Studies in Zionism
Vol. 8, no. 1 (1987); pp. 25 - 49
"Palestine's Rural
Economy, 1917 - 1939"
By Kenneth W. Stein
By Kenneth W. Stein
During the early decades of the twentieth century in
Palestine, the
majority Arab population sustained itself primarily through agricultural
and pastoral pursuits. The land and its management dominated the
peasant's life. Palestinian fellaheen precariously but diligently existed in
degrees of subsistence and poverty. The annual struggle to survive
required rugged persistence. It necessitated an almost fatalistic
acceptance of repeated destitution and regular financial insolvency. The
rural economy's nature prevented the peasant from enjoying economic or
political independence.
majority Arab population sustained itself primarily through agricultural
and pastoral pursuits. The land and its management dominated the
peasant's life. Palestinian fellaheen precariously but diligently existed in
degrees of subsistence and poverty. The annual struggle to survive
required rugged persistence. It necessitated an almost fatalistic
acceptance of repeated destitution and regular financial insolvency. The
rural economy's nature prevented the peasant from enjoying economic or
political independence.
Land was the nexus of economic and, ultimately,
political power in
Palestine. Those who controlled or benefited from cultivating, renting,
and selling land were, as elsewhere in the Middle East, the dominant if
not domineering social, economic, and political elite. The Palestinian
peasant was bound to the land because alternative occupations in
commerce, industry, manufacturing or manual labor were scarce; over a
period of centuries he relied upon cultivation and grazing for his primary
income in the absence of investment capital or exploitable natural
resources.
Palestine. Those who controlled or benefited from cultivating, renting,
and selling land were, as elsewhere in the Middle East, the dominant if
not domineering social, economic, and political elite. The Palestinian
peasant was bound to the land because alternative occupations in
commerce, industry, manufacturing or manual labor were scarce; over a
period of centuries he relied upon cultivation and grazing for his primary
income in the absence of investment capital or exploitable natural
resources.
What was critical to all who depended on agriculture was
the quantity
of produce. The state claimed its taxes, the landowner sought a part of
the yield as rent, and the peasant wanted his share to support himself
and his family, and to pay portions of what seemed endless debts. Any
factor that interrupted the growing or harvesting process was in some
measure economically harmful. There seemed to be an unending stream
of causes which hindered agricultural production and prevented rural
solvency in Palestine. These conspired together to hamper development.
of produce. The state claimed its taxes, the landowner sought a part of
the yield as rent, and the peasant wanted his share to support himself
and his family, and to pay portions of what seemed endless debts. Any
factor that interrupted the growing or harvesting process was in some
measure economically harmful. There seemed to be an unending stream
of causes which hindered agricultural production and prevented rural
solvency in Palestine. These conspired together to hamper development.
The purpose of this essay is to identify and
explain those factors which influenced the rural economy's evolution, and to
indicate how Palestine's rural population faired during the: emerging
Arab-Zionist struggle to control the country's political future.
Two broadly defined
areas combined to influence, create, and
maintain the fellaheen's precarious financial state:
administration of the
land sphere and a series of enfeebling events. First, there were Ottoman
and British policies which introduced unfamiliar changes in the style,
land sphere and a series of enfeebling events. First, there were Ottoman
and British policies which introduced unfamiliar changes in the style,
form, and rules of
governance under which the peasant had traditionally operated. For a
century prior to the 1940s, these included selective
alterations in the bureaucratic, fiscal, and administrative structure of Palestine. These innovations, combined with repeated governmental reluctance to assist financially the rural population, gave the peasantry little opportunity to escape insolvency.
alterations in the bureaucratic, fiscal, and administrative structure of Palestine. These innovations, combined with repeated governmental reluctance to assist financially the rural population, gave the peasantry little opportunity to escape insolvency.
Traditional behavior on the part of
fellaheen, such as the retention of
customary practices in cultivation habits and land use, limited economic
development. It also included severe indebtedness imposed in usurious
fashion by landowners, grain merchants, tax collectors, rural sheikhs,
and notables.
customary practices in cultivation habits and land use, limited economic
development. It also included severe indebtedness imposed in usurious
fashion by landowners, grain merchants, tax collectors, rural sheikhs,
and notables.
