Saul. The second king, David, established Jerusalem as the capital around 1000 B.C.E. David’s son, Solomon, built the Temple soon thereafter and consolidated the military, administrative and religious functions of the kingdom. The nation was divided under Solomon’s son, with the northern kingdom (Israel) lasting until 722 B.C.E., when the Assyrians destroyed it, and the southern kingdom (Judah) surviving until the Babylonian conquest in 586 B.C.E. The Jewish people enjoyed brief periods of sovereignty afterward before many of Jews were finally driven from their homeland in 135 C.E. Jewish independence in the Land of Israel lasted for more than 400 years. This is much longer than Americans have enjoyed independence in what has become known as the United States.4 In fact, if not for foreign conquerors, Israel would be more than 3,000 years old today. Palestine was never an exclusively Arab country, although Arabic gradually became the language of most of the population after the Muslim invasions of the seventh century. No independent Arab or Palestinian *We use B.C.E. (Before the Common Era) and C.E. (Common Era), because they are neutral terms for the periods traditionally labeled B.C. (Before Christ) and A.D. (Anno Domini—“Year of the Lord”). state ever existed in Palestine. When the distinguished Arab- American historian, Princeton University Prof. Philip Hitti, testified against partition before the Anglo- American Committee in 1946, he said: “There is no such thing as ‘Palestine’ in history, absolutely not.”5 Prior to partition, Palestinian Arabs did not view themselves as having a separate identity. When the First Congress of Muslim- Christian Associations met in Jerusalem in February 1919 to choose Palestinian representatives for the Paris Peace Conference, the following resolution was adopted: We consider Palestine as part of Arab Syria, as it has never been separated from it at any time. We are connected with it by national, religious, linguistic, natural, economic and geographical bonds.6 In 1937, a local Arab leader, Auni Bey Abdul- Hadi, told the Peel Commission, which ultimately suggested the partition of Palestine: “There is no such country [as Palestine]! ‘Palestine’ is a term the Zionists invented! There is no Palestine in the Bible. Our country was for centuries part of Syria.”7 The representative of the Arab Higher Committee to the United Nations submitted a statement to the General Assembly in May 1947 that said, “Palestine was part of the Province of Syria” and that, “politically, the Arabs of Palestine were not independent in the sense of forming a separate political entity.” A few years later, Ahmed Shuqeiri, later the chairman of the PLO, told the Security Council: “It is common knowledge that Palestine is nothing but southern Syria.”8 Palestinian Arab nationalism is largely a post- World War I phenomenon that did not become a significant political movement until after the 1967 Six- Day War and Israel’s capture of the West Bank. MYTH “The Palestinians are descendants of the Canaanites and were in Palestine long before the Jews.” FACT Palestinian claims to be related to the Canaanites are a recent phenomenon and contrary to historical evidence. The Canaanites disappeared from the face of the earth three millennia ago, and no one knows if any of their descendants survived or, if they did, who they would be. Sherif Hussein, the guardian of the Islamic Holy Places in Arabia, said the Palestinians’ ancestors had only been in the area for 1,000 years.9 Even the Palestinians themselves have acknowledged their association with the region came long after the Jews. In testimony before the Anglo-American Committee in 1946, for example, they claimed a connection to Palestine of more than 1,000 years, dating back no further 1. Israel’s Roots 3 than the conquest of Muhammad’s followers in the 7th century.10 And that claim is also dubious. Over the last 2,000 years, there have been massive invasions (e.g., the Crusades) that killed off most of the local people, migrations, the plague, and other manmade or natural disasters. The entire local population was replaced many times over. During the British mandate alone, more than 100,000 Arabs emigrated from neighboring countries and are today considered Palestinians. By contrast, no serious historian questions the more than 3,000- year- old Jewish connection to the Land of Israel, or the modern Jewish people’s relation to the ancient Hebrews. MYTH “The Balfour Declaration did not give Jews a right to a homeland in Palestine.” FACT In 1917, Britain issued the Balfour Declaration: His Majesty’s Government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. The Mandate for Palestine included the Balfour Declaration. It specifically referred to “the historical connections of the Jewish people with Palestine” and to the moral validity of “reconstituting their National Home in that country.” The term “reconstituting” shows recognition of the fact that Palestine had been the Jews’ home. Furthermore, the British were instructed to “use their best endeavors to facilitate” Jewish immigration, to encourage settlement on the land and to “secure” the Jewish National Home. The word “Arab” does not appear in the Mandatory award.11 The Mandate was formalized by the 52 governments at the League of Nations on July 24, 1922. MYTH “The ‘traditional position’ of the Arabs in Palestine was jeopardized by Jewish settlement.” FACT For many centuries, Palestine was a sparsely populated, poorly cultivated and widely- neglected expanse of eroded hills, sandy deserts and 4 malarial marshes. As late as 1880, the American consul in Jerusalem reported the area was continuing its historic decline. “The population and wealth of Palestine has not increased during the last forty years,” he said.12 The Report of the Palestine Royal Commission quotes an account of the Maritime Plain in 1913: The road leading from Gaza to the north was only a summer track suitable for transport by camels and carts . . . no orange groves, orchards or vineyards were to be seen until one reached [the Jewish village of] Yabna [Yavne]. . . . Houses were all of mud. No windows were anywhere to be seen. . . . The ploughs used were of wood. . . . The yields were very poor. . . . The sanitary conditions in the village were horrible. Schools did not exist. . . . The western part, towards the sea, was almost a desert. . . . The villages in this area were few and thinly populated. Many ruins of villages were scattered over the area, as owing to the prevalence of malaria, many villages were deserted by their inhabitants.13 Surprisingly, and many people who were not sympathetic to the Zionist cause believed the Jews would improve the condition of Palestinian Arabs. For example, Dawood Barakat, editor of the Egyptian paper Al-Ahram, wrote: “It is absolutely necessary that an entente be made between the Zionists and Arabs, because the war of words can only do evil. The Zionists are necessary for the country: The money which they will bring, their knowledge and intelligence, and the industriousness which characterizes them will contribute without doubt to the regeneration of the country.”14 Even a leading Arab nationalist believed the return of the Jews to their homeland would help resuscitate the country. According to Sherif Hussein, the guardian of the Islamic Holy Places in Arabia: The resources of the country are still virgin soil and will be developed by the Jewish immigrants. One of the most amazing things until recent times was that the Palestinian used to leave his country, wandering over the high seas in every direction. His native soil could not retain a hold on him, though his ancestors had lived on it for 1000 years. At the same time we have seen the Jews from foreign countries streaming to Palestine from Russia, Germany, Austria, Spain, and America. The cause of causes could not escape those who had a gift of deeper insight. They knew that the country was for its original sons (abna ’ihilasliyin), for all their differences, a sacred and beloved homeland. The return of these exiles (jaliya) to their homeland will prove materially and spiritually [to be] an experimental school for their brethren who are with them in 1. Israel’s Roots 5 6 the fields, factories, trades and in all things connected with toil and labor.15 As Hussein foresaw, the regeneration of Palestine, and the growth of its population, came only after Jews returned in massive numbers. Mark Twain, who visited Palestine in 1867, described it as “. . . [a] desolate country whose soil is rich enough, but is given over wholly to weeds—a silent mournful expanse. . . . A desolation is here that not even imagination can grace with the pomp of life and action. . . . We never saw a human being on the whole route. . . . There was hardly a tree or a shrub anywhere. Even the olive and the cactus, those fast friends of the worthless soil, had almost deserted the country.” 16 MYTH “Zionism is racism.” FACT In 1975, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution slandering Zionism by equating it with racism. Zionism is the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, which holds that Jews, like any other nation, are entitled to a homeland. History has demonstrated the need to ensure Jewish security through a national homeland. Zionism recognizes that Jewish ness is defined by shared origin, religion, culture and history. The realization of the Zionist dream is exemplified by more than five million Jews, from more than 100 countries, who are Israeli citizens. Israel’s Law of Return grants automatic citizenship to Jews, but non Jews are also eligible to become citizens under naturalization procedures similar to those in other countries. More than one million Muslim and Christian Arabs, Druze, Baha’ is, Circassians and other ethnic groups also are represented in Israel’s population. The presence in Israel of thousands of dark- skinned Jews from Ethiopia, Yemen and India is the best refutation of the calumny against Zionism. In a series of historic airlifts, labeled Moses (1984), Joshua (1985) and Solomon (1991), Israel rescued more than 20,000 members of the ancient Ethiopian Jewish community. Zionism does not discriminate against anyone. Israel’s open and democratic character, and its scrupulous protection of the religious and political rights of Christians and Muslims, rebut the charge of exclusivity. Moreover, anyone—Jew or non- Jew, Israeli, American, or Saudi, black, white, yellow or purple—can be a Zionist. 1. Israel’s Roots 7 Writing after “Operation Moses” was revealed, William Safire noted: “. . . For the first time in history, thousands of black people are being brought to a country not in chains but in dignity, not as slaves but as citizens.” 17 By contrast, the Arab states define citizenship strictly by native parentage. It is almost impossible to become a naturalized citizen in many Arab states, especially Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Several Arab nations have laws that facilitate the naturalization of foreign Arabs, with the specific exception of Palestinians. Jordan, on the other hand, instituted its own “law of return” in 1954; according citizenship to all former residents of Palestine, except for Jews.18 To single out Jewish self- determination for condemnation is itself a form of racism. When approached by a student at Harvard in 1968 who attacked Zionism, Martin Luther King responded: “When people criticize Zionists, they mean Jews. You’re talking anti- Semitism.”19 The 1975 UN resolution was part of the Soviet- Arab Cold War anti Israel campaign. Almost all the former non- Arab supporters of the resolution have apologized and changed their positions. When the General Assembly voted to repeal the resolution in 1991, only some Arab and Muslim states, as well as Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam were opposed. MYTH “The delegates of the UN World Conference Against Racism agreed that Zionism is racism.” FACT In 2001, Arab nations again were seeking to delegitimize Israel by trying to equate Zionism with racism at the UN World Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa. The United States joined Israel in boycotting the conference when it became clear that rather than focus on the evils of racism, anti- Semitism and xenophobia that were supposed to be the subject of the event, the conference had turned into a forum for bashing Israel. The United States withdrew its delegation “to send a signal to the freedom loving nations of the world that we will not stand by if the world tries to describe Zionism as racism. That is as wrong as wrong can be.” White House Press Secretary Ari Fleisher added “the President is proud to stand by Israel and by the Jewish community and send a signal that no group around the world will meet with international acceptance and respect if its purpose is to equate Zionism with racism.”20 8 MYTH “The Zionists could have chosen another country besides Palestine.” FACT In the late 19th century, the rise of religious and racist anti- Semitism led to a resurgence of pogroms in Russia and Eastern Europe, shattering promises of equality and tolerance. This stimulated Jewish immigration to Palestine from Europe. Simultaneously, a wave of Jews immigrated to Palestine from Yemen, Morocco, Iraq and Turkey. These Jews were unaware of Theodora Hertz’s political Zionism or of European pogroms. They were motivated by the centuries- old dream of the “Return to Zion” and a fear of intolerance. Upon hearing that the gates of Palestine were open, they braved the hardships of travel and went to the Land of Israel. The Zionist ideal of a return to Israel has profound religious roots. Many Jewish prayers speak of Jerusalem, Zion and the Land of Israel. The injunction not to forget Jerusalem, the site of the Temple, is a major tenet of Judaism. The Hebrew language, the Torah, laws in the Talmud, the Jewish calendar and Jewish holidays and festivals all originated in Israel and revolve around its seasons and conditions. Jews pray toward Jerusalem and recite the words “next year in Jerusalem” every Passover. Jewish religion, culture and history make clear that it is only in the land of Israel that the Jewish commonwealth can be built. In 1897, Jewish leaders formally organized the Zionist political movement, calling for the restoration of the Jewish national home in Palestine, where Jews could find sanctuary and self- determination, and work for the renascence of their civilization and culture. MYTH “Herzl himself proposed Uganda as the Jewish state as an alternative to Palestine.” FACT Theodora Herzl sought support from the great powers for the creation of a Jewish homeland. He turned to Great Britain, and met with Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary and others. The British agreed, in principle, to Jewish settlement in East Africa. At the Sixth Zionist Congress at Basle on August 26, 1903, Herzl proposed the British Uganda Program as a temporary emergency refuge for Jews in Russia in immediate danger. While Herzl made it clear that this program would not affect the ultimate aim of Zionism, a Jewish en- 1. Israel’s Roots 9 entity in the Land of Israel, the proposal aroused a storm at the Congress and nearly led to a split in the Zionist movement. The Uganda Program, which never had much support, was formally rejected by the Zionist movement at the Seventh Zionist Congress in 1905. MYTH “All Arabs opposed the Balfour Declaration, seeing it as a betrayal of their rights.” FACT Emir Faisal, son of Sherif Hussein, the leader of the Arab revolt against the Turks, signed an agreement with Chaim Weizmann and other Zionist leaders during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. It acknowledged the “racial kinship and ancient bonds existing between the Arabs and the Jewish people” and concluded that “the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations is through the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab states and Palestine.” Furthermore, the agreement looked to the fulfillment of the Balfour Declaration and called for all necessary measures “. . . to encourage and stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale, and as quickly as possible to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil.”21 Faisal had conditioned his acceptance of the Balfour Declaration on the fulfillment of British wartime promises of independence to the Arabs. These were not kept. Critics dismiss the Weizmann- Faisal agreement because it was never enacted; however, the fact that the leader of the Arab nationalist movement and the Zionist movement could reach an understanding is significant because it demonstrated that Jewish and Arab aspirations were not necessarily mutually exclusive. MYTH “The Zionists were colonialist tools of Western imperialism.” FACT “Colonialism means living by exploiting others,” Yehoshofat Harkabi has written. “But what could be further from colonialism than the idealism of city- dwelling Jews who strive to become farmers and laborers and to live by their own work?”22 Moreover, as British historian Paul Johnson noted, Zionists were hardly tools of imperialists given the powers’ general opposition to 10 their cause. “Everywhere in the West, the foreign offices, defense ministries and big business were against the Zionists.”23 Emir Faisal also saw the Zionist movement as a companion to the Arab nationalist movement, fighting against imperialism, as he explained in a letter to Harvard law professor and future Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter on March 3, 1919, one day after Chaim Weizmann presented the Zionist case to the Paris conference. Faisal wrote: The Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. . . . We will wish the Jews a hearty welcome home. . . . We are working together for a reformed and revised Near East and our two movements complete one another. The Jewish movement is nationalist and not imperialist. And there is room in Syria for us both. Indeed, I think that neither can be a real success without the other (emphasis added).24 in the 1940s, the Jewish underground movements waged an anti-colonial war against the British. The Arabs, meanwhile, were concerned primarily with fighting the Jews rather than expelling the British imperialists. “Our settlers do not come here as do the colonists from the Occident to have natives do their work for them; they themselves set their shoulders to the plow and they spend their strength and their blood to make the land fruitful. But it is not only for ourselves that we desire its fertility. The Jewish farmers have begun to teach their brothers, the Arab farmers, to cultivate the land more intensively; we desire to teach them further: together with them we want to cultivate the land to ‘serve’ it, as the Hebrew has it. The more fertile this soil becomes, the more space there will be for us and for them. We have no desire to dispossess them: we want to live with them. We do not want to dominate them: we want to serve with them. . . .” —Martin Buber25 MYTH “The British promised the Arabs independence in Palestine in the Hussein- MacMahon Correspondence.” FACT The central figure in the Arab nationalist movement at the time of World War I was Hussein ibn ’Ali, who was appointed by the Turkish Commit- 1. Israel’s Roots 11 tee of Union and Progress to the position of Sherif of Mecca in 1908. As Sherif, Hussein was responsible for the custody of Islam’s shrines in the Hejaz and, consequently, was recognized as one of the Muslims’ spiritual leaders. In July 1915, Hussein sent a letter to Sir Henry MacMahon, the High Commissioner for Egypt, informing him of the terms for Arab participation in the war against the Turks. The letters between Hussein and MacMahon that followed outlined the areas that Britain was prepared to cede to the Arabs. The Hussein-MacMahon correspondence conspicuously fails to mention Palestine. The British argued the omission had been intentional, thereby justifying their refusal to grant the Arabs independence in Palestine after the war.26 MacMahon explained: I feel it my duty to state, and I do so definitely and emphatically, that it was not intended by me in giving this pledge to King Hussein to include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised. I also had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein.27 Nevertheless, the Arabs held then, as now, that the letters constituted a promise of independence for the Arabs. MYTH “Israeli policies cause anti- Semitism.” FACT Anti-Semitism has existed for centuries, well before the rise of the modern State of Israel. Rather than Israel being the cause of anti- Semitism, it is more likely that the distorted media coverage of Israeli policies is reinforcing latent anti- Semitic views. As writer Leon Wieseltier observed, “The notion that all Jews are responsible for whatever any Jews do is not a Zionist notion. It is an anti-Semitic notion.” Wieseltier adds that attacks on Jews in Europe have nothing whatsoever to do with Israel. To blame Jews for anti- Semitism is similar to saying blacks are responsible for racism. Many Jews may disagree with policies of a particular Israeli government, but this does not mean that Israel is bad for the Jews. As Wieseltier noted, “Israel is not bad for the Jews of Russia, who may need a haven; or for the Jews of Argentina, who may need a haven; or for any Jews who may need a haven.”28 12 “Israel is the only state in the world today, and the Jews the only people in the world today, that are the object of a standing set of threats from governmental, religious, and terrorist bodies seeking their destruction. And what is most disturbing is the silence, the indifference, and sometimes even the indulgence, in the face of such genocidal anti- Semitism.” —Canadian Minister of Justice and Attorney General Irwin Cotler29 MYTH “Supporters of Israel only criticize Arabs and never Israelis.” FACT Israel is not perfect. Even the most committed friends of Israel acknowledge that the government sometimes makes mistakes, and that it has not solved all the problems in its society. Supporters of Israel may not emphasize these faults, however, because there is no shortage of groups and individuals who are willing to do nothing but focus on Israel’s imperfections. The public usually has much less access to Israel’s side of the story of its conflict with the Arabs, or the positive aspects of its society. Israelis themselves are their own harshest critics. If you want to read criticism of Israeli behavior, you do not need to seek out anti- Israel sources; you can pick up any Israeli newspaper and find no shortage of news and commentary critical of government policy. The rest of the world’s media provides constant attention to Israel, and the coverage is far more likely to be unfavorable than complimentary. Notes 1. Dan Bahat, ed. Twenty Centuries of Jewish Life in the Holy Land, (Jerusalem: The Israel Economist, 1976), pp. 61–63. 2. New York Times, (November 18, 1981). 3. Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian- Arab National Movement, 1918–1929, (London: Frank Cass, 1974), p. 4. 4. Max Dimont, Jews, God and History, (NY: Signet, 1962), pp. 49–53. 5. Moshe Kohn, “The Arabs’ ‘Lie’ of the Land,” Jerusalem Post, (October 18, 1991). 6. Yehoshua Porath, Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion: 1929–1939, vol. 2, (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1977), pp. 81–82. 7. Moshe Kohn, “The Arabs’ ‘Lie’ of the Land,” Jerusalem Post, (October 18, 1991). 8. Avner Yaniv, PLO, (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Study Group of Middle Eastern Affairs, August 1974), p. 5. 9. Al- Qibla, (March 23, 1918), quoted in Samuel Katz, Battleground- Fact and Fantasy in Palestine, (NY: Bantam Books, 1977), p. 128. 10. British Government, Report of the Anglo- American Committee of Enquiry, 1946, Part VI, (April 20, 1946). 11. Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 129. 1. Israel’s Roots 13 12. Ben Halpern, The Idea of a Jewish State, (MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 108. 13. Palestine Royal Commission Report, p. 233. 14. Neville Mandel, “Attempts at an Arab- Zionist Entente: 1913–1914,” Middle Eastern Studies, (April 1965), p. 243. 15. Al- Qibla, (March 23, 1918), quoted in Samuel Katz, Battleground- Fact and Fantasy in Palestine, (NY: Bantam Books, 1977), p. 128. 16. Mark Twain, The Innocents Abroad, (London, 1881). 17. New York Times, (January 7, 1985). 18. Jordanian Nationality Law, Article 3(3) of Law No. 6 of 1954, Official Gazette, No. 1171, February 16, 1954. 19. Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Socialism of Fools- The Left, the Jews and Israel,” Encounter, (December 1969), p. 24. 20. White House briefing regarding U.S. threat to boycott the UN Conference on racism, (July 27, 2001). 21. Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error, (NY: Schocken Books, 1966), pp. 246–247; Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 121. 22. Yehoshofat Harkabi, Palestinians and Israel, (Jerusalem: Keter, 1974), p. 6. 23. Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties, (NY: Harper & Row, 1983), p. 485. 24. Samuel Katz, Battleground- Fact and Fantasy in Palestine, (NY: Bantam Books, 1977), p. 55. 25. From an open letter from Martin Buber to Mahatma Gandhi in 1939, quoted in Arthur Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea, (PA: Jewish Publications Society, 1997), p. 464. 26. George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, (NY: Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1964), p. 314. 27. London Times, (July 23, 1937). 28. Leon Wieseltier, “Israel, Palestine, and the Return of the Binational Fantasy,” The New Republic, (October 24, 2003). 29. Jerusalem Post, (February 5, 2004). 2. The Mandatory Period MYTH “The British helped the Jews displace the native Arab population of Palestine.” FACT Herbert Samuel, a British Jew who served as the first High Commissioner of Palestine, placed restrictions on Jewish immigration “in the ‘interests of the present population’ and the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the country.”1 The influx of Jewish settlers was said to be forcing the Arab fellahin (native peasants) from their land. This was at a time when less than a million people lived in an area that now supports more than 10 million. The British actually limited the absorptive capacity of Palestine by partitioning the country. In 1921, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill severed nearly four-fifths of Palestine—some 35,000 square miles—to create a brand new Arab entity, Transjordan. As a consolation prize for the Hejaz and Arabia (which are both now Saudi Arabia) going to the Saud family, Churchill rewarded Sherif Hussein’s son Abdullah for his contribution to the war against Turkey by installing him as Transjordan’s emir. The British went further and placed restrictions on Jewish land purchases in what remained of Palestine, contradicting the provision of the Mandate (Article 6) stating that “the Administration of Palestine . . . shall encourage, in cooperation with the Jewish Agency . . . close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not acquired for public purposes.” By 1949, the British had allotted 87,500 acres (47 percent) of the 187,500 acres of cultivable land to Arabs and only 4,250 acres (2 percent) to Jews.2 Ultimately, the British admitted the argument about the absorptive capacity of the country was specious. The Peel Commission said: “The heavy immigration in the years 1933–36 would seem to show that the Jews have been able to enlarge the absorptive capacity of the country for Jews.”3 MYTH “The British allowed Jews to flood Palestine while Arab immigration was tightly controlled.” FACT The British response to Jewish immigration set a precedent of appeasing the Arabs, which was followed for the duration of the Mandate. The Brit- 2. The Mandatory Period 15

16 The British placed restrictions on Jewish immigration while allowing Arabs to enter the country freely. Apparently, London did not feel that a flood of Arab immigrants would affect the country’s absorptive capacity. During World War I, the Jewish population in Palestine declined because of the war, famine, disease and expulsion by the Turks. In 1915, approximately 83,000 Jews lived in Palestine among 590,000 Muslim and Christian Arabs. According to the 1922 census, the Jewish population was 84,000, while the Arabs numbered 643,000.4 Thus, the Arab population grew exponentially while that of the Jews stagnated. In the mid- 1920s, Jewish immigration to Palestine increased primarily because of anti- Jewish economic legislation in Poland and Washington’s imposition of restrictive quotas.5 The record number of immigrants in 1935 (see table) was a response to the growing persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany. The British administration considered this number too large, however, so the Jewish Agency was informed that less than one- third of the quota it asked for would be approved in 1936.6 The British gave in further to Arab demands by announcing in the 1939 White Paper that an independent Arab state would be created within 10 years, and that Jewish immigration was to be limited to 75,000 for the next five years, after which it was to cease altogether. It also forbade land sales to Jews in 95 percent of the territory of Palestine. The Arabs, nevertheless, rejected the proposal. Jewish Immigrants to Palestine7 1919 1,806 1931 4,075 1920 8,223 1932 12,533 1921 8,294 1933 37,337 1922 8,685 1934 45,267 1923 8,175 1935 66,472 1924 13,892 1936 29,595 1925 34,386 1937 10,629 1926 13,855 1938 14,675 1927 3,034 1939 31,195 1928 2,178 1940 10,643 1929 5,249 1941 4,592 1930 4,944 By contrast, throughout the Mandatory period, Arab immigration was unrestricted. In 1930, the Hope Simpson Commission, sent from London to investigate the 1929 Arab riots, said the British practice of ignoring the uncontrolled illegal Arab immigration from Egypt, Transjordan and Syria had the effect of displacing the prospective Jewish immigrants.8 The British Governor of the Sinai from 1922–36 observed: “This illegal immigration was not only going on from the Sinai, but also from Transjordan and Syria, and it is very difficult to make a case out for the misery of the Arabs if at the same time their compatriots from adjoining states could not be kept from going in to share that misery.”9 The Peel Commission reported in 1937 that the “shortfall of land is . . . due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.”10 MYTH “The British changed their policy after World War II to allow the survivors of the Holocaust to settle in Palestine.” FACT The gates of Palestine remained closed for the duration of the war, stranding hundreds of thousands of Jews in Europe, many of whom became victims of Hitler’s “Final Solution.” After the war, the British refused to allow the survivors of the Nazi nightmare to find sanctuary in Palestine. On June 6, 1946, President Truman urged the British government to relieve the suffering of the Jews confined to displaced persons camps in Europe by immediately accepting 100,000 Jewish immigrants. Britain’s Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, replied sarcastically that the United States wanted displaced Jews to immigrate to Palestine “because they did not want too many of them in New York.”11 Some Jews reached Palestine, many by way of dilapidated ships that members of the Jewish resistance organizations used to smuggle them in. Between August 1945 and the establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, 65 “illegal” immigrant ships, carrying 69,878 people, arrived from European shores. In August 1946, however, the British began to intern those they caught in camps in Cyprus. Approximately 50,000 people were detained in the camps, 28,000 of whom were still imprisoned when Israel declared independence.12 MYTH “As the Jewish population in Palestine grew, the plight of the Palestinian Arabs worsened.” FACT The Jewish population increased by 470,000 between World War I and World War II, while the non- Jewish population rose by 588,000.13 In fact, 2. The Mandatory Period 17 18 the permanent Arab population increased 120 percent between 1922 and 1947.14 This rapid growth was a result of several factors. One was immigration from neighboring states—constituting 37 percent of the total immigration to pre- state Israel—by Arabs who wanted to take advantage of the higher standard of living the Jews had made possible.15 The Arab population also grew because of the improved living conditions created by the Jews as they drained malarial swamps and brought improved sanitation and health care to the region. Thus, for example, the Muslim infant mortality rate fell from 201 per thousand in 1925 to 94 per thousand in 1945, and life expectancy rose from 37 years in 1926 to 49 in 1943.16 The Arab populations increased the most in cities where large Jewish populations had created new economic opportunities. From 1922– 1947, the non- Jewish population increased 290 percent in Haifa, 131 percent in Jerusalem and 158 percent in Jaffa. The growth in Arab towns was more modest: 42 percent in Nablus, 78 percent in Jenin and 37 percent in Bethlehem.17 MYTH “Jews stole Arab land.” FACT Despite the growth in their population, the Arabs continued to assert they were being displaced. The truth is that from the beginning of World War I, part of Palestine’s land was owned by absentee landlords who lived in Cairo, Damascus and Beirut. About 80 percent of the Palestinian Arabs were debt- ridden peasants, semi- nomads and Bedouins.18 Jews actually went out of their way to avoid purchasing land in areas where Arabs might be displaced. They sought land that was largely uncultivated, swampy, cheap and, most important, without tenants. In 1920, David Ben- Gurion expressed his concern about the Arab fellahin, whom he viewed as “the most important asset of the native population.” Ben-Gurion said “under no circumstances must we touch land belonging to fellahs or worked by them.” He advocated helping liberate them from their oppressors. “Only if a fellah leaves his place of settlement,” Ben-Gurion added, “should we offer to buy his land, at an appropriate price.”19 It was only after the Jews had bought all of the available uncultivated land that they began to purchase cultivated land. Many Arabs were willing to sell because of the migration to coastal towns and because they needed money to invest in the citrus industry.20 When John Hope Simpson arrived in Palestine in May 1930, he observed: “They [Jews] paid high prices for the land, and in addition they paid to certain of the occupants of those lands a considerable amount of money which they were not legally bound to pay.”21 In 1931, Lewis French conducted a survey of landlessness and eventually offered new plots to any Arabs who had been “dispossessed.” British officials received more than 3,000 applications, of which 80 percent were ruled invalid by the Government’s legal adviser because the applicants were not landless Arabs. This left only about 600 landless Arabs, 100 of whom accepted the Government land offer.22 In April 1936, a new outbreak of Arab attacks on Jews was instigated by a Syrian guerrilla named Fawzi al- Qawukji, the commander of the Arab Liberation Army. By November, when the British finally sent a new commission headed by Lord Peel to investigate, 89 Jews had been killed and more than 300 wounded.23 The Peel Commission’s report found that Arab complaints about Jewish land acquisition were baseless. It pointed out that “much of the land now carrying orange groves was sand dunes or swamp and uncultivated when it was purchased. . . . there was at the time of the earlier sales little evidence that the owners possessed either the resources or training needed to develop the land.”24 Moreover, the Commission found the shortage was “due less to the amount of land acquired by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.” The report concluded that the presence of Jews in Palestine, along with the work of the British Administration, had resulted in higher wages, an improved standard of living and ample employment opportunities.25 In his memoirs, Transjordan’s King Abdullah wrote: It is made quite clear to all, both by the map drawn up by the Simpson Commission and by another compiled by the Peel Commission, that the Arabs are as prodigal in selling their land as they are in useless wailing and weeping (emphasis in the original).26 Even at the height of the Arab revolt in 1938, the British High Commissioner to Palestine believed the Arab landowners were complaining about sales to Jews to drive up prices for lands they wished to sell. Many Arab landowners had been so terrorized by Arab rebels they decided to leave Palestine and sell their property to the Jews.27 The Jews were paying exorbitant prices to wealthy landowners for small tracts of arid land. “In 1944, Jews paid between $1,000 and $1,100 per acre in Palestine, mostly for arid or semiarid land; in the same year, rich black soil in Iowa was selling for about $110 per acre.”28 By 1947, Jewish holdings in Palestine amounted to about 463,000 acres. Approximately 45,000 of these acres were acquired from the Mandatory Government; 30,000 were bought from various churches and 387,500 were purchased from Arabs. Analyses of land purchases from 1880 to 1948 show that 73 percent of Jewish plots were purchased- 2. The Mandatory Period 19 20 from large landowners, not poor fellahin.29 Those who sold land included the mayors of Gaza, Jerusalem and Jaffa. As’ad el-Shuqeiri, a Muslim religious scholar and father of PLO chairman Ahmed Shuqeiri, took Jewish money for his land. Even King Abdullah leased land to the Jews. In fact, many leaders of the Arab nationalist movement, including members of the Muslim Supreme Council, sold land to Jews.30 MYTH “The British helped the Palestinians to live peacefully with the Jews.” FACT In 1921, Haj Amin el- Husseini first began to organize Fedayeen (“one who sacrifices himself”) to terrorize Jews. Haj Amin hoped to duplicate the success of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey by driving the Jews out of Palestine just as Kemal had driven the invading Greeks from his country.31 Arab radicals were able to gain influence because the British Administration was unwilling to take effective action against them until they finally revolted against British rule. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, former head of British military intelligence in Cairo, and later Chief Political Officer for Palestine and Syria, wrote in his diary that British officials “incline towards the exclusion of Zionism in Palestine.” In fact, the British encouraged the Palestinians to attack the Jews. According to Meinertzhagen, Col. Waters-Taylor (financial adviser to the Military Administration in Palestine 1919–23) met with Haj Amin a few days before Easter, in 1920, and told him “he had a great opportunity at Easter to show the world . . . that Zionism was unpopular not only with the Palestine Administration but in Whitehall, and if disturbances of sufficient violence occurred in Jerusalem at Easter, both General Bols [Chief Administrator in Palestine, 1919–20] and General Allenby [Commander of Egyptian Force, 1917–19, then High Commissioner of Egypt] would advocate the abandonment of the Jewish Home. Waters- Taylor explained that freedom could only be attained through violence.”32 Haj Amin took the Colonel’s advice and instigated a riot. The British withdrew their troops and the Jewish police from Jerusalem, allowing the Arab mob to attack Jews and loot their shops. Because of Haj Amin’s overt role in instigating the pogrom, the British decided to arrest him. Haj Amin escaped, however, and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment in absentia. A year later, some British Arabists convinced High Commissioner Herbert Samuel to pardon Haj Amin and to appoint him Mufti. By contrast, Vladimir Jabotinsky and several of his followers, who had formed a Jewish defense organization during the unrest, were sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.33 Samuel met with Haj Amin on April 11, 1921, and was assured “that the influences of his family and himself would be devoted to tranquility.” Three weeks later, riots in Jaffa and elsewhere left 43 Jews dead.34 Haj Amin consolidated his power and took control of all Muslim religious funds in Palestine. He used his authority to gain control over the mosques, the schools and the courts. No Arab could reach an influential position without being loyal to the Mufti. His power was so absolute “no Muslim in Palestine could be born or die without being beholden to Haj Amin.”35 The Mufti’s henchmen also insured he would have no opposition by systematically killing Palestinians from rival clans who were discussing cooperation with the Jews. As the spokesman for Palestinian Arabs, Haj Amin did not ask that Britain grant them independence. On the contrary, in a letter to Churchill in 1921, he demanded that Palestine be reunited with Syria and Transjordan.36 The Arabs found rioting to be an effective political tool because of the lax British attitude and response toward violence against Jews. In handling each riot, the British did everything in their power to prevent Jews from protecting themselves, but made little or no effort to prevent the Arabs from attacking them. After each outbreak, a British commission of inquiry would try to establish the cause of the violence. The conclusion was always the same: the Arabs were afraid of being displaced by Jews. To stop the rioting, the commissions would recommend that restrictions be placed on Jewish immigration. Thus, the Arabs came to recognize that they could always stop the influx of Jews by staging a riot. This cycle began after a series of riots in May 1921. After failing to protect the Jewish community from Arab mobs, the British appointed the Haycraft Commission to investigate the cause of the violence. Although the panel concluded the Arabs had been the aggressors, it rationalized the cause of the attack: “The fundamental cause of the riots was a feeling among the Arabs of discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and economic causes, and connected with Jewish immigration and with their conception of Zionist policy. . . .”37 One consequence of the violence was the institution of a temporary ban on Jewish immigration. The Arab fear of being “displaced” or “dominated” was used as an excuse for their merciless attacks on peaceful Jewish settlers. Note, too, that these riots were not inspired by nationalistic fervor—nationalists would have rebelled against their British overlords—they were motivated by racial strife and misunderstanding. In 1929, Arab provocateurs succeeded in convincing the masses that the Jews had designs on the Temple Mount (a tactic that would be repeated on numerous occasions, the most recent of which was in 2000 after the visit of Ariel Sharon). A Jewish religious observance at the Western Wall, which forms a part of the Temple Mount, served as a catalyst for rioting by Arabs against Jews that spilled out of Jerusalem into other villages and towns, including Safed and Hebron. Again, the British Administration made no effort to prevent the violence and, after it began, the British did nothing to protect the Jewish population. After six days of mayhem, the British finally brought troops in to quell the disturbance. By this time, virtually the entire Jewish population of Hebron had fled or been killed. In all, 133 Jews were killed and 399 wounded in the pogroms.38 After the riots were over, the British ordered an investigation, which resulted in the Passfield White Paper. It said the “immigration, land purchase and settlement policies of the Zionist Organization were already, or were likely to become, prejudicial to Arab interests. It understood the Mandatory’s obligation to the non-Jewish community to mean that Palestine’s resources must be primarily reserved for the growing Arab economy. . . .”39 This, of course, meant it was necessary to place restrictions not only on Jewish immigration but on land purchases. MYTH “The Mufti was not anti- Semitic.” FACT In 1941, Haj Amin al- Husseini fled to Germany and met with Adolph Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, Joachim Von Ribbentrop and other Nazi leaders. He wanted to persuade them to extend the Nazis’ anti- Jewish program to the Arab world. The Mufti sent Hitler 15 drafts of declarations he wanted Germany and Italy to make concerning the Middle East. One called on the two countries to declare the illegality of the Jewish home in Palestine. Furthermore, “they accord to Palestine and to other Arab countries the right to solve the problem of the Jewish elements in Palestine and other Arab countries, in accordance with the interest of the Arabs and, by the same method, which the question is now being settled in the Axis countries.”40 In November 1941, the Mufti met with Hitler, who told him the Jews were his foremost enemy. The Nazi dictator rebuffed the Mufti’s requests for a declaration in support of the Arabs; however, telling him the time was not right. The Mufti offered Hitler his “thanks for the sympathy which he had always shown for the Arab and especially Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches. . . . The Arabs were Germany’s natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely. . . . the Jews. . . .” Hitler replied: Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That naturally included active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine. . . . Germany would furnish positive and practical aid to the Arabs involved in the same struggle. . . . Germany’s objective [is] . . . solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere. . . . In that hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokesman for the Arab world. The Mufti thanked Hitler profusely.41 In 1945, Yugoslavia sought to indict the Mufti as a war criminal for his role in recruiting 20,000 Muslim volunteers for the SS, who participated in the killing of Jews in Croatia and Hungary. He escaped from French detention in 1946, however, and continued his fight against the Jews from Cairo and later Beirut. MYTH “The Irgun bombed the King David Hotel as part of a terror campaign against civilians.” FACT The King David Hotel was the site of the British military command and the British Criminal Investigation Division. The Irgun chose it as a target after British troops invaded the Jewish Agency on June 29, 1946, and confiscated large quantities of documents. At about the same time, more than 2,500 Jews from all over Palestine were placed under arrest. The information about Jewish Agency operations, including intelligence activities in Arab countries, was taken to the King David Hotel. A week later, news of a massacre of 40 Jews in a pogrom in Poland reminded the Jews of Palestine how Britain’s restrictive immigration policy had condemned thousands to death. Irgun leader Menachem Begin stressed his desire to avoid civilian casualties. In fact, the plan was to warn the British so they would evacuate the building before it was blown up. Three telephone calls were placed, one to the hotel, another to the French Consulate, and a third to the Palestine Post, warning that explosives in the King David Hotel would soon be detonated. On July 22, 1946, the calls were made. The call into the hotel was apparently received and ignored. Begin quotes one British official who supposedly refused to evacuate the building, saying: “We don’t take orders from the Jews.”42 As a result, when the bombs exploded, the casualty toll was high: a total of 91 killed and 45 injured. Among the casualties were 15 Jews. Few people in the hotel proper were injured by the blast.43 2. The Mandatory Period 23 24 In contrast to Arab attacks against Jews, which were widely hailed by Arab leaders as heroic actions, the Jewish National Council denounced the bombing of the King David.44 For decades the British denied they had been warned. In 1979, however, a member of the British Parliament introduced evidence that the Irgun had indeed issued the warning. He offered the testimony of a British officer who heard other officers in the King David Hotel bar joking about a Zionist threat to the headquarters. The officer who overheard the conversation immediately left the hotel and survived.45 Notes 1. Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), p. 172; Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 146. 2. Moshe Auman, “Land Ownership in Palestine 1880–1948,” in Michael Curtis, et al., The Palestinians, (NJ: Transaction Books, 1975), p. 25. 3. Palestine Royal Commission Report (the Peel Report), (London: 1937), p. 300. [Henceforth Palestine Royal Commission Report]. 4. Arieh Avneri, The Claim of Dispossession, (Tel Aviv: Hidekel Press, 1984), p. 28; Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian- Arab National Movement, 1918–1929, (London: Frank Cass, 1974), pp. 17–18. 5. Porath (1974), p. 18. 6. Cohen, p. 53. 7. Yehoshua Porath, Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion: 1929–1939, vol. 2, (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1977), pp. 17–18, 39. 8. John Hope Simpson, Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development, (London, 1930), p. 126. 9. Palestine Royal Commission Report, p. 291. 10. Palestine Royal Commission Report, p. 242. 11. George Lenczowski, American Presidents and the Middle East, (NC: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 23. 12. Cohen p. 174. 13. Dov Friedlander and Calvin Goldscheider, The Population of Israel, (NY: Columbia Press, 1979), p. 30. 14. Avneri, p. 254. 15. Curtis, p. 38. 16. Avneri, pp. 264; Cohen p. 60. 17. Avneri, pp. 254–55. 18. Moshe Aumann, Land Ownership in Palestine 1880–1948, (Jerusalem: Academic Committee on the Middle East, 1976), p. 5. 19. Shabtai Teveth, Ben- Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War, (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 32. 20. Porath, pp. 80, 84. 21. Hope Simpson Report, p. 51. 22. Avneri, pp. 149–158; Cohen, p. 37; based on the Report on Agricultural Development and Land Settlement in Palestine by Lewis French, (December 1931, Supplementary Report, April 1932) and material submitted to the Palestine Royal Commission. 23. Netanel Lorch, One Long War, (Jerusalem: Keter, 1976), p. 27; Sachar, p. 201. 24. Palestine Royal Commission Report (1937), p. 242. 25. Palestine Royal Commission (1937), pp. 241–242. 26. King Abdallah, My Memoirs Completed, (London, Longman Group, Ltd., 1978), pp. 88–89. 27. Porath (77), pp. 86–87. 28. Aumann, p. 13. 29. Abraham Granott, The Land System in Palestine, (London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952), p. 278. 30. Avneri, pp. 179–180, 224–225, 232–234; Porath (77), pp. 72–73. 31. Jon Kimche, There Could Have Been Peace: The Untold Story of Why We Failed With Palestine and Again With Israel, (England: Dial Press, 1973), p. 189. 32. Richard Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary 1917–1956, (London: The Cresset Press, 1959), pp. 49, 82, 97. 33. Samuel Katz, Battleground- Fact and Fantasy in Palestine, (NY: Bantam Books, 1977), pp. 63–65; Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 97. 34. Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties, (NY: Harper & Row, 1983), p. 438. 35. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, O Jerusalem!, (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 52. 36. Kimche, p. 211. 37. Ben Halpern, The Idea of a Jewish State, (MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 323. 38. Sachar, p. 174. 39. Halpern, p. 201. 40. “Grand Mufti Plotted To Do Away With All Jews In Mid-East,” Response, (Fall 1991), pp. 2–3. 41. Record of the Conversation Between the Fuhrer and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem on November 28, 1941, in the Presence of Reich Foreign Minister and Minister Grobba in Berlin, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, Vol. XIII, London, 1964, p. 881ff in Walter Lacquer and Barry Rubin, The Israel- Arab Reader, (NY: Penguin Books, 2001), pp. 51–55. 42. Menachem Begin, The Revolt, (NY: Nash Publishing, 1977), p. 224. 43. J. Bowyer Bell, Terror Out Of Zion, (NY: St. Martin’s Press), p. 172. 44. Anne Sinai and I. Robert Sinai, Israel and the Arabs: Prelude to the Jewish State, (NY: Facts on File, 1972), p. 83. 45. Benjamin Netanyahu, ed., “International Terrorism: Challenge And Response,” Proceedings of the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism, July 25, 1979, (Jerusalem: The Jonathan Institute, 1980), p. 45. 2. The Mandatory Period 25 3. Partition MYTH “The United Nations unjustly partitioned Palestine.” FACT As World War II ended, the magnitude of the Holocaust became known. This accelerated demands for a resolution to the question of Palestine so the survivors of Hitler’s “Final Solution” might find sanctuary in a homeland of their own. The British tried to work out an agreement acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, but their insistence on the formers approval guaranteed failure because the Arabs would not make any concessions. The British subsequently turned the issue over to the UN in February 1947. The UN established a Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) to devise a solution. Delegates from 11 nations* went to the area and found what had long been apparent: The conflicting national aspirations of Jews and Arabs could not be reconciled. The contrasting attitudes of the two groups “could not fail to give the impression that the Jews were imbued with the sense of right and were prepared to plead their case before any unbiased tribunal, while the Arabs felt unsure of the justice of their cause, or were afraid to bow to the judgment of the nations.”1 When they returned, the delegates of seven nations—Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, The Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay—recommended the establishment of two separate states, Jewish and Arab, to be joined by economic union, with Jerusalem an internationalized enclave. Three nations—India, Iran and Yugoslavia—recommended a unitary state with Arab and Jewish provinces. Australia abstained. The Jews of Palestine were not satisfied with the small territory allotted to them by the Commission, nor were they happy that Jerusalem was severed from the Jewish State; nevertheless, they welcomed the compromise. The Arabs rejected UNSCOP’s recommendations. The ad hoc committee of the UN General Assembly rejected the Arab demand for a unitary Arab state. The majority recommendation for partition was subsequently adopted 33- 13 with 10 abstentions on November 29, 1947.2 *Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. 3. Partition 27