And second, there
were natural and man-made setbacks that
consisted of
periodic military and civilian disturbances, regional trade
difficulties, and
vexing international problems. Any one of these obstacles might have been
surmountable, but not all three simultaneously and for prolonged periods of
time. For economic reasons alone an overwhelming majority of the Palestinian
peasantry remained on the sidelines of the
political struggle, at least until the mid-1930s, coping instead with matters of survival and existence. The status and decline of Palestine's rural
economy helped to neutralize the Jewish demographic disadvantage
during the early years of the Mandate.
political struggle, at least until the mid-1930s, coping instead with matters of survival and existence. The status and decline of Palestine's rural
economy helped to neutralize the Jewish demographic disadvantage
during the early years of the Mandate.
Over several centuries, Palestinian Arab class structure
became
stratified as it did elsewhere in the Middle East. There were two major
classes - the landed elite and the peasantry - and a very small middle
class. Either one owned land and worked it or had it worked by
permanent tenants or less permanent agricultural laborers. Some owners
lived on the land they worked; others dwelt in the area or in a distant
capital like Beirut, Damascus, or Cairo. When living away from the land,
an owner employed managers resident in the vicinity to collect rents and
taxes. Sometimes a peasant was both the owner of his own parcels and
a tenant or agricultural laborer on another's land. In Palestine, rent
payment in cash was rare. Instead in a great majority of cases rent varied
from 20% to 75% of the gross yield, depending upon the extent to which
the landlord provided the tenant with his seeds, animals, and other
subsistence. In addition, the cultivator paid 10% of his gross produce for
the tithe which amounted to at least 35% of the net produce. 1
stratified as it did elsewhere in the Middle East. There were two major
classes - the landed elite and the peasantry - and a very small middle
class. Either one owned land and worked it or had it worked by
permanent tenants or less permanent agricultural laborers. Some owners
lived on the land they worked; others dwelt in the area or in a distant
capital like Beirut, Damascus, or Cairo. When living away from the land,
an owner employed managers resident in the vicinity to collect rents and
taxes. Sometimes a peasant was both the owner of his own parcels and
a tenant or agricultural laborer on another's land. In Palestine, rent
payment in cash was rare. Instead in a great majority of cases rent varied
from 20% to 75% of the gross yield, depending upon the extent to which
the landlord provided the tenant with his seeds, animals, and other
subsistence. In addition, the cultivator paid 10% of his gross produce for
the tithe which amounted to at least 35% of the net produce. 1
1 Report of the Committee Appointed by His Excellency to
Give Further Consideration to the Draft Rural Property Tax, June 23, 1933,
Public Record Office (hereafter P.R.O.), CO 733/267/37560, P. 3; and Albert
Abramson, Palestine Commissioner of Lands, to Chief
During the Ottoman
regime, the fellaheen's economic situation was
continuously
precarious. The prosecution of World War I in Palestine
added to the
economic problems of all segments of the population. In the
1920s, during the first decade of the British Mandate, Palestine's
agricultural sector did not fair well except for plantation and cash crops
such as citrus and bananas. In the early 1930s before the peasant
suffered five consecutive years of poor crop yields, many villagers were
disillusioned by their financial difficulties; they were no longer making
efforts to extricate themselves from their indebtedness to the government
and moneylenders. 2 In the mid-1930s, the civil unrest in Palestine
further impaired the Arab rural economy. Eventually the peasant became
exhausted and was beaten by forces beyond his ken or control.
1920s, during the first decade of the British Mandate, Palestine's
agricultural sector did not fair well except for plantation and cash crops
such as citrus and bananas. In the early 1930s before the peasant
suffered five consecutive years of poor crop yields, many villagers were
disillusioned by their financial difficulties; they were no longer making
efforts to extricate themselves from their indebtedness to the government
and moneylenders. 2 In the mid-1930s, the civil unrest in Palestine
further impaired the Arab rural economy. Eventually the peasant became
exhausted and was beaten by forces beyond his ken or control.
Beginning in the nineteenth century or earlier, the
peasant steadily
became economically reliant and politically dependent upon others who
gradually gained irretrievable control over his future. Classic patron-client
relationships were formed. These ties were solidified and reinforced over
time, with the notable elite acting as intermediaries between
"government" and the peasantry. In matters pertaining to land the
peasant's illiteracy made him depend upon spokesmen in coping with
administrative matters like tax payment. During the early years of British
rule in Palestine, the peasantry had little interest in politics yet desired
changes in the rural economy which would lead to its improvement,
without greatly altering customary agricultural procedures and practices.
3 Thus the Arab political arena during the British Mandate was ultimately
left to those who had landowning interests, including urban merchants,
professionals, religious leaders, village sheikhs, mukhtars, and local
government officials. Together this elite numbered perhaps no more than
several thousand out of a total Muslim and Christian population of
769,813; the rural Arabs constituted approximately two-thirds of the total
Arab population of Palestine in 1931.4
became economically reliant and politically dependent upon others who
gradually gained irretrievable control over his future. Classic patron-client
relationships were formed. These ties were solidified and reinforced over
time, with the notable elite acting as intermediaries between
"government" and the peasantry. In matters pertaining to land the
peasant's illiteracy made him depend upon spokesmen in coping with
administrative matters like tax payment. During the early years of British
rule in Palestine, the peasantry had little interest in politics yet desired
changes in the rural economy which would lead to its improvement,
without greatly altering customary agricultural procedures and practices.
3 Thus the Arab political arena during the British Mandate was ultimately
left to those who had landowning interests, including urban merchants,
professionals, religious leaders, village sheikhs, mukhtars, and local
government officials. Together this elite numbered perhaps no more than
several thousand out of a total Muslim and Christian population of
769,813; the rural Arabs constituted approximately two-thirds of the total
Arab population of Palestine in 1931.4
Secretary, February 21, 1930, Israel State Archives
(hereafter I.S.A.), Land Registry Group, M3380/2.
2 Albert Abramson to Acting Chief Secretary of the
Palestine Government, May 12, 1931, P.R.O., CO 733/207/87275.
3 Great Britain, P.R.O., CAB 24/165 1887, Herbert Samuel,
"Palestine,"
February 25, 1924, P. 4; Lord Plumer, High Commissioner for Palestine,
to Sir Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, April 22, 1926,
February 25, 1924, P. 4; Lord Plumer, High Commissioner for Palestine,
to Sir Leopold Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, April 22, 1926,
I.S.A., M15/27A.
4 Palestine
Government, Census for Palestine, 1931, vol. 1, pp. 96, 291-
292. In 1931 there were 108,765 rural earners and 331,319 dependents.
Of the earner category, 70,526 (65%) were cultivators, 32,539 (35%)
were agricultural laborers, and 5,311 (5%) gained their livelihood from
292. In 1931 there were 108,765 rural earners and 331,319 dependents.
Of the earner category, 70,526 (65%) were cultivators, 32,539 (35%)
were agricultural laborers, and 5,311 (5%) gained their livelihood from
rents.
From the outset of
British military control of Palestine in 1917, the
peasant required
financial relief from accumulated liabilities. His
indebtedness was
due in a small way to improvidence and extravagance,
but was mostly caused by the needs of production, cost of living, taxes,
and payment of previous debts. Production essentials included seeds,
agricultural equipment, plows, and farm animals. Usually a peasant could
not defray more than a fraction of his outstanding debt to a moneylender.