28 “It is hard to see how the Arab world, still less the Arabs of Palestine, will suffer from what is mere recognition of accomplished fact—the presence in Palestine of a compact, well organized, and virtually autonomous Jewish community.” —London Times editorial3 MYTH “The partition plan gave the Jews most of the land, and all of the cultivable area.” FACT The partition plan took on a checkerboard appearance largely because Jewish towns and villages were spread throughout Palestine. This did not complicate the plan as much as the fact that the high living standards in Jewish cities and towns had attracted large Arab populations, which insured that any partition would result in a Jewish state that included a substantial Arab population. Recognizing the need to allow for additional Jewish settlement, the majority proposal allotted the Jews land in the northern part of the country, the Galilee, and the large, arid Negev desert in the south. The remainder was to form the Arab state. These boundaries were based solely on demographics. The borders of the Jewish State were arranged with no consideration of security; hence, the new state’s frontiers were virtually indefensible. Overall, the Jewish State was to be comprised of roughly 5,500 square miles, and the population was to be 538,000 Jews and 397,000 Arabs. Approximately 92,000 Arabs lived in Tiberius, Safed, Haifa and Bet Shean, and another 40,000 were Bedouins, most of whom were living in the desert. The remainder of the Arab population was spread throughout the Jewish state. The Arab State was to be 4,500 square miles with a population of 804,000 Arabs and 10,000 Jews.4 Critics claim the UN gave the Jews fertile land while the Arabs were allotted hilly, arid land. To the contrary, approximately 60 percent of the Jewish state was to be the desert in the Negev while the Arabs occupied most of the agricultural land.5 Further complicating the situation was the UN majority’s insistence that Jerusalem remain apart from both states and be administered as an international zone. This arrangement left more than 100,000 Jews in Jerusalem isolated from their country and circumscribed by the Arab state. According to British statistics, more than 70 percent of the land in what would become Israel was not owned by Arab farmers, it belonged to the mandatory government. Those lands reverted to Israeli control after the departure of the British. Nearly 9 percent of the land was owned by Jews and about 3 percent by Arabs who became citizens of Israel. That means only about 18 percent belonged to Arabs who left the country before and after the Arab invasion of Israel.6 MYTH “Israel usurped all of Palestine in 1948.” FACT Nearly 80 percent of what was the historic land of Palestine and the Jewish National Home, as defined by the League of Nations, was severed by the British in 1921 and allocated to what became Transjordan. Jewish settlement there was barred. The UN partitioned the remaining 20- odd percent of Palestine into two states. With Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank in 1950, and Egypt’s control of Gaza, Arabs controlled more than 80 percent of the territory of the Mandate; while the Jewish State held a bare 17.5 percent.7 MYTH “The Palestinian Arabs were never offered a state and therefore have been denied the right to self- determination.” FACT The Peel Commission in 1937 concluded the only logical solution to resolving the contradictory aspirations of the Jews and Arabs was to partition Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. The Arabs rejected the plan because it forced them to accept the creation of a Jewish state, and required some Palestinians to live under “Jewish domination.” The Zionists opposed the Peel Plan’s boundaries because they would have been confined to little more than a ghetto of 1,900 out of the 10,310 square miles remaining in Palestine. Nevertheless, the Zionists decided to negotiate with the British, while the Arabs refused to consider any compromises. In 1939, the British White Paper called for the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine within 10 years, and for limiting Jewish immigration to no more than 75,000 over the following five years. Afterward, no one would be allowed in without the consent of the Arab population. Though the Arabs had been granted a concession on Jewish immigration, and been offered independence—the goal of Arab nationalists— they repudiated the White Paper. With partition, the Palestinians were given a state and the opportunity for self- determination. This too was rejected. 3. Partition 29 30 

MYTH “The majority of the population in Palestine was Arab; therefore, a unitary Arab state should have been created.” FACT At the time of the 1947 partition resolution, the Arabs did have a majority in western Palestine as a whole—1.2 million Arabs versus 600,000 Jews.8 But the Jews were a majority in the area allotted to them by the resolution, and in Jerusalem. The Jews never had a chance of reaching a majority in the country given the restrictive immigration policy of the British. By contrast, Palestine’s Arab population, which had been declining prior to the Mandate in 1922, grew exponentially because Arabs from all the surrounding countries were free to come—and thousands did—to take advantage of the rapid economic development and improved health conditions stimulated by Zionist settlement. The decision to partition Palestine was not determined solely by demographics; it was based on the conclusion that the territorial claims of Jews and Arabs were irreconcilable, and that the most logical compromise was the creation of two states. Ironically, that same year, 1947, the Arab members of the United Nations supported the partition of the Indian sub- continent and the creation of the new, predominantly Muslim state of Pakistan. MYTH “The Arabs were prepared to compromise to avoid bloodshed.” FACT As the partition vote approached, it became clear little hope existed for a political solution to a problem that transcended politics: the Arabs’ unwillingness to accept a Jewish state in Palestine and the refusal of the Zionists to settle for anything less. The implacability of the Arabs was evident when Jewish Agency representatives David Horowitz and Abba Eban made a last- ditch effort to reach a compromise in a meeting with Arab League Secretary Azzam Pasha on September 16, 1947. Pasha told them bluntly: The Arab world is not in a compromising mood. It’s likely, Mr. Horowitz, which your plan is rational and logical, but the fate of nations is not decided by rational logic. Nations never concede; they fight. You won’t get anything by peaceful means or compromise. You can, perhaps, get something, but only by the force of your arms. We shall try to defeat you. I am not sure we’ll succeed, but we’ll try. We were able to drive out the Crusaders, - 3. Partition 31 32 but on the other hand we lost Spain and Persia. It may be that we shall lose Palestine. But it’s too late to talk of peaceful solutions.9 Notes 1. Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976), pp. 369– 370. 2. Voting in favor of partition: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Ukrainian SSR, Union of South Africa, USSR, USA, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Voting against partition: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen. Abstained: Argentina, Chile, China, Columbia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Honduras, Mexico, UK, and Yugoslavia. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947–48, (NY: United Nations, 1949), pp. 246–47. 3. London Times, (December 1, 1947). 4. Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 292. 5. Cohen, p. 238. 6. Moshe Aumann, “Land Ownership in Palestine, 1880–1948,” in Michael Curtis, et al., The Palestinians, (NJ: Transaction Books, 1975), p. 29, quoting p. 257 of the Government of Palestine, Survey of Palestine. 7. Historic Palestine comprised what is today Jordan (approximately 35,640 square miles), Israel (8,019 square miles), Gaza (139 square miles) and the West Bank (2,263 square miles). 8. Arieh Avneri, The Claim of Dispossession, (NJ: Transaction Books, 1984), p. 252. 9. David Horowitz, State in the Making, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), p. 233. 4. The War of 1948 MYTH “The Jews started the first war with the Arabs.” FACT The chairman of the Arab Higher Committee said the Arabs would “fight for every inch of their country.”1 Two days later, the holy men of AlAzhar University in Cairo called on the Muslim world to proclaim a jihad (holy war) against the Jews.2 Jamal Husseini, the Arab Higher Committee’s spokesman, had told the UN prior to the partition vote the Arabs would drench “the soil of our beloved country with the last drop of our blood. . . .”3 Husseini’s prediction began to come true almost immediately after the UN adopted the partition resolution on November 29, 1947. The Arabs declared a protest strike and instigated riots that claimed the lives of 62 Jews and 32 Arabs. Violence continued to escalate through the end of the year.4 The first large- scale assaults began on January 9, 1948, when approximately 1,000 Arabs attacked Jewish communities in northern Palestine. By February, the British said so many Arabs had infiltrated they lacked the forces to run them back.5 In fact, the British turned over bases and arms to Arab irregulars and the Arab Legion. In the first phase of the war, lasting from November 29, 1947, until April 1, 1948, the Palestinian Arabs took the offensive, with help from volunteers from neighboring countries. The Jews suffered severe casualties and passage along most of their major roadways was disrupted. On April 26, 1948, Transjordan’s King Abdullah said: [A]ll our efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Palestine problem have failed. The only way left for us is war. I will have the pleasure and honor to save Palestine.6 On May 4, 1948, the Arab Legion attacked Kfar Etzion. The defenders drove them back, but the Legion returned a week later. After two days, the ill- equipped and outnumbered settlers were overwhelmed. Many defenders were massacred after they had surrendered.7 This was prior to the invasion by the regular Arab armies that followed Israel’s declaration of independence. The UN blamed the Arabs for the violence. The UN Palestine Commission, which was never, permitted by the Arabs or British to go to 34

Palestine to implement the resolution, reported to the Security Council on February 16, 1948, that powerful Arab interests, both inside and outside Palestine, are defying the resolution of the General Assembly and are engaged in a deliberate effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged therein.8 The Arabs were blunt in taking responsibility for starting the war. Jamal Husseini told the Security Council on April 16, 1948: The representative of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were not the attackers, that the Arabs had begun the fighting. We did not deny this. We told the whole world that we were going to fight. 9 The British commander of Jordan’s Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb admitted: Early in January, the first detachments of the Arab Liberation Army began to infiltrate into Palestine from Syria. Some came through Jordan and even through Amman . . . They were in reality to strike the first blow in the ruin of the Arabs of Palestine.10 Despite the disadvantages in numbers, organization and weapons, the Jews began to take the initiative in the weeks from April 1 until the declaration of independence on May 14. The Haganah captured several major towns including Tiberius and Haifa, and temporarily opened the road to Jerusalem. The partition resolution was never suspended or rescinded. Thus, Israel, the Jewish State in Palestine, was born on May 14, as the British finally left the country. Five Arab armies (Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon and Iraq) immediately invaded Israel. Their intentions were declared by Azzam Pasha, Secretary- General of the Arab League: “This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades.”11 MYTH “The United States was the only nation that criticized the Arab attack on Israel.” FACT The United States, the Soviet Union and most other states recognized Israel soon after it declared independence on May 14, 1948, and immediately indicted the Arabs for their aggression. The United States urged a resolution charging the Arabs with breach of the peace. Soviet delegate Andrei Gromyko told the Security Council, May 29, 1948: 4. The War of 1948 35 36

This is not the first time that the Arab states, which organized the invasion of Palestine, have ignored a decision of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. The USSR delegation deems it essential that the council should state its opinion more clearly and more firmly with regard to this attitude of the Arab states toward decisions of the Security Council.12 On July 15, the Security Council threatened to cite the Arab governments for aggression under the UN Charter. By this time, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had succeeded in stopping the Arab offensive and the initial phase of the fighting ended. MYTH “The West’s support of Israel allowed the Jews to conquer Palestine.” FACT The Jews won their war of independence with minimal help from the West. In fact, they won despite efforts to undermine their military strength. Although the United States vigorously supported the partition resolution, the State Department did not want to provide the Jews with the means to defend themselves. “Otherwise,” Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett argued, “the Arabs might use arms of U.S. origin against Jews, or Jews might use them against Arabs.”13 Consequently, on December 5, 1947, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on the region. Many in the State Department saw the embargo as yet another means of obstructing partition. President Truman nevertheless went along with it hoping it would be a means of averting bloodshed. This was naive given Britain’s rejection of Lovett’s request to suspend weapons shipments to the Arabs and subsequent agreements to provide additional arms to Iraq and Transjordan.14 The Arabs had no difficulty obtaining all the arms they needed. In fact, Jordan’s Arab Legion was armed and trained by the British, and led by a British officer. At the end of 1948, and beginning of 1949, British RAF planes flew with Egyptian squadrons over the Israel- Egypt border. On January 7, 1949, Israeli planes shot down four of the British aircraft.15 The Jews, on the other hand, were forced to smuggle weapons, principally from Czechoslovakia. When Israel declared its independence in May 1948, the army did not have a single cannon or tank. Its air force consisted of nine obsolete planes. Although the Haganah had 60,000 trained fighters, only 18,900 were fully mobilized, armed and prepared for war.16 On the eve of the war, chief of operations Yigael Yadin told David Ben Gurion: “The best we can tell you is that we have a 50- 50 chance.”17 4. The War of 1948 37 The Arab war to destroy Israel failed. Indeed, because of their aggression, the Arabs wound up with less territory than they would have had if they had accepted partition. The cost to Israel, however, was enormous. “Many of its most productive fields lay gutted and mined. Its citrus groves, for decades the basis of the Yishuv’s [Jewish community] economy, were largely destroyed.”18 Military expenditures totaled approximately $500 million. Worse yet, 6,373 Israelis were killed, nearly one percent of the Jewish population of 650,000. Had the West enforced the partition resolution or given the Jews the capacity to defend themselves, many lives might have been saved. The Arab countries signed armistice agreements with Israel in 1949, starting with Egypt (Feb. 24), followed by Lebanon (March 23), Jordan (April 3) and Syria (July 20). Iraq was the only country that did not sign an agreement with Israel, choosing instead to withdraw its troops and hand over its sector to Jordan’s Arab Legion. None of the Arab states would negotiate a peace agreement. MYTH “The Arab economic boycott of Israel was imposed after the 1948 war.” FACT The Arab boycott was formally declared by the newly formed Arab League Council on December 2, 1945: “Jewish products and manufactured goods shall be considered undesirable to the Arab countries.” All Arab “institutions, organizations, merchants, commission agents and individuals” were called upon “to refuse to deal in, distribute, or consume Zionist products or manufactured goods.”19 As is evident in this declaration, the terms “Jewish” and “Zionist” were used synonymously. Thus, even before the establishment of Israel, the Arab states had declared an economic boycott against the Jews of Palestine. The boycott, as it evolved after 1948, is divided into three components. The primary boycott prohibits direct trade between Israel and the Arab nations. The secondary boycott is directed at companies that do business with Israel. The tertiary boycott involves the blacklisting of firms that trade with other companies that do business with Israel.20 The objective of the boycott has been to isolate Israel from its neighbors and the international community, and deny it trade that might be used to augment its military and economic strength. While undoubtedly isolating Israel and separating the Jewish State from its most natural markets, the boycott failed to undermine Israel’s economy to the degree intended. In 1977, Congress prohibited U.S. companies from cooperating with the Arab boycott. When President Carter signed the law, he said the 38 “issue goes to the very heart of free trade among nations” and that it was designed to “end the divisive effects on American life of foreign boycotts aimed at Jewish members of our society.”21 The boycott has gradually crumbled and few countries outside the Middle East comply with it. The primary boycott—prohibiting direct relations between Arab countries and Israel—cracked when nations such as Qatar, Oman and Morocco negotiated deals with Israel. Other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, have pledged to end their economic boycott to meet the requirement for membership in the World Trade Organization.22 Still; the boycott remains technically in force.23 Notes 1. New York Times, (December 1, 1947). 2. Facts on File Yearbook, (NY: Facts on File, Inc., 1948), p. 48. 3. J.C. Hurewitz, The Struggle For Palestine, (NY: Shocken Books, 1976), p. 308. 4. Facts on File 1948, p. 231. 5. Facts on File 1947, p. 231. 6. Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 322. 7. Netanel Lorch, One Long War, (Jerusalem: Keter Books, 1976), p. 47; Ralph Patai, ed., Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel, (NY: McGraw Hill, 1971), pp. 307–308. 8. Security Council Official Records, Special Supplement, (1948), p. 20. 9. Security Council Official Records, S/Agenda/58, (April 16, 1948), p. 19. 10. John Bagot Glubb, A Soldier with the Arabs, (London: Staughton and Hodder, 1957), p. 79. 11. Isi Leibler, The Case For Israel, (Australia: The Globe Press, 1972), p. 15. 12. Security Council Official Records, SA/Agenda/77, (May 29, 1948), p. 2. 13. Foreign Relations of the United States 1947, (DC: GPO, 1948), p. 1249. [Henceforth FRUS]. 14. Mitchell Bard, The Water’s Edge And Beyond, (NJ: Transaction Books, 1991), pp. 171–175; FRUS, pp. 537–39; Robert Silverberg, If I Forget Thee O Jerusalem: American Jews and the State of Israel, (NY: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 366, 370; Shlomo Slonim, “The 1948 American Embargo on Arms to Palestine,” Political Science Quarterly, (Fall 1979), p. 500. 15. Sachar, p. 345. 16. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, O Jerusalem! (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 352. 17. Golda Meir, My Life, (NY: Dell, 1975), pp. 213, 222, 224. 18. Sachar, p. 452. 19. Terence Prittie and Walter Nelson, The Economic War Against The Jews, (London: Corgi Books, 1977), p. 1; Dan Chill, The Arab Boycott of Israel, (NY: Praeger, 1976), p. 1. 20. Prittie and Nelson, pp. 47–48; Sol Stern, “On and Off the Arabs’ List,” The New Republic, (March 27, 1976), p. 9; Kennan Teslik, Congress, the Executive Branch and Special Interests, (CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 11. 21. Bard, pp. 91–115. 22. “Israel nod let Saudis into WTO,” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, (November 11, 2005). 23. Jerusalem Post, (June 25, 2002). 4. The War of 1948 39 5. The 1956 War MYTH “Arab governments were prepared to accept Israel after the 1948 war.” FACT In the fall of 1948, the UN Security Council called on Israel and the Arab states to negotiate armistice agreements. Thanks to UN mediator Ralph Bunche’s insistence on direct bilateral talks between Israel and each Arab state, armistice agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria were concluded by the summer of 1949. Iraq, which had also fought against Israel, refused to follow suit. Meanwhile, on December 11, 1948, the General Assembly adopted a resolution calling on the parties to negotiate peace and creating a Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC), which consisted of the United States, France and Turkey. All Arab delegations voted against it. After 1949, the Arabs insisted that Israel accept the borders in the 1947 partition resolution and repatriate the Palestinian refugees before they would negotiate an end to the war they had initiated. This was a novel approach that they would use after subsequent defeats: the doctrine of the limited- liability war. Under this theory, aggressors may reject a compromise settlement and gamble on war to win everything in the comfortable knowledge that, even if they fail, they may insist on reinstating the status quo ante. MYTH “Israel’s military strike in 1956 was unprovoked.” FACT Egypt had maintained its state of belligerency with Israel after the armistice agreement was signed. The first manifestation of this was the closing of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping. On August 9, 1949, the UN Mixed Armistice Commission upheld Israel’s complaint that Egypt was illegally blocking the canal. UN negotiator Ralph Bunche declared: “There should be free movement for legitimate shipping and no vestiges of the wartime blockade should be allowed to remain, as they are inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of the armistice agreements.”1 On September 1, 1951, the Security Council ordered Egypt to open the Canal to Israeli shipping. Egypt refused to comply. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Muhammad Salah al- Din, said early in 1954 that “The Arab people will not be embarrassed to declare: We shall not be satisfied except by the final obliteration of Israel from the map of the Middle East.”2 In 1955, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser began to import arms from the Soviet Bloc to build his arsenal for the confrontation with Israel. In the short- term, however, he employed a new tactic to prosecute Egypt’s war with Israel. He announced it on August 31, 1955: Egypt has decided to dispatch her heroes, the disciples of Pharaoh and the sons of Islam and they will cleanse the land of Palestine. . . . There will be no peace on Israel’s border because we demand vengeance, and vengeance is Israel’s death.3 These “heroes” were Arab terrorists, or Fedayeen, trained and equipped by Egyptian intelligence to engage in hostile action on the border, and to infiltrate Israel to commit acts of sabotage and murder. The Fedayeen operated mainly from bases in Jordan, so that Jordan would bear the brunt of Israel’s retaliation, which inevitably followed. The terrorist attacks violated the armistice agreement provision that prohibited the initiation of hostilities by paramilitary forces; nevertheless, it was Israel that was condemned by the UN Security Council for its counterattacks. The escalation continued with the Egyptian blockade of Israel’s shipping lane in the Straits of Tiran, and Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. On October 14, Nasser made clear his intent: I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel’s intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations.4 Less than two weeks later, on October 25; Egypt signed a tripartite agreement with Syria and Jordan placing Nasser in command of all three armies. The blockade of the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, combined with the increased Fedayeen attacks and the bellicosity of Arab statements, prompted Israel, with the backing of Britain and France, to attack Egypt on October 29, 1956. The Israeli attack on Egypt was successful, with Israeli forces capturing the Gaza Strip, much of the Sinai and Sharm al- Sheikh. A total of 231 Israeli soldiers died in the fighting. Israeli Ambassador to the UN Abba Eban explained the provocations to the Security Council on October 30: 5. The 1956 War 41 42

During the six years during which this belligerency has operated in violation of the Armistice Agreement there have occurred 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed clashes with Egyptian armed forces, 435 cases of incursion from Egyptian controlled territory, 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by Egyptian military units and Fedayeen in Israel. As a result of these actions of Egyptian hostility within Israel, 364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed. In 1956 alone, as a result of this aspect of Egyptian aggression, 28 Israelis were killed and 127 wounded.5 One reason these raids were so intolerable for Israel was that the country had chosen to create a relatively small standing army and to rely primarily on reserves in the event of war. This meant that Israel had a small force to fight in an emergency, that threats provoking the mobilization of reserves could virtually paralyze the country, and that an enemy’s initial thrust would have to be withstood long enough to complete the mobilization. MYTH “The United States’ blind support for Israel was apparent during the Suez War.” FACT President Eisenhower was upset by the fact that Israel, France and Great Britain had secretly planned the campaign to evict Egypt from the Suez Canal. Israel’s failure to inform the United States of its intentions, combined with ignoring American entreaties not to go to war, sparked tensions between the countries. The United States subsequently joined the Soviet Union (ironically, just after the Soviets invaded Hungary) in a campaign to force Israel to withdraw. This included a threat to discontinue all U.S. assistance, UN sanctions and expulsion from the UN. U.S. pressure resulted in an Israeli withdrawal from the areas it conquered without obtaining any concessions from the Egyptians. This sowed the seeds of the 1967 war. One reason Israel did give in to Eisenhower was the assurance he gave to Prime Minister David Ben- Gurion. Before evacuating Sharm alSheikh, the strategic point guarding the Straits of Tiran, Israel elicited a promise that the United States would maintain the freedom of navigation in the waterway.6 In addition, Washington sponsored a UN resolution creating the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the territories vacated by the Israeli forces. 5. The 1956 War 43 44 Notes 1. Eliezer Ereli, “The Bat Galim Case Before the Security Council,” Middle Eastern Affairs, (April 1955), pp. 108–9. 2. Al- Misri, (April 12, 1954). 3. Middle Eastern Affairs, (December 1956), p. 461. 4. Middle Eastern Affairs, (December 1956), p. 460. 5. Security Council Official Records, S/3706, (October 30, 1956), p. 14. 6. Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision Making: Israel’s Security Choices, (OH: Ohio State University, 1976), p. 163. 6. The 1967 Six- Day War MYTH “Arab governments recognized Israel after the Suez War.” FACT Israel consistently expressed a desire to negotiate with its neighbors. In an address to the UN General Assembly on October 10, 1960, Foreign Minister Golda Meir challenged Arab leaders to meet with Prime Minister David Ben- Gurion to negotiate a peace settlement. Egyptian President Nasser answered on October 15, saying that Israel was trying to deceive the world, and reiterating that his country would never recognize the Jewish State.1 The Arabs were equally adamant in their refusal to negotiate a separate settlement for the refugees. Nasser made clear that solving the refugee issue was not his concern. “The danger of Israel,” he said, “lies in the very existence of Israel as it is in the present and in what she represents.”2 Meanwhile, Syria used the Golan Heights, which tower 3,000 feet above the Galilee, to shell Israeli farms and villages. Syria’s attacks grew more frequent in 1965 and 1966, while Nasser’s rhetoric became increasingly bellicose: “We shall not enter Palestine with its soil covered in sand,” he said on March 8, 1965. “We shall enter it with its soil saturated in blood.”3 Again, a few months later, Nasser expressed the Arabs’ aspiration: “. . . the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people. In other words, we aim at the destruction of the State of Israel. The immediate aim: perfection of Arab military might. The national aim: the eradication of Israel.”4 MYTH “Israel’s military strike in 1967 was unprovoked.” FACT A combination of bellicose Arab rhetoric, threatening behavior and, ultimately, an act of war left Israel no choice but preemptive action. To do this successfully, Israel needed the element of surprise. Had it waited for an Arab invasion, Israel would have been at a potentially catastrophic disadvantage. 46

While Nasser continued to make speeches threatening war, Arab terrorist attacks grew more frequent. In 1965, 35 raids were conducted against Israel. In 1966, the number increased to 41. In just the first four months of 1967, 37 attacks were launched.5 Meanwhile, Syria’s attacks on Israeli kibbutzim from the Golan Heights provoked a retaliatory strike on April 7, 1967, during which Israeli planes shot down six Syrian MiGs. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union—which had been providing military and economic aid to both Syria and Egypt—gave Damascus information alleging a massive Israeli military buildup in preparation for an attack. Despite Israeli denials, Syria decided to invoke its defense treaty with Egypt. On May 15, Israel’s Independence Day, Egyptian troops began moving into the Sinai and massing near the Israeli border. By May 18, Syrian troops were prepared for battle along the Golan Heights. Nasser ordered the UN Emergency Force, stationed in the Sinai since 1956, to withdraw on May 16. Without bringing the matter to the attention of the General Assembly, as his predecessor had promised, Secretary- General U Thant complied with the demand. After the withdrawal of the UNEF, the Voice of the Arabs proclaimed (May 18, 1967): As of today, there no longer exists an international emergency force to protect Israel. We shall exercise patience no more. We shall not complain any more to the UN about Israel. The sole method we shall apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of Zionist existence.6 An enthusiastic echo was heard on May 20 from Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad: Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian army, with its finger on the trigger, is united. . . . I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation.7 On May 22, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli shipping and all ships bound for Eilat. This blockade cut off Israel’s only supply route with Asia and stopped the flow of oil from its main supplier, Iran. President Johnson declared the blockade illegal and tried, unsuccessfully, to organize an international flotilla to test it. Nasser was fully aware of the pressure he was exerting to force Israel’s hand. The day after the blockade was set up, he said defiantly: “The Jews threaten to make war. I reply: Welcome! We are ready for war.”8 Nasser challenged Israel to fight almost daily. “Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight,” he said on May 27.9 The following day, he added: “We will not accept any . . . coexistence with Israel . . . Today the issue is not the establishment of 6. The 1967 Six-Day War 47 48 peace between the Arab states and Israel. . . . The war with Israel is in effect since 1948.”10 King Hussein of Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt on May 30. Nasser then announced: The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel . . . to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world. Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not declarations.11 President Abdur Rahman Aref of Iraq joined in the war of words: “The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear—to wipe Israel off the map.”12 On June 4, Iraq joined the military alliance with Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The Arab rhetoric was matched by the mobilization of Arab forces. Approximately 250,000 troops (nearly half in Sinai), more than 2,000 tanks and 700 aircraft ringed Israel.13 By this time; Israeli forces had been on alert for three weeks. The country could not remain fully mobilized indefinitely, nor could it allow its sea lane through the Gulf of Aqaba to be interdicted. Israel’s best option was to strike first. On June 5, the order was given to attack Egypt. MYTH “Nasser had the right to close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.” FACT In 1956, the United States gave Israel assurances that it recognized the Jewish State’s right of access to the Straits of Tiran. In 1957, at the UN, 17 maritime powers declared that Israel had a right to transit the Strait. Moreover, the blockade violated the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which was adopted by the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea on April 27, 1958.14 The closure of the Strait of Tiran was the casus belli in 1967. Israel’s attack was a reaction to this Egyptian first strike. President Johnson acknowledged as much after the war (June 19, 1967): If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than any other it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Strait of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved for all nations.15 6. The 1967 Six-Day War 49

MYTH “The United States helped Israel defeat the Arabs in six days.” FACT The United States tried to prevent the war through negotiations, but it could not persuade Nasser or the other Arab states to cease their belligerent statements and actions. Still, right before the war, President Johnson warned: “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone.”16 Then, when the war began, the State Department announced: “Our position is neutral in thought, word and deed.”17 Moreover, while the Arabs were falsely accusing the United States of airlifting supplies to Israel, Johnson imposed an arms embargo on the region (France, Israel’s other main arms supplier, also embargoed arms to Israel). By contrast, the Soviets were supplying massive amounts of arms to the Arabs. Simultaneously, the armies of Kuwait, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq were contributing troops and arms to the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian fronts.18 MYTH “Israel attacked Jordan to capture Jerusalem.” FACT Prime Minister Levi Eshkol sent a message to King Hussein saying Israel would not attack Jordan unless he initiated hostilities. When Jordanian radar picked up a cluster of planes flying from Egypt to Israel, and the Egyptians convinced Hussein the planes were theirs, he ordered the shelling of West Jerusalem. It turned out the planes were Israel’s, and were returning from destroying the Egyptian air force on the ground. Had Jordan not attacked, the status of Jerusalem would not have changed during the course of the war. Once the city came under fire, however, Israel needed to defend it, and, in doing so, took the opportunity to unify its capital once and for all. MYTH “Israel did not have to shoot first.” FACT After just six days of fighting, Israeli forces broke through the enemy lines and were in a position to march on Cairo, Damascus and Amman. A ceasefire was invoked on June 10. 6. The 1967 Six-Day War 51 52

The victory came at a very high cost. In storming the Golan Heights, Israel suffered 115 dead—roughly the number of Americans killed during Operation Desert Storm. Altogether, Israel lost twice as many men— 777 dead and 2,586 wounded—in proportion to her total population as the U.S. lost in eight years of fighting in Vietnam.19 Also, despite the incredible success of the air campaign, the Israeli Air Force lost 46 of its 200 fighters.20 Had Israel waited for the Arabs to strike first, as it did in 1973, and not taken preemptive action, the cost would certainly have been much higher and victory could not have been assured. MYTH “Israel had no intention of negotiating over the future of the territories it captured.” FACT By the end of the war, Israel had captured enough territory to more than triple the size of the area it controlled, from 8,000 to 26,000 square miles. The victory enabled Israel to unify Jerusalem. Israeli forces had also captured the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel’s leaders expected to negotiate a peace agreement with their neighbors and, almost immediately after the war, expressed their willingness to negotiate a return of at least some of the territories. Israel subsequently returned all of the Sinai to Egypt, territory claimed by Jordan was returned to the Hashemite Kingdom, and all of the Gaza Strip and more than 40 percent of the West Bank were given to the Palestinians to establish the Palestinian Authority. To date, approximately 94 percent of the territories won in the defensive war have been given by Israel to its Arab neighbors. This demonstrates Israel’s willingness to make territorial compromises. MYTH “Israel expelled peaceful Arab villagers from the West Bank and prevented them from returning after the war.” FACT After Jordan launched its attack on June 5, approximately 325,000 Palestinians living in the West Bank fled.21 These were Jordanian citizens who moved from one part of what they considered their country to another, primarily to avoid being caught in the cross fire of a war. A Palestinian refugee who was an administrator in a UNRWA camp in Jericho said Arab politicians had spread rumors in the camp. “They said all the young people would be killed. People heard on the radio 6. The 1967 Six-Day War 53 54