He steadily increased both the size and sources of his borrowing while
loan rates also rose. It was not uncommon in Palestine for the fellah to
pay interest rates of 30% to 60% on money borrowed over periods of
three months to a year. Loans were rarely used to upgrade an
agricultural holding for future benefit; instead they were employed to
meet immediate and pressing needs. By the early 1930s money for
current or debt payments became scarce, contributing to the evolving
barter economy in the rural sector. Villagers in the hill regions of Nablus
and the Galilee were wont to sell their animal manure to orange growers
for specie rather than use it to fertilize their own land. 5 Gradually many
peasants became unable to repay borrowed sums, defaulting on their
sources of credit such as their crops, farm animals, homes, tenants'
privileges or land. Creditors accepted payment of debts for a crop not yet
harvested at a price below its market value; the moneylender held the
crop for future sale when supplies were short and demand greater. In
Palestine, most of the money-lenders were also grain merchants, wheat
being the most common medium of exchange. Loans were usually
expressed in terms of kilograms of wheat, with a proviso for a
proportionate increase in the quantity to be repaid by the peasant, should
prices fall below a certain figure. Money-lenders regularly resorted to
various subterfuges by which they circumvented the Ottoman law which
set the legal rate of interest at 9%.6
but was mostly caused by the needs of production, cost of living, taxes,
and payment of previous debts. Production essentials included seeds,
agricultural equipment, plows, and farm animals. Usually a peasant could
not defray more than a fraction of his outstanding debt to a moneylender.
He steadily increased both the size and sources of his borrowing while
loan rates also rose. It was not uncommon in Palestine for the fellah to
pay interest rates of 30% to 60% on money borrowed over periods of
three months to a year. Loans were rarely used to upgrade an
agricultural holding for future benefit; instead they were employed to
meet immediate and pressing needs. By the early 1930s money for
current or debt payments became scarce, contributing to the evolving
barter economy in the rural sector. Villagers in the hill regions of Nablus
and the Galilee were wont to sell their animal manure to orange growers
for specie rather than use it to fertilize their own land. 5 Gradually many
peasants became unable to repay borrowed sums, defaulting on their
sources of credit such as their crops, farm animals, homes, tenants'
privileges or land. Creditors accepted payment of debts for a crop not yet
harvested at a price below its market value; the moneylender held the
crop for future sale when supplies were short and demand greater. In
Palestine, most of the money-lenders were also grain merchants, wheat
being the most common medium of exchange. Loans were usually
expressed in terms of kilograms of wheat, with a proviso for a
proportionate increase in the quantity to be repaid by the peasant, should
prices fall below a certain figure. Money-lenders regularly resorted to
various subterfuges by which they circumvented the Ottoman law which
set the legal rate of interest at 9%.6
Under the Ottoman regime there was little
monetary relief from regular
government or bank sources for the peasants' indebtedness. Absence of
government or bank sources for the peasants' indebtedness. Absence of
5 Alfred Bonne,
Palastina Land und Wirtschaft, Berlin, 1935, P. 124;
London Times,
August 14, 1936. Abraham Granott in The Land System in Palestine:
History and Structure, London, 1952, depicts a devastating picture of the
Palestine peasantry's enormous indebtedness. See
especially pp. 54-70.
especially pp. 54-70.
6 Great Britain,
Palestine Royal Commission Memoranda Prepared by
the Government of Palestine, Memorandum No. 13, "Rural
Indebtedness," P.R.O., Colonial No. 133, London, 1937, P. 42; Sir John
Chancellor, High Commissioner for Palestine, to Lord Passfield,
Secretary of State for the Colonies, June 21, 1930, Sir John Chancellor
the Government of Palestine, Memorandum No. 13, "Rural
Indebtedness," P.R.O., Colonial No. 133, London, 1937, P. 42; Sir John
Chancellor, High Commissioner for Palestine, to Lord Passfield,
Secretary of State for the Colonies, June 21, 1930, Sir John Chancellor
Papers, Rhodes
House, Oxford University; Claude F. Strickland, 'The
Struggle for Land
in Palestine,' Current History (published by the New
York Times) 34 (April 1931), P. 47. For examples of how
grain merchants
and moneylenders repeatedly put the cultivator into perennial debt, see
and moneylenders repeatedly put the cultivator into perennial debt, see
F. G. Howill (of the Westminister Bank Ltd.), The
Banking Situation in Palestine, Palestine, 1936, pp. 80, 91.