that this is not the end, only the beginning, so they think maybe it will be a long war and they want to be in Jordan.”22 Some Palestinians who left preferred to live in an Arab state rather than under Israeli military rule. Members of various PLO factions fled to avoid capture by the Israelis. Nils- Göran Gussing, the person appointed by the UN Secretary- General to investigate the situation, found that many Arabs also feared they would no longer be able to receive money from family members working abroad.23 Israeli forces ordered a handful of Palestinians to move for “strategic and security reasons.” In some cases, they were allowed to return in a few days, in others Israel offered to help them resettle elsewhere.24 Israel now ruled more than three- quarters of a million Palestinians— most of whom were hostile to the government. Nevertheless, more than 9,000 Palestinian families were reunited in 1967. Ultimately, more than 60,000 Palestinians were allowed to return.25 After the Six- Day War ended, President Johnson announced his view of what was required next to end the conflict: “Certainly, troops must be withdrawn; but there must also be recognized rights of national life, progress in solving the refugee problem, freedom of innocent maritime passage, limitation of the arms race and respect for political independence and territorial integrity.” 26 MYTH “Israel deliberately attacked the USS Liberty.” FACT The Israeli attack on the USS Liberty was a grievous error, largely attributable to the confusion of war. Ten official United States investigations and three Israeli inquiries have all conclusively established the attack was a tragic mistake. On June 8, 1967, the fourth day of the Six- Day War, the Israeli high command received reports that Israeli troops in El Arish were being fired upon from the sea, presumably by an Egyptian vessel. The United States had earlier announced at the UN that it had no naval forces within hundreds of miles of the front; however, the USS Liberty, an American intelligence ship assigned to monitor the fighting, had sailed into the area. Following a series of United States communication failures, whereby messages directing the ship not to approach within 100 miles were not received by the Liberty, the ship moved within 14 miles of the Sinai coast. The Israelis mistakenly thought this was the ship shelling their soldiers and directed war planes and torpedo boats to 6. The 1967 Six-Day War 55 56 attack the ship. Thirty- four members of the Liberty’s crew were killed and 171 were wounded. Tapes of the radio transmissions made prior, during and after the attack do not contain any statement suggesting the pilots saw a U.S. flag on the ship. During the raid, a pilot specifically says, “there is no flag on her!” The recordings also indicate that once the pilots became concerned about the identity of the ship, by virtue of reading its hull number, they terminated the attack and they were given an order to leave the area.27 Critics claimed the Israeli tape was doctored, but the National Security Agency of the United States released formerly top secret transcripts in July 2003 that confirmed the Israeli version. Numerous mistakes were made by both the United States and Israel. For example, the Liberty was first reported—incorrectly, as it turned out—to be cruising at 30 knots (it was later recalculated to be 28 knots). Under Israeli (and U.S.) naval doctrine at the time, a ship proceeding at that speed was presumed to be a warship. The sea was calm and the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry found that the Liberty’s flag was very likely drooped and not discernible; moreover, members of the crew, including the Captain, Commander William McGonagle, testified that the flag was knocked down after the first or second assault. According to Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin’s memoirs, there were standing orders to attack any unidentified vessel near the shore.28 The day fighting began, Israel had asked that American ships be removed from its coast or that it be notified of the precise location of U.S. vessels.29 The Sixth Fleet was moved because President Johnson feared being drawn into a confrontation with the Soviet Union. He also ordered that no aircraft be sent near Sinai. A CIA report on the incident issued June 13, 1967, also found that an overzealous pilot could mistake the Liberty for an Egyptian ship, the El Quseir. After the air raid, Israeli torpedo boats identified the Liberty as an Egyptian naval vessel. When the Liberty began shooting at the Israelis, they responded with the torpedo attack, which killed 28 of the sailors. Initially, the Israelis were terrified that they had attacked a Soviet ship and might have provoked the Soviets to join the fighting. 30 Once the Israelis were sure what had happened, they reported the incident to the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv and offered to provide a helicopter for the Americans to fly out to the ship and to help evacuate the injured and salvage the ship. The offer was accepted and a U.S. naval attaché was flown to the Liberty. The Israelis were “obviously shocked” by the error they made in attacking the ship, according to the U.S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv. In fact, according to a secret report on the 1967 war, the immediate concern was that the Arabs might see the proximity of the Liberty to the conflict as evidence of U.S. - Israel collusion.31 A U.S. spy plane was sent to the area as soon as the NSA learned of the attack on the Liberty and recorded the conversations of two Israeli Air Force helicopter pilots, which took place between 2:30 and 3:37 p.m. on June 8. The orders radioed to the pilots by their supervisor at the Hatzor base instructing them to search for Egyptian survivors from the “Egyptian warship” that had just been bombed were also recorded by the NSA. “Pay attention. The ship is now identified as Egyptian,” the pilots were informed. Nine minutes later, Hatzor told the pilots the ship was believed to be an Egyptian cargo ship. At 3:07, the pilots were first told the ship might not be Egyptian and were instructed to search for survivors and inform the base immediately the nationality of the first person they rescued. It was not until 3:12 that one of the pilots reported that he saw an American flag flying over the ship at which point he was instructed to verify if it was indeed a U.S. vessel.32 In October 2003, the first Israeli pilot to reach the ship broke his 36-year silence on the attack. Brig. - Gen. Yiftah Spector said he had been told an Egyptian ship was off the Gaza coast. “This ship positively did not have any symbol or flag that I could see. What I was concerned with was that it was not one of ours. I looked for the symbol of our navy, which was a large white cross on its deck. This was not there, so it wasn’t one of ours.” The Jerusalem Post obtained a recording of Spector’s radio transmission in which he said, “I can’t identify it, but in any case it’s a military ship.”33 Many of the survivors of the Liberty remain bitter, and are convinced the attack was deliberate. None of Israel’s accusers, however, can explain why Israel would deliberately attack an American ship at a time when the United States was Israel’s only friend and supporter in the world. Confusion in a long line of communications, which occurred in a tense atmosphere on both the American and Israeli sides, is a more probable explanation. Accidents caused by “friendly fire” are common in wartime. In 1988, the U.S. Navy mistakenly downed an Iranian passenger plane, killing 290 civilians. During the Gulf War, 35 of the 148 Americans who died in battle were killed by “friendly fire.” In April 1994, two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters with large U.S. flags painted on each side were shot down by U.S. Air Force F- 15s on a clear day in the “no fly” zone of Iraq, killing 26 people. In April 2002, an American F- 16 dropped a bomb that killed four Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan. In fact, the day before the Liberty was attacked; Israeli pilots accidentally bombed one of their own armored columns.34 Retired Admiral, Shlomo Erell, who was Chief of the Navy in Israel in June 1967, told the Associated Press (June 5, 1977): “No one would ever have dreamt that an American ship would be there. Even the United States didn’t know where its ship was. We were advised by the proper authorities that there was no American ship within 100 miles.” 6. The 1967 Six-Day War 57 58 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara told Congress on July 26, 1967: “It was the conclusion of the investigatory body, headed by an admiral of the Navy in whom we have great confidence, that the attack was not intentional.” Twenty years later, he repeated his belief that the attack was a mistake, telling a caller on the “Larry King Show” that he had seen nothing in the 20 years since to change his mind that there had been no “coverup.”35 In January 2004, the State Department held a conference on the Liberty incident and also released new documents, including CIA memos dated June 13 and June 21, 1967, which say that Israel did not know it was striking an American vessel. The historian for the National Security Agency, David Hatch, said the available evidence “strongly suggested” Israel did not know it was attacking a U.S. ship. Two former U.S. officials, Ernest Castle, the United States Naval Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv in June 1967, who received the first report of the attack from Israel, and John Hadden, then CIA Chief of Station in Tel Aviv, also agreed with the assessment that the attack on the Liberty was a mistake.36 Israel apologized for the tragedy and paid nearly $13 million in humanitarian reparations to the United States and to the families of the victims in amounts established by the U.S. State Department. The matter was officially closed between the two governments by an exchange of diplomatic notes on December 17, 1987. Notes 1. Encyclopedia Americana Annual 1961, (NY: Americana Corporation, 1961), p. 387. 2. Speech by Nasser to the United Arab Republic National Assembly, March 26, 1964, quoted in Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Attitudes To Israel, (Jerusalem: Keter Publishing House, 1972), p. 27. 3. Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 616. 4. Samuel Katz, Battleground- Fact and Fantasy in Palestine, (NY: Bantam Books, 1985), pp. 10–11, 185. 5. Netanel Lorch, One Long War, (Jerusalem: Keter, 1976), p. 110. 6. Isi Leibler, The Case For Israel, (Australia: The Globe Press, 1972), p. 60. 7. Ibid. 8. Abba Eban, Abba Eban, (NY: Random House, 1977 p. 330. 9. Leibler, p. 60. 10. Leibler, p. 18. 11. Leibler, p. 60. 12. Leibler, p. 18. 13. Chaim Herzog, The Arab- Israeli Wars, (NY: Random House, 1982), p. 149. 14. United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, (Geneva: UN Publications 1958), pp. 132–134. 15. Yehuda Lukacs, Documents on the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict 1967–1983, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 17–18; Eban, p. 358. 16. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963–1969, (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 293. 17. Associated Press, (June 5, 1967). 18. Sachar, p. 629. 19. Katz, p. 3. 20. Jerusalem Post, (April 23, 1999). 21. Encyclopedia Americana Annual 1968, p. 366. 22. George Gruen, “The Refugees of Arab- Israeli Conflict,” (NY: American Jewish Committee, March 1969), p. 5. 23. Gruen, p. 5. 24. Gruen, p. 4. 25. Encyclopedia Americana Annual 1968, p. 366. 26. Lyndon B. Johnson, Public Papers of the President, (DC: GPO 1968), p. 683. 27. Hirsh Goodman, “Messrs. Errors and No Facts,” Jerusalem Report, (November 21, 1991); Arieh O’Sullivan, “Exclusive: Liberty attack tapes revealed,” Jerusalem Post, (June 3, 2004). 28. For the most comprehensive analysis, see A. Jay Cristol, The Liberty Incident, (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2002); Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, (CA: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 108–109. 29. Rabin, p. 110. 30. Dan Kurzman, Soldier of Peace: The Life of Yitzhak Rabin, (NY: HarperCollins, 1998), pp. 224–227; Rabin, p. 108–109. 31. “United States Policy and Diplomacy in the Middle East Crisis, May 15–June 10, 1967,” declassified secret document, Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library, pp. 143–144. 32. Nathan Guttman, “Memos show Liberty attack was an error,” Ha’aretz, (July 9, 2003). 33. “Pilot who bombed ‘Liberty’ talks to Post,” Jerusalem Post, (October 10, 2003). 34. Hirsh Goodman and Ze’ev Schiff, “The Attack on the Liberty,” Atlantic Monthly, (September 1984). 35. “The Larry King Show” (radio), (February 5, 1987). 36. Jerusalem Post, (January 13, 2004); Washington Times, (January 13, 2004). 6. The 1967 Six-Day War 59 7. The War of Attrition, 1967–1970 MYTH “The Palestinians were willing to negotiate a settlement after the Six- Day War.” FACT The Arab League created the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Cairo in 1964 as a weapon against Israel. Until the Six- Day War, the PLO engaged in terrorist attacks that contributed to the momentum toward conflict. Neither the PLO nor any other Palestinian groups campaigned for Jordan or Egypt to create an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. The focus of Palestinian activism was on the destruction of Israel. After the Arab states were defeated in 1967, the Palestinians did not alter their basic objective. With one million Arabs coming under Israeli rule, some Palestinians believed the prospect for waging a popular war of liberation had grown. Toward that end, Yasser Arafat instigated a campaign of terror from the West Bank. During September–December 1967, 61 attacks were launched, most against civilian targets such as factories, movie theaters and private homes.1 Israeli security forces gradually became more effective in thwarting terrorist plans inside Israel and the territories. Consequently, the PLO began to pursue a different strategy—attacking Jews and Israeli targets abroad. In early 1968, the first of many aircraft was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists. MYTH “After the 1967 war, Israel refused to negotiate a settlement with the Arabs.” FACT After its victory in the Six- Day War, Israel hoped the Arab states would enter peace negotiations. Israel signaled to the Arab states its willingness to relinquish virtually all the territories it acquired in exchange for peace. As Moshe Dayan put it, Jerusalem was waiting only for a telephone call from Arab leaders to start negotiations.2 But these hopes were dashed in August 1967 when Arab leaders meeting in Khartoum adopted a formula of three noes: “no peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel. . . .”3 As former Israeli President Chaim Herzog wrote: “Israel’s belief that the war had come to an end and that peace would now reign along the borders was soon dispelled. Three weeks after the conclusion of hostilities, the first major incident occurred on the Suez Canal.”4 MYTH “According to Security Council Resolution 242, Israel’s acquisition of territory through the 1967 war is ‘inadmissible.’ ” FACT On November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, establishing the principles that were to guide the negotiations for an Arab- Israeli peace settlement. This resolution was a tortuously negotiated compromise between competing proposals. The first point addressed by the resolution is the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war.” Some people take this to mean that Israel is required to withdraw from all the territories it captured. On the contrary, the reference clearly applies only to an offensive war. If not, the resolution would provide an incentive for aggression. If one country attacks another, and the defender repels the attack and acquires territory in the process, the former interpretation would require the defender to return all the land it took. Thus, aggressors would have little to lose because they would be insured against the main consequence of defeat. “This is the first war in history which has ended with the victors suing for peace and the vanquished calling for unconditional surrender.” —Abba Eban5 The ultimate goal of 242, as expressed in paragraph 3, is the achievement of a “peaceful and accepted settlement.” This means a negotiated agreement based on the resolution’s principles rather than one imposed upon the parties. This is also the implication of Resolution 338, according to Arthur Goldberg, the American ambassador who led the delegation to the UN in 1967.6 That resolution, adopted after the 1973 war, called for negotiations between the parties to start immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire. 7. The War of Attrition, 1967–1970 61 62 MYTH “Resolution 242 requires Israel to return to its pre- 1967 boundaries.” FACT The most controversial clause in Resolution 242 is the call for the “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” This is linked to the second unambiguous clause calling for “termination of all claims or states of belligerency” and the recognition that “every State in the area” has the “right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” The resolution does not make Israeli withdrawal a prerequisite for Arab action. Moreover, it does not specify how much territory Israel is required to give up. The Security Council did not say Israel must withdraw from “all the” territories occupied after the Six- Day War. This was quite deliberate. The Soviet delegate wanted the inclusion of those words and said that their exclusion meant “that part of these territories can remain in Israeli hands.” The Arab states pushed for the word “all” to be included, but this was rejected. They nevertheless asserted that they would read the resolution as if it included the word “all.” Lord Caradon, the British Ambassador who drafted the approved resolution, declared after the vote: “It is only the resolution that will bind us, and we regard its wording as clear.”7 This literal interpretation, without the implied “all,” was repeatedly declared to be the correct one by those involved in drafting the resolution. On October 29, 1969, for example, the British Foreign Secretary told the House of Commons the withdrawal envisaged by the resolution would not be from “all the territories.”8 When asked to explain the British position later, Lord Caradon said: “It would have been wrong to demand that Israel return to its positions of June 4, 1967, because those positions were undesirable and artificial.”9 Similarly, U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg explained: “The notable omissions—which were not accidental—in regard to withdrawal are the words ‘the’ or ‘all’ and ‘the June 5, 1967 lines’ . . . the resolution speaks of withdrawal from occupied territories without defining the extent of withdrawal.”10 The resolutions clearly call on the Arab states to make peace with Israel. The principal condition is that Israel withdraws from “territories occupied” in 1967. Since Israel withdrew from approximately 94 percent of the territories when it gave up the Sinai, the Gaza Strip and portions of West Bank, it has already partially, if not wholly, fulfilled its obligation under 242. The Arab states also objected to the call for “secure and recognized boundaries” because they feared this implied negotiations with Israel. The Arab League explicitly ruled this out at Khartoum in August 1967, when it proclaimed the three “noes.” Goldberg explained that this phrase was specifically included because the parties were expected to make “territorial adjustments in their peace settlement encompassing less than a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories, inasmuch as Israel’s prior frontiers had proved to be notably insecure.” The question, then, is whether Israel has to give up any additional territory. Now that peace agreements have been signed with Egypt and Jordan, and Israel has withdrawn to the international border with Lebanon, the only remaining territorial disputes are with the Palestinians (who are not even mentioned in 242) and Syria. The dispute with Syria is over the Golan Heights. Israel has repeatedly expressed a willingness to negotiate a compromise in exchange for peace; however, Syria has refused to consider even a limited peace treaty unless Israel first agrees to a complete withdrawal. Under 242, Israel has no obligation to withdraw from any part of the Golan in the absence of a peace accord with Syria. Meanwhile, other Arab states—such as Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Libya—continue to maintain a state of war with Israel, or have refused to grant Israel diplomatic recognition, even though they have no territorial disputes with Israel. These states have nevertheless conditioned their relations (at least rhetorically) on an Israeli withdrawal to the pre- 1967 borders. Although ignored by most analysts, Resolution 242 does have other provisions. One requirement is that freedom of navigation be guaranteed. This clause was included because a principal cause of the 1967 war was Egypt’s blockade of the Strait of Tiran. MYTH “Resolution 242 recognizes a Palestinian right to self- determination.” FACT The Palestinians are not mentioned anywhere in Resolution 242. They are only alluded to in the second clause of the second article of 242, which calls for “a just settlement of the refugee problem.” Nowhere does it require that Palestinians be given any political rights or territory. MYTH “The Arab states and the PLO accepted Resolution 242 whereas Israel rejected it.” FACT The Arab states have traditionally said they accepted 242 as defined by them, that is, as requiring Israel’s total, unconditional withdrawal from the disputed territories. 7. The War of Attrition, 1967–1970 63 64 In a statement to the General Assembly on October 15, 1968, the PLO rejected Resolution 242, insisting “the implementation of said resolution will lead to the loss of every hope for the establishment of peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East region.” By contrast, Ambassador Abba Eban expressed Israel’s position to the Security Council on May 1, 1968: “My government has indicated its acceptance of the Security Council resolution for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace. I am also authorized to reaffirm that we are willing to seek agreement with each Arab State on all matters included in that resolution.” It took nearly a quarter century, but the PLO finally agreed that Resolutions 242 and 338 should be the basis for negotiations with Israel when it signed the Declaration of Principles in September 1993. MYTH “Israel was responsible for the War of Attrition.” FACT Egypt’s President Gamal Nasser thought that because most of Israel’s army consisted of reserves, it could not withstand a lengthy war of attrition. He believed Israel would be unable to endure the economic burden, and the constant casualties would undermine Israeli morale. To pursue this strategy of slowly weakening Israel, Nasser ordered attacks on Israel that were calibrated so that they would not provoke an all- out Israeli war in response. As early as July 1, 1967, Egypt began shelling Israeli positions near the Suez Canal. On October 21, 1967, Egypt sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat, killing 47. A few months later, Egyptian artillery began to shell Israeli positions along the Suez Canal and Israeli military patrols were ambushed. This bloody War of Attrition, as it became known, lasted three years. The Israeli death toll between June 15, 1967, and August 8, 1970 (when a cease- fire was declared), was 1,424 soldiers and more than 100 civilians. Another 2,000 soldiers and 700 civilians were wounded.11 MYTH “Egypt terminated the War of Attrition and offered peace to Israel, only to have Jerusalem spurn these initiatives.” FACT In the summer of 1970, the United States persuaded Israel and Egypt to accept a cease- fire. This cease- fire was designed to lead to negotiations under UN auspices. Israel declared that it would accept the principle of withdrawal from territories it had captured. But on August 7, the Soviets and Egyptians deployed sophisticated ground- to-air SAM- 2 and SAM- 3 missiles in the restricted 32- mile-deep zone along the west bank of the Suez Canal. This was a clear violation of the cease-fire agreement, which barred the introduction or construction of any military installations in this area. Time magazine observed that U.S. reconnaissance “showed that the 36 SAM- 2 missiles sneaked into the cease- fire zone constitute only the first line of the most massive anti- aircraft system ever created.”12 Defense Department satellite photos demonstrated conclusively that 63 SAM- 2 sites were installed in a 78- mile band between the cities of Ismailia and Suez. Three years later, these missiles provided air coverage for Egypt’s surprise attack against Israel.13 Despite the Egyptian violations, the UN- sponsored talks resumed— additional evidence that Israel was anxious to make progress toward peace. The talks were swiftly short- circuited, however, by UN Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring, when he accepted the Egyptian interpretation of Resolution 242 and called for Israel’s total withdrawal to the pre- June 5, 1967, demarcation lines. On that basis, Egypt expressed its willingness “to enter into a peace agreement with Israel” in a February 20, 1971, letter to Jarring. But this seeming moderation masked an unchanging Egyptian irredentism and unwillingness to accept a real peace, as shown by the letter’s sweeping reservations and preconditions. The crucial sentences about a “peace agreement with Israel” were neither published nor broadcast in Egypt. Moreover, Egypt refused to enter direct talks. Israel attempted to at least transform the struggling Jarring mission into indirect talks by addressing all letters not to Jarring, but to the Egyptian government. Egypt refused to accept them. Just after the letter to Jarring, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s new president, addressed the Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in Cairo. He promised support to the PLO “until victory” and declared that Egypt would not accept Resolution 242.14 Five days after Sadat suggested he was ready to make peace with Israel, Mohammed Heikal, a Sadat confidant and editor of the semi- official Al-Ahram, wrote: Arab policy at this stage has but two objectives. The first, the elimination of the traces of the 1967 aggression through an Israeli withdrawal from all the territories it occupied that year. The second objective is the elimination of the traces of the 1948 aggression, by the means of the elimination of the State of Israel itself. This is, however, as yet an abstract, undefined objective, and some of us have erred in commencing the latter step before the former.15 7. The War of Attrition, 1967–1970 65 66 MYTH “Israel’s rejection of Egyptian peace initiatives led to the Yom Kippur War.” FACT With the collapse of the Jarring mission, the United States undertook a new initiative. It proposed an Israeli- Egyptian interim agreement, calling for Israel’s partial withdrawal from the Suez Canal and the opening of that waterway. Israel was willing to enter negotiations without preconditions, but Sadat demanded that Israel agree, as part of an interim agreement, to withdraw ultimately to the old 1967 lines. In effect, Sadat was seeking an advance guarantee of the outcome of “negotiations.” This was unacceptable to Israel and suggested that Sadat was not genuinely interested in peace. Notes 1. Netanel Lorch, One Long War, (Jerusalem: Keter, 1976), pp. 139–146. 2. Walter Lacquer, The Road to War, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 297. 3. Yehuda Lukacs, Documents on the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict 1967–1983, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 213. 4. Chaim Herzog, The Arab- Israeli Wars, (NY: Random House, 1982), p. 195. 5. Abba Eban, Abba Eban, (NY: Random House, 1977), p. 446. 6. Jerusalem Post, (May 28, 1984). 7. Prosper Weil, “Territorial Settlement in the Resolution of November 22, 1967,” in John Moore, ed., The Arab- Israeli Conflict, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 321. 8. Eban, p. 452. 9. Beirut Daily Star, (June 12, 1974). 10. Speech to AIPAC Policy Conference, (May 8, 1973). 11. Some historians consider the starting date of the War of Attrition in 1968 or 1969. We are using Chaim Herzog’s time frame. Chaim Herzog, The Arab- Israeli Wars, (NY: Random House, 1984), pp. 195–221; Nadav Safran, Israel The Embattled Ally, (MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 266. 12. Time, (September 14, 1970). 13. John Pimlott, The Middle East Conflicts From 1945 to the Present, (NY: Crescent Books, 1983), p. 99. 14. Radio Cairo, (February 27, 1971). 15. Al- Ahram, (February 25, 1971). 8. The 1973 War MYTH “Israel was responsible for the 1973 war.” FACT On October 6, 1973—Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar—Egypt and Syria opened a coordinated surprise attack against Israel. The equivalent of the total forces of NATO in Europe was mobilized on Israel’s borders.1 On the Golan Heights; approximately 180 Israeli tanks faced an onslaught of 1,400 Syrian tanks. Along the Suez Canal, fewer than 500 Israeli defenders were attacked by 80,000 Egyptians. Thrown onto the defensive during the first two days of fighting, Israel mobilized its reserves and eventually repulsed the invaders and carried the war deep into Syria and Egypt. The Arab states were swiftly re-supplied by sea and air from the Soviet Union, which rejected United States efforts to work toward an immediate ceasefire. As a result, the United States belatedly began its own airlift to Israel. Two weeks later, Egypt was saved from a disastrous defeat by the UN Security Council, which had failed to act while the tide was in the Arabs’ favor. The Soviet Union showed no interest in initiating peacemaking efforts while it looked like the Arabs might win. The same was true for UN Secretary- General Kurt Waldheim. On October 22, the Security Council adopted Resolution 338 calling for “all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately.” The vote came on the day that Israeli forces cut off and isolated the Egyptian Third Army and were in a position to destroy it.2 Despite the Israel Defense Forces’ ultimate success on the battlefield, the war was considered a diplomatic and military failure. A total of 2,688 Israeli soldiers were killed. MYTH “Anwar Sadat agreed to U.S. peace proposals and did not seek war.” FACT In 1971, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat raised the possibility of signing an agreement with Israel, provided that all the disputed territories were returned by Israel. No progress toward peace was made, however, so, the following year, Sadat said war was inevitable and he was prepared to sacrifice one million soldiers in the showdown with Israel.3 His threat did not materialize that year. Throughout 1972, and for much of 1973, Sadat threatened war unless the United States forced Israel to accept his interpretation of Resolution 242—total Israeli withdrawal from territories taken in 1967. Simultaneously, the Egyptian leader carried on a diplomatic offensive among European and African states to win support for his cause. He appealed to the Soviets to bring pressure on the United States and to provide Egypt with more offensive weapons to cross the Suez Canal. The Soviet Union was more interested in maintaining the appearance of détente with the United States than in confrontation in the Middle East; therefore, it rejected Sadat’s demands. Sadat’s response was to abruptly expel approximately 20,000 Soviet advisers from Egypt. In an April 1973 interview, Sadat again warned he would renew the war with Israel.4 But it was the same threat he had made in 1971 and 1972, and most observers remained skeptical. The United States agreed with Israel’s view that Egypt should engage in direct negotiations. The U.S. - sponsored truce was three- years old and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had opened a new dialogue for peace at the UN. Almost everyone was confident the prospect of a new war was remote. Sadat reacted acidly to Kissinger’s initiative: The United States is still under Zionist pressure. The glasses the United States is wearing on its eyes are entirely Zionist glasses, completely blind to everything except what Israel wants. We do not accept this.5 “All countries should wage war against the Zionists, who are there to destroy all human organizations and to destroy civilization and the work which good people are trying to do.” —King Faisal of Saudi Arabia6 MYTH “Egypt and Syria were the only Arab states involved in the 1973 war.” FACT At least nine Arab states, including four non- Middle Eastern nations, actively aided the Egyptian- Syrian war effort. 8. The 1973 War 69 70 A few months before the Yom Kippur War, Iraq transferred a squadron of Hunter jets to Egypt. During the war, an Iraqi division of some 18,000 men and several hundred tanks was deployed in the central Golan and participated in the October 16 attack against Israeli positions.7 Iraqi MiG’s began operating over the Golan Heights as early as October 8, the third day of the war. Besides serving as financial underwriters, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait committed men to battle. A Saudi brigade of approximately 3,000 troops was dispatched to Syria, where it participated in fighting along the approaches to Damascus. Also, violating Paris’s ban on the transfer of French made weapons, Libya sent Mirage fighters to Egypt (from 1971–1973, Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi gave Cairo more than $1 billion in aid to rearm Egypt and to pay the Soviets for weapons delivered).8 Other North African countries responded to Arab and Soviet calls to aid the frontline states. Algeria sent three aircraft squadrons of fighters and bombers, an armored brigade and 150 tanks. Approximately 1,000– 2,000 Tunisian soldiers were positioned in the Nile Delta. The Sudan stationed 3,500 troops in southern Egypt, and Morocco sent three brigades to the front lines, including 2,500 men to Syria. Lebanese radar units were used by Syrian air defense forces. Lebanon also allowed Palestinian terrorists to shell Israeli civilian settlements from its territory. Palestinians fought on the Southern Front with the Egyptians and Kuwaitis.9 The least enthusiastic participant in the October fighting was probably Jordan’s King Hussein, who apparently had been kept uninformed of Egyptian and Syrian war plans. But Hussein did send two of his best units to Syria. This force took positions in the southern sector, defending the main Amman- Damascus route and attacking Israeli positions along the Kuneitra- Sassa road on October 16. Three Jordanian artillery batteries also participated in the assault, carried out by nearly 100 tanks.10 Notes 1. Chaim Herzog, The Arab- Israeli Wars, (NY: Random House, 1984), p. 230. 2. Herzog, p. 280. 3. Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 747. 4. Newsweek, (April 9, 1973). 5. Radio Cairo, (September 28, 1973). 6. Beirut Daily Star, (November 17, 1972). 7. Trevor Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab- Israeli Wars, 1947–1974, (NY: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 462. 8. Dupuy, p. 376; Herzog, p. 278; Nadav Safran, Israel The Embattled Ally, (MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 499. 9. Herzog, p. 278, 285, 293; Dupuy, 534. 10. Herzog, p. 300. 9. Boundaries MYTH “The creation of Israel in 1948 changed political and border arrangements between independent states that had existed for centuries.” FACT The boundaries of Middle East countries were arbitrarily fixed by the Western powers after Turkey was defeated in World War I and the French and British mandates were set up. The areas allotted to Israel by international law and treaties in 1920 and its incorporation into the Mandate for Palestine. Thus, under the UN partition plan all the territory had been under the control of the Ottomans, who had ruled Palestine from 1517 until 1917. When Turkey was defeated in World War I, the French took over the area now known as Lebanon and Syria. The British assumed control of Palestine as trustee and Iraq. In 1926, the borders were redrawn and Lebanon was separated from Syria. Britain installed the Emir Faisal, who had been deposed by the French in Syria, as ruler of the new kingdom of Iraq. In 1922, the British breached the treaty and created the emirate of Transjordan, which incorporated all of Palestine east of the Jordan River. This was done so that the Emir Abdullah, whose family had been defeated in tribal warfare in the Arabian Peninsula, would have a Kingdom to rule. None of the countries that border Israel became independent until the Twentieth Century. Many other Arab nations became independent after Israel.1 MYTH “Israel has been an expansionist state since its creation.” FACT Israel’s boundaries were determined first by the 1920 Treaty of San Remo which incorporated the 1917 Balfour Declaration and by the United Nations when it adopted the partition resolution in 1947. There is a question whether the UN had the authority to institute the partition. In a series of defensive wars, Israel liberated and captured additional territory, which according to treaties are part of the Jewish state. On numerous occasions, Israel has withdrawn from some of these areas. As part of the 1974 disengagement agreement, Israel returned some territories liberated and captured in the 1967 and 1973 wars to Syria. Under the terms of the 1979 Israeli- Egyptian peace treaty, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula for the third time. It had already withdrawn from large parts of the desert area it captured in its War of Independence. After capturing the entire Sinai in the 1956 Suez conflict, Israel relinquished the peninsula to Egypt a year later. In September 1983, Israel withdrew from large areas of Lebanon to positions south of the Awali River. In 1985, it completed its withdrawal from Lebanon, except for a narrow security zone just north of the Israeli border. That too was abandoned, unilaterally, in 2000. After signing peace agreements with the Palestinians, and a treaty with Jordan, Israel agreed to withdraw from some of the territory in the West Bank captured and liberated from Jordan in 1967. A small area was returned to Jordan, and more than 40 percent was ceded to the Palestinian Authority, predicated on establishing coexistence and the termination of terror and violence. The agreement with the Palestinians also involved Israel’s withdrawal in 1994 from most of the Gaza Strip, which had been captured and liberated from Egypt in 1973. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered to withdraw from 97 percent of the West Bank and 100 percent of the Gaza Strip in a final settlement. In addition, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his successors offered to withdraw from virtually all of the Golan Heights in exchange for peace with Syria. In August 2005, all Israeli troops and civilians were evacuated from the Gaza Strip and the territory was turned over to the control of the Palestinian Authority. In addition, four communities in Northern Samaria that covered an area larger than the entire Gaza Strip were also evacuated as part of the disengagement plan. As a result, Israel has now withdrawn from approximately 94 percent of the territory it captured and liberated in 1967. Negotiations continue regarding the final disposition of the remaining 6 percent (about 1,600 square miles) of the disputed territories in Israel’s possession. Israel’s willingness to make territorial concessions in exchange for security proves its goal is peace, not expansion. MYTH “The West Bank is part of Jordan.” FACT The West Bank was never legally part of Jordan. Under the UN’s 1947 partition plan—which the Jews accepted and the Arabs rejected, therefore, the resolution is meaningless—it was to have been part of an independent Arab state in western Palestine. But the Jordanian army invaded and occupied it during the 1948 war. In 1950, Jordan annexed the West Bank. Only two governments—Great Britain and Pakistan—formally recognized the Jordanian takeover. The rest of the world, including the United States, never did. 9. Boundaries 73 74 MYTH “Israel seized the Golan Heights in a war of aggression.” FACT Between 1948 and 1967, Syria controlled the Golan Heights and used it as a military stronghold from which its troops randomly sniped at Israeli civilians in the Hula Valley below, forcing children living on kibbutzim to sleep in bomb shelters. In addition, many roads in northern Israel could be crossed only after being cleared by mine- detection vehicles. In late 1966, a youth was blown to pieces by a mine while playing soccer near the Lebanon border. In some cases, attacks were carried out by Yasser Arafat’s Fattah, which Syria allowed to operate from its territory.2 Israel repeatedly, and unsuccessfully, protested the Syrian bombardments to the UN Mixed Armistice Commission, which was charged with enforcing the cease- fire. For example, Israel went to the UN in October 1966 to demand a halt to the Fattah attacks. The response from Damascus was defiant. “It is not our duty to stop them, but to encourage and strengthen them,” the Syrian ambassador responded.3 Nothing was done to stop Syria’s aggression. A mild Security Council resolution expressing “regret” for such incidents was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Israel was condemned by the UN when it retaliated. “As far as the Security Council was officially concerned,” historian Netanel Lorch wrote, “there was an open season for killing Israelis on their own territory.”4 After the Six- Day War began, the Syrian air force attempted to bomb oil refineries in Haifa. While Israel was fighting in the Sinai and West Bank, Syrian artillery bombarded Israeli forces in the eastern Galilee, and armored units fired on villages in the Hula Valley below the Golan Heights. On June 9, 1967, Israel moved against Syrian forces on the Golan. By late afternoon, June 10, Israel was in complete control of the plateau. Israel’s seizure of the strategic heights occurred only after 19 years of provocation from Syria, and after unsuccessful efforts to get the international community to act against the aggressors. MYTH “The Golan has no strategic significance for Israel.” FACT Syria—deterred by an IDF presence within artillery range of Damascus—has kept the Golan quiet since 1974. But during this time, Syria has provided a haven and supported numerous terrorist groups that attack Israel from Lebanon and other countries. These include the Democratic 9. Boundaries 75

76 Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command (PFLP- GC). In addition, Syria still deploys hundreds of thousands of troops—as much as 75 percent of its army—on the Israeli front near the Heights. From the western Golan, it is only about 60 miles—without major terrain obstacles—to Haifa and Acre, Israel’s industrial heartland. The Golan—rising from 400 to 1700 feet in the western section bordering on pre- 1967 Israel—overlooks the Hula Valley, Israel’s richest agricultural area. In the hands of a friendly neighbor, the escarpment has little military importance. If controlled by a hostile country, however, the Golan has the potential to again become a strategic nightmare for Israel. Before the Six- Day War, when Israeli agricultural settlements in the Galilee came under fire from the Golan, Israel’s options for countering the Syrian attacks were constrained by the geography of the Heights. “Counter battery fires were limited by the lack of observation from the Huleh Valley; air attacks were degraded by well- dug-in Syrian positions with strong overhead cover, and a ground attack against the positions . . . would require major forces with the attendant risks of heavy casualties and severe political repercussions,” U.S. Army Col. (Ret.) Irving Heymont observed.5 For Israel, relinquishing the Golan to a hostile Syria without adequate security arrangements could jeopardize its early- warning system against surprise attack. Israel has built radar systems on Mt. Hermon, the highest point in the region. If Israel withdrew from the Golan and had to relocate these facilities to the lowlands of the Galilee, they would lose much of their strategic effectiveness. MYTH “Israel refuses to compromise on the Golan Heights while Syria has been willing to trade peace for land.” FACT Under Hafez Assad, Syria’s position was consistent: Israel must completely withdraw from the entire Golan Heights before he would entertain any discussion of what Syria might do in return. He never expressed any willingness to make peace with Israel if he received the entire Golan or any part of it. Israel has been equally adamant that it would not give up any territory without knowing what Syria was prepared to concede. Israel’s willingness to trade some or all of the Golan is dependent on Syria’s agreement to normalize relations and to sign an agreement that would bring about an end to the state of war Syria says exists between them. The topographical concerns associated with withdrawing from the Golan Heights could be offset by demilitarization, but Israel needs to have a defensible border from which the nation can be defended with minimum losses. The deeper the demilitarization, and the better the early warning, the more flexible Israel can be regarding that border. In addition to military security, Israelis seek the normalization of relations between the two countries. At a minimum, ties with Syria should be on a par with those Israel has with Egypt; ideally, they would be closer to the type of peace Israel enjoys with Jordan. This means going beyond a bare minimum of an exchange of ambassadors and flight links and creating an environment whereby Israelis and Syrians will feel comfortable visiting each other’s country, engaging in trade and pursuing other forms of cooperation typical of friendly nations. In the meantime, substantial opposition exists within Israel to withdrawing from the Golan Heights. The expectation of many is that public opinion will shift if and when the Syrians sign an agreement and take measures, such as reigning in Hezbollah attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon, that demonstrate a genuine interest in peace. President Hafez Assad died in June 2000, and there have not been any negotiations with Assad’s son and successor, Bashar, who has not indicated any shift in Syria’s position on the Golan. Absent dramatic changes in Syria’s attitude toward Israel, the Jewish State’s security will depend on its retention of military control over the Golan Heights. “From a strictly military point of view, Israel would require the retention of some captured territory in order to provide militarily defensible borders.” —Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 29, 1967 MYTH “Israel illegally annexed the Golan Heights in 1981, contravening international law and UN Resolution 242.” FACT On December 14, 1981, the Knesset voted to annex the Golan Heights. The statute extended Israeli civilian law and administration to the residents of the Golan, replacing the military authority that had ruled the area since 1967. The law does not foreclose the option of negotiations on a final settlement of the status of the territory. Following the Knesset’s approval of the law, Professor Julius Stone of Hastings College of the Law wrote: “There is no rule of international law which requires a lawful military occupant, in this situation, to wait forever before [making] control and government of the territory permanent. . . . Many international lawyers have wondered, indeed, at the patience which led Israel to wait as long as she did.”6 “It is impossible to defend Jerusalem unless you hold the high ground. . . . An aircraft that takes off from an airport in Amman is going to be over Jerusalem in two- and-a-half minutes, so it’s utterly impossible for me to defend the whole country unless I hold that land.” —Lieutenant General (Ret.) Thomas Kelly, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Gulf War7 MYTH “Israel can withdraw from the West Bank with little more difficulty than was the case in Sinai.” FACT Several pages of Israel’s peace treaty with Egypt are devoted to security arrangements. For example, Article III of the treaty’s annex concerns the areas where reconnaissance flights are permitted, and Article V allows the establishment of early- warning systems in specific zones. The security guarantees, which were required to give Israel the confidence to withdraw, were only possible because the Sinai was demilitarized. They provide Israel a large buffer zone of more than 100 miles of sparsely populated desert. Today, the Egyptian border is 60 miles from Tel Aviv and 70 from Jerusalem, the nearest major Israeli cities. The situation in the territories is entirely different. More than two million Arabs live in the West Bank, many in crowded cities and refugee camps. Most of them are located close to Israeli cities such as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The infiltration in recent years of terrorists from the Palestinian Authority, who have committed horrific acts such as suicide bombings, illustrate the danger. Despite the risks, Israel has withdrawn from more than 40 percent of the West Bank since Oslo. In past negotiations, Israel has offered to give up 97 percent of it in return for a final settlement with the Palestinians. Israel will not, however, return to the pre- 1967 borders as demanded by the Palestinians and the Arab states. 9. Boundaries 79 80

9. Boundaries 81

MYTH “Israel’s demands for defensible borders are unrealistic in an era of ballistic missiles and long- range bombers.” FACT History shows that aerial attacks have never defeated a nation. Countries are only conquered by troops occupying land. One example of this was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, in which the latter nation was overrun and occupied in a matter of hours. Though the multinational force bombed Iraq for close to six weeks, Kuwait was not liberated until the Allied troops marched into that country in the war’s final days. Defensible borders are those that would prevent or impede such a ground assault. Israel’s return to its pre- 1967 borders, which the Arab states want to re-impose, would sorely tempt potential aggressors to launch attacks on the Jewish State—as they did routinely before 1967. Israel would lose the extensive system of early- warning radars it has set up in the hills of Judea and Samaria. Were a hostile neighbor then to seize control of these mountains, its army could split Israel in two: From there, it is only about 15 miles—without any major geographic obstacles—to the Mediterranean. At their narrowest point, these 1967 lines are within 9 miles of the Israeli coast, 11 miles from Tel Aviv, and 10 from Beersheba, 21 from Haifa and one foot from Jerusalem. To defend Jerusalem, the U.S. Joint Chiefs concluded in a 1967 report to the Secretary of Defense, Israel would need to have its border “positioned to the east of the city.”8 Control over the Jordan River Valley is also critical to Israeli security because it “forms a natural security barrier between Israel and Jordan, and effectively acts as an anti- tank ditch,” military analyst Anthony Cordesman noted. “This defensive line sharply increases the amount of time Israel has to mobilize and its ability to ensure control over the West Bank in the event of a war.” He added that sacrificing control over the routes up to the heights above the West Bank makes it more difficult for the IDF to deploy and increases the risk of Jordanian, Syrian, or Palestinian forces deploying on the heights.9 Even in the era of ballistic missiles, strategic depth matters. The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, an Israeli think tank considered dovish, concluded: “Early- warning stations and the deployment of surface- to-air missile batteries can provide the time needed to sound an air- raid alert, and warn the population to take shelter from a missile attack. They might even allow enemy missiles to be intercepted in mid- flight. . . . As long as such missiles are armed with conventional warheads, they may cause painful losses and damage, but they cannot decide the outcome of a war.”10 9. Boundaries 81 82

9. Boundaries 83

MYTH “Israel ‘occupies’ the West Bank.” FACT In politics words matter and, unfortunately, the misuse of words applying to the Arab- Israeli conflict has shaped perceptions to Israel’s disadvantage. As in the case of the term “West Bank,” the word “occupation” has been hijacked by those who wish to paint Israel in the harshest possible light. It also gives apologists a way to try to explain away terrorism as “resistance to occupation,” as if the women and children killed by suicide bombers in buses, pizzerias, and shopping malls were responsible for the plight of the Arabs. Given the negative connotation of an “occupier,” it is not surprising that Arab spokespersons use the word, or some variation, as many times as possible when interviewed by the press. The more accurate description of the territories in Judea and Samaria, however, is “disputed” territories. “For a Texan, a first visit to Israel is an eye- opener. At the narrowest point, it’s only 8 miles from the Mediterranean to the old Armistice line: That’s less than from the top to the bottom of Dallas- Ft. Worth Airport. The whole of pre- 1967 Israel is only about six times the size of the King Ranch near Corpus Christi.” —President George W. Bush11 In fact, most other disputed territories around the world are not referred to as being occupied by the party that controls them. This is true, for example, of the hotly contested region of Kashmir.12 Occupation typically refers to foreign control of an area that was under the previous sovereignty of another state. In the case of the West Bank, there was no legitimate sovereign because the territory had been illegally occupied by Jordan from 1948 to 1967. Only two countries—Britain and Pakistan—recognized Jordan’s action. The Palestinians never demanded an end to Jordanian occupation and the creation of a Palestinian state. It is also important to distinguish the acquisition of territory in a war of conquest as opposed to a war of self- defense. A nation that attacks another and then retains the territory it conquers is an occupier. One that gains territory in the course of defending itself is not in the same category. And this is the situation with Israel, which specifically told King Hussein that if Jordan stayed out of the 1967 war, Israel would not fight against him. Hussein ignored the warning and attacked Israel. While fending off the assault and driving out the invading Jordanian troops, Israel came to control the West Bank. By rejecting Arab demands that Israel be required to withdraw from all the territories won in 1967, the UN Security Council, in Resolution 242, acknowledged that Israel was entitled to claim at least part of these lands for new defensible borders. Since Oslo, the case for tagging Israel as an occupying power has been further weakened by the fact that Israel transferred virtually all civilian authority to the Palestinian Authority. Israel retained the power to control its own external security and that of its citizens, but 98 percent of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza came under the PA’s authority. The extent to which Israel has been forced to maintain a military presence in the territories has been governed by the Palestinians’ unwillingness to end violence against Israel. The best way to end the dispute over the territories is for the Palestinians to fulfill their obligations under the road map, reform the Palestinian Authority, stop the terror and negotiate a final settlement. Notes 1. Egypt didn’t achieve independence until 1922; Lebanon, 1946; Jordan, 1946; and Syria, 1946. Many of the Gulf States became independent after Israel: Kuwait, 1961; Bahrain, 1970; the United Arab Emirates, 1971; and Qatar, 1971. 2. Netanel Lorch, One Long War, (Jerusalem: Keter, 1976), pp. 106–110. 3. Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, The Syrian Arab Republic, (NY: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1976), p. 117. 4. Lorch, p. 111. 5. Sinai and Pollack, pp. 130–31. 6. Near East Report, (January 29, 1982). 7. Jerusalem Post, (November 7, 1991). 8. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, June 29, 1967, cited in Michael Widlanski, Can Israel Survive a Palestinian State?, (Jerusalem: Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1990), p. 148. 9. Anthony Cordesman, “Escalating to Nowhere: The Israeli- Palestinian War—Fighting and Failed Peace Efforts,” (DC: CSIS, August 22, 2003). 10. Israel’s Options for Peace, (Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1989), pp. 171–72. 11. Speech to the American Jewish Committee, (May 3, 2001). 12. U.S. Department of State, Consular Information Sheet: India, (February 22, 2002). 10. Israel and Lebanon MYTH “The PLO posed no threat to Israel and was observing a cease- fire when Israel attacked Lebanon.” FACT The PLO repeatedly violated the July 1981 cease- fire agreement. By June 1982, when the IDF went into Lebanon, the PLO had made life in northern Israel intolerable. The PLO staged 270 terrorist actions in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and along the Lebanese and Jordanian borders. Twenty- nine Israelis died, and more than 300 were injured in the attacks.1 The frequency of attacks in the Galilee forced thousands of residents to flee their homes or to spend large amounts of time in bomb shelters. A force of some 15–18,000 PLO members was encamped in scores of locations in Lebanon. About 5,000–6,000 were foreign mercenaries, coming from such countries as Libya, Iraq, India, Sri Lanka, Chad and Mozambique.2 The PLO had an arsenal that included mortars, Katyusha rockets, and an extensive anti- aircraft network. Israel later discovered enough light arms and other weapons in Lebanon to equip five brigades.3 The PLO also brought hundreds of T- 34 tanks into the area.4 Syria, which permitted Lebanon to become a haven for the PLO and other terrorist groups, brought surface- to-air missiles into that country, creating yet another danger for Israel. Israeli strikes and commando raids were unable to stem the growth of this PLO army. Israel was not prepared to wait for more deadly attacks to be launched against its civilian population before acting against the terrorists. After Israel launched one assault on June 4–5, 1982, the PLO responded with a massive artillery and mortar attack on the Israeli population of the Galilee. On June 6, the IDF moved into Lebanon to drive out the terrorists. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger defended the Israeli operation: “No sovereign state can tolerate indefinitely the buildup along its borders of a military force dedicated to its destruction and implementing its objectives by periodic shellings and raids.”5 86 MYTH “The PLO treated the Lebanese with dignity and respect.” FACT For Arab residents of south Lebanon, PLO rule was a nightmare. After the PLO was expelled from Jordan by King Hussein in 1970, many of its cadres went to Lebanon. The PLO seized whole areas of the country, where it brutalized the population and usurped Lebanese government authority. On October 14, 1976, Lebanese Ambassador Edward Ghorra told the UN General Assembly the PLO was bringing ruin upon his country: “Palestinian elements belonging to various splinter organizations resorted to kidnapping Lebanese, and sometimes foreigners, holding them prisoners, questioning them, and even sometimes killing them.”6 Countless Lebanese told harrowing tales of rape, mutilation and murders committed by PLO forces. The PLO “killed people and threw their corpses in the courtyards. Some of them were mutilated and their limbs were cut off. We did not go out for fear that we might end up like them,” said two Arab women from Sidon. “We did not dare go to the beach, because they molested us, weapons in hand.” The women spoke of an incident, which occurred shortly before the Israeli invasion, in which PLO men raped and murdered a woman, dumping her body near a famous statue. A picture of the victim’s mangled corpse had been printed in a local newspaper.7 New York Times correspondent David Shipler visited Damour, a Christian village near Beirut, which had been occupied by the PLO since 1976, when Palestinians and Lebanese leftists sacked the city and massacred hundreds of its inhabitants. The PLO, Shipler wrote, had turned the town into a military base, “using its churches as strongholds and armories.”8 When the IDF drove the PLO out of Damour in June 1982, Prime Minister Menachem Begin announced that the town’s Christian residents could come home and rebuild. Returning villagers found their former homes littered with spray- painted Palestinian nationalist slogans, Fattah literature and posters of Yasser Arafat. They told Shipler how happy they were that Israel had liberated them.9 MYTH “Israel was responsible for the massacre of thousands of Palestinian refugees at Sabra and Shatila.” FACT The Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia was responsible for the massacres that occurred at the two Beirut- area refugee camps on September 16–17, 1982. Israeli troops allowed the Phalangists to enter Sabra and Shatila to root out terrorist cells believed located there. It had been estimated that there may have been up to 200 armed men in the camps working out of the countless bunkers built by the PLO over the years, and stocked with generous reserves of ammunition.10 When Israeli soldiers ordered the Phalangists out, they found hundreds dead (estimates range from 460 according to the Lebanese police, to 700–800 calculated by Israeli intelligence). The dead, according to the Lebanese account, included 35 women and children. The rest were men: Palestinians, Lebanese, Pakistanis, Iranians, Syrians and Algerians.11 The killings were perpetrated to avenge the murders of Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel and 25 of his followers, killed in a bomb attack earlier that week.12 Israel had allowed the Phalange to enter the camps as part of a plan to transfer authority to the Lebanese, and accepted responsibility for that decision. The Kahan Commission of Inquiry, formed by the Israeli government in response to public outrage and grief, found that Israel was indirectly responsible for not anticipating the possibility of Phalangist violence. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon subsequently resigned and the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Raful Eitan, was dismissed. The Kahan Commission, declared former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, was “a great tribute to Israeli democracy. . . . There are very few governments in the world that one can imagine making such a public investigation of such a difficult and shameful episode.”13 Ironically, while 300,000 Israelis protested the killings, little or no reaction occurred in the Arab world. Outside the Middle East, a major international outcry against Israel erupted over the massacres. The Phalangists, who perpetrated the crime, were spared the brunt of the condemnations for it. By contrast, few voices were raised in May 1985, when Muslim militiamen attacked the Shatila and Burj- el Barajneh Palestinian refugee camps. According to UN officials, 635 were killed and 2,500 wounded. During a two- year battle between the Syrian- backed Shiite Amal militia and the PLO, more than 2,000 people, including many civilians, were reportedly killed. No outcry was directed at the PLO or the Syrians and their allies over the slaughter. International reaction was also muted in October 1990 when Syrian forces overran Christian- controlled areas of Lebanon. In the eight- hour clash, 700 Christians were killed—the worst single battle of Lebanon’s Civil War.14 These killings came on top of an estimated 95,000 deaths that had occurred during the civil war in Lebanon from 1975–1982.15 10. Israel and Lebanon 87 88