acceptable
collateral such as title deeds, required by the Ottoman
Agricultural Bank
for the tendering of loans, gave the moneylender, who
was offered inadequate security for his loans, reason to charge very high
rates of interest. The Director of the Palestine Department of Lands
noted that "the fellah rarely had clear title [to his land] ... and rarely ha[d]
recourse to the formality of a regular mortgage with perhaps not 5% of
the fellah's land mortgaged formally."7 In 1931, it was estimated that the
volume of the Palestinian peasant's liabilities represented the full value of
his annual income from crops and agricultural stock, or in other words, all
his temporary wealth. In December 1939, the Managing Director of the
Jewish National Fund noted that the Arabs were in monetary distress due
to indebtedness. 8
was offered inadequate security for his loans, reason to charge very high
rates of interest. The Director of the Palestine Department of Lands
noted that "the fellah rarely had clear title [to his land] ... and rarely ha[d]
recourse to the formality of a regular mortgage with perhaps not 5% of
the fellah's land mortgaged formally."7 In 1931, it was estimated that the
volume of the Palestinian peasant's liabilities represented the full value of
his annual income from crops and agricultural stock, or in other words, all
his temporary wealth. In December 1939, the Managing Director of the
Jewish National Fund noted that the Arabs were in monetary distress due
to indebtedness. 8
The British for their part were parsimonious and lacked
personnel who
knew the culture, languages and recent local political history of the
region. They were aware of the problems in the rural economy but
decided not to ameliorate them. Meager and sporadic British assistance
was provided the peasant by His Majesty's Government's (HMG)
presence in Palestine. Only rarely during the Mandate did the British
even try to undo fellaheen indebtedness. They had good intentions but
lacked real commitment. Instead the British administration relied upon
legislative solutions from the late 1920s onward for rural problems that
required massive financial injections. Continuous financial commitments
by HMG to rid the peasant of his indebtedness were suggested
numerous times by those who investigated his plight.
knew the culture, languages and recent local political history of the
region. They were aware of the problems in the rural economy but
decided not to ameliorate them. Meager and sporadic British assistance
was provided the peasant by His Majesty's Government's (HMG)
presence in Palestine. Only rarely during the Mandate did the British
even try to undo fellaheen indebtedness. They had good intentions but
lacked real commitment. Instead the British administration relied upon
legislative solutions from the late 1920s onward for rural problems that
required massive financial injections. Continuous financial commitments
by HMG to rid the peasant of his indebtedness were suggested
numerous times by those who investigated his plight.
Reports, assessments, reviews and analyses were
repeatedly and
accurately made by British experts, commissions of inquiry, and
administrators in the Palestine Government about the poor state of the
land regime, the need to reform the agricultural sector, and provisions for
rural financial relief. All stressed the need to ameliorate the situation and
assist Palestine's rural population. Yet little substance came of the
suggestions made. The Land Settlement Commission Report of 1921,
the numerous reports written on Palestine's land regime by Sir Ernest
Dowson in the 1920s and 1930s, the Shaw Commission Report, the
Hope Simpson investigation, the Johnson-Crosbie Report, and the
Strickland Report, all in 1930, and both of Lewis French's reports in 1931
and 1932 supported
accurately made by British experts, commissions of inquiry, and
administrators in the Palestine Government about the poor state of the
land regime, the need to reform the agricultural sector, and provisions for
rural financial relief. All stressed the need to ameliorate the situation and
assist Palestine's rural population. Yet little substance came of the
suggestions made. The Land Settlement Commission Report of 1921,
the numerous reports written on Palestine's land regime by Sir Ernest
Dowson in the 1920s and 1930s, the Shaw Commission Report, the
Hope Simpson investigation, the Johnson-Crosbie Report, and the
Strickland Report, all in 1930, and both of Lewis French's reports in 1931
and 1932 supported
7 Mr. J. N. Stubbs, Director of Lands, to the Director
of the Development Department, February 10, 1932, I.S.A., M3390/3.