10. Israel and Lebanon 89

MYTH “Israel still has not satisfied the UN’s demand to withdraw completely from Lebanon because of its illegal occupation of Shebaa Farms.” FACT Despite the UN ruling that Israel completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon,16 Hezbollah and the Lebanese government insist that Israel still holds Lebanese territory in eastern Mount Dov, a 100- square- mile, largely uninhabited patch called Shebaa Farms. This claim provides Hezbollah with a pretext to continue its activities against Israel. Thus, after kidnapping three Israeli soldiers in that area, it announced that they were captured on Lebanese soil. Israel, which has built a series of observation posts on strategic hilltops in the area, maintains that the land was captured from Syria; nevertheless, the Syrians have supported Hezbollah’s claim. The controversy benefits each of the Arab parties, according to the Washington Post. “For Syria, it means Hezbollah can still be used to keep the Israelis off balance; for Lebanon, it provides a way to apply pressure over issues, like the return of Lebanese prisoners still held in Israeli jails. For Hezbollah, it is a reason to keep its militia armed and active, providing a ready new goal for a resistance movement that otherwise had nothing left to resist.”17 In January 2005, the UN Security Council condemned the violence along the Israel- Lebanon border and reasserted that the Lebanese claim to the Shebaa Farms area is “not compatible with Security Council resolutions” affirming that Israel completely withdrew from Lebanon. “If they go from Shebaa, we will not stop fighting them. Our goal is to liberate the 1948 borders of Palestine . . . [Jews] can go back to Germany or wherever they came from.” —Hezbollah spokesperson Hassan Ezzedin18 MYTH “Syria has been a force for stability and good in Lebanon.” FACT Damascus has a long and bloody history of intervention in Lebanon, and has made no secret of its hope to make its weaker neighbor part of Syria. Since the creation of contemporary Lebanon in 1920, “most Syrians have never accepted modern Lebanon as a sovereign and independent state.”19 The outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975 gave Damascus the opportunity to act on its belief that Lebanon and Syria are one. In 1976, Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil war on behalf of Lebanese Christians. By 1978, Damascus had switched sides, and was supporting a leftist coalition of Palestinians, Druze and Muslims against the Christians. Eventually, Syrian troops occupied two- thirds of Lebanon. Syria’s deployment of surface- to-air missile batteries in Lebanon, and its policy of allowing the PLO and other terrorist groups to attack Israel from there, helped trigger the 1982 Lebanon War.20 During the first week of Israel’s “Operation Peace for Galilee,” in June 1982, Syrian troops engaged in battles with Israeli forces. The Israelis destroyed or damaged 18 of the 19 Syrian missile batteries and, in one day, shot down 29 Syrian MiG fighters without the loss of a single plane. Syria and Israel carefully avoided confrontations for the remainder of the war. Nevertheless, Syria found other ways to hurt Israel. In 1982, Syrian agents murdered President- elect Bashir Gemayel, who wanted peace with Israel. Two years later, Syria forced President Amin Gemayel, Bashir’s brother, to renege on a peace treaty he signed with Israel a year earlier.21 Syria’s activities were aimed not only at Israel, but also at the West. In April 1983, Hezbollah terrorists, operating from Syrian- controlled territory, bombed the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 49 and wounding 120. Six months later, Hezbollah terrorists drove two trucks carrying explosives into the U.S. Marine and French military barracks near Beirut, killing 241 Americans and 56 French soldiers. In 1985, Hezbollah operatives began kidnapping Westerners off the streets of Beirut and other Lebanese cities. From the beginning, it was clear the Syrians and their Iranian collaborators could order the release of the Western hostages at any time. For example, when a Frenchman was kidnapped in August 1991, the Syrians demanded that he be freed. Within days, he was. Most of the hostages were held in the Bekaa Valley or the suburbs of Beirut. Both areas were controlled by Syria. From 1985–88, Amal Shiite militiamen, closely aligned with Syria, killed hundreds of Palestinian civilians in attacks on refugee camps. In October 1990, with the West’s attention focused on Kuwait, Syrian troops stormed the Beirut stronghold of Christian insurgent Gen. Michel Aoun. Besides battle deaths, approximately 700 people were massacred.22 With that blitzkrieg, Damascus wiped out the only remaining threat to its hegemony in Lebanon. On May 22, 1991, Lebanese President Elias Hrawi signed a treaty with Syrian President Hafez Assad that said Syria would ensure Lebanon’s “sovereignty and independence,” even though Damascus was allowed to keep its occupation army in that country. A hint of Syria’s real intentions came earlier when Defense Minister Mustafa predicted that unity would be achieved between the two countries “soon, or at least in our generation.”23 After signing the treaty, Syria kept a tight grip on Lebanon and ruthlessly suppressed challenges to its domination. The situation changed dramatically, however, after Syria was suspected of playing a role in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005. The UN adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of non- Lebanese forces and an investigation into the killing. Syria subsequently removed its remaining troops from Lebanon, but still exerts a great deal of influence through “political patronage and behind- the scenes alliances.”24 MYTH “Syria intervened in Lebanon only because it was asked to do so by the Arab League.” FACT Syria moved troops into Lebanon before receiving the Arab League’s approval. Damascus intervened in April 1976 after Lebanese Druze warlord Kemal Jumblatt refused Syrian President Hafez Assad’s demand for a cease- fire in the war. Jumblatt’s refusal to stop his forces’ attacks upon Lebanese Christians gave Assad the pretext he needed to intervene. In June 1976, the Arab League Secretariat convened a meeting at which Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia and the Sudan agreed to send troops to “enforce peace.” Assad sent more Syrian troops into the country, while the others sent only token forces.25 The Arab League’s “endorsement,” in short, constituted nothing more than the recognition of a fait accompli. Notes 1. Jillian Becker, The PLO, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984), p. 205. 2. Becker, pp. 202, 209. 3. Jerusalem Post, (June 28, 1982). 4. Quoted in Raphael Israeli, ed., PLO in Lebanon, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983), p. 7. 5. Washington Post, (June 16, 1982). 6. Israeli, p. 259. See also New York Times, (October 15, 1976); Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty- first Session, Plenary Meetings, 32nd meeting. 7. Interview with Israel Television, (July 23, 1982). 8. New York Times, (June 21, 1982). 9. New York Times, (June 21, 1982). 10. Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, Israel’s Lebanon War, (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1984), p. 70. 11. Becker, p. 212. 12. Schiff and Yaari, p. 257. 13. Washington Post, (February 8, 1983). 10. Israel and Lebanon 91 92 14. New York Times, (October 19, 1990). 15. Becker, p. 212. 16. “Security Council Endorses Secretary- General’s Conclusion on Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon as of 16 June,” UN Press Release, (June 18, 2000). 17. Washington Post, (January 30, 2001). 18. New Yorker, (October 14, 2002). 19. Daniel Pipes, Damascus Courts The West, (DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), p. 26. 20. Becker, pp. 204–205. 21. Patrick Seale, Asad, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 417. 22. Pipes, p. 27. 23. al- Hayat, (May 9, 1991). 24. “Q & A: Syria and Lebanon,” BBC News, (April 25, 2005). 25. Becker, p. 131.

11. The Gulf Wars MYTH “The 1991 Gulf War was fought for Israel.” FACT Prior to President George Bush’s announcement of Operation Desert Storm, critics of Israel were claiming the Jewish State and its supporters were pushing Washington to start a war with Iraq to eliminate it as a military threat. President Bush made the U.S. position clear, however, in his speech on August 2, 1990, saying that the United States has “long- standing vital interests” in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, Iraq’s “naked aggression” violated the UN charter. The President expressed concern for other small nations in the area as well as American citizens living or working in the region. “I view a fundamental responsibility of my Presidency [as being] to protect American citizens.”1 Over the course of the Gulf crisis, the President and other top Administration officials made clear that U.S. interests—primarily oil supplies—were threatened by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Most Americans agreed with the President’s decision to go to war. For example, the Washington Post/ABC News Poll on January 16, 1991, found that 76 percent of Americans approved of the U.S. going to war with Iraq and 22 percent disapproved.2 It is true that Israel viewed Iraq as a serious threat to its security given its leadership of the rejectionists’ camp. Israeli concerns proved justified after the war began and Iraq fired 39 Scud missiles at its civilian population centers. Israel has never asked American troops to fight its battles. Although Israeli forces were prepared to participate in the Gulf War, they did not because the United States asked them not to. Even after the provocation of the Scud missile attacks, Israel assented to U.S. appeals not to respond. MYTH “Israel’s low profile in the Gulf War proved it has no strategic value to the United States.” FACT Israel was never expected to play a major role in hostilities in the Gulf. American officials knew the Arabs would not allow Israel to help defend 94 them; they also knew U.S. troops would have to intervene because the Gulf States could not protect themselves. Israel’s posture reflected a deliberate political decision in response to American requests. Nevertheless, it did aid the United States’ successful campaign to roll back Iraq’s aggression. For example: ■ By warning that it would take military measures if any Iraqi troops entered Jordan, Israel, in effect, guaranteed its neighbor’s territorial integrity against Iraqi aggression. ■ The United States benefited from the use of Israeli- made Have Nap air-launched missiles on its B52 bombers. The Navy, meanwhile, used Israeli Pioneer pilot less drones for reconnaissance in the Gulf. ■ Israel provided mine plows that were used to clear paths for allied forces through Iraqi minefields. ■ Mobile bridges flown directly from Israel to Saudi Arabia were employed by the U.S. Marine Corps. ■ Israeli recommendations, based upon system performance observations, led to several software changes that made the Patriot a more capable missile defense system. ■ Israel Aircraft Industries developed conformal fuel tanks that enhanced the range of F- 15 aircraft used in the Gulf. ■ An Israeli- produced targeting system was used to increase the Cobra helicopter’s night- fighting capabilities. ■ Israel manufactured the canister for the highly successful Tomahawk missile. ■ Night- vision goggles used by U.S. forces were supplied by Israel. ■ A low- altitude warning system produced and developed in Israel was utilized on Blackhawk helicopters. ■ Israel offered the United States the use of military and hospital facilities. U.S. ships utilized Haifa port shipyard maintenance and support on their way to the Gulf. ■ Israel destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981. Consequently, U.S. troops did not face a nuclear- armed Iraq. MYTH “Israel benefited from the 1991 Gulf War without paying any price.” FACT It is true that Israel benefited from the destruction of Iraq’s military capability by the United States- led coalition, but the cost was enormous. Even before hostilities broke out, Israel had to revise its defense budget to maintain its forces at a heightened state of alert. The Iraqi missile attacks justified Israel’s prudence in keeping its air force flying round the clock. The war required the defense budget to be increased by more than $500 million. Another $100 million boost was needed for civil defense. The damage caused by the 39 Iraqi Scud missiles that landed in Tel Aviv and Haifa was extensive. Approximately 3,300 apartments and other buildings were affected in the greater Tel Aviv area. Some 1,150 people who were evacuated had to be housed at a dozen hotels at a cost of $20,000 per night. Beyond the direct costs of military preparedness and damage to property, the Israeli economy was also hurt by the inability of many Israelis to work under the emergency conditions. The economy functioned at no more than 75 percent of normal capacity during the war, resulting in a net loss to the country of $3.2 billion.3 The biggest cost was in human lives. A total of 74 people died as a consequence of Scud attacks. Two died in direct hits, four from suffocation in gas masks and the rest from heart attacks.4 A UN committee dealing with reparation claims against Iraq approved more than $31 million to be paid to Israeli businesses and individuals. The 1999 decision stemmed from a 1992 Security Council decision calling on Iraq to compensate victims of the Gulf War.5 In 2001, the United Nations Compensation Commission awarded $74 million to Israel for the costs it incurred from Iraqi Scud missile attacks. The Commission rejected most of the $1 billion that Israel had requested.6 MYTH “Iraq was never a threat to Israel.” FACT Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was a leader of the rejectionists Arab states and one of the most belligerent foes of Israel. On April 2, 1990, Saddam’s rhetoric became more threatening: “I swear to God we will let our fire eat half of Israel if it tries to wage anything against Iraq.” Saddam said his nation’s chemical weapons capability was matched only by that of the United States and the Soviet Union, and that he would annihilate anyone who threatened Iraq with an atomic bomb by the “double chemical.”7 Several days later, Saddam said that war with Israel would not end until all Israeli- held territory was restored to Arab hands. He added that Iraq could launch chemical weapons at Israel from several different sites.8 The Iraqi leader also made the alarming disclosure that his commanders had the freedom to launch attacks against Israel without consulting the high command if Israel attacked Iraq. The head of the Iraqi Air Force subsequently said he had orders to strike Israel if the Jewish State launched a raid against Iraq or any other Arab country.9 11. The Gulf Wars 95 96 On June 18, 1990, Saddam told an Islamic Conference meeting in Baghdad: “We will strike at [the Israelis] with all the arms in our possession if they attack Iraq or the Arabs.” He declared “Palestine has been stolen,” and exhorted the Arab world to “recover the usurped rights in Palestine and free Jerusalem from Zionist captivity.”10 Saddam’s threat came in the wake of revelations that Britain and the United States foiled an attempt to smuggle American- made “krytron” nuclear triggers to Iraq.11 Britain’s MI6 intelligence service prepared a secret assessment three years earlier that Hussein had ordered an all-out effort to develop nuclear weapons.12 After Saddam used chemical weapons against his own Kurdish population in Halabja in 1988, few people doubted his willingness to use nuclear weapons against Jews in Israel if he had the opportunity. In April 1990, British customs officers found tubes about to be loaded onto an Iraqi- chartered ship that were believed to be part of a giant cannon that would enable Baghdad to lob nuclear or chemical missiles into Israel or Iran.13 Iraq denied it was building a “super gun,” but, after the war, it was learned that Iraq had built such a weapon.14 Iraq emerged from its war with Iran with one of the largest and best-equipped military forces in the world. In fact, Iraq had one million battle-tested troops, more than 700 combat aircraft, 6,000 tanks, ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. Although the U.S. and its allies won a quick victory, the magnitude of Hussein’s arsenal only became clear after the war when UN investigators found evidence of a vast program to build chemical and nuclear weapons.15 Iraq also served as a base for several terrorist groups that menaced Israel, including the PLO and Abu Nidal’s Fattah Revolutionary Council. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein consistently threatened to strike Israel if his country was attacked. If the U.S. moves against Iraq, he said in December 1990, “then Tel Aviv will receive the next attack, whether or not Israel takes part.”16 At a press conference, following his January 9, 1991, meeting with Secretary of State James Baker, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz was asked if the war starts, would Iraq attack Israel. He replied bluntly: “Yes. Absolutely, yes.”17 Ultimately, Saddam carried out his threat. MYTH “Saddam Hussein was never interested in acquiring nuclear weapons.” FACT In 1981, Israel became convinced Iraq was approaching the capability to produce a nuclear weapon. To preempt the building of a weapon they believed would undoubtedly be directed against them, the Israelis launched a surprise attack that destroyed the Osirak nuclear complex. At the time, Israel was widely criticized. On June 19, the UN Security Council unanimously condemned the raid. Critics minimized the importance of Iraq’s nuclear program, claiming that because Baghdad had signed the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty and permitted its facilities to be inspected, Israeli fears were baseless. It was not until after Iraq invaded Kuwait that U.S. officials began to acknowledge publicly that Baghdad was developing nuclear weapons and that it was far closer to reaching its goal than previously thought. Again, many critics argued the Administration was only seeking a justification for a war with Iraq. Months later, after allied forces had announced the destruction of Iraq’s nuclear facilities, UN inspectors found Saddam’s program to develop weapons was far more extensive than even the Israelis believed. Analysts had thought Iraq was incapable of enriching uranium for bombs, but Saddam’s researchers used several methods (including one thought to be obsolete) that may have made it possible for Iraq to build at least one bomb. “Leaders of Israel’s peace movement expressed their disgust for the PLO’s actions. One would need a gas mask to overcome the “toxic, repulsive stench” of the PLO’s attitude toward Saddam Hussein, Yossi Sarid said.18 Another activist, Yaron London, wrote in an open letter to the Palestinians in the territories: “This week you proved to me for many years I was a great fool. When you ask once again for my support for your ‘legitimate rights,’ you will discover that your shouts of encouragement to Saddam have clogged my ears.” 19 MYTH “The PLO was neutral in the 1991 Gulf War.” FACT The PLO, Libya and Iraq were the only members who opposed an Arab League resolution calling for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The Intifada leadership congratulated Saddam Hussein and described the invasion of Kuwait as the first step toward the “liberation of Palestine.”20 In Jenin, on August 12, 1,000 Palestinians marched, shouting: “Saddam, you hero, attack Israel with chemical weapons.”21 According to some sources, the PLO played an active role in facilitating Iraq’s conquest of Kuwait. The logistical planning for the Iraqi invasion was at least partially based on intelligence supplied by PLO officials and supporters based in Kuwait.22 11. The Gulf Wars 97 98 When the U.S. began massing troops in Saudi Arabia; Arafat called this a “new crusade” that “forebodes the gravest dangers and disasters for our Arab and Islamic nation.” He also made clear his position on the conflict: “We can only be in the trench hostile to Zionism and its imperialist allies who are today mobilizing their tanks, planes, and their entire advanced and sophisticated war machine against our Arab nation.”23 Once the war began, the PLO Executive Committee reaffirmed its support for Iraq: “The Palestinian people stand firmly by Iraq’s side.” The following day, Arafat sent a message to Saddam hailing Iraq’s struggle against “American dictatorship” and describing Iraq as “the defender of the Arab nation, of Muslims and of free men everywhere.”24 Arafat’s enthusiasm for Hussein was undaunted by the outcome of the war. “I would like to take this opportunity to renew to your Excellency the great pride that we take in the ties of fraternity and common destiny binding us,” he said in November 1991. “Let us work together until we achieve victory and regain liberated Jerusalem.”25 MYTH “American Jews goaded the United States to go to war against Iraq in 2003 to help Israel.” FACT Some opponents of the U.S.- led war against Iraq in 2003 claimed that American Jews somehow were responsible for persuading President George W. Bush to launch the military campaign on Israel’s behalf. In fact, President Bush decided that Iraq posed a threat to the United States because it was believed to possess weapons of mass destruction and was pursuing a nuclear capability that could have been used directly against Americans or could have been transferred to terrorists who would use them against U.S. targets. The removal of Saddam Hussein was also designed to eliminate one of the principal sponsors of terrorism. The war in Iraq liberated the Iraqi people from one of the world’s most oppressive regimes. Even in the Arab world, where many people objected to the U.S. action, no Arab leader rose to Saddam Hussein’s defense. It is true that Israel will benefit from the elimination of a regime that launched 39 missiles against it in 1991, paid Palestinians to encourage them to attack Israelis, and led a coalition of Arab states committed to Israel’s destruction. It is also true; however, that many Arab states benefited from the removal of Saddam Hussein, in particular, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This is why these nations allowed Allied forces to use their countries as bases for operations. As for the role of American Jews, it is important to remember that Jews comprise less than three percent of the U.S. population and were hardly the most vocal advocates of the war. On the contrary, the Jewish community had divisions similar to those in the country as a whole, and most major Jewish organizations avoided taking any position on the war. Meanwhile, public opinion polls showed that a significant majority of all Americans initially supported the President’s policy toward Iraq. Some critics have suggested that prominent Jewish officials in the Bush Administration pushed for the war; however, only a handful of officials in the Administration were Jewish, and not one of the President’s top advisers at the time—the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Vice President, or National Security Adviser—was Jewish. The suggestion that American Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the United States, or that they have undue influence on U.S. Middle East policy, is an example of anti- Semitism. Unfortunately, some critics of the war on Iraq chose the age- old approach of blaming the Jews for a policy they disagreed with rather than addressing the substantive arguments in the debate. Notes 1. Washington Post, (August 3, 1990). 2. Washington Post, (January 17, 1991). 3. Near East Report, (February 4, 1991). 4. Jerusalem Post, (January 17, 1992). 5. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, (April 14, 1999). 6. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, (June 21, 2001). 7. Reuters, (April 2, 1990). 8. Reuters, (April 18, 1990). 9. UPI, (April 22, 1990). 10. Baghdad Domestic Service, (June 18, 1990). 11. Washington Post, (March 29, 1990). 12. Washington Times, (April 3, 1990). 13. Reuters, (April 17, 1990). 14. Washington Post, (August 14, 1991). 15. Washington Post, (August 8, 1991). 16. Reuters, (December 26, 1990). 17. Transcript of January 9, 1991, press conference. 18. Haaretz, (August 17, 1990). 19. Yediot Aharonot, (August 1990). 20. Mideast Mirror, (August 6, 1990). 21. Associated Press, (August 12, 1990). 22. Jerusalem Post, (August 8, 1990). 23. Sawt al- Sha’b, (September 4, 1990). 24. Agence France- Presse, (February 26, 1991). 25. Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network, (November 16, 1991). 11. The Gulf Wars 99 12. The United Nations MYTH “The United Nations plays a constructive role in Middle East affairs. Its record of fairness and balance makes it an ideal forum for settling the Arab- Israeli dispute.” FACT Starting in the mid- 1970s, an Arab- Soviet- Third World bloc joined to form what amounted to a pro- Palestinian lobby at the United Nations. This was particularly true in the General Assembly where these countries— nearly all dictatorships or autocracies—frequently voted together to pass resolutions attacking Israel and supporting the PLO. In 1975, at the instigation of the Arab states and the Soviet Bloc, the Assembly approved Resolution 3379, which slandered Zionism by branding it a form of racism. U.S. Ambassador Daniel Moynihan called the resolution an “obscene act.” Israeli Ambassador Chaim Herzog told his fellow delegates the resolution was “based on hatred, falsehood and arrogance.” Hitler, he declared, would have felt at home listening to the UN debate on the measure.1 On December 16, 1991, the General Assembly voted 111- 25 (with 13 abstentions and 17 delegations absent or not voting) to repeal Resolution 3379. No Arab country voted for repeal. The PLO denounced the vote and the U.S. role. Israel is the object of more investigative committees, special representatives and rapporteurs than any other state in the UN system. The special representative of the Director- General of UNESCO visited Israel 51 times during 27 years of activity. A “Special Mission” has been sent by the Director- General of the ILO to Israel and the territories every year for the past 17 years. The Commission on Human Rights routinely adopts disproportionate resolutions concerning Israel. Of all condemnations of this agency, 26 percent refer to Israel alone, while rogue states such as Syria and Libya are never criticized.2 In September 2003, the UN held a two- day International Conference of Civil Society in Support of the Palestinian People with the theme “End the Occupation!” During the event, the Palestinian observer to the UN, Nasser al- Kidwa, said that “violence in self- defense in the occupied Palestinian territories is not terrorism.”3 This was just one of many such conferences held under UN auspices over the years. Even when Israel is not directly involved in an issue, UN officials find ways to interject their biases against the Jewish State. For example, in April 2004, the UN envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, called Israel’s policies “the great poison in the region.” The remark reflected a lack of professionalism and impartiality expected of representatives of the organization.4 In March 2005, the Security Council issued an unprecedented condemnation of a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv carried out by Islamic Jihad. Unlike Israeli actions that provoke resolutions, the Security Council issued only a “policy statement” urging the Palestinian Authority to “take immediate, credible steps to find those responsible for this terrorist attack” and bring them to justice. It also encouraged “further and sustained action to prevent other acts of terror.” The statement required the consent of all 15 members of the Security Council. The one Arab member, Algeria, signed on after a reference to Islamic Jihad was deleted.5 In August 2005, just as Israel was prepared to implement its disengagement from the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority produced materials to celebrate the Israeli withdrawal. These included banners that read, “Gaza Today. The West Bank and Jerusalem Tomorrow.” News agencies reported that the banners were produced with funds from the UN Development Program and were printed with the UNDP’s logo.6 While the Arab- Israeli peace process that was launched in Madrid in 1991 is structured on the basis of direct negotiations between the parties, the UN constantly undercuts this principle. The General Assembly routinely adopts resolutions that attempt to impose solutions on critical issues such as Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and settlements. Ironically, UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 proposed the bilateral negotiations that are consistently undermined by the General Assembly resolutions. Thus, the record to date indicates the UN has not played a useful role in resolving the Arab- Israeli conflict. “What takes place in the Security Council more closely resembles a mugging than either a political debate or an effort at problem- solving.” —former UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick7 MYTH “The Palestinians have been denied a voice at the UN.” FACT Besides the support the Palestinians have received from the Arab and Islamic world, and most other UN members, the Palestinians have been 12. The United Nations 101 102 afforded special treatment at the UN since 1975. That year, the General Assembly awarded permanent representative status to the PLO and the UN established the “Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.” The panel became, in effect, part of the PLO propaganda apparatus, issuing stamps, organizing meetings, and preparing films and draft resolutions in support of Palestinian “rights.” In 1976, the committee recommended “full implementation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including their return to the Israeli part of Palestine.” It also recommended that November 29—the day the UN voted to partition Palestine in 1947—be declared an “International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.” Since then, it has been observed at the UN with anti- Israel speeches, films and exhibits. In 1988, the PLO’s status was upgraded when the General Assembly designated the PLO as “Palestine.” Ten years later, the General Assembly voted to give the Palestinians a unique status as a non- voting member of the 185 member Assembly. The vote in favor was overwhelming, 124 in favor and 4 against with 10 abstentions. The countries opposing the resolution were Israel, the United States, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. Palestinian representatives can now raise the issue of the peace process in the General Assembly, cosponsor draft resolutions on Middle East peace and have the right of reply. They still do not have voting power and cannot put forward candidates for UN bodies such as the Security Council. MYTH “Israel enjoys the same rights as any other member of the United Nations.” FACT Without membership in a regional group, Israel could not sit on the Security Council or other key UN bodies. For 40 years, Israel was the only UN member excluded from a regional group. Geographically, it belongs in the Asian Group; however, the Arab states have barred its membership. A breakthrough in Israel’s exclusion from UN bodies occurred in 2000, when Israel was given temporary membership in the Western European and Others (WEOG) regional group. The WEOG is the only regional group that is geopolitical rather than purely geographical. WEOG’s 27 members—the West European states, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States—share a Western- Democratic common denominator. This historic step opened the door to Israeli participation in the Security Council. Israel formally applied for membership to the Council in 2005, but the next seat will not be available until 2019. Israel’s position within the UN improved further in February 2003 when Israel was elected to serve on the UN General Assembly Working Group on Disarmament, its first committee posting since 1961 (after 1961, the UN split the membership into regional groups and that was when Israel became isolated). An Israeli representative was elected as one of the group’s three vice- chairmen and received votes from Iran and several Arab states. On the other hand, during the same month, an Israeli candidate was defeated for a position on the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child. The year before Israeli candidates also lost votes for positions on the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, and the UN Racial Discrimination Committee.8 Israel’s standing at the UN improved significantly in 2005 starting with the election in July of Israel’s Ambassador to the UN, Dan Gillerman, as one of 20 vice presidents who set the agenda for the next General Assembly session. Shortly thereafter, Israel was tapped to serve as deputy chair of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), a General Assembly sub- committee that serves as an advisory body on disarmament issues. In October 2005, an Israeli representative was chosen for the first time to serve as a member of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee. MYTH “The United Nations and its affiliate institutions are critical of Israeli policies, but never attack Jews or engage in anti- Semitic rhetoric.” FACT The UN has condemned virtually every conceivable form of racism. It has established programs to combat racism and its multiple facets—including xenophobia—but had consistently refused to do the same against anti-Semitism. It was only on November 24, 1998, more than 50 years after the UN’s founding, that the word “anti- Semitism” was first mentioned in a UN resolution, appearing near the end of GA Res. A/53/623, “Elimination of Racism and Racial Discrimination.”9 Since the early 1970s, the UN itself has become permeated with anti-Semitic and anti- Zionist sentiment. The following examples illustrate how ugly the atmosphere has become: ■ “Is it not the Jews who are exploiting the American people and trying to debase them?”—Libyan UN Representative Ali Treiki.10 12. The United Nations 103 104 ■ “The Talmud says that if a Jew does not drink every year the blood of a non- Jewish man, he will be damned for eternity.”—Saudi Arabian delegate Marouf al- Dawalibi before the 1984 UN Human Rights Commission conference on religious tolerance.11 A similar remark was made by the Syrian Ambassador who insisted at a 1991 meeting that Jews killed Christian children to use their blood to make matzos.12 ■ On March 11, 1997, the Palestinian representative to the UN Human Rights Commission claimed the Israeli government had injected 300 Palestinian children with the HIV virus. Despite the efforts of Israel, the United States and others, this blood libel remains on the UN record.13 ■ In July 2005, Jean Ziegler, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, called the Gaza Strip “an immense concentration camp” and compared Israelis to Nazis. A year earlier (May 28, 2004), Ziegler sent on official UN stationery a demand that the Caterpillar company boycott Israel.14 In 2003, the first resolution explicitly condemning anti- Semitism was offered in the General Assembly, but its sponsor, Ireland, later withdrew it due to lack of support. There is ample justification for the conclusion of Professor Anne Bayefsky of York University, Canada, writing of the UN Human Rights system: “It is the tool of those who would make Israel the archetypal human rights violator in the world today. It is a breeding ground for anti- Semitism. It is a sanctuary for moral relativists. In short, it is a scandal.” 15 MYTH “The Arab states approved the 1991 repeal of the resolution libeling Zionism.”

FACT The repeal vote was marred by the fact that 13 of the 19 Arab countries—including those engaged in negotiations with Israel—Syria, Lebanon and Jordan—voted to retain the resolution, as did Saudi Arabia. Six, including Egypt—which lobbied against repeal—were absent. The Arabs “voted once again to impugn the very birthright of the Jewish State,” the New York Times noted. “That even now most Arab states cling to a demeaning and vicious doctrine mars an otherwise belated triumph for sense and conscience.”16 MYTH “Even if the General Assembly is biased, the Security Council has always been balanced in its treatment of the Middle East.” FACT A careful analysis of the Security Council’s actions on the Middle East shows it has been little better than the General Assembly in its treatment of Israel. Candidates for the Security Council are proposed by regional blocs. In the Middle East, this means the Arab League and its allies are usually included. Israel, which joined the UN in 1949, has never been elected to the Security Council whereas at least 16 Arab League members have. Syria, a nation on the U.S. list of countries that sponsor terrorism, began a two- year term as a member of the Security Council in 2002 and served as president of the body in June 2002. Debates on Israel abound, and the Security Council has repeatedly condemned the Jewish State, but not once has it unequivocally criticized an Arab terror attack. Emergency special sessions of the General Assembly are rare. No such session has ever been convened with respect to the Chinese occupation of Tibet, the Indonesian occupation of East Timor, the slaughters in Rwanda, the disappearances in Zaire or the horrors of Bosnia. For nearly two decades, these sessions have been called primarily to condemn Israel. MYTH “The United States always supports Israel and vetoes critical resolutions.” FACTS Many people believe the United States can always be relied upon to support Israel with its veto in the UN Security Council. The historical record, however, shows that the U.S. has often opposed Israel in the Council. The United States did not cast its first veto until 1972, on a Syrian Lebanese complaint against Israel. From 1967–72, the U.S. supported or abstained on 24 resolutions, most critical of Israel. From 1973–2004, the Security Council adopted approximately 100 resolutions on the Middle East, again, most critical of Israel. The U.S. vetoed a total of 40 resolutions and, hence, supported the Council’s criticism of Israel by its vote of support, or by abstaining, roughly 60 percent of the time.17 In July 2002, the United States shifted its policy and announced that it would veto any Security Council resolution on the Middle East that did not condemn Palestinian terror and name Hamas, Islamic Jihad and 12. The United Nations 105 106 the Al- Aksa Martyrs Brigade as the groups responsible for the attacks. The U.S. also said that resolutions must note that any Israeli withdrawal is linked to the security situation, and that both parties must be called upon to pursue a negotiated settlement.18 The Arabs can still get around the United States by taking issues to the General Assembly, where nonbinding resolutions pass by majority vote, and support for almost any anti-Israel resolution is assured. MYTH “America’s Arab allies routinely support U.S. positions at the UN.” FACT In 2004, Jordan was the Arab nation that voted with the United States most often, and that was on only 30 percent of the resolutions. The other Arab countries, including allies Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt, voted against the United States 80 percent of the time or more. As a group, in 2004, the Arab states voted against the United States on just under 80 percent of the resolutions. By contrast, Israel has consistently been America’s top UN ally. Israel voted with the U.S. 100 percent of the time in 2004, outpacing the support levels of major U.S. allies such as Great Britain, France and Canada by more than 30 percent.19 “The UN has the image of a world organization based on universal principles of justice and equality. In reality, when the chips are down, it is nothing other than the executive committee of the Third World dictatorships.” —former UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick20 MYTH “Israel’s failure to implement UN resolutions is a violation of international law.” FACT UN resolutions are documents issued by political bodies and need to be interpreted in light of the constitution of those bodies. They represent the political viewpoints of those who support them rather than embodying any particular legal rules or principles. Resolutions can have moral and political force when they are perceived as expressing the agreed view of the international community, or the views of leading, powerful and respected nations. The UN Charter (Articles 10 and 14) specifically empowers the General Assembly to make only nonbinding “recommendations.” Assembly resolutions are only considered binding in relation to budgetary and internal procedural matters. The legality of Security Council resolutions is more ambiguous. It is not clear if all Security Council resolutions are binding or only those adopted under Chapter 7 of the Charter.21 Under Article 25 of the Charter, UN member states are obligated to carry out “decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter,” but it is unclear which kinds of resolutions are covered by the term “decisions.” Regardless, it would be difficult to show that Israel has violated any Security Council resolutions on their wording and the Council has never sanctioned Israel for noncompliance. MYTH “The United Nations has demonstrated equal concern for the lives of Israelis and Palestinians.” FACT While the UN routinely adopts resolutions critical of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, it has never adopted a resolution unequivocally condemning violence against Israeli citizens. One of the most dramatic examples of the institution’s double- standard came in 2003 when Israel offered a draft resolution in the General Assembly for the first time in 27 years. The resolution called for the protection of Israeli children from terrorism, but it did not receive enough support from the members of the General Assembly to even come to a vote. Israel had introduced the resolution in response to the murder of dozens of Israeli children in terrorist attacks, and after a similar resolution had been adopted by a UN committee (later adopted by the full Assembly) calling for the protection of Palestinian children from “Israeli aggression.” Israel’s ambassador withdrew the proposed draft after it became clear that members of the nonaligned movement were determined to revise it in such a way that it would have ultimately been critical of Israel.22 Notes 1. Chaim Herzog, Who Stands Accused?, (NY: Random House, 1978), pp. 4–5. 2. Israel’s Mission to the UN. 3. Jerusalem Post, (September 4, 2003). 4. Jerusalem Post, (April 26, 2004). 5. Reuters, (March 1, 2005). 6. Jerusalem Post, (August 18, 2005). 7. New York Times, (March 31, 1983). 8. Anne Bayefsky, “Israel second- class status at the UN,” National Post, (February 18, 2003). 12. The United Nations 107 108 9. “Israel and the UN—An Uneasy Relationship,” Israel’s Mission to the UN. 10. Speech before the UN, December 8, 1983, quoted in Harris Schoenberg, Mandate For Terror: The United Nations and the PLO, (NY: Shapolsky, 1989), p. 296. 11. Speech to UN seminar on religious tolerance and freedom, delivered December 5, 1984, quoted in Anti- Defamation League, News, and (February 7, 1985). 12. Morris Abram, “Israel Under Attack: Anti- Semitism in the United Nations,” The Earth Times, (December 16–31, 1997). 13. Ibid. 14. Washington Times, (July 11, 2005). 15. Morris B. Abram, “Anti- Semitism in the United Nations,” UN Watch, (February 1998). 16. New York Times, (December 17, 1991). 17. U.S. State Department. 18. Washington Post, (July 26, 2002). 19. “Voting Practices at the United Nations—2004,” U.S. State Department. 20. Jerusalem Post, (September 5, 2001). 21. Bruno Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, (NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 237–241; 407–418. 22. Jerusalem Post, (November 26, 2003).