8 Great Britain,
Palestine Royal Commission Memoranda Prepared by
the Government of Pales- tine, Memorandum No. 13, "Rural
Indebtedness," Palestine, 1937, P. 42; minutes of the Jewish National
Fund Directorate meeting, December 19, 1939, remarks by Abraham
Granovsky, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter C.Z.A.), KKL I
0.
the Government of Pales- tine, Memorandum No. 13, "Rural
Indebtedness," Palestine, 1937, P. 42; minutes of the Jewish National
Fund Directorate meeting, December 19, 1939, remarks by Abraham
Granovsky, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem (hereafter C.Z.A.), KKL I
0.
HMG's annual reports on Palestine and Transjordan made
to the League
of Nations, which called for substantive changes in the land regime and a
wide assortment of assistance to Palestinian agriculture and to the fellah
himself. 9
of Nations, which called for substantive changes in the land regime and a
wide assortment of assistance to Palestinian agriculture and to the fellah
himself. 9
Cash loans were sponsored by the British and had a
salutary effect
until 1923 when they were suspended owing to HMG's financial
stringency. That stringency repeated itself when, in the 1930s, a
development loan for Palestine, first planned for £7.2 million, was
reduced to £50,000.10 Some seed and fodder loans were made in 1928
and 1934 respectively, and agricultural loans amounting to £169,214
were provided from 1930 to March 1936. But the total rural earner
population in 1930 exceeded 100,000 and total indebtedness was
estimated at £2 million."
until 1923 when they were suspended owing to HMG's financial
stringency. That stringency repeated itself when, in the 1930s, a
development loan for Palestine, first planned for £7.2 million, was
reduced to £50,000.10 Some seed and fodder loans were made in 1928
and 1934 respectively, and agricultural loans amounting to £169,214
were provided from 1930 to March 1936. But the total rural earner
population in 1930 exceeded 100,000 and total indebtedness was
estimated at £2 million."
The sums allocated by the British for financial relief
barely scratched
the surface of the fellaheen's needs, particularly since the earnings of
one-quarter of the Muslim rural population in 1931 were below the
subsistence level,12 that is, a sufficient income to provide food and
shelter for a peasant and his family. In the 1930s, tithe payments were
remitted and some instruction was introduced to improve the quality of
seeds, livestock and farming procedures. Though it was reported that
many fellaheen were appreciative of these British efforts, the great
majority of them were in a state of depression. 13 A large number of
peasants had lost
the surface of the fellaheen's needs, particularly since the earnings of
one-quarter of the Muslim rural population in 1931 were below the
subsistence level,12 that is, a sufficient income to provide food and
shelter for a peasant and his family. In the 1930s, tithe payments were
remitted and some instruction was introduced to improve the quality of
seeds, livestock and farming procedures. Though it was reported that
many fellaheen were appreciative of these British efforts, the great
majority of them were in a state of depression. 13 A large number of
peasants had lost
9 See "Land
Settlement Commission Report," May 1921, P.R.O., CO
733/18/9614; Ernest Dowson, "Preliminary Study of Land Tenure in
Palestine," 1924, I.S.A., 3571/ I; idem, "Notes on Land Tax, Cadastral
Survey and Settlement," n.d., I.S.A., 065/02059; idem, "Memorandum on
an Agricultural Bank," 1933, P.R.O., CO 733/233/97248; idem, "Note on
the Palestine Land Problem," 1935, CO 733/272/75072; Great Britain,
733/18/9614; Ernest Dowson, "Preliminary Study of Land Tenure in
Palestine," 1924, I.S.A., 3571/ I; idem, "Notes on Land Tax, Cadastral
Survey and Settlement," n.d., I.S.A., 065/02059; idem, "Memorandum on
an Agricultural Bank," 1933, P.R.O., CO 733/233/97248; idem, "Note on
the Palestine Land Problem," 1935, CO 733/272/75072; Great Britain,
P.R.O., Cmd. 3530.