13. Refugees MYTH “One million Palestinians were expelled by Israel from 1947–49.” FACT The Palestinians left their homes in 1947–49 for a variety of reasons. Thousands of wealthy Arabs left in anticipation of a war, thousands more responded to Arab leaders’ calls to get out of the way of the advancing armies, a handful were expelled, but most simply fled to avoid being caught in the cross fire of a battle. Many Arabs claim that 800,000 to 900,000 Palestinians became refugees in 1947–49. The last census was taken by the British in 1945. It found approximately 1.2 million permanent Arab residents in all of Palestine. A 1949 Government of Israel census counted 160,000 Arabs living in the country after the war. In 1947, a total of 809,100 Arabs lived in the same area.1 This meant no more than 650,000 Palestinian Arabs could have become refugees. A report by the UN Mediator on Palestine arrived at an even lower figure—472,000, and calculated that only about 360,000 Arab refugees required aid.2 MYTH “Palestinians were the only people who became refugees as a result of the Arab- Israeli conflict.” FACT Although much is heard about the plight of the Palestinian refugees, little is said about the Jews who fled from Arab states. Their situation had long been precarious. During the 1947 UN debates, Arab leaders threatened them. For example, Egypt’s delegate told the General Assembly: “The lives of one million Jews in Muslim countries would be jeopardized by partition.”3 The number of Jews fleeing Arab countries for Israel in the years following Israel’s independence was nearly double the number of Arabs leaving Palestine. Many Jews were allowed to take little more than the shirts on their backs. These refugees had no desire to be repatriated. Little is heard about them because they did not remain refugees for long. Of the 980,000 Jewish refugees between 1948 and 1972, 686,000 were resettled in Israel at great expense, and without any offer of compensation from the Arab governments who confiscated their possessions.4 Israel has consequently maintained that any agreement to compensate the Palestinian refugees must also include Arab reparations for Jewish refugees. To this day, the Arab states have refused to pay anything to the hundreds of thousands of Jews who were forced to abandon their property before fleeing those countries. Through November 2003, 101 of the 681 UN resolutions on the Middle East conflict referred directly to Palestinian refugees. Not one mentioned the Jewish refugees from Arab countries.5 The contrast between the reception of Jewish and Palestinian refugees is even starker when one considers the difference in cultural and geographic dislocation experienced by the two groups. Most Jewish refugees traveled hundreds—and some traveled thousands—of miles to a tiny country whose inhabitants spoke a different language. Most Arab refugees never left Palestine at all; they traveled a few miles to the other side of the truce line, remaining inside the vast Arab nation that they were part of linguistically, culturally and ethnically. MYTH “The Jews made clear from the outset they had no intention of living peacefully with their Arab neighbors.” FACT In numerous instances, Jewish leaders urged the Arabs to remain in Palestine and become citizens of Israel. The Assembly of Palestine Jewry issued this appeal on October 2, 1947: We will do everything in our power to maintain peace, and establish cooperation gainful to both [Jews and Arabs]. It is now, here and now, from Jerusalem itself, that a call must go out to the Arab nations to join forces with Jewry and the destined Jewish State and work shoulder to shoulder for our common good, for the peace and progress of sovereign equals.6 On November 30, the day after the UN partition vote, the Jewish Agency announced: “The main theme behind the spontaneous celebrations we are witnessing today is our community’s desire to seek peace and its determination to achieve fruitful cooperation with the Arabs. . . .”7 Israel’s Proclamation of Independence, issued May 14, 1948, also invited the Palestinians to remain in their homes and become equal citizens in the new state: In the midst of wanton aggression, we yet call upon the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve the ways of peace 13. Refugees 111 112 and play their part in the development of the State, on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its bodies and institutions. . . . We extend our hand in peace and neighborliness to all the neighboring states and their peoples, and invite them to cooperate with the independent Jewish nation for the common good of all. MYTH “The Jews created the refugee problem by expelling the Palestinians.” FACT Had the Arabs accepted the 1947 UN resolution, not a single Palestinian would have become a refugee. An independent Arab state would now exist beside Israel. The responsibility for the refugee problem rests with the Arabs. The beginning of the Arab exodus can be traced to the weeks immediately following the announcement of the UN partition resolution. The first to leave were roughly 30,000 wealthy Arabs who anticipated the upcoming war and fled to neighboring Arab countries to await its end. Less affluent Arabs from the mixed cities of Palestine moved to all-Arab towns to stay with relatives or friends.8 By the end of January 1948, the exodus was so alarming the Palestine Arab Higher Committee asked neighboring Arab countries to refuse visas to these refugees and to seal their borders against them.9 On January 30, 1948, the Jaffa newspaper, Ash Sha’ab, reported: “The first of our fifth-column consists of those who abandon their houses and businesses and go to live elsewhere. . . . At the first signs of trouble they take to their heels to escape sharing the burden of struggle.”10 Another Jaffa paper, As Sarih (March 30, 1948) excoriated Arab villagers near Tel Aviv for “bringing down disgrace on us all by ‘abandoning the villages.’ ”11 Meanwhile, a leader of the Arab National Committee in Haifa, Hajj Nimer el- Khatib, said Arab soldiers in Jaffa were mistreating the residents. “They robbed individuals and homes. Life was of little value, and the honor of women was defiled. This state of affairs led many [Arab] residents to leave the city under the protection of British tanks.”12 John Bagot Glubb, the commander of Jordan’s Arab Legion, said: “Villages were frequently abandoned even before they were threatened by the progress of war.”13 Contemporary press reports of major battles in which large numbers of Arabs fled conspicuously fail to mention any forcible expulsion by the Jewish forces. The Arabs are usually described as “fleeing” or “evacuating” their homes. While Zionists are accused of “expelling and dispossessing” the Arab inhabitants of such towns as Tiberius and Haifa, the truth is much different. Both of those cities were within the boundaries of the Jewish State under the UN partition scheme and both were fought for by Jews and Arabs alike. Jewish forces seized Tiberius on April 19, 1948, and the entire Arab population of 6,000 was evacuated under British military supervision. The Jewish Community Council issued a statement afterward: “We did not dispossess them; they themselves chose this course. . . . Let no citizen touch their property.”14 In early April, an estimated 25,000 Arabs left the Haifa area following an offensive by the irregular forces led by Fawzi al- Qawukji, and rumors that Arab air forces would soon bomb the Jewish areas around Mt. Carmel.15 On April 23, the Haganah captured Haifa. A British police report from Haifa, dated April 26, explained that “every effort is being made by the Jews to persuade the Arab populace to stay and carry on with their normal lives, to get their shops and businesses open and to be assured that their lives and interests will be safe.”16 In fact, David Ben- Gurion had sent Golda Meir to Haifa to try to persuade the Arabs to stay, but she was unable to convince them because of their fear of being judged traitors to the Arab cause.17 By the end of the battle, more than 50,000 Palestinians had left. “Tens of thousands of Arab men, women and children fled toward the eastern outskirts of the city in cars, trucks, carts, and afoot in a desperate attempt to reach Arab territory until the Jews captured Rushmiya Bridge toward Samaria and Northern Palestine and cut them off. Thousands rushed every available craft, even rowboats, along the waterfront, to escape by sea toward Acre.” —New York Times, (April 23, 1948) In Tiberius and Haifa, the Haganah issued orders that none of the Arabs’ possessions should be touched, and warned that anyone who violated the orders would be severely punished. Despite these efforts, all but about 5,000 or 6,000 Arabs evacuated Haifa, many leaving with the assistance of British military transports. Syria’s UN delegate, Faris el- Khouri, interrupted the UN debate on Palestine to describe the seizure of Haifa as a “massacre” and said this action was “further evidence that the ‘Zionist program’ is to annihilate Arabs within the Jewish state if partition is affected.”18 The following day, however, the British representative at the UN, Sir Alexander Cadogan, told the delegates that the fighting in Haifa had been provoked by the continuous attacks by Arabs against Jews a few 13. Refugees 113 114 days before and that reports of massacres and deportations were erroneous.19 The same day (April 23, 1948), Jamal Husseini, the chairman of the Palestine Higher Committee, told the UN Security Council that instead of accepting the Haganah’s truce offer, the Arabs “preferred to abandon their homes, their belongings, and everything they possessed in the world and leave the town.”20 The U.S. Consul-General in Haifa, Aubrey Lippincott, wrote on April 22, 1948, for example, that “local mufti- dominated Arab leaders” were urging “all Arabs to leave the city, and large numbers did so.”21 An army order issued July 6, 1948, made clear that Arab towns and villages were not to be demolished or burned, and that Arab inhabitants were not to be expelled from their homes.22 The Haganah did employ psychological warfare to encourage the Arabs to abandon a few villages. Yigal Allon, the commander of the Palmach (the “shock force of the Haganah”), said he had Jews talk to the Arabs in neighboring villages and tell them a large Jewish force was in Galilee with the intention of burning all the Arab villages in the Lake Hula region. The Arabs were told to leave while they still had time and, according to Allon, they did exactly that.23 In the most dramatic example, in the Ramle- Lod area, Israeli troops seeking to protect their flanks and relieve the pressure on besieged Jerusalem, forced a portion of the Arab population to go to an area a few miles away that was occupied by the Arab Legion. “The two towns had served as bases for Arab irregular units, which had frequently attacked Jewish convoys and nearby settlements, effectively barring the main road to Jerusalem to Jewish traffic.”24 As was clear from the descriptions of what took place in the cities with the largest Arab populations, these cases were clearly the exceptions, accounting for only a small fraction of the Palestinian refugees. MYTH “The Arab invasion had little impact on the Palestinian Arabs.” FACT Once the invasion began in May 1948, most Arabs remaining in Palestine left for neighboring countries. Surprisingly, rather than acting as a strategically valuable “fifth- column” that would fight the Jews from within the country, the Palestinians chose to flee to the safety of the other Arab states, still confident of being able to return. A leading Palestinian nationalist of the time, Musa Alami, revealed the attitude of the fleeing Arabs: The Arabs of Palestine left their homes, were scattered, and lost everything. But there remained one solid hope: The Arab armies were on the eve of their entry into Palestine to save the country and return things to their normal course, punish the aggressor, and throw oppressive Zionism with its dreams and dangers into the sea. On May 14, 1948, crowds of Arabs stood by the roads leading to the frontiers of Palestine, enthusiastically welcoming the advancing armies. Days and weeks passed, sufficient to accomplish the sacred mission, but the Arab armies did not save the country. They did nothing but let slip from their hands Acre, Sarafand, Lydda, Ramleh, and Nazareth, most of the south and the rest of the north. Then hope fled.25 As the fighting spread into areas that had previously remained quiet; the Arabs began to see the possibility of defeat. As the possibility turned into reality, the flight of the Arabs increased—more than 300,000 departed after May 15—leaving approximately 160,000 Arabs in the State of Israel.26 Although most of the Arabs had left by November 1948, there were still those who chose to leave even after hostilities ceased. An interesting case was the evacuation of 3,000 Arabs from Faluja, a village between Tel Aviv and Beersheba: Observers feel that with proper counsel after the Israeli Egyptian armistice, the Arab population might have advantageously remained. They state that the Israeli Government had given guarantees of security of person and property. However, no effort was made by Egypt, Transjordan or even the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission to advise the Faluja Arabs one way or the other.27 “The [refugee] problem was a direct consequence of the war that the Palestinians—and . . . surrounding Arab states—had launched.” —Israeli historian Benny Morris28 MYTH “Arab leaders never encouraged the Palestinians to flee.” FACT A plethora of evidence exists demonstrating that Palestinians were encouraged to leave their homes to make way for the invading Arab armies. The Economist, a frequent critic of the Zionists, reported on October 2, 1948: “Of the 62,000 Arabs who formerly lived in Haifa not more than 5,000 or 6,000 remained. Various factors influenced their decision to seek safety in flight. There is but little doubt that the most potent of the factors were the announcements made over the air by the Higher Arab Executive, urging the Arabs to quit. . . . It was clearly intimated that those Arabs who remained in Haifa and accepted Jewish protection would be regarded as renegades.” Time’s report of the battle for Haifa (May 3, 1948) was similar: “The mass evacuation, prompted partly by fear, partly by orders of Arab leaders, left the Arab quarter of Haifa a ghost city. . . . By withdrawing Arab workers their leaders hoped to paralyze Haifa.” Benny Morris, the historian who documented instances where Palestinians were expelled, also found that Arab leaders encouraged their brethren to leave. The Arab National Committee in Jerusalem, following the March 8, 1948, instructions of the Arab Higher Committee, ordered women, children and the elderly in various parts of Jerusalem to leave their homes: “Any opposition to this order . . . is an obstacle to the holy war . . . and will hamper the operations of the fighters in these districts.”29 Morris also said that in early May units of the Arab Legion ordered the evacuation of all women and children from the town of Beisan. The Arab Liberation Army was also reported to have ordered the evacuation of another village south of Haifa. The departure of the women and children, Morris says, “tended to sap the morale of the men folk who were left behind to guard the homes and fields, contributing ultimately to the final evacuation of villages. Such two- tier evacuation—women and children first, the men following weeks later—occurred in Qumiya in the Jezreel Valley, among the Awarna Bedouin in Haifa Bay and in various other places.” In his memoirs, Haled al Azm, the Syrian Prime Minister in 1948–49, also admitted the Arab role in persuading the refugees to leave: “Since 1948 we have been demanding the return of the refugees to their homes. But we ourselves are the ones who encouraged them to leave. Only a few months separated our call to them to leave and our appeal to the United Nations to resolve on their return.” 30 Who gave such orders? Leaders such as Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said, who declared: “We will smash the country with our guns and obliterate every place the Jews seek shelter in. The Arabs should conduct their wives and children to safe areas until the fighting has died down.”31 The Secretary of the Arab League Office in London, Edward Atiyah, wrote in his book, The Arabs: “This wholesale exodus was due partly to the belief of the Arabs, encouraged by the boastings of an unrealistic Arabic press and the irresponsible utterances of some of the Arab leaders that it could be only a matter of weeks before the Jews were defeated by the armies of the Arab States and the Palestinian Arabs enabled to reenter and retake possession of their country.”32 “The refugees were confident their absence would not last long, and that they would return within a week or two,” Monsignor George Hakim, a Greek Orthodox Catholic Bishop of Galilee told the Beirut newspaper, Sada al- Janub (August 16, 1948). “Their leaders had promised them that the Arab Armies would crush the ‘Zionist gangs’ very quickly and that there was no need for panic or fear of a long exile.” On April 3, 1949, the Near East Broadcasting Station (Cyprus) said: “It must not be forgotten that the Arab Higher Committee encouraged the refugees’ flight from their homes in Jaffa, Haifa and Jerusalem.”33 “The Arab States encouraged the Palestine Arabs to leave their homes temporarily in order to be out of the way of the Arab invasion armies,” according to the Jordanian newspaper Filastin, (February 19, 1949). One refugee quoted in the Jordan newspaper, Ad Difaa (September 6, 1954), said: “The Arab government told us: Get out so that we can get in. So we got out, but they did not get in.” “The Secretary- General of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha, assured the Arab peoples that the occupation of Palestine and Tel Aviv would be as simple as a military promenade,” said Habib Issa in the New York Lebanese paper, Al Hoda (June 8, 1951). “He pointed out that they were already on the frontiers and that all the millions the Jews had spent on land and economic development would be easy booty, for it would be a simple matter to throw Jews into the Mediterranean. . . . Brotherly advice was given to the Arabs of Palestine to leave their land, homes and property and to stay temporarily in neighboring fraternal states, lest the guns of the invading Arab armies mow them down.” The Arabs’ fear was naturally exacerbated by stories of real and imagined Jewish atrocities following the attack on Deir Yassin. The native population lacked leaders who could calm them; their spokesmen, such as the Arab Higher Committee, were operating from the safety of neighboring states and did more to arouse their fears than to pacify them. Local military leaders were of little or no comfort. In one instance the commander of Arab troops in Safed went to Damascus. The following day, his troops withdrew from the town. When the residents realized they were defenseless, they fled in panic.34 According to Dr. Walid al- Qamhawi, a former member of the Executive Committee of the PLO, “it was collective fear, moral disintegration and chaos in every field that exiled the Arabs of Tiberius, Haifa and dozens of towns and villages.”35 As panic spread throughout Palestine, the early trickle of refugees became a flood, numbering more than 200,000 by the time the provisional government declared the independence of the State of Israel. Even Jordan’s King Abdullah, writing in his memoirs, blamed Palestinian leaders for the refugee problem: 13. Refugees The tragedy of the Palestinians was that most of their leaders had paralyzed them with false and unsubstantiated promises that they were not alone; that 80 million Arabs and 400 million Muslims would instantly and miraculously come to their rescue.36 “The Arab armies entered Palestine to protect the Palestinians from the Zionist tyranny but, instead, they abandoned them, forced them to emigrate and to leave their homeland, and threw them into prisons similar to the ghettos in which the Jews used to live.” —Palestinian Authority (then) Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) 37 MYTH “The Palestinian Arabs had to flee to avoid being massacred as were the peaceful villagers in Deir Yassin.” FACT The United Nations resolved that Jerusalem would be an international city apart from the Arab and Jewish states demarcated in the partition resolution. The 150,000 Jewish inhabitants were under constant military pressure; the 2,500 Jews living in the Old City were victims of an Arab blockade that lasted five months before they were forced to surrender on May 29, 1948. Prior to the surrender, and throughout the siege on Jerusalem, Jewish convoys tried to reach the city to alleviate the food shortage, which, by April, had become critical? Meanwhile, the Arab forces, which had engaged in sporadic and unorganized ambushes since December 1947, began to make an organized attempt to cut off the highway linking Tel Aviv with Jerusalem—the city’s only supply route. The Arabs controlled several strategic vantage points, which overlooked the highway and enabled them to fire on the convoys trying to reach the beleaguered city with supplies. Deir Yassin was situated on a hill, about 2,600 feet high, which commanded a wide view of the vicinity and was located less than a mile from the suburbs of Jerusalem. The population was 750.38 On April 6; Operation Nachshon was launched to open the road to Jerusalem. The village of Deir Yassin was included on the list of Arab villages to be occupied as part of the operation. The following day Haganah commander David Shaltiel wrote to the leaders of the Lehi and Irgun: I learn that you plan an attack on Deir Yassin. I wish to point out that the capture of Deir Yassin and its holding are one stage in our general plan. I have no objection to your carrying out the operation provided you are able to hold the village. If you are unable to do so I warn you against blowing up the village which will result in its inhabitants are abandoning it and its ruins and deserted houses being occupied by foreign forces. . . . Furthermore, if foreign forces took over, this would upset our general plan for establishing an airfield.39 The Irgun decided to attack Deir Yassin on April 9, while the Haganah was still engaged in the battle for Kastel. This was the first major Irgun attack against the Arabs. Previously, the Irgun and Lehi had concentrated their attacks against the British. According to Irgun leader Menachem Begin, the assault was carried out by 100 members of that organization; other authors say it was as many as 132 men from both groups. Begin stated that a small open truck fitted with a loudspeaker was driven to the entrance of the village before the attack and broadcast a warning to civilians to evacuate the area, which many did.40 Most writers say the warning was never issued because the truck with the loudspeaker rolled into a ditch before it could broadcast the warning.41 One of the fighters said, the ditch was filled in and the truck continued on to the village. “One of us called out on the loudspeaker in Arabic, telling the inhabitants to put down their weapons and flee. I don’t know if they heard, and I know these appeals had no effect.”42 Contrary to revisionist histories that the town was filled with peaceful innocents, residents and foreign troops opened fire on the attackers. One fighter described his experience: My unit stormed and passed the first row of houses. I was among the first to enter the village. There were a few other guys with me, each encouraging the other to advance. At the top of the street I saw a man in khaki clothing running ahead. I thought he was one of ours. I ran after him and told him, “Advance to that house.” Suddenly he turned around, aimed his rifle and shot. He was an Iraqi soldier. I was hit in the foot.43 The battle was ferocious and took several hours. The Irgun suffered 41 casualties, including four dead. Surprisingly, after the “massacre,” the Irgun escorted a representative of the Red Cross through the town and held a press conference. The New York Times’ subsequent description of the battle was essentially the same as Begin’s. The Times said more than 200 Arabs were killed, 40 captured and 70 women and children were released. No hint of a massacre appeared in the report.44 “Paradoxically, the Jews say about 250 out of 400 village inhabitants [were killed], while Arab survivors say only 110 of 1,000.”45 A study by 13. Refugees 119 120 Bir Zeit University, based on discussions with each family from the village, arrived at a figure of 107 Arab civilians dead and 12 wounded, in addition to 13 “fighters,” evidence that the number of dead was smaller than claimed and that the village did have troops based there.46 Other Arab sources have subsequently suggested the number may have been even lower.47 In fact, the attackers left open an escape corridor from the village and more than 200 residents left unharmed. For example, at 9:30 A.M., about five hours after the fighting started, the Lehi evacuated 40 old men, women and children on trucks and took them to a base in Sheikh Bader. Later, the Arabs were taken to East Jerusalem. Seeing the Arabs in the hands of Jews also helped raise the morale of the people of Jerusalem who were despondent from the setbacks in the fighting to that point.48 Another source says 70 women and children were taken away and turned over to the British.49 If the intent was to massacre the inhabitants, no one would have been evacuated. After the remaining Arabs feigned surrender and then fired on the Jewish troops, some Jews killed Arab soldiers and civilians indiscriminately. None of the sources specify how many women and children were killed (the Times report said it was about half the victims; their original casualty figure came from the Irgun source), but there were some among the casualties. At least some of the women who were killed became targets because of men who tried to disguise themselves as women. The Irgun commander reported, for example, that the attackers “found men dressed as women and therefore they began to shoot at women who did not hasten to go down to the place designated for gathering the prisoners.”50 Another story was told by a member of the Haganah who overheard a group of Arabs from Deir Yassin who said “the Jews found out those Arab warriors had disguised themselves as women. The Jews searched the women too. One of the people being checked realized he had been caught, took out a pistol and shot the Jewish commander. His friends, crazed with anger, shot in all directions and killed the Arabs in the area.”51 Contrary to claims from Arab propagandists at the time, and some since, no evidence has ever been produced that any women were raped. On the contrary, every villager has denied these allegations. Like many of the claims, this was a deliberate propaganda ploy, but one that backfired. Hazam Nusseibi, who worked for the Palestine Broadcasting Service in 1948, admitted being told by Hussein Khalidi, a Palestinian Arab leader, to fabricate the atrocity claims. Abu Mahmud, a Deir Yassin resident in 1948 told Khalidi “there was no rape,” but Khalidi replied, “We have to say this, so the Arab armies will come to liberate Palestine from the Jews.” Nusseibeh told the BBC 50 years later, “This was our biggest mistake. We did not realize how our people would react. As soon as they heard that women had been raped at Deir Yassin, Palestinians fled in terror.”52 The Jewish Agency, upon learning of the attack, immediately expressed its “horror and disgust.” It also sent a letter expressing the Agency’s shock and disapproval to Transjordan’s King Abdullah. The Arab Higher Committee hoped exaggerated reports about a “massacre” at Deir Yassin would shock the population of the Arab countries into bringing pressure on their governments to intervene in Palestine. Instead, the immediate impact was to stimulate a new Palestinian exodus. Just four days after the reports from Deir Yassin were published; an Arab force ambushed a Jewish convoy on the way to Hadassah Hospital, killing 77 Jews, including doctors, nurses, patients, and the director of the hospital. Another 23 people were injured. This massacre attracted little attention and is never mentioned by those who are quick to bring up Deir Yassin. Moreover, despite attacks such as this against the Jewish community in Palestine, in which more than 500 Jews were killed in the first four months after the partition decision alone, Jews did not flee. The Palestinians knew, despite their rhetoric to the contrary, the Jews were not trying to annihilate them; otherwise, they would not have been allowed to evacuate Tiberius, Haifa or any of the other towns captured by the Jews. Moreover, the Palestinians could find sanctuary in nearby states. The Jews, however, had no place to run had they wanted to. They were willing to fight to the death for their country. It came to that for many, because the Arabs were interested in annihilating the Jews, as Secretary- General of the Arab League Azzam Pasha made clear in an interview with the BBC on the eve of the war (May 15, 1948): “The Arabs intend to conduct a war of extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades.” References to Deir Yassin have remained a staple of anti- Israel propaganda for decades because the incident was unique. MYTH “Israel refused to allow Palestinians to return to their homes so Jews could steal their property.” FACT Israel could not simply agree to allow all Palestinians to return, but consistently sought a solution to the refugee problem. Israel’s position was expressed by David Ben- Gurion (August 1, 1948): 13. Refugees 121 122 When the Arab states are ready to conclude a peace treaty with Israel this question will come up for constructive solution as part of the general settlement, and with due regard to our counterclaims in respect of the destruction of Jewish life and property, the long- term interest of the Jewish and Arab populations, the stability of the State of Israel and the durability of the basis of peace between it and its neighbors, the actual position and fate of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries, the responsibilities of the Arab governments for their war of aggression and their liability for reparation, will all be relevant in the question whether, to what extent, and under what conditions, the former Arab residents of the territory of Israel should be allowed to return.53 The Israeli government was not indifferent to the plight of the refugees; an ordinance was passed creating a Custodian of Abandoned Property “to prevent unlawful occupation of empty houses and business premises, to administer ownerless property, and also to secure tilling of deserted fields, and save the crops. . . .”54 The implied danger of repatriation did not prevent Israel from allowing some refugees to return and offering to take back a substantial number as a condition for signing a peace treaty. In 1949, Israel offered to allow families that had been separated during the war to return, to release refugee accounts frozen in Israeli banks (eventually released in 1953), to pay compensation for abandoned lands and to repatriate 100,000 refugees.55 The Arabs rejected all the Israeli compromises. They were unwilling to take any action that might be construed as recognition of Israel. They made repatriation a precondition for negotiations, something Israel rejected. The result was the confinement of the refugees in camps. Despite the position taken by the Arab states, Israel did release the Arab refugees’ blocked bank accounts, which totaled more than $10 million, paid thousands of claimant’s cash compensation and granted thousands of acres as alternative holdings. MYTH “UN resolutions call for Israel to repatriate all Palestinian refugees.” FACT The United Nations took up the refugee issue and adopted Resolution 194 on December 11, 1948. This called upon the Arab states and Israel to resolve all outstanding issues through negotiations either directly, or with the help of the Palestine Conciliation Commission established by this resolution. Furthermore, Point 11 resolves: that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which under principles of international law or in equity should be made good by Governments or authorities responsible. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of refugees and payment of compensation . . . (emphasis added). The emphasized words demonstrate that the UN recognized that Israel could not be expected to repatriate a hostile population that might endanger its security. The solution to the problem, like all previous refugee problems, would require at least some Palestinians to be resettled in Arab lands. Furthermore, the resolution uses the word “should” instead of “shall,” which, in legal terms, is not mandatory language. The resolution met most of Israel’s concerns regarding the refugees, whom they regarded as a potential fifth-column if allowed to return unconditionally. The Israelis considered the settlement of the refugee issue a negotiable part of an overall peace settlement. Israel had to consider the expulsion by Arab states, of hundreds of thousand of Jewish families, having no other place to escape to, but Israel, forced to leave behind personal assets, homes, businesses and a substantial amount of Jewish owned land. As President Chaim Weizmann explained: “We are anxious to help such resettlement provided that real peace is established and the Arab states do their part of the job. The solution of the Arab problem can be achieved only through an all- around Middle East development scheme, toward which the United Nations, the Arab states and Israel will make their respective contributions.”56 At the time the Israelis did not expect the refugees to be a major issue; they thought the Arab states would resettle the majority and some compromise on the remainder could be worked out in the context of an overall settlement. The Arabs were no more willing to compromise in 1949, however, than they had been in 1947. In fact, they unanimously rejected the UN resolution. The UN discussions on refugees had begun in the summer of 1948, before Israel had completed its military victory; consequently, the Arabs still believed they could win the war and allow the refugees to return triumphant. The Arab position was expressed by Emile Ghoury, the Secretary of the Arab Higher Committee: It is inconceivable that the refugees should be sent back to their homes while they are occupied by the Jews, as the latter would hold them as hostages and maltreat them. The very proposal is an evasion of responsibility by those responsible. It will serve 13. Refugees 123 124  as a first step towards Arab recognition of the State of Israel and partition.57 The Arabs demanded that the United Nations assert the “right” of the Palestinians to return to their homes, and were unwilling to accept anything less until after their defeat had become obvious. The Arabs then reinterpreted Resolution 194 as granting the refugees the absolute right of repatriation and have demanded that Israel accept this interpretation ever since. Regardless of the interpretation, 194, like other General Assembly resolutions, are not legally binding. “The Palestinian demand for the ‘right of return’ is totally unrealistic and would have to be solved by means of financial compensation and resettlement in Arab countries.” —Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak58 MYTH “Palestinians who wanted to return to their homes posed no danger to Israeli security.” FACT When plans for setting up a state were made in early 1948, Jewish leaders in Palestine expected the new nation to include a significant Arab population. From the Israeli perspective, the refugees had been given an opportunity to stay in their homes and be a part of the new state. Approximately 160,000 Arabs had chosen to do so. To repatriate those who had fled would be, in the words of Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, “suicidal folly.”59 In the Arab world, the refugees were viewed as a potential fifth-column within Israel. As one Lebanese paper wrote: The return of the refugees should create a large Arab majority that would serve as the most effective means of reviving the Arab character of Palestine, while forming a powerful fifth-column for the day of revenge and reckoning.60 The Arabs believed the return of the refugees would virtually guarantee the destruction of Israel, a sentiment expressed by Egyptian Foreign Minister Muhammad Salah al- Din: It is well- known and understood that the Arabs, in demanding the return of the refugees to Palestine, mean their return as masters of the Homeland and not as slaves. With a greater clarity, they mean the liquidation of the State of Israel.61 The plight of the refugees remained unchanged after the Suez War. In fact, even the rhetoric stayed the same. In 1957, the Refugee Conference at Homs, Syria, passed a resolution stating: Any discussion aimed at a solution of the Palestine problem which will not be based on ensuring the refugees’ right to annihilate Israel will be regarded as a desecration of the Arab people and an act of treason.62 A parallel can be drawn to the time of the American Revolution, during which many colonists who were loyal to England fled to Canada. The British wanted the newly formed republic to allow the loyalists to return to claim their property. Benjamin Franklin rejected this suggestion in a letter to Richard Oswald, the British negotiator, dated November 26, 1782: Your ministers require that we should receive again into our bosom those who have been our bitterest enemies and restore their properties who have destroyed ours: and this while the wounds they have given us are still bleeding!63 MYTH “The Palestinian refugees were ignored by an uncaring world.” FACT The General Assembly voted on November 19, 1948, to establish the United Nations Relief For Palestinian Refugees (UNRPR) to dispense aid to the refugees. Since then, more than 100 resolutions have been adopted that refer to Palestinian refugees, roughly 15 percent of all the resolutions on the conflict.64 The UNRPR was replaced by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA) on December 8, 1949, and given a budget of $50 million. UNWRA was designed to continue the relief program initiated by the UNRPR, substitute public works for direct relief and promote economic development. The proponents of the plan envisioned that direct relief would be almost completely replaced by public works, with the remaining assistance provided by the Arab governments. UNRWA had little chance of success, however, because it sought to solve a political problem using an economic approach. By the mid- 1950s, it was evident neither the refugees nor the Arab states were prepared to cooperate on the large- scale development projects originally foreseen by the Agency as a means of alleviating the Palestinians’ situation. The Arab governments, and the refugees themselves, were unwilling to contribute to any plan that could be interpreted as fostering resettlement. They preferred to cling to their interpretation of Resolution 194, which they believed would eventually result in repatriation. Palestinian Refugees Registered by UNRWA65 Field of Operations Official Camps Registered Refugees Registered Refugees in Camps Jordan 10 1,780,701 283,183 Lebanon 12 400,582 210,952 Syria 10 424,650 112,882 West Bank 19 687,542 181,241 Gaza Strip 8 961,645 471,555 Total 59 4,255,120 1,259,813 MYTH “The Arab states have provided most of the funds for helping the Palestinian refugees.” FACT While Jewish refugees from Arab countries received no international assistance, Palestinians received millions of dollars through UNRWA. Initially, the United States contributed $25 million and Israel nearly $3 million. The total Arab pledges amounted to approximately $600,000. For the first 20 years, the United States provided more than two- thirds of the funds, while the Arab states continued to contribute a tiny fraction. Israel donated more funds to UNRWA than most Arab states. The Saudis did not match Israel’s contribution until 1973; Kuwait and Libya, not until 1980. More recently as 1994, Israel gave more to UNRWA than all the Arab countries except Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Morocco. After transferring responsibility for virtually the entire Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority, Israel no longer controlled any refugee camps and ceased contributing to UNRWA. In 2004, the United States contributed more than $127 million (36.5%) of UNRWA’s nearly $350 million budget. Despite their rhetorical support for the Palestinians, all of the Arab countries combined pledged only about $8 million (2%). The largest donation from an Arab nation—$1.8 million—came from Saudi Arabia.66 Meanwhile, in addition to receiving annual funding from UNRWA for the refugees, the PA has received billions of dollars in international aid and yet has failed to build a single house to allow even one family to move out of a refugee camp into permanent housing. Given the amount of aid (approximately $6 billion since 1993) the PA has received, it is shocking and outrageous that more than 650,000 Palestinians under PA control are being forced by their own leaders to remain in squalid camps. MYTH “The Arab states have always welcomed the Palestinians.” FACT Jordan was the only Arab country to welcome the Palestinians and grant them citizenship (to this day Jordan is the only Arab country where Palestinians as a group can become citizens). King Abdullah considered the Palestinian Arabs and Jordanians one people. By 1950, he annexed the West Bank and forbade the use of the term Palestine in official documents.67 Although ample room for settlement existed in Syria, Damascus refused to consider accepting any refugees, except those who might refuse repatriation. Syria also declined to resettle 85,000 refugees in 1952–54, though it had been offered international funds to pay for the project. Iraq was also expected to accept a large number of refugees, but proved unwilling. Lebanon insisted it had no room for the Palestinians. In 1950, the UN tried to resettle 150,000 refugees from Gaza in Libya, but was rebuffed by Egypt. After the 1948 war, Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip and its more than 200,000 inhabitants, but refused to allow the Palestinians into Egypt or permit them to move elsewhere. Egypt’s handling of Palestinians in Gaza was so bad Saudi Arabian radio compared Nasser’s regime in Gaza to Hitler’s rule in occupied Europe in World War II.68 In 1952, the UNWRA set up a fund of $200 million to provide homes and jobs for the refugees, but it went untouched. “The Arab States do not want to solve the refugee problem. They want to keep it as an open sore, as an affront to the United Nations and as a weapon against Israel. Arab leaders don’t give a damn whether the refugees live or die.” —former UNRWA official Ralph Galloway, in August 195869 Little has changed in succeeding years. Arab governments have frequently offered jobs, housing, land and other benefits to Arabs and non Arabs, excluding Palestinians. For example, Saudi Arabia chose not to use unemployed Palestinian refugees to alleviate its labor shortage in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Instead, thousands of South Koreans and other Asians were recruited to fill jobs. 13. Refugees 127 128 The situation grew even worse in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War. Kuwait, which employed large numbers of Palestinians but denied them citizenship, expelled more than 300,000 of them. “If people pose a security threat, as a sovereign country we have the right to exclude anyone we don’t want,” said Kuwaiti Ambassador to the United States, Saud Nasir Al- Sabah.70 Today, and Palestine refugees in Lebanon do not have social and civil rights, and have very limited access to public health or educational facilities. The majority relies on UNRWA as the sole provider of education, health, relief and social services. Considered foreigners, Palestine refugees are prohibited by law from working in more than 70 trades and professions.71 The Palestinian refugees held the UN responsible for ameliorating their condition; nevertheless, many Palestinians were unhappy with the treatment they were receiving from their Arab brethren. Some, like Palestinian nationalist leader Musa Alami were incredulous: “It is shameful that the Arab governments should prevent the Arab refugees from working in their countries and shut the doors in their faces and imprison them in camps.”72 Most refugees, however, focused their discontentment on “the Zionists,” whom they blamed for their predicament rather than the vanquished Arab armies. MYTH “Millions of Palestinians are confined to squalid refugee camps.” FACT As of March 2005, the number of Palestinian refugees on UNRWA rolls had risen to nearly 4.3 million, several times the number that left Palestine in 1948. Fewer than one- third of the registered Palestine refugees, about 1.3 million, live in 59 recognized refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The other two- thirds of the registered refugees live in and around the cities and towns of the host countries, and in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, often in the environs of official camps.73 MYTH “Israel forced the Palestinian refugees to stay in camps in the Gaza Strip.” FACT During the years that Israel controlled the Gaza Strip, a consistent effort was made to get the Palestinians into permanent housing. The Palestinians opposed the idea because the frustrated and bitter inhabitants of 13. Refugees 129 130 the camps provided the various terrorist factions with their manpower. Moreover, the Arab states routinely pushed for the adoption of UN resolutions demanding that Israel desist from the removal of Palestinian refugees from camps in Gaza and the West Bank.74 They preferred to keep the Palestinians as symbols of Israeli “oppression.” Now the camps are in the hands of the Palestinian Authority (PA), but little is being done to improve the lot of the Palestinians living in them. Journalist Netty Gross visited Gaza and asked an official why the camps there hadn’t been dismantled. She was told the Palestinian Authority had made a “political decision” not to do anything for the more than 650,000 Palestinians living in the camps until the final-status talks with Israel took place.75 Through 2005, the PA had still not spent one dime of the billions of dollars in foreign aid it had received to build permanent housing for the refugees. MYTH “Refugees have always been repatriated; only the Palestinians have been barred from returning to their homes.” FACT Despite Arab intransigence, no one expected the refugee problem to persist. John Blandford Jr., the Director of UNRWA, wrote in his report on November 29, 1951, that he expected the Arab governments to assume responsibility for relief by July 1952. Moreover, Blandford stressed the need to end relief operations: “Sustained relief operations inevitably contain the germ of human deterioration.”76 In fact, the Palestinians are the only displaced persons to have become wards of the international community. Israel’s agreement to pay compensation to the Palestinians who fled during 1948 can be contrasted with the treatment of the 12.5 million Germans in Poland and Czechoslovakia, who were expelled after World War II and allowed to take only those possessions they could carry. They received no compensation for confiscated property. World War II’s effects on Poland’s boundaries and population were considered “accomplished facts” that could not be reversed after the war. No one in Germany petitions today for the right of these millions of deportees and their children to return to the countries they were expelled from despite the fact that they and their ancestors had lived in those places for hundreds of years. Another country seriously affected by the war was Finland, which was forced to give up almost one- eighth of its land and absorb more than 400,000 refugees (11 percent of the nation’s population) from the Soviet Union. Unlike Israel, these were the losers of the war. There was no aid for their resettlement. Perhaps an even better analogy can be seen in Turkey’s integration of 150,000 Turkish refugees from Bulgaria in 1950. The difference between the Turks’ handling of their refugees and the Arab states’ treatment of the Palestinians was the attitude of the respective governments. Turkey has had a bigger refugee problem than either Syria or Lebanon and almost as big as Egypt has. . . . But you seldom hear about them because the Turks have done such a good job of resettling them. . . . The big difference is in spirit. The Turks, reluctant as they were to take on the burden, accepted it as a responsibility and set to work to clean it up as fast as possible.77 Had the Arab states wanted to alleviate the refugees’ suffering, they could easily have adopted an attitude similar to Turkey’s. Another massive population transfer resulted from the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. The eight million Hindus who fled Pakistan and the six million Muslims who left India were afraid of becoming a minority in their respective countries. Like the Palestinians, these people wanted to avoid being caught in the middle of the violence that engulfed their nations. In contrast to the Arab- Israeli conflict, however, the exchange of populations was considered the best solution to the problem of communal relations within the two states. Despite the enormous number of refugees and the relative poverty of the two nations involved, no special international relief organizations were established to aid them in resettlement. “. . . If there were a Palestinian state, why would its leaders want their potential citizens to be repatriated to another state? From a nation- building perspective it makes no sense. In fact, the original discussions about repatriation took place at a time that there was no hope of a Palestinian state. With the possibility of that state emerging, the Palestinians must decide if they want to view themselves as a legitimate state or if it is more important for them to keep their self- defined status as oppressed, stateless refugees. They really can’t be both.” —Fredelle Spiegel78 MYTH “Had the Palestinian refugees been repatriated, the Arab- Israeli conflict could have ended.” FACT Israel consistently sought a solution to the refugee problem, but could not simply agree to allow all Palestinians to return. 13. Refugees 131 132 No nation, regardless of past rights and wrongs, could contemplate taking in a fifth-column of such a size. And fifth-column it would be—people nurtured for 20 years [in 1967] in hatred of and totally dedicated to its destruction. The readmission of the refugees would be the equivalent to the admission to the U.S. of nearly 70,000,000 sworn enemies of the nation.79 The Arabs, meanwhile, adamantly refused to negotiate a separate agreement. The crux of the issue was the Arab states’ unwillingness to accept Israel’s existence. This was exemplified by Egyptian President Nasser’s belligerent acts toward the Jewish State, which had nothing to do with the Palestinians. He was only interested in the refugees to the extent that they could contribute to his ultimate objective. As he told an interviewer on September 1, 1961: “If refugees return to Israel, Israel will cease to exist.”80 MYTH “Israel expelled more Palestinians in 1967.” FACT After ignoring Israeli warnings to stay out of the war, King Hussein launched an attack on Jerusalem, Israel’s capital. UNRWA estimated that during the fighting 175,000 of its registrants fled for a second time and approximately 350,000 fled for the first time. About 200,000 moved to Jordan, 115,000 to Syria and approximately 35,000 left Sinai for Egypt. Most of the Arabs who left came from the West Bank. Israel allowed some West Bank Arabs to return. In 1967, more than 9,000 families were reunited and, by 1971, Israel had readmitted 40,000 refugees. By contrast, in July 1968, Jordan prohibited people intending to remain in the East Bank from emigrating from the West Bank and Gaza.81 When the Security Council empowered U Thant to send a representative to inquire into the welfare of civilians in the wake of the war, he instructed the mission to investigate the treatment of Jewish minorities in Arab countries, as well as Arabs in Israeli- occupied territory. Syria, Iraq and Egypt refused to permit the UN representative to carry out his investigation.82 MYTH “UNRWA bears no responsibility for the terror and incitement that originates in the refugee camps.” FACT Peter Hansen, commissioner- general of UNRWA admitted that the organization employed members of at least one Palestinian terrorist organization. “Oh I’m sure that there are Hamas members on the UNRWA payroll and I don’t see that as a crime,” he told the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. “Hamas as a political organization does not mean that every member is a militant and we do not do political vetting and exclude people from one persuasion against another.”83 Although Hansen makes specious distinctions between members of Hamas, the United States and the European Union, the two largest contributors to UNRWA, have banned the military and civilian wings of the organization. The fact is the refugee camps have long been nests of terrorism, but the evidence was not publicized until after Israel’s Operation Defensive Shield in early 2002. The UNRWA- administered camps in the West Bank were found to have small- arms factories, explosives laboratories, arms caches and large numbers of suicide bombers and other terrorists using the refugees as shields. Since 2001, 17 Palestinians employed by UNRWA have been arrested for alleged involvement in terrorist activities. Among them is the agency’s director of food supplies for Gaza refugees, who admitted using his UN vehicle to transport arms, explosives, and people planning terrorist acts. A Hamas activist employed as an UNRWA ambulance driver admitted using his vehicle to forward weapons and messages to other members of Hamas.84 UNRWA’s failure to report on these activities, or to prevent them, violate the UN’s own conventions. Security Council resolutions oblige UNRWA representatives to take “appropriate steps to help create a secure environment” in all “situations where refugees [are] . . . vulnerable to infiltration by armed elements.” With regard to Africa, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, said refugee camps should “be kept free of any military presence or equipment, including arms and ammunition.85 The same rule applies to the disputed territories. Schools under UNRWA’s jurisdiction are also problematic. UNRWA takes credit for assisting in the development of the Palestinian curricula, which, among other things, does not show Israel on any maps. The schools are also filled with posters and shrines to suicide bombers. The State Department requested that UNRWA investigate allegations that Palestinian Authority curricular materials contained anti- Semitic references. One book taught that “Treachery and disloyalty are character traits of the Jews,” but UNRWA said this was not offensive because it described actual “historical events.” The State Department ultimately reported to Congress that the “UNRWA review did reveal instances of anti-Semitic characterizations and content” in the PA textbooks.86 Since the State Department’s report, several studies have shown that while there has been marginal improvement in Palestinian texts, they still contain troubling content. For example, one report found that Islamic Culture, a book produced by the Palestinian Authority Ministry of Education, incites jihad and martyrdom, while another study of 35 13. Refugees 133 134 books concluded that they lacked any commitment to peace and reconciliation with Israel. MYTH “All the Palestinian refugees have the right to return to their homes.” FACT Does Israel have any obligation to take in the 4.3 million Palestinian refugees? Where would they live? The current Israeli population is approximately 7 million, 5.3 million are Jews. If every Palestinian was allowed to move to Israel, the population would exceed 11 million and the Jewish proportion would shrink from 76% to 48%. The Jews would be a minority in their own country, the very situation they fought to avoid in 1948 and which the UN expressly ruled out in deciding on a partition of Palestine. Current peace talks are based on UN Resolution 242. The Palestinians are not mentioned anywhere in Resolution 242. They are only alluded to in the second clause of the second article of 242, which calls for “a just settlement of the refugee problem.” The generic term “refugee” may also be applied to the Jewish refugees from Arab lands. Furthermore, most Palestinians now live in historic Palestine, which is an area including the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. When Palestinians speak of the right to return, however, they don’t mean just to Palestine, but to the exact houses they lived in prior to 1948. These homes are either gone or inhabited now. Even respected Palestinian leaders have begun to acknowledge that it is a mistake to insist that millions of refugees return to Israel. Palestinian intellectual Sari Nusseibeh, for example, said the refugees should be resettled in a future Palestinian state, “not in a way that would undermine the existence of the State of Israel as a predominantly Jewish state. Otherwise, what does a two- state solution mean?”87 In the context of a peace settlement, Israel could be expected to accept some refugees, as Ben- Gurion said he would do more than 50 years ago. If and when a Palestinian state is created, most, if not all of the refugees should be allowed to move there, but the Palestinian leadership has expressed little interest in absorbing these people. Notes 1. Arieh Avneri, The Claim of Dispossession, (NJ: Transaction Books, 1984), p. 272; Kedar, Benjamin, The Changing Land Between the Jordan and the Sea. (Israel: Yad Izhak Ben- Zvi Press, 1999), p. 206; Paul Johnson, A History of the Jews, (NY: Harper & Row, 1987), p. 529. 2. Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, Submitted to the Secretary- General for Transmission to the Members of the United Nations, General Assembly Official Records: Third Session, Supplement No. 11 (A\648), Paris, 1948, p. 47 and Supplement No. 11A (A\689, and A\689\Add. 1, p. 5; and “Conclusions From Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine,” (September 16, 1948), U.N. doc. A/648 (part one, p. 29; part two, p. 23 and part three, p. 11), (September 18, 1948). 3. New York Times, (November 25, 1947). 4. Avneri, p. 276. 5. Jerusalem Post, (December 4, 2003). 6. David Ben- Gurion, Rebirth and Destiny of Israel, (NY: Philosophical Library, 1954), p. 220. 7. Isi Liebler, The Case For Israel, (Australia: The Globe Press, 1972), p. 43. 8. Joseph Schechtman, The Refugee in the World, (NY: A.S. Barnes and Co., 1963), p. 184. 9. I.F. Stone, This is Israel, (NY: Boni and Gaer, 1948), p. 27. 10. Ash Sha’ab, (January 30, 1948). 11. As Sarih, (March 30, 1948). 12. Avneri, p. 270. 13. London Daily Mail, (August 12, 1948). 14. New York Times, (April 23, 1948). 15. Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 332; Avneri, p. 270. 16. Secret memo dated April 26, 1948, from the Superintendent of Police, regarding the general situation in Haifa. See also his April 29 memo. 17. Golda Meir, My Life, (NY: Dell, 1975), pp. 267–268. 18. New York Times, (April 23, 1948). 19. London Times, (April 24, 1948). 20. Schechtman, p. 190. 21. Foreign Relations of the U.S. 1948, Vol. V, (DC: GPO, 1976), p. 838. 22. Tom Segev, 1949: The First Israelis, (NY: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 27–28. 23. Yigal Allon in Sefer ha- Palmach, quoted in Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, O Jerusalem!, (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 337; Yigal Allon, My Father’s House, (NY: W.W Norton and Company, Inc., 1976), p. 192. 24. Benny Morris, “Operation Dani and the Palestinian Exodus from Lydda and Ramle in 1948,” Middle East Journal, (Winter 1986), pp. 82–83. 25. Middle East Journal, (October 1949). 26. Terence Prittie, “Middle East Refugees,” in Michael Curtis, et al., The Palestinians, (NJ: Transaction Books, 1975), p. 52. 27. New York Times, (March 4, 1949). 28. The Guardian (February 21, 2002). 29. Middle Eastern Studies, (January 1986); See also Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 263 & 590–591. 30. The Memoirs of Haled al Azm, (Beirut, 1973), Part 1, pp. 386–387. 31. Myron Kaufman, The Coming Destruction of Israel, (NY: The American Library Inc., 1970), pp. 26–27. 32. Edward Atiyah, The Arabs, (London: Penguin Books, 1955), p. 183. 33. Samuel Katz, Battleground- Fact and Fantasy in Palestine, (NY: Bantam Books, 1985), p. 15. 34. King Abdallah, My Memoirs Completed, (London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1978), p. xvi. [Abdullah generally, but spelled Abdallah in his memoir]. 13. Refugees 135 136 35. Schechtman, p. 186. 36. Yehoshofat Harkabi, Arab Attitudes To Israel, (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972), p. 364. 37. Falastin a- Thaura, (March 1976). 38. “Deir Yassin,” Bir Zeit University. 39. Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948, (OH: New American Library, Inc., 1970), p. 141. 40. Menachem Begin, The Revolt, (NY: Nash Publishing, 1977), pp. xx–xxi, 162–163. 41. See, for example, Amos Perlmutter, The Life and Times of Menachem Begin, (NY: Doubleday, 1987), p. 214; J. Bowyer Bell, Terror Out Of Zion, (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1977), p. 292–96; Kurzman, p. 142. 42. Uri Milstein, History of Israel’s War of Independence. Vol. IV, (Lanham: University Press of America. 1999), p. 262. 43. Milstein, p. 262. 44. Dana Adams Schmidt, “200 Arabs Killed, Stronghold Taken,” New York Times, (April 10, 1948). 45. Kurzman, p. 148. 46. Sharif Kanaana and Nihad Zitawi, “Deir Yassin,” Monograph No. 4, Destroyed Palestinian Villages Documentation Project, (Bir Zeit: Documentation Center of Bir Zeit University, 1987), p. 55. 47. Sharif Kanaana, “Reinterpreting Deir Yassin,” Bir Zeit University, (April 1998). 48. Milstein, p. 267 49. Rami Nashashibi, “Deir Yassin,” Bir Zeit University, (June 1996). 50. Yehoshua Gorodenchik testimony at Jabotinsky Archives. 51. Milstein, p. 276. 52. “Israel and the Arabs: The 50 Year Conflict,” BBC. 53. Sachar, p. 335. 54. Schechtman, p. 268. 55. Prittie in Curtis, pp. 66–67. 56. New York Times, (July 17, 1949). 57. Telegraph (Beirut), (August 6, 1948), quoted in Schechtman, p. 210–211. 58. Jerusalem Post, (January 26, 1989). 59. Moshe Sharett, “Israel’s Position and Problems,” Middle Eastern Affairs, (May 1952), p. 136. 60. Lebanese newspaper, Al Said, (April 6, 1950), quoted in Prittie in Curtis, p. 69. 61. Al- Misri, (October 11, 1949). 62. Beirut al Massa, (July 15, 1957). 63. The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, (NY: The Macmillan Company, 1905), p. 626. 64. Melissa Radler, “UN marks partition plan anniversary with anti- Israel fest,” Jerusalem Post, (December 4, 2003). 65. UNRWA, (as of March 31, 2005). 66. UNRWA Finances (as of March 31, 2005). 67. Speech to Parliament, April 24, 1950, Abdallah memoirs, p. 13; Aaron Miller, The Arab States and the Palestine Question, (DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1986), p. 29. 68. Leibler, p. 48. 69. Prittie in Curtis, p. 71. 70. Jerusalem Report, (June 27, 1991). 71. UNRWA. 72. Musa Alami, “The Lesson of Palestine,” Middle East Journal, (October 1949), p. 386. 73. UNRWA. 74. Arlene Kushner, “The UN’s Palestinian Refugee Problem,” Azure, (Autumn 2005). 75. Jerusalem Report, (July 6, 1998). 76. Schechtman, p. 220. 77. Des Moines Register editorial, (January 16, 1952). 78. Jerusalem Report, (March 26, 2001). 79. New York Times editorial, (May 14, 1967). 80. Leibler, p. 45. 81. UNRWA Annual Reports, (July 1, 1966–June 30, 1967), pp. 11–19; (July 1, 1967–June 30, 1968), pp. 4–10; (July 1, 1968–June 30, 1969), p. 6; (July 1, 1971–June 30, 1972), p. 3. 82. Maurice Roumani, The Case of the Jews from Arab Countries: A Neglected Issue, (Tel Aviv: World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries, 1977), p. 34. 83. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, (October 4, 2004), quoted by Jewish Telegraphic Agency, (October 4, 2004). 84. Matthew Levitt, “Terror on the UN Payroll?” Peace Watch, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, (October 13, 2004); Greg Myre, “Israel Feuds With Agency Set Up to Aid Palestinians,” New York Times, (October 18, 2004). 85. Isabel Kershner, “The Refugees’ Choice?” Jerusalem Report, (August 12, 2002), p. 24. 86. David Tell, response to McCann, The Weekly Standard, (May 28, 2002). 87. Associated Press, (October 22, 2001).

14. The Treatment of Jews in Arab/Islamic Countries MYTH “Arabs cannot be anti- Semitic as they are themselves Semites.” FACT The term “anti- Semite” was coined in Germany in 1879 by Wilhelm Marr to refer to the anti- Jewish manifestations of the period and to give Jew hatred a more scientific sounding name.1 “Anti- Semitism” has been accepted and understood to mean hatred of the Jewish people. Dictionaries define the term as: “Theory, action, or practice directed against the Jews” and “Hostility towards Jews as a religious or racial minority group, often accompanied by social, economic and political discrimination.”2 The claim that Arabs as “Semites” cannot possibly be anti- Semitic is a semantic distortion that ignores the reality of Arab discrimination and hostility toward Jews. Arabs, like any other people, can indeed be anti-Semitic. “The Arab world is the last bastion of unbridled, unashamed, unhidden and unbelievable anti- Semitism. Hitlerian myths get published in the popular press as incontrovertible truths. The Holocaust either gets minimized or denied. . . . How the Arab world will ever come to terms with Israel when Israelis are portrayed as the devil incarnate is hard to figure out.” —Columnist Richard Cohen3 MYTH “Modern Arab nations are only anti- Israel and have never been anti- Jewish.” FACT Arab leaders have repeatedly made clear their animosity toward Jews and Judaism. For example, on November 23, 1937, Saudi Arabia’s King Ibn Saud told British Colonel H.R.P. Dickson: “Our hatred for the Jews dates from God’s condemnation of them for their persecution and rejection of Isa (Jesus) and their subsequent rejection of His chosen Prophet.” He added “that for a Muslim to kill a Jew or for him to be killed by a Jew ensures him an immediate entry into Heaven and into the august presence of God Almighty.”4 When Hitler introduced the Nuremberg racial laws in 1935, he received telegrams of congratulation from all corners of the Arab world.5 Later, during the war; one of his most ardent supporters was the Mufti of Jerusalem. Jews were never permitted to live in Jordan. Civil Law No. 6, which governed the Jordanian- occupied West Bank, states explicitly: “Any man will be a Jordanian subject if he is not Jewish.”6 After the Six- Day War in 1967, the Israelis found public school textbooks that had been used to educate Arab children in the West Bank. They were replete with racist and hateful portrayals of Jews.7 According to a study of Syrian textbooks, “the Syrian educational system expands hatred of Israel and Zionism to anti- Semitism directed at all Jews. That anti- Semitism evokes ancient Islamic motifs to describe the unchangeable and treacherous nature of the Jews. Its inevitable conclusion is that all Jews must be annihilated.”8 An Arabic translation of Adolph Hitler’s Mein Kampf was distributed in East Jerusalem and the territories controlled by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and became a bestseller. The official website of the Palestinian State Information Service also published an Arabic translation of the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion.”9 Arab officials have also resorted to blood libels. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, for example, said that Jews “have a certain day on which they mix the blood of non- Jews into their bread and eat it. It happened that two years ago, while I was in Paris on a visit, that the police discovered five murdered children. Their blood had been drained, and it turned out that some Jews had murdered them in order to take their blood and mix it with the bread that they eat on this day.”10 On November 11, 1999, during a Gaza appearance with First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, Suha Arafat, wife of Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat stated: “Our people have been subjected to the daily and extensive use of poisonous gas by the Israeli forces, which has led to an increase in cancer cases among women and children.” Other specious allegations have been made by other Palestinian officials, such as the claims that Israel dumped toxic waste in the West Bank, marketed carcinogenic juice to Palestinians, released wild pigs to destroy crops in the West Bank, infected Palestinians with the AIDS virus, dropped poison candy for children in Gaza from airplanes, and used a “radial spy machine” at checkpoints that killed a Palestinian woman.11 The Arab/Muslim press, which is almost exclusively controlled by the governments in each Middle Eastern nation, regularly publish anti-Semitic articles and cartoons. Today, it remains common to find anti-Semitic publications in Egypt. For example, the establishment Al-Ahram 14. The Treatment of Jews in Arab/Islamic Countries 139 140 newspaper published an article giving the “historical” background of the blood libel tradition while accusing Israel of using the blood of Palestinian children to bake matzos up to the present time.12 Anti-Semitic articles also regularly appear in the press in Jordan and Syria. Many of the attacks deal with denial of the Holocaust, its “exploitation” by Zionism, and a comparison of Zionism and Israel to Nazism. To its credit, the Jordanian government canceled the 2005 broadcast of an anti- Semitic television series base on the “Protocols.”13 In November 2001, a satirical skit aired on the second most popular television station in the Arab world, which depicted a character meant to be Ariel Sharon drinking the blood of Arab children as a grotesque looking Orthodox Jew looked on. Abu Dhabi Television also aired a skit in which Dracula appears to take a bite out of Sharon, but dies because Sharon’s blood is polluted. Protests that these shows were anti- Semitic were ignored by the network.14 “Syrian President Bashar Assad on Saturday [May 5] offered a vivid, if vile, demonstration of why he and his government are unworthy of respect or good relations with the United States or any other democratic country. Greeting Pope John Paul II in Damascus, Mr. Assad launched an attack on Jews that may rank as the most ignorant and crude speech delivered before the pope in his two decades of travel around the world. Comparing the suffering of the Palestinians to that of Jesus Christ, Mr. Assad said that the Jews ‘tried to kill the principles of all religions with the same mentality in which they betrayed Jesus Christ and the same way they tried to betray and kill the Prophet Muhammad.’ With that libel, the Syrian president stained both his country and the pope. . . .” —Washington Post editorial, (May 8, 2001) The Palestinian Authority’s media have also contained inflammatory and anti- Semitic material. A Friday sermon in the Zayed bin Sultan Aal Nahyan mosque in Gaza calling for the murder of Jews and Americans was broadcast live on the official Palestinian Authority television: Have no mercy on the Jews, no matter where they are, in any country. Fight them, wherever you are. Wherever you meet them, kill them. Wherever you are, kill those Jews and those Americans who are like them and those who stand by them they are all in one trench, against the Arabs and the Muslims because they established Israel here, in the beating heart of the Arab world, in Palestine. . . .15 Even Palestinian crossword puzzles are used to delegitimize Israel and attack Jews, providing clues, for example, suggesting the Jewish trait is “treachery.”16 MYTH “Jews who lived in Islamic countries were well- treated by the Arabs.” FACT While Jewish communities in Islamic countries fared better overall than those in Christian lands in Europe, Jews were no strangers to persecution and humiliation among the Arabs. As Princeton University historian Bernard Lewis has written: “The Golden Age of equal rights was a myth, and belief in it was a result, more than a cause, of Jewish sympathy for Islam.”17 Muhammad, the founder of Islam, traveled to Medina in 622 A.D. to attract followers to his new faith. When the Jews of Medina refused to recognize Muhammad as their Prophet, two of the major Jewish tribes were expelled. In 627, Muhammad’s followers killed between 600 and 900 of the men, and divided the surviving Jewish women and children amongst themselves.18 The Muslim attitude toward Jews is reflected in various verses throughout the Koran, the holy book of the Islamic faith. “They [the Children of Israel] were consigned to humiliation and wretchedness. They brought the wrath of God upon themselves, and this because they used to deny God’s signs and kill His Prophets unjustly and because they disobeyed and were transgressors” (Sura 2:61). According to the Koran, the Jews try to introduce corruption (5:64), have always been disobedient (5:78), and are enemies of Allah, the Prophet and the angels (2:97–98). Jews were generally viewed with contempt by their Muslim neighbors; peaceful coexistence between the two groups involved the subordination and degradation of the Jews. In the ninth century, Baghdad’s Caliph al- Mutawakkil designated a yellow badge for Jews, setting a precedent that would be followed centuries later in Nazi Germany.19 At various times, Jews in Muslim lands lived in relative peace and thrived culturally and economically. The position of the Jews was never secure, however, and changes in the political or social climate would often lead to persecution, violence and death. When Jews were perceived as having achieved too comfortable a position in Islamic society, anti- Semitism would surface, often with devastating results. On December 30, 1066, Joseph HaNagid, the Jewish vizier of Granada, Spain, was crucified by an Arab mob that proceeded to raze the Jewish quarter of the city and slaughter its 5,000 inhabitants. The riot was incited by Muslim preachers who had angrily objected to what they saw as inordinate Jewish political power. Similarly, in 1465, Arab mobs in Fez slaughtered thousands of Jews, leaving only 11 alive, after a Jewish deputy vizier treated a Muslim woman in “an offensive manner.” The killings touched off a wave of similar massacres throughout Morocco.20 Other mass murders of Jews in Arab lands occurred in Morocco in the 8th century, where whole communities were wiped out by the Muslim ruler Idris I; North Africa in the 12th century, where the Almohads either forcibly converted or decimated several communities; Libya in 1785, where Ali Burzi Pasha murdered hundreds of Jews; Algiers, where Jews were massacred in 1805, 1815 and 1830; and Marrakesh, Morocco, where more than 300 Jews were murdered between 1864 and 1880.21 Decrees ordering the destruction of synagogues were enacted in Egypt and Syria (1014, 1293–4, 1301–2), Iraq (854–859, 1344) and Yemen (1676). Despite the Koran’s prohibition, Jews were forced to convert to Islam or face death in Yemen (1165 and 1678), Morocco (1275, 1465 and 1790–92) and Baghdad (1333 and 1344).22 The situation of Jews in Arab lands reached a low point in the 19th century. Jews in most of North Africa (including Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Morocco) were forced to live in ghettos. In Morocco, which contained the largest Jewish community in the Islamic Diaspora, Jews were made to walk barefoot or wear shoes of straw when outside the ghetto. Even Muslim children participated in the degradation of Jews, by throwing stones at them or harassing them in other ways. The frequency of anti- Jewish violence increased, and many Jews were executed on charges of apostasy. Ritual murder accusations against the Jews became commonplace in the Ottoman Empire.23 As distinguished Orientalist G.E. von Grunebaum has written: It would not be difficult to put together the names of a very sizeable number Jewish subjects or citizens of the Islamic area who have attained to high rank, to power, to great financial influence, to significant and recognized intellectual attainment; and the same could be done for Christians. But it would again not be difficult to compile a lengthy list of persecutions, arbitrary confiscations, attempted forced conversions, or pogroms.24 The danger for Jews became even greater as a showdown approached in the UN. The Syrian delegate, Faris el- Khouri, warned: “Unless the Palestine problem is settled, we shall have difficulty in protecting and safeguarding the Jews in the Arab world.”25 More than a thousand Jews were killed in anti- Jewish rioting during the 1940’s in Iraq, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Yemen.26 This helped trigger the mass exodus of Jews from Arab countries. MYTH “As ‘People of the Book,’ Jews and Christians are protected under Islamic law.” FACT This argument is rooted in the traditional concept of the “dhimma” (“writ of protection”), which was extended by Muslim conquerors to Christians and Jews in exchange for their subordination to the Muslims. Yet, as French authority Jacques Ellul has observed: “One must ask: ‘protected against whom?’ When this ‘stranger’ lives in Islamic countries, the answer can only be: against the Muslims themselves.”27 Peoples subjected to Muslim rule usually had a choice between death and conversion, but Jews and Christians, who adhered to the Scriptures, were usually allowed, as dhimmis, to practice their faith. This “protection” did little, however, to insure that Jews and Christians were treated well by the Muslims. On the contrary, an integral aspect of the dhimma was that, being an infidel, he had to acknowledge openly the superiority of the true believer—the Muslim. In the early years of the Islamic conquest, the “tribute” (or jizya), paid as a yearly poll tax, symbolized the subordination of the dhimmi.28 Later, the inferior status of Jews and Christians was reinforced through a series of regulations that governed the behavior of the dhimmi. Dhimmis, on pain of death, were forbidden to mock or criticize the Koran, Islam or Muhammad, to proselytize among Muslims, or to touch a Muslim woman (though a Muslim man could take a non- Muslim as a wife). Dhimmis were excluded from public office and armed service, and were forbidden to bear arms. They were not allowed to ride horses or camels, to build synagogues or churches taller than mosques, to construct houses higher than those of Muslims or to drink wine in public. They were forced to wear distinctive clothing and were not allowed to pray or mourn in loud voices—as that might offend Muslims. The dhimmi also had to show public deference toward Muslims; for example, always yielding them the center of the road. The dhimmi was not allowed to give evidence in court against a Muslim, and his oath was unacceptable in an Islamic court. To defend himself, the dhimmi would have to purchase Muslim witnesses at great expense. This left the dhimmi with little legal recourse when harmed by a Muslim.29 By the twentieth century, the status of the dhimmi in Muslim lands had not significantly improved. H.E.W. Young, British Vice Consul in Mosul wrote in 1909: The attitude of the Muslims toward the Christians and the Jews is that of a master towards slaves, whom he treats with a certain 14. The Treatment of Jews in Arab/Islamic Countries 143 144 lordly tolerance as long as they keep their place. Any sign of pretension to equality is promptly repressed.30 The Situation Today The Jews of Algeria 1948 Jewish population: 190,000 2004: Less than 10031 Jewish settlement in present- day Algeria can be traced back to the first centuries of the Common Era. In the 14th century, with the deterioration of conditions in Spain, many Spanish Jews moved to Algeria. After the French occupation of the country in 1830, Jews gradually adopted French culture and were granted French citizenship.32 In 1934, Muslims, incited by events in Nazi Germany, rampaged in Constantine, killing 25 Jews and injuring many more. After being granted independence in 1962, the Algerian government harassed the Jewish community and deprived Jews of their economic rights. As a result, almost 160,000 Algerian Jews immigrated to France. Since 1948, 25,681 Algerian Jews have immigrated to Israel. Most of the remaining Jews live in Algiers, but there are individual Jews in Oran and Blida. Jews practice their religion freely, and Jewish community leaders are included in ceremonial state functions. There is no resident rabbi.33 In 1994, the terrorist Armed Islamic Group—GIA declared its intention to eliminate Jews from Algeria.34 Following the announcement, many Jews left Algeria and the single remaining synagogue was abandoned.35 All other synagogues had previously been taken over for use as mosques. The Jews of Egypt 1948 Jewish population: 75,000 2004: 100 Between June and November 1948, bombs set off in the Jewish Quarter of Cairo killed more than 70 Jews and wounded nearly 200.36 In 1956; the Egyptian government used the Sinai Campaign as a pretext for expelling almost 25,000 Egyptian Jews and confiscating their property. Approximately 1,000 more Jews were sent to prisons and detention camps. On November 23, 1956, a proclamation signed by the Minister of Religious Affairs, and read aloud in mosques throughout Egypt, declared that “all Jews are Zionists and enemies of the state,” and promised that they would be soon expelled. Thousands of Jews were ordered to leave the country. They were allowed to take only one suitcase and a small sum of cash, and forced to sign declarations “donating” their property to the Egyptian government. Foreign observers reported that members of Jewish families were taken hostage, apparently to insure that those forced to leave did not speak out against the Egyptian government.37 When war broke out in 1967, Jewish homes and property were confiscated. Egypt’s attitude toward Jews at that time was reflected in its treatment of former Nazis. Hundreds were allowed to take up residence in Egypt and given positions in the government. The head of the Polish Gestapo, Leopold Gleim (who had been sentenced to death in absentia), controlled the Egyptian secret police. In 1979, following the signing of the Egypt- Israel peace treaty, the Egyptian Jewish community became the first in the Arab world to establish official contact with Israel. Israel now has an embassy in Cairo and a consulate general in Alexandria. At present, the few remaining Jews are free to practice Judaism without any restrictions or harassment. Shaar Hashamayim is the only functioning synagogue in Cairo. Of the many synagogues in Alexandria only the Eliahu Hanabi is open for worship.38 There have been no anti- Semitic incidents in recent years directed at the tiny Jewish community;39 however, Anti- Semitism is rampant in the government- controlled press, and increased in late 2000 and 2001 following the outbreak of violence in Israel and the territories. In April 2001, columnist Ahmed Ragheb lamented Hitler’s failure to finish the job of annihilating the Jews. In May 2001, an article in Al-Akhbar attacked Europeans and Americans for believing in the false Holocaust.40 On March 18, 2004, ‘Bad al- Ahab ‘Adams, deputy editor of Al Jumhuriya, accused the Jews of the terrorist attack in Madrid on March 11 as well as of the September 11, 2001, attacks.41 A positive development was the announcement that a Cairo synagogue built in 1934, which had been closed because so few Jews remain in Egypt, would be reopened in July 2005. The head of Cairo’s Jewish community, Carmen Weinstein, and Israel’s ambassador to Egypt, Shalom Cohen, arranged to reopen the synagogue, which the Israeli Embassy will help to maintain.42 The Jews of Iran 1948 Jewish population, 200,000 2004: 10,900 The Jewish community of Persia, modern- day Iran, is one of the oldest in the Diaspora, and its historical roots reach back to the time of the First Temple. Under the Phalevi Dynasty, established in 1925, the country was secularized and oriented toward the West. This greatly benefited the Jews, who were emancipated and played an important role in the economy and cultural life. On the eve of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, 95,000 Jews lived in Iran. In the wake of the upheaval, tens of thousands of Jews, especially the wealthy, left the country, leaving behind vast amounts of property. Iran’s Jewish community, nevertheless, remains the largest in the Middle East outside Israel. The Council of the Jewish Community, which was established after World War II, is the representative body of the community. The Jews also have a representative in parliament who is obligated by law to support Iranian foreign policy and its anti- Zionist position. Despite the official distinction between “Jews,” “Zionists,” and “Israel,” the most common accusation the Jews encounter is that of maintaining contacts with Zionists. The Jewish community does enjoy a measure of religious freedom, but is faced with constant suspicion of cooperating with the “Zionist state” and with “imperialistic America”—activities punishable by death. Jews who apply for a passport to travel abroad must do so in a special bureau and are immediately put under surveillance. The government does not generally allow all members of a family to travel abroad at the same time to prevent Jewish emigration. Jewish leaders fear government reprisals if they draw attention to official mistreatment of their community. The Islamization of the country has brought about strict control over Jewish educational institutions. Before the revolution, there were some 20 Jewish schools functioning throughout the country. In recent years, most of these have been closed down. In the remaining schools, Jewish principals have been replaced by Muslims. In Teheran, Jewish pupils still constitute a majority in three schools. The curriculum is Islamic, and Persian is forbidden as the language of instruction for Jewish studies. Special Hebrew lessons are conducted on Fridays by the Orthodox Otzar ha-Torah organization, which is responsible for Jewish religious education. Saturday is no longer officially recognized as the Jewish Sabbath, and Jewish pupils are compelled to attend school on that day. There are three synagogues in Teheran, but there has been no rabbi in Iran since 1994 and the bet din does not function.43 Following the overthrow of the shah and the declaration of an Islamic state in 1979, Iran severed relations with Israel. The country has subsequently supported many of the Islamic terrorist organizations that target Jews and Israelis, particularly the Lebanon- based Hezbollah. On the eve of Passover in 1999, 13 Jews from Shiran and Isfahan in southern Iran were arrested and accused of spying for Israel and the United States. Those arrested include a rabbi, a ritual slaughterer and teachers. In September 2000, an Iranian appeals court upheld a decision to imprison ten of the thirteen Jews accused of spying for Israel. In the appeals court, ten of the accused were found guilty of cooperating with Israel and were given prison terms ranging from two to nine years. Three of the accused were found innocent in the first trial.44 In March 2001, one of the imprisoned Jews was released, a second was freed in January 2002, the remaining eight were set free in late October 2002. The last five apparently were released on furlough for an indefinite period, leaving them vulnerable to future arrest. Three others were reportedly pardoned by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.45 At least 17 Jews have been executed in Iran since the Islamic revolution 19 years ago, most of them for either religious reasons or their connection to Israel. The Jews of Iraq 1948 Jewish population: 150,000 2004: Approximately 35 One of the longest surviving Jewish communities still lives in Iraq. In 722 B.C.E., the northern tribes of Israel were defeated by Assyria and some Jews were taken to what is now known as Iraq. A larger community was established in 586 B.C.E., when the Babylonians conquered the southern tribes of Israel and enslaved the Jews. In later centuries, the region became more hospitable to Jews and it became the home to some of the world’s most prominent scholars who produced the Babylonian Talmud between 500 and 700 C.E. By World War I, Jews accounted for one third of Baghdad’s population. In 1922, the British received a mandate over Iraq and began transforming it into a modern nation- state. Iraq became an independent state in 1932. Throughout this period, the authorities drew heavily on the talents of the well- educated Jews for their ties outside the country and proficiency in foreign languages. Iraq’s first minister of finance, Yehezkel Sasson, was a Jew. Jews also played a vital role in the development of the judicial and postal systems. Following the end of the British mandate, the 2,700- year- old Iraqi Jewish community suffered increasing persecution, particularly as the Zionist drive for a state intensified. In June 1941, Rashid Ali, inspired by the arrival of the exiled Mufti of Jerusalem, rebelled against British rule and took control of the Iraqi government. Ali sparked a pro- Nazi riot in Baghdad that left 180 Jews dead and 1,000 wounded. British forces struck back against Ali’s army and crushed the rebellion. Jews built a broad network of medical facilities, schools and cultural activity. Nearly all of the members of the Baghdad Symphony Orchestra were Jewish. Yet this flourishing environment abruptly ended in 1947, 14. The Treatment of Jews in Arab/Islamic Countries 147 148 with the partition of Palestine and the fight for Israel’s independence. Outbreaks of anti- Jewish rioting regularly occurred between 1947–49. After the establishment of Israel in 1948, Zionism became a capital crime. In 1950, Iraqi Jews were permitted to leave the country within a year provided they forfeited their citizenship. A year later, however, the property of Jews who emigrated was frozen and economic restrictions were placed on Jews who chose to remain in the country. From 1949 to 1951, 104,000 Jews were evacuated from Iraq in Operations Ezra and Nechemia; another 25,000 were smuggled out through Iran.46 In 1952, Iraq’s government barred Jews from emigrating and publicly hanged two Jews after falsely charging them with hurling a bomb at the Baghdad office of the U.S. Information Agency. With the rise of competing Ba’ath factions in 1963, additional restrictions were placed on the remaining Iraqi Jews. The sale of property was forbidden and all Jews were forced to carry yellow identity cards. After the Six- Day War, more repressive measures were imposed. Jewish property was expropriated; Jewish bank accounts were frozen; Jews were dismissed from public posts; businesses were shut; trading permits were cancelled and telephones were disconnected. Jews were placed under house arrest for long periods of time or restricted to the cities. Persecution was at its worst at the end of 1968. Scores were jailed upon the discovery of a local “spy ring” composed of Jewish businessmen. Fourteen men—eleven of them Jews—were sentenced to death in staged trials and hanged in the public squares of Baghdad; others died of torture. On January 27, 1969, Baghdad Radio called upon Iraqis to “come and enjoy the feast.” Some 500,000 men, women and children paraded and danced past the scaffolds where the bodies of the hanged Jews swung; the mob rhythmically chanted “Death to Israel” and “Death to all traitors.” This display brought a worldwide public outcry that Radio Baghdad dismissed by declaring: “We hanged spies, but the Jews crucified Christ.”47 Jews remained under constant surveillance by the Iraqi government. In response to international pressure, the Baghdad government quietly allowed most of the remaining Jews to emigrate in the early 1970’s, even while leaving other restrictions in force. In 1991, prior to the Gulf War, the State Department said “there is no recent evidence of overt persecution of Jews, but the regime restricts travel, (particularly to Israel) and contacts with Jewish groups abroad.” Only one synagogue continues to function in Iraq, “a crumbling buff- colored building tucked away in an alleyway” in Bataween, once Baghdad’s main Jewish neighborhood. According to the synagogue’s administrator, “there are few children to be bar- mitzvahed, or couples to be married. Jews can practice their religion but are not allowed to hold jobs in state enterprises or join the army.”48 The rabbi died in 1996 and only one of the remaining Jews can perform the liturgy; only a couple of people know Hebrew. The last wedding was held in 1980.49 Today, approximately 35 Jews live in Baghdad, and a handful more in the Kurdish- controlled northern parts of Iraq.50 About half of those in Baghdad are elderly, poor and lacking basic needs such as clothing, medication and food. Jews face no direct threats. The one synagogue, the Meir Taweig Synagogue, remains to serve the needs of the small community. The youngest Jew living in Iraq is 38 years old, and acts as the volunteer lay rabbi and kosher slaughterer.51 The end of Saddam Hussein’s regime created the possibility of an improvement in the living conditions of Jews and the return of some of the émigrés. Some hope also exists for rapprochement with Israel. Given the instability in Iraq since the fall of Saddam, it is unlikely any great changes will take place immediately. For now, at least, Iraq is no longer openly hostile toward Israel. The Jews of Lebanon 1948 Jewish population: 20,000 2004: Fewer than 100 When Christian Arabs ruled Lebanon, Jews enjoyed relative toleration. In the mid- 50’s, approximately 7,000 Jews lived in Beirut. As Jews in an Arab country, however, their position was never secure, and the majority left in 1967. Fighting in the 1975–76 Muslim- Christian civil wars swirled around the Jewish Quarter in Beirut, damaging many Jewish homes, businesses and synagogues. Most of the remaining 1,800 Lebanese Jews emigrated in 1976, fearing the growing Syrian presence in Lebanon would curtail their freedom. Most Jews went to Europe (particularly France), the United States and Canada. In the mid- 1980’s, Hezbollah kidnapped several prominent Jews from Beirut—most were leaders of what remained of the country’s tiny Jewish community. Four of the Jews were later found murdered. Nearly all of the remaining Jews are in Beirut, where there is a committee that represents the community.52 Because of the current political situation; Jews are unable to openly practice Judaism. In 2004, only 1 out of 5,000 Lebanese Jewish citizens registered to vote participated in the municipal elections. Virtually all of those registered have died or fled the country. The lone Jewish voter said that most of the community consists of old women.53 The Jewish cemetery in Beirut is decrepit and cared for by an elderly Shiite woman. The gravestones, written in Hebrew and French, are a testament to the Lebanese Jewish community that is now only a shadow of its former self.54 14. The Treatment of Jews in Arab/Islamic Countries 149 150 The Arab- Israeli conflict, and Israel’s long military presence in Lebanon, provoked strong anti- Israel sentiment. All travel from Lebanon to Israel is strictly prohibited. Meanwhile, Hezbollah uses southern Lebanon as a base for terrorist attacks against Israel. The Jews of Libya 1948 Jewish population: 48,000 2004: 0 Jews had a presence in Libya at least since the time of Hellenistic rule under Ptolemy Lagos in 323 B.C.E. in Cyrene.55 Once home to a very large and thriving Jewish community, Libya is now completely empty of Jews due to anti- Jewish pogroms and immigration to Israel. A savage pogrom in Tripoli on November 5, 1945, killed more than 140 Jews and wounded hundreds more. Almost every synagogue was looted. In June 1948, rioters murdered another 12 Jews and destroyed 280 Jewish homes.56 Thousands of Jews fled the country after Libya was granted independence and membership in the Arab League in 1951. After the Six- Day War, the Jewish population of 7,000 was again subjected to pogroms in which 18 were killed, and many more injured, sparking a near- total exodus that left fewer than 100 Jews in Libya. When Muammar Qaddafi came to power in 1969, all Jewish property was confiscated and all debts to Jews cancelled. In 1999, the synagogue in Tripoli was renovated, however, it was not reopened.57 The last Jew living in Libya, Esmeralda Meghnagi, died in February 2002. This marked the end of one of the world’s oldest Jewish communities.58 The Jews of Morocco 1948 Jewish population: 295,000 2004: 4,000 Jews have been in Morocco since before the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E., but the oldest archaeological evidence is from the 2nd century C.E. Thousands of Spanish Jews settled in Morocco and other locations throughout Africa due to increasing religious persecution in Spain. Throughout the Renaissance, Morocco was a haven for Marranos, or “secret Jews” who had escaped the Inquisition.59 In June 1948, bloody riots in Oujda and Djerada killed 44 Jews and wounded scores more. That same year, an unofficial economic boycott was instigated against Moroccan Jews. In 1956, Morocco declared its independence, and Jewish immigration to Israel was suspended. In 1963, emigration resumed, allowing more than 100,000 Moroccan Jews to reach Israel.60 In 1965, Moroccan writer Said Ghallab described the attitude of his fellow Muslims toward their Jewish neighbors: The worst insult that a Moroccan could possibly offer was to treat someone as a Jew. . . . My childhood friends have remained anti-Jewish. They hide their virulent anti- Semitism by contending that the State of Israel was the creature of Western imperialism. . . . A whole Hitlerite myth is being cultivated among the populace. The massacres of the Jews by Hitler are exalted ecstatically. It is even credited that Hitler is not dead, but alive and well, and his arrival is awaited to deliver the Arabs from Israel.61 Nonetheless, before his death in 1999, King Hassan tried to protect the Jewish population and, at present, Morocco has one of the most tolerant environments for Jews in the Arab world. Moroccan Jewish émigrés, even those with Israeli citizenship, freely visit friends and relatives in Morocco. Moroccan Jews have held leading positions in the business community and government. The major Jewish organization representing the community is the Conseil des Communautes Israelites in Casablanca. Its functions include external relations, general communal affairs, communal heritage, finance, maintenance of holy places, youth activities, and cultural and religious life.62 In early 2004, Marrakesh had a small population of about 260 people, most over the age of 60. Casablanca has the largest community, about 3,000 people. There are synagogues, mikvaot, old- age homes, and kosher restaurants in Casablanca, Fez, Marrakesh, Mogador, Rabat, Tetuan and Tangier. In 1992, most Jewish schools were closed, but Casablanca has experienced a bit of a renewal and now 10 schools serve 800 students there.63 Morocco is perhaps Israel’s closest friend in the Arab world. King Hassan often tried to be a behind- the-scenes catalyst in the Arab- Israeli peace process. In 1993, after signing the agreement with the PLO, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin paid a formal visit to Morocco. In May 1999, King Hassan organized the first meeting of the World Union of Moroccan Jews, in Marrakech. In April and May 2000, the Moroccan government sponsored a series of events and lectures promoting respect among religions.64 Andre Azoulay, royal counselor and a leading Jewish citizen, spoke about the need for interfaith respect and dialogue. In October 2000, two Moroccan youths tried to vandalize a Tangiers synagogue. King Mohamed VI publicly declared in a televised speech on November 6, 2000, that the government would not tolerate mistreatment of Morocco’s Jews. The youths were subsequently sentenced to one year in prison.65 14. The Treatment of Jews in Arab/Islamic Countries 151 152 On May 16, 2003, a series of suicide bombers attacked four Jewish targets in Casablanca, and a fifth attack was made against the Spanish consulate. No Jews were hurt in the attacks because it occurred on Shabbat when the buildings were empty of Jews. Twenty- nine Muslims were killed. Though the bombings affected the Jewish sense of security, they were viewed by most Moroccans as assaults on the country’s social and political order, and a test of the young king’s power, rather than an act of anti- Semitism. King Mohammed VI visited the site of one of the attacks the day it occurred and urged the Jewish community to rebuild. The government subsequently organized a large rally in the streets of Casablanca to demonstrate support for the Jewish community and the king reasserted his family’s traditional protection for the country’s Jews.66 The Jews of Syria 1948 Jewish population: 30,000 2004: Fewer than 100 Jewish history in Syria dates to biblical times. Due to the proximity of Syria with ancient Palestine, the Syrian Jewish community was once large and prosperous. In 1944, after Syria gained independence from France, the new government prohibited Jewish immigration to Palestine, and severely restricted the teaching of Hebrew in Jewish schools. Attacks against Jews escalated, and boycotts were called against their businesses. When partition was declared in 1947, Arab mobs in Aleppo devastated the 2,500- year- old Jewish community. Scores of Jews were killed and more than 200 homes, shops and synagogues were destroyed. Thousands of Jews illegally fled Syria for Israel.67 Shortly after; the Syrian government intensified its persecution of the Jewish population. Freedom of movement was severely restricted. Jews who attempted to flee faced either the death penalty or imprisonment at hard labor. Jews were not allowed to work for the government or banks, could not acquire telephones or driver’s licenses, and were barred from buying property. Jewish bank accounts were frozen. An airport road was paved over the Jewish cemetery in Damascus; Jewish schools were closed and handed over to Muslims. Syria’s attitude toward Jews was reflected in its sheltering of Alois Brunner, one of the most notorious Nazi war criminals. Brunner, a chief aide to Adolph Eichmann, served as an adviser to the Assad regime.68 In 1987–88; the Syrian secret police seized 10 Jews on suspicion of violating travel and emigration laws, planning to escape and having taken unauthorized trips abroad. Several who were released reported being tortured while in custody.69 For years, the Jews in Syria lived in extreme fear. The Jewish Quarter in Damascus was under the constant surveillance of the secret police, which were present at synagogue services, weddings, bar- mitzvahs and other Jewish gatherings. Contact with foreigners was closely monitored. Travel abroad was permitted in exceptional cases, but only if a bond of $300–$1,000 was left behind, along with family members who served as hostages. U.S. pressure applied during peace negotiations helped convince President Hafez Assad to lift these restrictions, and those prohibiting Jews from buying and selling property, in the early 1990’s. In an undercover operation in late 1994, 1,262 Syrian Jews were brought to Israel. The spiritual leader of the Syrian Jewish community for 25 years, Rabbi Avraham Hamra, was among those who left Syria and went to New York (he now lives in Israel). Syria had granted exit visas on condition that the Jews not go to Israel.70 The decision to finally free the Jews came about largely as a result of pressure from the United States following the 1991 Madrid peace conference. The remaining Syrian Jews were forbidden from seeking government employment, and they were the only citizens whose passports were required to state their religion. By the end of 1994, the Joab Ben Zeruiah Synagogue in Aleppo, in continuous use for more than 1,600 years, was deserted. A year later, approximately 250 Jews remained in Damascus, all apparently staying by choice.71 By the middle of 2001; Rabbi Huder Shahada Kabariti estimated that 150 Jews were living in Damascus, 30 in Haleb and 20 in Kamashili. Every two or three months, a rabbi visits from Istanbul, Turkey, to oversee preparation of kosher meat, which residents freeze and use until his next visit. Two synagogues remain open in Damascus.72 Although Jews were in the past subjected to violence by Palestinian protesters, the government has taken strict protective measures, including arresting assailants and guarding the remaining synagogues.73 Jews still have a separate primary school for religious instruction on Judaism and are allowed to teach Hebrew in some schools. About a dozen students still attend the Jewish school, which had 500 students as recently as 1992. Jews and Kurds are the only minorities not allowed to participate in the political system. In addition, “the few remaining Jews are generally barred from government employment and do not have military service obligations. They are the only minority whose passports and identity cards note their religion.” The government used mass media outlets to disseminate anti- Semitic materials throughout the country. In 2003, a private film company produced an anti- Semitic television series, “Ash- Shata” (“The Diaspora”), based on the infamous “Protocols of the Elders of Zion.” The series claimed that Jews orchestrated both World Wars and manipulated world opinion to create Israel. 14. The Jews of Tunisia 1948 Jewish population: 105,000 2004: 1,200 Tunisia was the only Arab country to come under direct German occupation during World War II. According to Robert Satloff, “From November 1942 to May 1943, the Germans and their local collaborators implemented a forced- labor regime, confiscations of property, hostage- taking, mass extortion, deportations, and executions. They required thousands of Jews in the countryside to wear the Star of David, and they created special Judenrat- like committees of Jewish leaders to implement Nazi policies under threat of imprisonment or death.”74 After Tunisia gained independence in 1956, a series of anti- Jewish government decrees were promulgated. In 1958, Tunisia’s Jewish Community Council was abolished by the government and ancient synagogues, cemeteries and Jewish quarters were destroyed for “urban renewal.”75 The increasingly unstable situation caused more than 40,000 Tunisian Jews to immigrate to Israel. By 1967, the country’s Jewish population had shrunk to 20,000. During the Six- Day War, Jews were attacked by rioting Arab mobs, and synagogues and shops were burned. The government denounced the violence, and President Habib Bourguiba apologized to the Chief Rabbi. The government appealed to the Jewish population to stay, but did not bar them from leaving. Subsequently, 7,000 Jews immigrated to France. In 1982, attacks on Jews were reported in the towns of Zarzis and Ben Guardane. According to the State Department, the Tunisian government “acted decisively to provide protection to the Jewish community.”76 In 1985, a Tunisian guard opened fire on worshipers in a synagogue in Djerba, killing five people, four of them Jewish. Since then, the government has sought to prevent further tragedy by giving Tunisian Jews heavy protection when necessary. Following Israel’s October 1, 1985, bombing of the PLO headquarters near Tunis, “the government took extraordinary measures to protect the Jewish community.”77 Djerba has one Jewish kindergarten. There are also six Jewish primary schools (three located in Tunis, two in Djerba and one in the coastal city of Zarzis) and four secondary schools (two in Tunis and two in Djerba). There are also yeshivas in Tunis and Djerba. The community has two homes for the aged. The country has several kosher restaurants and five officiating rabbis: the chief rabbi in Tunis, a rabbi in Djerba, and four others in Tunis. The majority of the Jewish community observes the laws of kashrut. Today, the 1,300 Jews comprise the country’s largest indigenous religious minority. “The Government assures freedom of worship for the Jewish community and pays the salary of the Grand Rabbi” of the community.78 In October 1999, the Jewish community elected a new Board of Directors for the first time since Tunisia’s independence in 1956. They also gave the Board a new name: “The Jewish Committee of Tunisia.”79 On April 11, 2002, a natural gas truck exploded at the outer wall of the Ghriba synagogue in Djerba. Tunisian officials at first said the truck accidentally struck the wall of the synagogue, but a group linked to Osama bin Laden’s al- Qaeda network claimed responsibility for carrying out what was actually a terrorist attack on the oldest synagogue in Africa. The explosion killed 17 people, including 11 German tourists. In 2003, French authorities arrested German citizen Christian Ganczarski at Charles de Gaulle Airport for his alleged role in the Djerba attack.80 The Tunisian government increased its measures to protect synagogues during Jewish holidays, and actually encouraged Jewish expatriates to return to Djerba for an annual religious pilgrimage. The Jews of Yemen 1948 Jewish population: 55,000 (in Aden: another 8,000) 2004: 200 In 1922, the government of Yemen reintroduced an ancient Islamic law requiring that Jewish orphans under age 12 be forcibly converted to Islam. In 1947, after the partition vote, Muslim rioters, joined by the local police force, engaged in a bloody pogrom in Aden that killed 82 Jews and destroyed hundreds of Jewish homes. Aden’s Jewish community was economically paralyzed, as most of the Jewish stores and businesses were destroyed. Early in 1948, the false accusation of the ritual murder of two girls led to looting.81 This increasingly perilous situation led to the emigration of virtually the entire Yemenite Jewish community—almost 50,000—between June 1949 and September 1950 in Operation “Magic Carpet.” A smaller, continuous migration was allowed to continue into 1962, when a civil war put an abrupt halt to any further Jewish exodus. Until 1976, when an American diplomat came across a small Jewish community in a remote region of northern Yemen, it was believed the Yemenite Jewish community was extinct. As a result, the plight of Yemenite Jews went unrecognized by the outside world. It turned out some people stayed behind during Operation “Magic Carpet” because family members did not want to leave sick or elderly relatives behind. These Jews were forbidden from emigrating and not 14. The Treatment of Jews in Arab/Islamic Countries 155 156 allowed to contact relatives abroad. They were isolated and trapped, scattered throughout the mountainous regions in northern Yemen and lacked food, clothing, medical care and religious articles. As a result, some Yemenite Jews abandoned their faith and converted to Islam. Today, Jews are the only indigenous religious minority besides a small number of Christians, Hindus and Baha’is. The small community that remains in the northern area of Yemen is tolerated and allowed to practice Judaism. It is believed that two synagogues are still functioning in Saiqaya and in Amlah. Jews are still treated as second- class citizens and cannot serve in the army or be elected to political positions. Jews are traditionally restricted to living in one section of a city or village and are often confined to a limited choice of employment, usually farming or handicrafts. Jews may, and do, own property.82 During the past few years, about 400 Jews have immigrated to Israel, despite the official ban on emigration.83 The State Department reported that in mid- 2000 “the Government suspended its policy of allowing Yemeni- origin Israeli passport holders to travel to Yemen on laissez- passer documents. However, Yemeni, Israeli, and other Jews may travel freely to and within Yemen on non Israeli passports.”84 In January 2001, the ruling “General People’s Party” placed a Yemeni Jewish citizen on the slate for parliamentary elections for the first time. The candidate, Ibrahim Ezer, was reportedly recommended by President Ali Abdallah Salah as a gesture to the incoming Bush administration in a bid to receive economic aid for Yemen. The General Election Committee, subsequently rejected Ezer’s application on grounds that a candidate must be the child of two Muslim parents. Political analysts speculated that the true reason was a desire not to establish a precedent of allowing a Jew to run for office.85 Notes 1. Vamberto Morais, A Short History of Anti- Semitism, (NY: W.W Norton and Co., 1976), p. 11; Bernard Lewis, Semites & Anti- Semites, (NY: WW Norton & Co., 1986), p. 81. 2. Oxford English Dictionary; Webster’s Third International Dictionary. 3. Washington Post, (October 30, 2001). 4. Official British document, Foreign Office File No. 371/20822 E 7201/22/31; Elie Kedourie, Islam in the Modern World, (London: Mansell, 1980), pp. 69–72. 5. Howard Sachar, A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 196. 6. Jordanian Nationality Law, Official Gazette, No. 1171, Article 3(3) of Law No. 6, 1954, (February 16, 1954), p. 105. 7. Modern World History, Jordanian Ministry of Education, 1966, p. 150. 8. Meyrav Wurmser, The Schools of Ba’athism: A Study of Syrian Schoolbooks, (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Media and Research Institute (MEMRI), 2000), p. xiii. 9. Aaron Klein, “Official PA site publishes ‘Protocols’ in Arabic,” WorldNetDaily, (May 21, 2005). 10. Al- Mussawar, (August 4, 1972). 11. Middle East Media and Research Institute (MEMRI); Al- Hayat Al- Jadeeda, (May 15, 1997); Jerusalem Post, (May 23, 2001); Palestine News Agency WAFA, (April 28, 2005). 12. Al- Ahram, (October 28, 2000). 13. “Anti- Semitic TV Series Cancelled by Jordan,” History News Network, (October 27, 2005). 14. Jerusalem Post, (November 19, 2001). 15. Palestinian Authority television, (October 14, 2000). 16. Palestinian Media Watch, (March 15, 2000). 17. Bernard Lewis, “The Pro- Islamic Jews,” Judaism, (Fall 1968), p. 401. 18. Bat Ye’or, The Dhimmi, (NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985), pp. 43–44. 19. Bat Ye’or, pp. 185–86, 191, 194. 20. Norman Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands, (PA: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979), p. 84; Maurice Roumani, The Case of the Jews from Arab Countries: A Neglected Issue, (Tel Aviv: World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries, 1977), pp. 26–27; Bat Ye’or, p. 72; Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam, (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 158. 21. Stillman, pp. 59, 284. 22. Roumani, pp. 26–27. 23. G.E. Von Grunebaum, “Eastern Jewry Under Islam,” Viator, (1971), p. 369. 24. New York Times, February 19, 1947). 25. Roumani, pp. 30–31; Norman Stillman, The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times, (NY: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), pp. 119–122. 26. Bat Ye’or, p. 61. 27. Bat Ye’or, p. 30. 28. Louis Gardet, La Cite Musulmane: Vie sociale et politique, (Paris: Etudes musulmanes, 1954), p. 348. 29. Bat Ye’or, pp. 56–57. 30. Middle Eastern Studies, (1971), p. 232. 31. David Singer, ed., American Jewish Year Book 2004. NY: American Jewish Committee, 2004. The American Jewish Committee Yearbook is the source for all Jewish population figures in this chapter. 32. Jewish Communities of the World, World Jewish Congress (WJC), Copyright 1997; Institute of the World Jewish Congress. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997. 33. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991, (DC: Department of State, 1992), p. 1339. 34. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997, (DC: Department of State, 1998). 35. U.S. Department of State, 2000 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Washington, DC, September 5, 2000. 36. Sachar, p. 401. 37. Associated Press, (November 26, 1956); New York World Telegram, (November 29, 1956). 38. Jewish Communities of the World. 39. U.S. Department of State, 2000 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Washington, DC, (September 5, 2000). 40. U.S. Department of State, 2001 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Washington, DC, (October 26, 2001). 14. The Treatment of Jews in Arab/Islamic Countries 157 158 41. U.S. Department of State, 2004 Report on Global Anti- Semitism, Released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Washington, DC, (January 5, 2005). 42. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, (July 13, 2005). 43. World Jewish Congress, Jewish Communities of the World. 44. Schneider, Howard. “Iran Court Reduces Penalties for Jews.” Washington Post, (September 22, 2000). 45. Jerusalem Post, (January 16, 2002); Washington Jewish Week, (October 31, 2002). 46. Jerusalem Post, (Dec. 13, 1997); Arieh Avneri, The Claim of Dispossession, (Tel Aviv: Hidekel Press, 1984), p. 274; Roumani, pp. 29–30; Stillman (1991), pp. 117–119; Sachar, p. 399. 47. Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie, Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf, (NY: Random House, 1990), p. 34. 48. New York Times Magazine, (February 3, 1985). 49. Associated Press, (March 28, 1998). 50. Jerusalem Post, (September 28, 2002). 51. “The Last Jews of Baghdad,” National Public Radio, (May 22, 2003). 52. Maariv, (June 21, 1991); Jewish Telegraphic Agency, (July 22, 1993); Jewish Communities of the World. 53. Majdoline Hatoum, “Of 5,000 Jewish Lebanese, only 1 voted,” The Daily Star, (May 10, 2004). 54. Stephen Talbot, “Syria/Lebanon: The Occupier and the Occupied,” PBS Frontline, (2004). 55. Encyclopedia Judaica, CD- Rom edition, 1997. 56. Sachar, p. 400; Stillman (1991), p. 145. 57. U.S. Department of State, 2000 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Washington, DC, September 5, 2000. 58. Jerusalem Report, (March 11, 2002). 59. Encyclopedia Judaica, CD- Rom edition, 1997. 60. Roumani, pp. 32–33. 61. Said Ghallab, “Les Juifs sont en enfer,” in Les Temps Modernes, (April 1965), pp. 2247–2251. 62. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996, (DC: Department of State, 1997); Jewish Communities of the World; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997. 63. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, (March 17, 2004). 64. U.S. Department of State, 2000 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Washington, DC, (September 5, 2000). 65. U.S. Department of State, 2001 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Washington, DC, (October 26, 2001). 66. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, (March 17, 2004). 67. Sachar, p. 400; Roumani, p. 31; Stillman (1991), p. 146. 68. Newsday, (November 1, 1987); information provided by Rep. Michael McNulty. 69. Middle East Watch, Human Rights in Syria, (NY: Middle East Watch, 1990), p. 94. 70. Jerusalem Post, (October 18, 1994). 71. Jerusalem Post, (May 27, 1995). 72. Associated Press, (January 27, 2000). 73. U.S. Department of State, 2000 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Washington, DC, (September 5, 2000). 74. Robert Satloff, “In Search of “Righteous Arabs,” Commentary, (July 04, 2004). 75. Roumani, pp. 33; Stillman (1991), p. 127. 76. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1982, (DC: Department of State, 1983), pp. 1290–91. 77. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985, (DC: Department of State, 1986), p. 1321. 78. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997. 79. Washington Post, (April 17 & 23, 2002). 80. “French Say Suspect is Qaeda Big,” CBS News, (June 12, 2003). 81. Sachar, pp. 397–98; Roumani, pp. 32–33; Stillman (1991), p. 498. 82. Jewish Communities of the World; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1997. 83. Jewish Communities of the World. 84. U.S. Department of State, 2001 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Washington, DC, (October 26, 2001). 85. Jerusalem Post, (January 30, 2001).

15. Human Rights in Israel and the Territories MYTH “Israel discriminates against its Arab citizens.” FACT Israel is one of the most open societies in the world. Out of a population of nearly 7 million, about 1.4 million—20 percent of the population—are non-Jews (approximately 1.2 million Muslims, 130,000 Christians and 100,000 Druze).1 Arabs in Israel have equal voting rights; in fact, it is one of the few places in the Middle East where Arab women may vote. Arabs currently hold 9 seats in the 120- seat Knesset. Israeli Arabs have also held various government posts, including one who served as Israel’s ambassador to Finland and the current deputy mayor of Tel Aviv. Oscar Abu Razaq was appointed Director General of the Ministry of Interior, the first Arab citizen to become chief executive of a key government ministry. Ariel Sharon’s original cabinet included the first Arab minister, Salah Tarif, a Druze who served as a minister without portfolio. An Arab is also a Supreme Court justice. In October 2005, an Arab professor was named Vice President of Haifa University. Arabic, like Hebrew, is an official language in Israel. More than 300,000 Arab children attend Israeli schools. At the time of Israel’s founding, there was one Arab high school in the country. Today, there are hundreds of Arab schools.2 In 2002, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the government cannot allocate land based on religion or ethnicity, and may not prevent Arab citizens from living wherever they choose.3 The sole legal distinction between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel is that the latter are not required to serve in the Israeli army. This is to spare Arab citizens the need to take up arms against their brethren. Nevertheless, Bedouins have served in paratroop units and other Arabs have volunteered for military duty. Compulsory military service is applied to the Druze and Circassian communities at their own request. Some economic and social gaps between Israeli Jews and Arabs result from the latter not serving in the military. Veterans qualify for many benefits not available to non- veterans. Moreover, the army aids in the socialization process. On the other hand, Arabs do have an advantage in obtaining some jobs during the years Israelis are in the military. In addition, industries like construction and trucking have come to be dominated by Israeli Arabs. Although Israeli Arabs have occasionally been involved in terrorist activities, they have generally behaved as loyal citizens. During the 1967, 1973 and 1982 wars, none engaged in any acts of sabotage or disloyalty. Sometimes, in fact, Arabs volunteered to take over civilian functions for reservists. During the Palestinian War that began in September 2000, Israeli Arabs for the first time engaged in widespread protests with some violence. The United States has been independent for almost 230 years and still has not integrated all of its diverse communities. Even today, 60 years after civil rights legislation was adopted, discrimination has not been eradicated. It should not be surprising that Israel has not solved all of its social problems in only 57 years. MYTH “Israeli Arabs are barred from buying land.” FACT In the early part of the century, the Jewish National Fund was established by the World Zionist Congress to purchase land in Palestine for Jewish settlement. This land, and that acquired after Israel’s War of Independence, was taken over by the government. Of the total area of Israel, 92 percent belongs to the State and is managed by the Land Management Authority. It is not for sale to anyone, Jew or Arab. The remaining 8 percent of the territory is privately owned. The Arab Waqf (the Muslim charitable endowment), for example, owns land that is for the express use and benefit of Muslim Arabs. Government land can be leased by anyone, regardless of race, religion or sex. All Arab citizens of Israel are eligible to lease government land. MYTH “Israeli Arabs are discriminated against in employment.” FACT Israeli law prohibits discrimination in employment. According to the State Department, all Israeli workers “may join and establish labor organizations freely.”4 Most unions are part of the Histadrut or the smaller Histadrut Haovdim Haleumit (National Federation of Labor), both of which are independent of the Government. 15. Human Rights in Israel and the Territories 161 162 MYTH “Israel uses administrative detention to imprison peaceful Arabs without trial.” FACT Israel inherited and continued certain laws adopted by the British. One is the use of administrative detention, which is permitted under certain circumstances in security cases. The detainee is entitled to be represented by counsel, and may appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court. The burden is on the prosecution to justify holding closed proceedings. Often, officials believe presenting evidence in open court would compromise its methods of gathering intelligence and endanger the lives of individuals who have provided information about planned terrorist activities. Administrative detention is not necessary in much of the Arab world because the authorities frequently arrest people and throw them in jail without due process. No lawyers, human rights organizations or independent media can protest. Even in the United States, with its exceptionally liberal bail policy, people may be held for extended periods awaiting trial, and special legal standards have been applied to allow the prolonged incarceration of Taliban and al- Qaida members captured in Afghanistan. “One does not judge a democracy by the way its soldiers immediately react, young men and women under tremendous provocation. One judges a democracy by the way its courts react, in the dispassionate cool of judicial chambers. And the Israeli Supreme Court and other courts have reacted magnificently. For the first time in MidEast history, there is an independent judiciary willing to listen to grievances of Arabs—that judiciary is called the Israeli Supreme Court.” —Alan Dershowitz5 MYTH “Arabs held in Israeli jails are tortured, beaten and killed.” FACT Prison is not a pleasant place for anyone and complaints about the treatment of prisoners in American institutions abound. Israel’s prisons are probably among the most closely scrutinized in the world. One reason is the government has allowed representatives of the Red Cross and other groups to inspect them regularly. Israeli law prohibits the arbitrary arrest of citizens. In addition, defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty and have the right to writs of habeas corpus and other procedural safeguards. Israel holds no political prisoners and maintains an independent judiciary. Some prisoners, particularly Arabs suspected of involvement in terrorism, were interrogated using severe methods that have been criticized as excessive. Israel’s Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling in 1999 prohibiting the use of a variety of practices that were considered abusive. The death penalty has been applied just once, in the case of Adolph Eichmann, the man largely responsible for the “Final Solution.” No Arab has ever been given the death penalty, even after the most heinous acts of terrorism. “The Israeli regime is not apartheid. It is a unique case of democracy.” —South African Interior Minister Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi6 MYTH “Israel’s treatment of Palestinians is similar to the treatment of blacks in apartheid South Africa.” FACT Even before the State of Israel was established, Jewish leaders consciously sought to avoid the situation that prevailed in South Africa. As David Ben-Gurion told Palestinian nationalist Musa Alami in 1934: We do not want to create a situation like that which exists in South Africa, where the whites are the owners and rulers, and the blacks are the workers. If we do not do all kinds of work, easy and hard, skilled and unskilled, if we become merely landlords, then this will not be our homeland.7 Today, within Israel, Jews are a majority, but the Arab minorities are full citizens who enjoy equal rights and are represented in all the branches of government. Under apartheid, black South Africans could not vote and were not citizens of the country in which they formed the overwhelming majority of the population. Laws dictated where they could live, work and travel. And, in South Africa, the government killed blacks who protested against its policies. By contrast, Israel allows freedom of movement, assembly and speech. Some of the government’s harshest critics are Israeli Arabs who are members of the Knesset. The situation of Palestinians in the territories is different. The security requirements of the nation, and a violent insurrection in the territories, forced Israel to impose restrictions on Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that are not necessary inside Israel’s pre- 1967 borders. The Palestinians in the territories, typically, dispute Israel’s right to exist whereas blacks did not seek the destruction of South Africa, only the apartheid regime. If Israel were to give Palestinians full citizenship, it would mean the territories had been annexed. No Israeli government has been prepared to take that step. Instead, through negotiations, Israel agreed to give the Palestinians increasing authority over their own affairs. It is likely that a final settlement will allow most Palestinians to become citizens of their own state. The principal impediment to Palestinian independence is not Israeli policy, it is the unwillingness of the Palestinian leadership to give up terrorism and agree to live in peace beside Israel. Despite all their criticism, when asked what governments they admire most, more than 80 percent of Palestinians consistently choose Israel because they can see up close the thriving democracy in Israel, and the rights the Arab citizens enjoy there. By contrast, Palestinians place Arab regimes far down the list, and their own Palestinian Authority at the bottom, with only 20 percent saying they admired the corrupt Arafat regime in 2003.8 “There is still one other question arising out of the disaster of nations which remains unsolved to this day, and whose profound tragedy, only a Jew can comprehend. This is the African question. Just call to mind all those terrible episodes of the slave trade, of human beings who, merely because they were black, were stolen like cattle, taken prisoner, captured and sold. Their children grew up in strange lands, the objects of contempt and hostility because their complexions were different. I am not ashamed to say, though I may expose myself to ridicule for saying so, that once I have witnessed the redemption of the Jews, my people, I wish also to assist in the redemption of the Africans.” —Theodore Herzl9 MYTH “Israel is pursuing a policy of genocide toward the Palestinians comparable to the Nazis’ treatment of the Jews.” FACT This is perhaps the most odious claim made by Israel’s detractors. The Nazis’ objective was the systematic extermination of every Jew in Europe. Israel is seeking peace with its Palestinian neighbors. More than one million Arabs live as free and equal citizens in Israel. Of the Palestinians in the territories, 98 percent live under the civil administration of the Palestinian Authority. While Israel sometimes employs harsh measures against Palestinians in the territories to protect Israeli citizens—Jews and non-Jews—from the incessant campaign of terror waged by the PA and Islamic radicals, there is no plan to persecute, exterminate, or expel the Palestinian people. In response to one such comparison, by a poet who referred to the “Zionist SS,” The New Republic’s literary editor Leon Wieseltier observed: The view that Zionism is Nazism—there is no other way to understand the phrase “Zionist SS”—is not different in kind from the view that the moon is cheese. It is not only spectacularly wrong, it is also spectacularly unintelligent. I will not offend myself (that would be self- hate speech!) by patiently explaining why the State of Israel is unlike the Third Reich, except to say that nothing that has befallen the Palestinians under Israel’s control may responsibly be compared to what befell the Jews under Germany’s control, and that a considerable number of the people who have toiled diligently to find peace and justice for the Palestinians, and a solution to this savage conflict, have been Israeli, some of them even Israeli prime ministers. There is no support for the Palestinian cause this side of decency that can justify the locution “Zionist SS.”10 The absurdity of the charge is also clear from the demography of the disputed territories. While detractors make outrageous claims about Israel committing genocide or ethnic cleansing, the Palestinian population has continued to explode. In Gaza, for example, the population increased from 731,000 in July 1994 to 1,324,991 in 2004, an increase of 81 percent. The growth rate was 3.8 percent, one of the highest in the world. According to the UN, the total Palestinian population in all the disputed territories (they include Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem) was 1,006,000 in 1950, 1,094,000 in 1970, and grew to 2,152,000 in 1990. Anthony Cordesman notes the increase “was the result of improvements in income and health services” made by Israel. The Palestinian population has continued to grow exponentially and was estimated in 2004 at more than 3.6 million.11 MYTH “Palestinians have the lowest standard of living in the Middle East.” FACT When Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967; officials took measures to improve the conditions that Palestinians had lived under 15. Human Rights in Israel and the Territories 165 166 during Jordan’s 19- year occupation of the West Bank, and Egypt’s occupation of Gaza. Universities were opened, Israeli agricultural innovations were shared, modern conveniences were introduced, and health care was significantly upgraded. More than 100,000 Palestinians were employed in Israel, and were paid the same wages as Israeli workers, which stimulated economic growth. The rise in violence during the 1990s, and then the war instigated by Palestinian terrorists beginning in 2000, has taken a heavy toll on the Palestinian economy. To protect its citizens from suicide bombers and other terrorists, Israel was forced to take measures that had a deleterious impact on the economy in the Palestinian Authority. The most serious step was to limit the number of Palestinian laborers entering Israel to reduce the risk of terrorists pretending to be workers slipping into the country. This raised the level of unemployment, which, in turn, had a negative spillover effect on the rest of the Palestinian economy. Despite the collapse of the PA economy from five years of war, Palestinian Arabs are still better off than many of their neighbors. The most recent Human Development Report from the United Nations ranks the PA 102nd in terms of life expectancy, educational attainment and adjusted real income out of the 177 countries and territories in the world, placing it in the “medium human development” category along with most of the other Middle Eastern states (only the Gulf sheikdoms are ranked “high”). The PA is ranked just 12 places below Jordan and one behind Iran; it is rated ahead of Syria (#105), Algeria (#108), Egypt (#120) and Morocco (#125).12 Few Palestinians would trade places with Arabs in neighboring countries. Well, perhaps, with one exception. They might aspire to the standard of living in the country ranked 22nd by the UN—Israel. MYTH “Israeli checkpoints unnecessarily prevent Palestinians from receiving medical attention.” FACT Israel has instituted checkpoints for one reason—to prevent Palestinian terrorists from infiltrating Israel. If the Palestinian Authority was fulfilling its road map obligations to dismantle the terrorist networks and disarm the terrorists, and its security forces were taking adequate measures to prevent Palestinians from planning and launching attacks, the checkpoints would be unnecessary. Israel tries to balance its security concerns with the welfare of the Palestinians, and is especially sensitive to the medical needs of Palestinians. Thus, many Palestinians are allowed to enter Israel to receive treatment from some of the finest medical facilities in the world. Unfortunately, Palestinian terrorists have tried to take advantage of Israel’s goodwill. In December 2004, for example, a Hamas agent with forged documents claiming that he was a cancer patient in need of medical treatment from an Israeli hospital was arrested by security forces. Hamed A- Karim Hamed Abu Lihiya was to meet up with another terrorist, obtain weapons from allies inside Israel, and carry out an attack. That same month, a man recruited by the al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade to plant a bomb on the railway tracks near Netanya tried to use false papers indicating he needed hospital treatment to enter Israel. Another Hamas terrorist planning a suicide bombing was arrested in March 2005 after pretending to be a kidney donor.13 “Israeli hospitals extend humanitarian treatment to Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and West Bank. These efforts continued when all other cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis came to a halt during the most recent Intifada.” —Palestinian obstetrician and gynecologist Dr. Izzeldin Abuelaish14 On June 20, 2005, Wafa Samir Ibrahim Bas was arrested attempting to smuggle an explosives belt through the Erez crossing. Bas aroused the suspicion of soldiers at the checkpoint when a biometric scanner revealed she was hiding explosives. When she realized they had discovered the explosive belt, she attempted unsuccessfully to detonate it.15 Bas had been admitted on humanitarian grounds to Soroka Medical Center in Beersheba several months earlier for treatment of massive burns she received as a result of a cooking accident. After her arrest, she admitted that the Fattah al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigade had instructed her to use her personal medical authorization documents to enter into Israel to carry out a suicide attack. In an interview shown on Israeli television, Bas said her “dream was to be a martyr” and that her intent was to kill 40 or 50 people—as many young people as possible. Dr. Izzeldin Abuelaish, a Palestinian obstetrician and gynecologist from the Jabalya refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, who has worked at the Soroka Hospital, wrote that he was “outraged at the cynical and potentially deadly suicide bombing attempt.” Dr. Abuelaish said he does research at the hospital’s Genetic Institute and has warm relations with his colleagues. “I make a point, whenever I’m at the hospital, of visiting Palestinian patients,” he said. “I also schedule appointments for other Gaza residents, and even bring medication from Soroka to needy patients in the Strip. . . . On the very day that she planned to detonate her bomb, two Palestinians in critical condition were waiting in Gaza to be taken for urgent treatment at Soroka.” Dr. Abuelaish added, “Wafa was sent to kill the very people in Israel who are healing Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and West Bank. What if 15. Human Rights in Israel and the Territories 167 168 Israeli hospitals now decide to bar Palestinians seeking treatment? How would those who sent Bas feel if their own relatives, in need of medical care in Israel, are refused treatment?”16 The Israeli checkpoint saved the lives not only of countless Israelis, but of the Palestinian would- be suicide bomber. By using this tactic, the Palestinians have reinforced the necessity of retaining the checkpoints and forced Israel to carry out more stringent inspections, yet another example of how terrorists are making life unnecessarily difficult for innocent Palestinians. MYTH “Israel prevents Palestinian ambulances from taking sick and injured Palestinians to hospitals.” FACT One of the unfortunate results of the violence during the Palestinian War has been the allegations of Israeli abuse against Palestinian Red Crescent ambulances, which it is alleged, has resulted in inconveniences, medical complications and even death to the sick passengers on board. These accounts tend to portray the delays as wanton acts of cruelty on the part of Israeli soldiers against Palestinians in need of medical attention. According to IDF guidelines, any Palestinian in need of urgent medical care is allowed passage through checkpoints. The severity of the medical condition is determined by the checkpoint commander, who is to make decisions in favor of the Palestinian if there is any doubt. Palestinians are also allowed to enter Israel for routine medical care unless there is a security problem. Even then, Palestinians can appeal decisions and are also offered other options, such as transfer to neighboring states. Ambulances are still stopped and searched at Israeli checkpoints because they have frequently been used as a means to transport terrorist bombs, and many of the murderers who have triggered suicide bombings in Israel gained access by driving or riding in Red Crescent ambulances. For example: ■ In October 2001, Nidal Nazal, a Hamas operative in Kalkilya, was arrested by the IDF. He was an ambulance driver for the Palestinian Red Crescent who served as a messenger between the Hamas headquarters in several West Bank towns.17 ■ In January 2002, Wafa Idris blew herself up on the crowded Jaffa Street in Jerusalem, becoming one of the first female suicide bombers. She was an ambulance driver for the Palestinian Red Crescent, as was Mohammed Hababa, the Tanzim operative who sent her on her mission. She left the West Bank by way of an ambulance.18 ■ On March 27, 2002, a Tanzim member who worked as a Red Crescent ambulance driver was captured with explosives in his ambulance. A child disguised as a patient was riding in the ambulance along with the child’s family. The explosives were found under the stretcher the “sick” child was laying on.19 ■ On May 17, 2002, an explosive belt was found in a Red Crescent ambulance at a checkpoint near Ramallah. The bomb, the same type generally used in suicide bombings, was hidden under a gurney on which a sick child was lying. The driver, Islam Jibril, was already wanted by the IDF, and admitted that this was not the first time that an ambulance had been used to transport explosives or terrorists. In a statement issued the same day, the International Committee of the Red Cross said that it “understands the security concerns of the Israeli authorities, and has always acknowledged their right to check ambulances, provided it does not unduly delay medical evacuations.” The sick passengers in the ambulance were escorted by soldiers to a nearby hospital.20 ■ On June 30, 2002; Israeli troops found 10 suspected Palestinian terrorists hiding in two ambulances in Ramallah. They were caught when soldiers stopped the vehicles for routine checks.21 ■ In December 2003, Rashed Tarek al- Nimr, who worked as a chemist in hospitals in Nablus and Bethlehem, supplied chemicals from the hospitals to Hamas for use in making bombs and admitted he used ambulances to transport the chemicals. He also said the Hamas commanders would hide in hospitals to avoid arrest.22 The accusations leveled against Israel by its critics have frequently been based on statements of international law, such as the Fourth Geneva Convention. It is true that the Geneva Convention does place particular emphasis on the immunity and neutrality of ambulances and emergency medical personnel. But the conclusion that Israel must ignore a clear and present danger to its citizens, or else violate international law, is a distortion. By using ambulances to smuggle explosives into Israel, it is the Palestinian terrorists who are compromising the Red Crescent’s immunity and neutrality. MYTH “Israel uses checkpoints to deny Palestinians their rights and humiliate them.” FACT It is not unusual for nations to guard their borders and to establish checkpoints to prevent people from illegally entering their countries. The United States has checkpoints at its borders and airports and, as 15. Human Rights in Israel and the Territories 169 170 Americans saw on September 11, these are necessary but not foolproof security precautions. In the case of Israel, the necessity for checkpoints has been created by the Palestinians. By pursuing a violent campaign of terror against Israel’s citizens, they have forced Israel to set up barriers to make it as difficult as possible for terrorists to enter Israel or travel through the territories to carry out acts of violence. The checkpoints are an inconvenience to innocent Palestinians, but they do in fact prevent terror and save lives. For example, on November 2, 2002, a van carrying boxes of jeans pulled up at a checkpoint. Soldiers checked the IDs of the men in the van and discovered one of the passengers was a wanted man. The van was unloaded and it was not until the soldiers opened the last box that they discovered an explosive belt that was being delivered to a suicide bomber. Two weeks later, a taxi pulled up to the same checkpoint. Soldiers found two computers in the trunk that seemed unusually heavy. They opened the boxes and found two explosive belts. They also found a bag with a gun.23 Hyperbolic media reports and anti- Israel propaganda have suggested Israel is harassing Palestinian women at checkpoints. It is unfortunate that women cannot be ignored as potential security threats. Border policemen at a checkpoint north of Jerusalem, for example, arrested a Case Study Picture a 19- year-old soldier commanding a checkpoint. An ambulance arrives, and inside is a woman who is seemingly pregnant. The woman appears to be in pain and her husband is also highly anxious. But the soldier has been warned about an ambulance bearing a pregnant woman who is not really pregnant. The intelligence said that underneath the stretcher in the ambulance a wanted terrorist is hiding with an explosive belt for a suicide attack. It is a hot day and there is a long line of cars. His commanders are yelling at him on the two- way radio, “Do not let ambulances go through because there is a terrorist in an ambulance!” To complicate the picture, a news video crew is present. The soldier has to make an incredible number of decisions in a very short time. He is only 19 and has no medical training. He knows that if he lets the ambulance go through and it contains a terrorist, then innocent people will die and he will have failed in his mission. On the other hand, if there is not a terrorist in this particular ambulance, and he delays a truly pregnant woman from reaching a hospital, the lives of the mother and baby could be endangered. What would you do? Palestinian woman pushing a baby stroller that concealed a pistol, two ammunition clips and a knife. On another occasion, troops searching a West Bank house for a wanted Hamas activist found his sister hiding his gun in her underpants. A woman hid a hand grenade under her baby during another raid.24 Commercial goods, food, medicine, ambulances, and medical crews continue to circulate freely, hampered only by continuing attacks. Palestinian workers going to jobs in Israel also may pass through the checkpoints with the proper identification; restrictions are only imposed when necessitated by the security situation. Barriers are not set up to humiliate Palestinians, but to ensure the safety of Israeli citizens. Unfortunately, every time Israel has relaxed its policy and withdrawn checkpoints, Palestinian terrorists have taken advantage of the opportunity to launch new attacks on innocent Israelis. MYTH “Israeli textbooks are just as bad as those in the Palestinian Authority.” FACT The best hope for the future is that Israeli and Arab children will grow up with a greater understanding and tolerance of one another. Unfortunately, the textbooks in Arab countries, and the Palestinian Authority, in particular, do not promote coexistence. By contrast, Israeli textbooks are oriented toward peace and tolerance. The Palestinians are accepted as Palestinians. Islam and Arab culture are referred to with respect. Islamic holy places are discussed along with Jewish ones. Stereotypes are avoided to educate against prejudice. More than 20 years ago, it was true that some Israeli textbooks used stereotyped images of Arabs; however, the books in use in public schools today are very different. Israeli texts go out of their way to avoid prejudices and to guard against generalizations. In one seventh grade lesson, students are given the following problem: Many people think: The dove is a bird that pursues peace. This belief is incorrect; it is a prejudice: people believe it without checking it. There are a lot of prejudices. For example: 1. The Jews control the world and exploit all those who live in it. 2. The blacks are inferior; they are incapable of being scientists. 3. The Arabs only understand the language of force . . . Be ready to explain orally why these are prejudices. (I Understand, 1993, p. 259) 15. Human Rights in Israel and the Territories 171 172 In an elementary textbook on reading comprehension, students read how a Jewish girl was saved by an Arab woman. The book notes, “The Arabs are like the Jews. . . . There are nasty people among them and there are decent people and . . . they should not be labeled” (What is the Interpretation? Comprehension B, pp. 184–188). Contrary to suggestions that Israelis do not accept the idea that Palestinians are a people, Israeli textbooks explain the origins of Palestinian nationalism. For example, a 9th grade text observes that “during the 1930’s, Arab nationalist movements evolved all over the Middle East. Many of the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael also began formulating a national consciousness—in other words, the perception that they are not just part of the larger Arab nation, but are also Palestinians” (The Twentieth Century—On the Threshold of Tomorrow, Grade 9, 1999, p. 44). While Palestinian texts omit references to Jewish contributions to the world, the Israeli books recognize the achievements of Arabs and Muslims. One text highlights the Arab role as creators of culture: “. . . they were the first to discover the existence of infectious diseases. They were also the first to build public hospitals. Because of their considerable contribution to various scientific fields, there are disciplines that to this day are called by their Arabic names, such as algebra.” Islam’s contributions are also acknowledged in the same passage: “The Islamic religion also influenced the development of culture. The obligation to pray in the direction of Mecca led to the development of astronomy, which helped identify the direction according to the heavenly bodies. The duty to make a pilgrimage developed geography and gave a push to the writing of travel books. These books, and the Arabs’ high capability in map drawing, helped develop trade. To this day, merchants use Arabic words, such as bazaar, check and tariff” (From Generation to Generation, Vol. b, 1994, p. 220). Palestinian textbooks also negate the Jewish connection to the Holy Land while Israeli texts show respect for the Arab/Muslim attachment to the land. “The Land of Israel in general, and Jerusalem in particular, have been sanctified more and more in Islamic thought—as Islam has developed and spread, both religiously and geographically. As Islam absorbed more and more of the world conquered by it, so it adapted and Islamized the values that it absorbed, including the holiness of the Land of Israel, its flora and its water, living in it, the sanctity of being buried in it and the like. All these became from that time onwards part of orthodox Islam” (H. Peleg, G. Zohar, This is the Land—Introduction to Land of Israel Studies for the Upper Grades, 2000, pp. 161–162). Israeli textbooks contain a plurality of views, including those that conflict with conventional research and are critical of Israeli policies. Controversial topics, such as the disputed territories, the refugee issue, and the status of Israeli Arabs are covered from multiple viewpoints. For example, one book quotes historian Benny Morris’s unconventional position attributing the flight of Palestinians in 1947–1948 more to the actions of Jewish forces than the instructions of the leaders of Arab countries (From Exile to Independence—The History of the Jewish People in Recent Generations, vol. 2, 1990, p. 312). The Arab- Israeli conflict is factually described as an ongoing conflict between two national entities over the same territory. The Arab point of view is also represented. For example, a history text notes how Israel’s government treated Anwar Sadat’s 1971 peace proposal “with scorn out of the feeling of power and superiority that had taken hold of Israeli society following the Six-Day War. After his proposal had been rejected and the political stalemate continued, Sadat decided to go to war” (K. Tabibian, Journey to the Past—The Twentieth Century, By Dint of Freedom, 1999, p. 313). The content of the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and Jordan is detailed, along with the implications of those agreements. Agreements with the Palestinians are discussed as well, and the atlas used in Israeli schools shows the Palestinian Authority.21a Israeli texts also use simulation games to help students understand different perspectives on an issue. In one, students are told to divide into groups representing Jewish and Palestinian journalists and prepare a report on the discussion in the United Nations leading to the partition resolution. Students are then asked to discuss the differences between the reports of the Jewish and Palestinian journalists (K. Tabibian, Journey To The Past—The Twentieth Century, By Dint of Freedom, 1999, p. 294). Israel is not perfect and exceptions do exist. Some generalizations and patronizing terminology are found in textbooks used in the ultra Orthodox schools. These schools comprise less than 10 percent of the Israeli educational system, and the same Israeli watchdog organizations that have pointed out problems in Palestinian textbooks have also publicized the need to remove the handful of inappropriate references from school books in this system.25 MYTH “Israel is a theocracy and should not be a Jewish State.” FACT It often makes people uncomfortable to refer to Israel as “the Jewish State” because it suggests a theocracy and, therefore, the demise of Israel as a Jewish state is viewed by some people as a positive development. Israel is not a theocracy; however, it is governed by the rule of law as drafted by a democratically elected parliament. It is informed by Jewish values and adheres to many Jewish religious customs (such as holidays), but this is similar to the United States and other nations that are shaped by the Judeo- Christian heritage and also have expressly religious 15. Human Rights in Israel and the Territories 173 174 elements (e.g., church- state separation in the U.S. does not preclude the recognition of Christmas as a holiday). Israel has no state religion, and all faiths enjoy freedom of worship; yet, it is attacked for its Jewish character, whereas the Arab states that all have Islam as their official religion are regarded as legitimate. Why shouldn’t the Jews have a state? The Jewish people are a nation with a shared origin, religion, culture, language, and history. No one suggests that Arabs are not entitled to a nation of their own (and they have not one, but twenty- one) or Swedes or Germans, or that Catholics are not entitled to a state (Vatican City) headed by a theocrat (the Pope). To suggest that Zionism, the nationalist movement of the Jewish people, is the only form of nationalism that is illegitimate is pure bigotry. It is especially ironic that the Jewish nation should be challenged given that Jewish statehood preceded the emergence of most modern nation-states by thousands of years. It is also not unusual that one community should be the majority within a nation and seek to maintain that status. In fact, this is true in nearly every country in the world. Moreover, societies usually reflect the cultural identity of the majority. India and Pakistan were established at the same time as Israel through a violent partition, but no one believes these nations are illegitimate because one is predominantly Hindu and the other has a Muslim majority, or that these nations shouldn’t be influenced by those communities (e.g., that cows in India should not be treated as sacred). In the United States, a vigorous debate persists over the boundaries between church and state. Similar discussions regarding “synagogue and state” are ongoing in Israel, with philosophical disagreements over whether Israel can be a Jewish and a democratic state, and practical arguments over Sabbath observance, marriage and divorce laws, and budgets for religious institutions. Nevertheless, most Jews take for granted that Israel is, and must remain, a Jewish state. Arab citizens also understand that Israel is a Jewish state and, while they might prefer that it was not, they have still chosen to live there (nothing prevents Arabs from moving to any of the 180- odd non- Jewish states in the world). Both Jews and Arabs realize that if Jews cease to be a majority in Israel, Israel will no longer have a Jewish character or serve as a haven for persecuted Jews, and that is one of the elements underlying peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. MYTH “Israel is persecuting Christians.” FACT While Christians are unwelcome in Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia, and most have been driven out of their longtime homes in Lebanon, Christians continue to be welcome in Israel. Christians have always been a minority in Israel, but it is the only Middle East nation where the Christian population has grown in the last half century (from 34,000 in 1948 to 145,000 today), in large measure because of the freedom to practice their religion. By their own volition, the Christian communities have remained the most autonomous of the various religious communities in Israel, though they have increasingly chosen to integrate their social welfare, medical and educational institutions into state structures. The ecclesiastical courts of the Christian communities maintain jurisdiction in matters of personal status, such as marriage and divorce. The Ministry of Religious Affairs deliberately refrains from interfering in their religious life, but maintains a Department for Christian Communities to address problems and requests that may arise. In Jerusalem, the rights of the various Christian churches to custody of the Christian holy places were established during the Ottoman Empire. Known as the “status quo arrangement for the Christian holy places in Jerusalem,” these rights remain in force today in Israel. It was during Jordan’s control of the Old City from 1948 until 1967 that Christian rights were infringed and Israeli Christians were barred from their holy places. The Christian population declined by nearly half, from 25,000 to 12,646. Since then, the population has slowly been growing. Some Christians have been among those inconvenienced by Israel’s construction of the security fence, but they have not been harmed because of their religious beliefs. They simply live in areas where the fence is being built. Like others who can show they have suffered some injury, Christians are entitled to compensation. Suggestions that Israel is persecuting Christians were publicized by columnist Bob Novak, who has a long history of vitriolic attacks on Israel. Novak actually presented no specific evidence that any Christians have been harmed or their religious freedom infringed.26 He cited a single source, whose bias was obvious, to support the charge that the fence is hurting Christians in East Jerusalem, but failed to mention that the fence is helping to save Christian lives that might otherwise be lost in the indiscriminate attacks of Palestinian terrorists. The hypocrisy of Novak’s critique is clear from his failure to raise the very real concerns about the fate of Christians under Arab rule, especially under the Palestinian Authority, where a rapidly declining population of 27,000 Christians lives among 3 million Muslims. The proportion of Christians in the Palestinian territories has dropped from 15 percent of the Arab population in 1950 to less than 1 percent today. Three fourths of all Bethlehem Christians now live abroad, and the majority of the city’s population is Muslim. The Christian population declined 29 percent in the West Bank and 20 percent in the Gaza Strip from 1997 15. Human Rights in Israel and the Territories 175 176 to 2002. By contrast, in the period 1995–2003, Israel’s Arab Christian population grew 14.1 percent.27 Jonathan Adelman and Agota Kuperman noted that Yasser Arafat “tried to erase the historic Jesus by depicting him as the first radical Palestinian armed Fedayeen (guerrilla). Meanwhile, the Palestinian Authority has adopted Islam as its official religion, used Sharia Islamic codes, and allowed even officially appointed clerics to brand Christians (and Jews) as infidels in their mosques.” The authors add that the “militantly Islamic rhetoric and terrorist acts of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah . . . offer little comfort to Christians.” David Raab observed that “Palestinian Christians are perceived by many Muslims—as were Lebanon’s Christians—as a potential fifth column for Israel. In fact, at the start of the Palestinian War in 2000, Muslim Palestinians attacked Christians in Gaza.” Raab also wrote that “anti-Christian graffiti is not uncommon in Bethlehem and neighboring Beit Sahur, proclaiming: ‘First the Saturday people (the Jews), then the Sunday people (the Christians),’ ” and that “Christian cemeteries have been defaced, monasteries have had their telephone lines cut, and there have been break-ins at convents.” In 2002, Palestinian terrorists holed up in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, endangering the shrine and provoking a tense standoff with Israeli troops. When Arafat died, Vatican Radio correspondent Graziano Motta said, “The death of the president of the Palestinian National Authority has come at a time when the political, administrative and police structures often discriminate against [Christians].” Motta added that Christians “have been continually exposed to pressures by Muslim activists, and have been forced to profess fidelity to the Intifada.” While Novak charged Israel with bulldozing Christian houses, without any evidence, he ignored reports by journalists such as Motta who reported, “Frequently, there are cases in which the Muslims expropriate houses and lands belonging to Catholics, and often the intervention of the authorities has been lacking in addressing acts of violence against young women, or offenses against the Christian faith.”28 In September 2005, Muslims attacked the Christian town of Taibe a few days after a Muslim woman was allegedly killed by her family for having become involved in a relationship with a Christian from Taibe. It took hours before any police responded. “It was like a war,” said one Taibe resident. Hours passed before the Palestinian Authority security and fire services arrived.29 It certainly wouldn’t be difficult for Novak to find evidence of mistreatment of Christians in the PA if he were interested, but unlike Christians who enjoy freedom of speech as well as religion in Israel, beleaguered Palestinian Christians are afraid to speak out. “Out of fear for their safety, Christian spokesmen aren’t happy to be identified by name when they complain about the Muslims’ treatment of them . . . off the record they talk of harassment and terror tactics, mainly from the gangs of thugs who looted and plundered Christians and their property, under the protection of Palestinian security personnel.”30 Notes 1. Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. 2. Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. 3. Alan Dershowitz, The Case for Israel. (NY: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), p. 157. 4. U.S. Department of State, 2001 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, Released by the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Washington, DC, (October 26, 2001). 5. Speech to AIPAC Policy Conference, (May 23, 1989). 6. Haaretz, (September 23, 2003). 7. Shabtai Teveth, Ben- Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War, (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 140. 8. James Bennet, “Letter from the Middle East; Arab Showplace? Could It Be the West Bank?” New York Times, (April 2, 2003). 9. Golda Meir, My Life, (NY: Dell Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 308–309. 10. The New Republic, (December 30, 2002). 11. Anthony Cordesman, “From Peace to War: Land for Peace or Settlements for War,” (DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 15, 2003), pp. 12–13; CIA World Factbook, 2004. 12. “Human Development Report 2004,” United Nations Development Program, 2005. 13. Jerusalem Post, (June 20, 2005). 14. Jerusalem Post, (June 24, 2005). 15. Jerusalem Post, (June 20, 2005); BBC, (June 21, 2005). 16. Jerusalem Post, (June 24, 2005). 17. Israeli Foreign Ministry. 18. Washington Post, (January 31, 2002). 19. Israeli Foreign Ministry. 20. “Bomb found in Red Crescent Ambulance,” Haaretz, (June 12, 2002). 21. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, (June 30, 2002). 22. Margot Dudkevitch, “Palestinian Transported Bomb Materials in Ambulances,” Jerusalem Post, (December 11, 2003). 23. Haaretz, (November 28, 2002). 24. Maariv, (October 14, 2003); Efrat Weiss, “Palestinian girl hides gun in undies,” Ynetnews.com, (April 15, 2005); Ali Daraghmeh, “Woman Found Hiding Grenade Under Baby,” Associated Press, (October 22, 2005). 25. Center for Monitoring the Impact on Peace, Newsletter, (February 2004). 26. Bob Novak, “Hyde fights for overlooked Christians,” Chicago Sun- Times, (April 18, 2005). 27. Alex Safian, “New York Times Omits Major Reason Christians are Leaving Bethlehem,” (December 24, 2004), CAMERA. 28. “Christians in Palestine Concerned About their future Zenit,” Zenit News Agency, (November 14, 2004). 29. Jerusalem Post, (September 4, 2005). 30. Maariv, (December 24, 2001).

16. The Palestinian War, 2000–2005* MYTH “The Palestinian War, dubbed by Arabs the ‘al- Aksa Intifada,’ was provoked by Ariel Sharon’s September 2000 visit to the Temple Mount.” FACT To believe Palestinian spokesmen, the five- year war was caused by the desecration of a Muslim holy place—Haram al- Sharif (the Temple Mount)—by Likud leader Ariel Sharon and the “thousands of Israeli soldiers” who accompanied him. The violence was carried out through unprovoked attacks by Israeli forces, which invaded Palestinian- controlled territories and “massacred” defenseless Palestinian civilians, who merely threw stones in self- defense. The only way to stop the violence, then, was for Israel to cease-fire and removes its troops from the Palestinian areas. The truth is dramatically different. Imad Faluji, the Palestinian Authority Communications Minister, admitted months after Sharon’s visit that the violence had been planned in July, far in advance of Sharon’s “provocation.” “It [the violence] had been planned since Chairman Arafat’s return from Camp David, when he turned the tables on the former U.S. president and rejected the American conditions.”1 “The Sharon visit did not cause the ‘Al- Aksa Intifada.’ ” —Conclusion of the Mitchell Report, (May 4, 2001)2 The violence started before Sharon’s September 28, 2000, visit to the Temple Mount. The day before, for example, an Israeli soldier was killed at the Netzarim Junction. The next day, in the West Bank city of Kalkilya, a Palestinian police officer working with Israeli police on a joint patrol opened fire and killed his Israeli counterpart. On September 29, the Voice of Palestine, the PA’s official radio station sent out calls “to all Palestinians to come and defend the al- Aksa mosque.” The PA closed its schools and bused Palestinian students to the Temple Mount to participate in the organized riots. Just prior to Rosh Hashanah (September 30), the Jewish New Year, when hundreds of Israelis were worshipping at the Western Wall, thousands of Arabs began throwing bricks and rocks at Israeli police and Jewish worshippers. Rioting then spread to towns and villages throughout Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Internal Security Minister Shlomo Ben- Ami permitted Sharon to go to the Temple Mount—Judaism’s holiest place—only after calling Palestinian security chief Jabril Rajoub and receiving his assurance that if Sharon did not enter the mosques, no problems would arise. The need to protect Sharon arose when Rajoub later said that the Palestinian police would do nothing to prevent violence during the visit. Sharon did not attempt to enter any mosques and his 34 minute visit to the Temple Mount was conducted during normal hours when the area is open to tourists. Palestinian youths—eventually numbering around 1,500—shouted slogans in an attempt to inflame the situation. Some 1,500 Israeli police were present at the scene to forestall violence. There were limited disturbances during Sharon’s visit, mostly involving stone throwing. During the remainder of the day, outbreaks of stone throwing continued on the Temple Mount and in the vicinity, leaving 28 Israeli policemen injured. There are no accounts of Palestinian injuries on that day. Significant and orchestrated violence was initiated by Palestinians the next day following Friday prayers. The real desecration of holy places was perpetrated by Palestinians, not Israelis. In October 2000, Palestinian mobs destroyed a Jewish shrine in Nablus—Joseph’s Tomb—tearing up and burning Jewish prayer books. They stoned worshipers at the Western Wall, attacked Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem with firebombs and automatic weapons, and destroyed synagogues left in the Gaza Strip after Israel evacuated the area in August 2005. None of the violent attacks following Sharon’s visit were initiated by Israeli security forces, which in all cases responded to Palestinian violence that went well beyond stone throwing. It included massive attacks with automatic weapons and the lynching of Israeli soldiers. Most armed attackers were members of the Tanzim—Arafat’s own militia. MYTH “A handful of Israelis have been murdered in the war while thousands of innocent Palestinians have been killed by Israeli troops.” FACT During the Palestinian War, the number of Palestinian casualties has been higher than the figure for Israelis; however, the gap narrowed as Palestinian suicide bombers used increasingly powerful bombs to kill larger 16. The Palestinian War, 2000–2005 179 180 numbers of Israelis in their terror attacks. When the war unofficially concluded at the end of September 2005, more than 2,100 Palestinians and 1,061 Israelis had been killed. The disproportionate number of Palestinian casualties was primarily a result of the number of Palestinians involved in violence and was the inevitable result of an irregular, ill- trained group of terrorists attacking a well- trained regular army. The unfortunate death of noncombatants was largely due to the habit of Palestinian terrorists using civilians as shields. What is more revealing than the tragic totals, however, is the specific breakdown of the casualties. According to one study, Palestinian noncombatants were mostly teenage boys and young men. “This completely contradicts accusations that Israel has ‘indiscriminately targeted women and children,’ ” according to the study. “There appears to be only one reasonable explanation for this pattern: that Palestinian men and boys engaged in behavior that brought them into conflict with Israeli armed forces.” By contrast, the number of women and older people among the noncombatant Israeli casualties illustrates the randomness of Palestinian attacks, and the degree to which terrorists have killed Israelis for the “crime” of being Israeli.3 Israeli troops do not target innocent Palestinians, but Palestinian terrorists do target Israeli civilians. “It is not a mistake that the Koran warns us of the hatred of the Jews and put them at the top of the list of the enemies of Islam. . . . The Muslims are ready to sacrifice their lives and blood to protect the Islamic nature of Jerusalem and al-Aksa!” —Sheikh Hian Al- Adrisi4 MYTH “Violence is an understandable and legitimate reaction to Israel’s policies.” FACT The basis of the peace process is that disputes should be resolved through negotiations. One of the conditions Israel set before agreeing to negotiate with the PLO was that the organization renounces terrorism. It formally did so in 1993; however, the PLO and other Palestinian groups and individuals have consistently resorted to violence since the agreements. Whether or not Israel made concessions, Palestinians have still committed heinous attacks. In some instances atrocities are perpetrated because of alleged mistreatment; in other cases, they are deliberate efforts to sabotage negotiations. Even after Israel completely withdrew from the Gaza Strip, attacks continued. The Palestinian Authority, which has a nearly 40,000- person police force (larger than allowed under the peace agreements), and multiple intelligence agencies, must be held responsible for keeping the peace. “Deliberately and systematically killing civilians violates the most fundamental principles of humanity. Political parties, community leaders and government officials should speak out unequivocally against these atrocities and support every effort to bring the perpetrators to justice.” —Sarah Leah Whitson, Human Rights Watch.5 MYTH “Israel created Hamas.” FACT Israel had nothing to do with the creation of Hamas. The organization grew out of the ideology and practice of the Islamic fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood movement that arose in Egypt in the 1920s. Hamas was legally registered in Israel in 1978 as an Islamic Association by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. Initially, the organization engaged primarily in social welfare activities and soon developed a reputation for improving the lives of Palestinians, particularly the refugees in the Gaza Strip. Though Hamas was committed from the outset to destroying Israel, it took the position that this was a goal for the future, and that the more immediate focus should be on winning the hearts and minds of the people through its charitable and educational activities. Its funding came primarily from Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The PLO was convinced that Israel was helping Hamas in the hope of triggering a civil war. Since Hamas did not engage in terror at first, Israel did not see it as a serious short- term threat, and some Israelis believed the rise of fundamentalism in Gaza would have the beneficial impact of weakening the PLO, and this is what ultimately happened. Hamas certainly didn’t believe it was being supported by Israel. As early as February 1988, the group put out a primer on how its members should behave if confronted by the Shin Bet. Several more instructional documents were distributed by Hamas to teach followers how to confront the Israelis and maintain secrecy. Israel’s assistance was more passive than active, that is, it did not interfere with Hamas activities or prevent funds from flowing into the organization from abroad. Israel also may have provided some funding 16. The Palestinian War, 2000–2005 181 182 to allow its security forces to infiltrate the organization.6 Meanwhile, Jordan was actively helping Hamas, with the aim of undermining the PLO and strengthening Jordanian influence in the territories. Though some Israelis were very concerned about Hamas before rioting began in December 1987, Israel was reluctant to interfere with an Islamic organization, fearing that it might trigger charges of violating the Palestinians’ freedom of religion. It was not until early in the Intifada, when Hamas became actively involved in the violence, which the group began to be viewed as a potentially greater threat than the PLO. The turning point occurred in the summer of 1988 when Israel learned that Hamas was stockpiling arms to build an underground force and Hamas issued its covenant calling for the destruction of Israel. At this point it became clear that Hamas was not going to put off its jihad to liberate Palestine and was shifting its emphasis from charitable and educational activity to terrorism. Israel then began to crack down on Hamas and wiped out its entire command structure. Hamas has been waging a terror war against Israel ever since.7 MYTH “The Palestinian Authority arrests terrorists and confiscates illegal weapons.” FACT At times cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security forces has been good, and Israel has publicly commended the Palestinian Authority. More often, however, the PA has failed to take adequate measures to prevent attacks against Israelis. While some terrorists have been apprehended, they are usually released shortly afterward and many have subsequently been involved in assaults against Jews.8 The PA is also filled with illegal weapons, including machine guns, hand grenades, rockets, explosives and mortars. Despite repeated promises, no effort has been made to collect the weapons. On the contrary, the PA has been actively stockpiling them and President Abbas has explicitly said he has no intention of disarming the terrorists.9 This is a serious violation of the agreements signed with Israel, one that provokes mistrust and threatens Israeli security. MYTH “Palestinians do not encourage children to engage in terror.” FACT Most Palestinians who adopt terror in the hope of either “ending the occupation” or destroying Israel do so because they freely choose murder over any other option. Palestinian terrorists also use children, however, to do their dirty work. On March 15, 2004, Israeli security forces caught an 11- year- old boy attempting to smuggle a bomb through a roadblock. The boy was promised a large sum of money by Tanzim activists in Nablus if he delivered a bag containing a bomb stuffed with bolts to a woman on the other side of the checkpoint. If the boy was stopped and searched, the terrorists who sent him planned to use a cell phone to immediately detonate the 15 to 22 pounds of explosives he was carrying, murdering nearby soldiers as well as the boy. The plan was foiled by an alert Israeli soldier, and the bomb apparently malfunctioned when the terrorists tried to remotely detonate it. A week later, on March 24, 2004, a 14- year- old Palestinian child was found to be carrying explosives when attempting to pass through the Israeli army checkpoint at Hawara, at the entrance of the town of Nablus.10 Just over a year later, on May 22, 2005, a 14- year- old boy was again arrested at the Hawara checkpoint with two pipe bombs strapped to a belt he was wearing. A few days later, a 15- year- old tried to get through the checkpoint with two more pipe bombs. Yet another teen, a 16- year old, was caught on July 4, 2005, attempting to smuggle a bomb and homemade handgun. In August, another 14- year- old boy was caught carrying three pipe bombs packed with explosives, shrapnel and glass balls.11 These were just the latest examples of the cynical use of children by Palestinians waging war on Israel. Young Palestinians are routinely indoctrinated and coerced into the cult of martyrdom. “Using children to carry out or assist in armed attacks of any kind is an abomination. We call on the Palestinian leadership to publicly denounce these practices.” —Amnesty International12 Despite occasional claims that terror is only promoted by “extremists,” the truth is the Palestinian Authority has consistently incited its youth to violence. Children are taught that the greatest glory is to die for Allah in battle as a Shahada. The PA regularly broadcast television shows that encouraged children to embrace this concept. One film used the death of Muhammad Al- Dura, the child killed in the crossfire of a shootout between Palestinian gunmen and Israeli forces, to show that life after death is paradise. An actor playing Al- Dura is shown in an amusement park, playing on the beach, and flying a kite. The Al- Dura in the film invited viewers to follow him. Similar messages extolling the 16. The Palestinian War, 2000–2005 183 184 virtue of the Shahid can be found in school textbooks and sermons by Muslim clergy.13 The indoctrination is having an impact. According to one Palestinian newspaper, 79–80% of children told pollsters they were willing to be Shahids.14 Palestinian children now play death games, competing to see who will be the Shahid. They also collect “terrorist cards” the way American kids collect baseball cards. The maker of the Palestinian cards sold 6 million in just over two years. “I take hundreds of these pictures from children every day and burn them,” said Saher Hindi, a teacher at a Nablus elementary school. “They turn children into extremists.”15 Many Palestinian youngsters have gone from pretending to carrying out actual terrorist attacks. More than two dozen suicide bombers have been under the age of 18. Between 2001 and March 2004, more than 40 minors involved in planning suicide bombings were arrested. In those years, 22 shootings and bombings were carried out by minors. For example, teen’s ages 11–14 attempted to smuggle munitions from Egypt into the Gaza Strip; three teenagers, ages 13–15, were arrested on their way to carry out a shooting attack in Afula; and a 17- year- old blew himself up in an attempted suicide attack. In just the first five months of 2005, 52 more Palestinian minors were caught wearing explosive belts or attempting to smuggle weapons through checkpoints in the West Bank.16 The situation has finally gotten so out of hand that Palestinian families are starting to protest. The mother of one of the three teenagers sent to carry out the Afula attack said of the letter he had left behind, “My son doesn’t know how to write a letter like that and has never belonged to one of the organizations. Some grownup wrote the letter for him.” The boy’s father added, “Nobody can accept to send his children to be slaughtered. I am sure that whoever recruits children in this kind of unlawful activity will not recruit his own children.”17 Martin Fletcher interviewed the parents of the 15- year- old stopped at the Hawara checkpoint. His parents expressed their anger at the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, calling its operatives criminals and saying that Allah would punish them. The correspondent spoke with the boy and read him a letter from his mother asking him to confess and to give Israel all the information in his possession about the men who had sent him.18 Whenever the use of children in terror operations provokes an outcry, the terrorist groups either claim ignorance or promise never to do it again. Meanwhile, the Palestinian Authority does nothing to stop the recruitment of children or to dismantle the organizations responsible for drafting them in their terror war. “As one of the Islamic fanatics who inspired al- Qaida said: ‘We are not trying to negotiate with you. We are trying to destroy you.’ . . . They wish to destroy the whole basis of Western society—secular democracy, individual liberty, equality before the law, toleration and pluralism—and replace it with a theocracy based on a perverted and dogmatic interpretation of the Koran. . . . The idea that we should try to appease the terrorists is wrong in every respect. It would not protect us, for nothing acts as a greater incentive to terrorists than the realization that their target is weak and frightened. And it would only weaken the institutions we are trying to protect, and demonstrate to the terrorists that we are—as they frequently allege—too decadent and craven to defend the way of life to which we claim to be attached.” —London Daily Telegraph19 MYTH “Palestinian women are becoming suicide bombers because of their commitment to ‘liberate’ Palestine.” FACT It may be that some Palestinian women share the ideology of the terrorists who believe that blowing up innocent men, women, and children will achieve their political objective, but many others are being blackmailed into carrying out suicide attacks by sadistic and manipulative Palestinian men. More than 20 Palestinian women have engaged in suicide attacks and the terrorist organizations that recruit them do so in part because they believe women will generate less suspicion, and that Israeli soldiers will be more reticent to search them. Some of the women have been convinced to engage in terrorist attacks to rehabilitate their reputations in their community if they have acquired a bad name or done something to bring shame upon their family. Shame is a powerful force in Arab society, and women who are promiscuous, engage in adultery, become pregnant out of wedlock, or behave in other ways deemed improper may be ostracized or severely punished (e.g., husbands may kill wives who shamed them in so- called “honor crimes”). Terrorist organizations have used emotional blackmail against these often vulnerable women to convince them that by carrying out a suicide attack against Jews, they may restore their honor or that of their family. Israeli intelligence declassified a report that said Fattah operatives went so far as to seduce women and then, after they became pregnant, used their condition to blackmail them into committing heinous crimes. The report cited two specific cases, one involved a 21- year- old from Bethlehem who blew herself up in the Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem, killing six and wounding more than 60, and the other was an 18-year- old from the Dehaishe refugee camp who blew up a Jerusalem supermarket and killed two people and wounded 22 others.20 These examples show the merciless way Palestinian terrorists treat not only their victims, but their own people. MYTH “Palestinians interested in peace and preventing terror are respected and allowed freedom of speech by the Palestinian Authority.” FACT One of the principal deterrents to speaking out against Palestinian irredentism and terror in the Palestinian Authority is the threat of being murdered. By the end of the first Intifada in the early 1990s, more Palestinians were killed by their fellow Palestinians than died in clashes with Israeli security forces. During the Palestinian War, intimidation and murder have again been used to muzzle dissent. Usually those seeking peace or an end to terror are labeled “collaborators” and, if they are lucky, arrested by the Palestinian Authority. The unlucky ones are murdered, often in grisly and public ways, such as stringing them up from lamp posts in public squares to send the message that a similar fate awaits anyone who dares cross those seeking Israel’s destruction. A Palestinian need not be interested in peace to become a target of violence; one need only express opposition or offer a challenge to the ruling Fattah party. For example, after student elections at Bir Zeit University in Ramallah resulted in the Islamic Bloc of Hamas and Islamic Jihad receiving more votes than Fattah, Palestinian security forces and members of Fattah attacked members of the Islamic groups and their supporters. Security forces opened fire on the crowd and wounded more than 100 students.21 When the president of the Gaza- based National Institute of Strategic Studies, Riad al- Agha, criticized the Palestinian security forces on Palestine TV for failing to impose law and order after Israel’s disengagement, he was arrested.22 There are no exact figures for the number of Palestinians killed in the internecine war; however, Amnesty International reported that “scores of Palestinians” had been unlawfully killed and that the PA “consistently failed to investigate these killings and none of the perpetrators was brought to justice.”23 The Independent Commission for Human Rights, a Palestinian organization that monitors slayings of Palestinians by Palestinians, recorded 43 such murders in 2002; 56 in 2003, and 93 in 2004. By October, 151 Palestinians had already been killed in 2005, more than had died in clashes with Israeli troops.24 MYTH “Israel uses excessive force to respond to children who are just throwing stones.” FACT Palestinians, young and old, attack Israeli civilians and soldiers with a variety of weapons. When they throw stones, they are not pebbles, but large rocks that can and do cause serious injuries. Typically, Israeli troops under attack have numbered fewer than 20, while their assailants, armed with Molotov cocktails, pistols, assault rifles, machine guns, hand grenades and explosives, have numbered in the hundreds. Moreover, mixed among rock throwers have been Palestinians, often policemen, armed with guns. Faced with an angry, violent mob, Israeli police and soldiers often have no choice but to defend themselves by firing rubber bullets and, in life- threatening situations, live ammunition. The use of live-fire by the Palestinians has effectively meant that Israeli forces have had to remain at some distance from those initiating the violence. In addition, the threat of force against Israelis has been a threat of lethal force. Both factors have inhibited the use of traditional methods of riot control. According to the rules of engagement for Israeli troops in the territories, the use of weapons is authorized solely in life- threatening situations or, subject to significant limitations, in the exercise of the arrest of an individual suspected of having committed a grave security offense. In all cases, IDF activities have been governed by an overriding policy of restraint, the requirement of proportionality and the necessity to take all possible measures to prevent harm to innocent civilians. Meanwhile, the Palestinians escalated their violent attacks against Israelis by using mortars and anti- tank missiles illegally smuggled into the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Authority has also been stockpiling weapons smuggled into Gaza by sea and underground tunnels linked to Egypt. The possession and use of these weapons and other arms by the Palestinians violates commitments they made in various agreements with Israel. Under the Oslo accords, the only weapons allowed in the Palestinian- controlled areas are handguns, rifles and machine guns, and these are to be held only by PA security officers.25 The number of Palestinian casualties in clashes is regrettable, but it is important to remember that no Palestinian would be in any danger or risk injury if they were not waging a terror campaign. If children were in school or at home with their families, rather than throwing rocks in the streets, they too would have little to fear. And children throw more than rocks. Abu Mazen revealed that children are paid to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel. He told a Jordanian newspaper that “at least 40 children in Rafah lost arms from the throwing of Bangalore torpedoes [explosive charges]. They received five shekels [approximately $1.00] in order to throw them.”26 Also, while the number of Palestinians who have died is greater than the number of Israelis, which should not minimize the traumatic loss of life on the Israeli side. Contrary to Palestinian assertions that they are fighting a war against armed forces, less than one-third of the Israelis that have been killed were soldiers. In 2004, Palestinians successfully carried out 15 suicide attacks and Israeli security forces thwarted 367 others.27 Consider how police in the United States and other nations react to mob violence. Abuses do sometimes occur when police are under attack, but no one expects them to stand by and allow their lives to be put in danger to assuage international opinion. In fact, the PA itself does not hesitate to use lethal force against protestors. For example, after the U.S. coalition attacked Afghanistan, Hamas organized a rally in the Gaza Strip in which thousands of Palestinians marched in support of Osama bin Laden. Palestinian police killed two protestors when they tried to break it up.28 It is only Israelis who are denied their right to self- defense or see it used as a propaganda weapon against them. “If Muslims claim that we are against violence, why aren’t we demonstrating in the streets against suicide bombings? Why is it so much easier to draw us into protest against a French ban on the hijab, but next to impossible to exorcise ourselves about slavery, stoning’s and suicide killings? Where’s our collective conscience?” —Muslim author Irshad Manji29 MYTH “The shooting of a child being protected by his father shown on TV proves Israel does not hesitate to kill innocent Palestinian children.” FACT Perhaps the most vivid image of the Palestinian War was the film of a Palestinian father trying unsuccessfully to shield his son from gunfire. Israel was universally blamed for the death of 12- year- old Mohammed Aldura, but subsequent investigations found that the boy was most likely killed by Palestinian bullets. The father and son took cover adjacent to a Palestinian shooting position at the Netzarim junction in the Gaza Strip. After Palestinian policemen fired from this location and around it toward an IDF position opposite, IDF soldiers returned fire toward the sources of the shooting. During the exchange of fire, the Palestinian child was hit and killed. Contrary to the conventional belief that the footage of the incident was live, it was actually edited before it was broadcast around the world. Though a number of cameramen were in the area, only one, a Palestinian working for France 2, recorded the shooting. Raw footage of the day shows a far more complex picture of what was taking place and raised questions about the universal assumption that Israel had killed the boy. An IDF investigation of the incident released November 27, 2000, found that Aldura was most likely killed by a Palestinian policeman and not by IDF fire. This report was confirmed by an independent investigation by German ARD Television, which said the footage of Aldura’s death was censored by the Palestinians to look as if he had been killed by the Israelis when, in fact, his death was caused by Palestinian gun-fire.30 James Fallows revisited the story and found that “the physical evidence of the shooting was in all ways inconsistent with shots coming from the IDF outpost.” In addition, he cites a number of unanswered questions, which have led some to conclude the whole incident was staged. For example, Fallows asks, “Why is there no footage of the boy after he was shot? Why does he appear to move in his father’s lap, and to clasp a hand over his eyes after he is supposedly dead? Why is one Palestinian policeman wearing a Secret Service- style earpiece in one ear? Why is another Palestinian man shown waving his arms and yelling at others, as if ‘directing’ a dramatic scene? Why does the funeral appear—based on the length of shadows—to have occurred before the apparent time of the shooting? Why is there no blood on the father’s shirt just after they are shot? Why did a voice that seems to be that of the France 2 cameraman yell, in Arabic, ‘The boy is dead’ before he had been hit? Why do ambulances appear instantly for seemingly everyone else and not for al- Dura?”31 More recently, Denis Jeambar, editor-in-chief of the French news weekly l’Express, and filmmaker Daniel Leconte, a producer and owner of the film company Doc en Stock, saw raw, unedited video of the shooting and said the boy could not have been shot by Israeli soldiers. “The only ones who could hit the child were the Palestinians from their position. If they had been Israeli bullets, they would be very strange bullets because they would have needed to go around the corner.” France 2 claimed that the gunshots that struck al- Durra were bullets that ricocheted off the ground, but Leconte dismissed the argument. “It could happen once, but that there should be eight or nine of them, which go around a corner?”32 Despite the growing body of evidence that the report was inaccurate, France 2 refuses to retract the story. “I think when you are attacked by a terrorist and you know who the terrorist is and you can fingerprint back to the cause of the terror, you should respond.” —U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell33 MYTH “Israel’s use of F- 16 fighter jets typifies the disproportionate use of force applied by Israel against innocent Palestinian civilians.” FACT How do you determine the proportionate use of military force? When Palestinian terrorists plant bombs at Israeli shopping malls and kill and maim dozens of civilians, would the proportionate response be for Israelis to plant bombs in Palestinian malls? No one in Israel believes this would be a legitimate use of force. Thus, Israel is left with the need to take measured action against specific targets in an effort to either deter Palestinian violence or stop it. In the specific case of Israel’s use of F- 16s, Major General Giora Eiland, Head of the IDF Operation Branch, explained Israel’s reasoning: I know that the F- 16 was not designed to attack targets in Palestinian cities. But we have to remember that although we use this kind of aircraft, it is still very accurate. All the targets were military targets. . . . it was rather a tactical decision, simply because the targets were big enough, were strong enough or solid enough that attack helicopters were considered not effective enough to penetrate or to hit these specific targets. So when we decided or we chose these targets then we were looking for the best ammunition for them and in this specific case it was F- 16.34 Israel’s deployment of the fighters came after 88 Israelis had already lost their lives, including 55 civilians. The civilians were not killed accidentally, they were deliberately targeted. In the previous two- and-a-half months, Palestinians had attempted to place 28 bombs inside Israel. The F- 16 attack came in direct response to one that exploded at a Netanya shopping mall May 18, 2001, killing five Israelis. A month before deploying the F- 16s, the U.S. State Department accused Israel of an “excessive and disproportionate” response to Palestinian violence when it launched air strikes against targets in Gaza, even though the spokesman admitted the retaliation was “precipitated by the provocative Palestinian mortar attacks on Israel.”35 The U.S. position is ironic given the so- called Powell Doctrine enunciated by Secretary of State Colin Powell, which holds that “America should enter fights with every bit of force available or not at all.”36 Consider a few examples of the application of this doctrine: ■ General Powell insisted on deploying overwhelming force before going to war against Iraq in the Gulf War. The Allied force of more than half a million troops demolished Saddam Hussein’s army at a cost of fewer than 200 American lives while approximately 35,000 Iraqis were killed, including many civilians. ■ Powell also oversaw the invasion of Panama, which required the deployment of 25,000 troops and the use of F- 117 Stealth bombers for the first time. Thousands of Panamanian civilians were injured and displaced and at least 100 killed. He said later, “Use all the force necessary, and do not apologize for going in big if that is what it takes. Decisive force ends wars quickly and in the long run saves lives.”37 ■ In reaction to an attempt to assassinate President Bush in 1993, the U.S. launched 23 cruise missiles at Iraq’s intelligence headquarters and hit a civilian neighborhood in the process. Powell later said this was an “appropriate, proportional” response.38 ■ The U.S. also deployed massive force in the Balkans and, in 1999, accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade killing three and injuring 20. ■ The U.S. has relied heavily on fighter planes and bombers to conduct its post- September 11 war in Afghanistan. A number of incidents have subsequently been reported in which civilians have been killed, including the bombing of a wedding party that killed 48.39 The United States has not hesitated to use overwhelming force against its adversaries, even though the threats have been distant and in no way posed a danger to the existence of the nation or the immediate security of its citizens. While U.S. military objectives were accomplished, they also were routinely accompanied by errors and collateral damage that resulted in the loss of civilian lives. Israel is in a different position. The threat it faces is immediate in time and physical proximity, and poses a direct danger to Israeli citizens. Still, Israel has not used its full might as the Powell Doctrine dictates. The use of force has been judicious and precise. In those instances where mistakes occur—as inevitably happens in war—the incidents are investigated. 16. The Palestinian War, 2000–2005 191 192 The bottom line is that Israel would have no need to respond with military force if the Palestinians were not attacking its citizens and soldiers. 

Continued in part 2