Report of the Commission on the Palestine
Disturbances of August 1929 (Shaw Report), London, 1930,
P.R.O.,
Cmd. 3683; Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and
Development (Hope Simpson Report), London, 1930; Report of a
Cmd. 3683; Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and
Development (Hope Simpson Report), London, 1930; Report of a
Committee on the
Economic Conditions of Agriculturists in Palestine and
Fiscal Measures of Government in Relation Thereto (Johnson-Crosbic
Report), Palestine, 1930 Report by Mr. C. F. Strickland of the Indian Civil
Service on the Possibility of Introducing a System of Agricultural
Cooperation in Palestine (hereafter Strickland Report), Palestine, 1930;
Lewis French, First Report on Agricultural Development and Land
Settlement in Palestine (hereafter French, First Report), Palestine, 1931;
idem, Supplementary Report on Agricultural Development and Land
Settlement in Palestine (French Supplementary Report), Palestine, 1932.
Fiscal Measures of Government in Relation Thereto (Johnson-Crosbic
Report), Palestine, 1930 Report by Mr. C. F. Strickland of the Indian Civil
Service on the Possibility of Introducing a System of Agricultural
Cooperation in Palestine (hereafter Strickland Report), Palestine, 1930;
Lewis French, First Report on Agricultural Development and Land
Settlement in Palestine (hereafter French, First Report), Palestine, 1931;
idem, Supplementary Report on Agricultural Development and Land
Settlement in Palestine (French Supplementary Report), Palestine, 1932.
10 Kenneth W. Stein, The Land Question in Palestine,
1917-1939, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1984, P. 146.
1 1 Great Britain, Palestine Royal Commission Memoranda
Prepared by the Government of Palestine, Memorandum No. 14, "Measures
Taken to Provide Agricultural Credit," Palestine, 1937,pp.45-48.
12 Census for
Palestine, 1931, vol. 1, P. 291.
13 League of
Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission-Minutes,
Twenty-seventh Session, remarks by Mr. Sydney Moody of
the Palestine administration, June 5, 1935, P. 38.
control of their
economic destiny and vented their frustration on their own
brethren, the British, and the Zionists through various degrees of
disturbance in the 1930s, which included disputes over cultivation and
grazing rights, the uprooting of trees, squatting and trespassing on other
people's property, civil protests, strikes, and communal violence.
brethren, the British, and the Zionists through various degrees of
disturbance in the 1930s, which included disputes over cultivation and
grazing rights, the uprooting of trees, squatting and trespassing on other
people's property, civil protests, strikes, and communal violence.
Mr. Moody of the Palestine Chief Secretariat summed it
up well in 1923 when he said:
... the Palestine
government would do well to devote more
money and attention
to agriculture. If the farmers could see some sort of improvement in their
circumstances the danger of political troubles would be lessened: A strong
agrarian policy seems to me the one positive thing that the Palestine
government could do to relieve the economic and
therefore the political situations. 14
therefore the political situations. 14
But HMG came to Palestine to protect and enhance Great
Britain's
national interests, not to act as a social and economic welfare net for
either the poor Palestinian peasant or the Jewish population. To be sure,
HMG protected the rights and aspirations of the Jewish community in its
efforts to establish a Jewish National Home, but even this priority in the
dual obligation was secondary to its larger interest of preserving its
strategic presence at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Throughout
national interests, not to act as a social and economic welfare net for
either the poor Palestinian peasant or the Jewish population. To be sure,
HMG protected the rights and aspirations of the Jewish community in its
efforts to establish a Jewish National Home, but even this priority in the
dual obligation was secondary to its larger interest of preserving its
strategic presence at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Throughout
the Mandate, HMG
concentrated upon building a military infrastructure in
Palestine that would maintain peace at a minimal cost while protecting
Britain's various economic and political interests in Egypt (Suez), links to
Iraq (oil) and India, and positions vis-à-vis other great powers in the
region.
Palestine that would maintain peace at a minimal cost while protecting
Britain's various economic and political interests in Egypt (Suez), links to
Iraq (oil) and India, and positions vis-à-vis other great powers in the
region.
It was not just intentional and benign neglect on the
part of the British
Mandatory Government which gave little hope to the Palestinian peasant.
The introduction of administrative reform under the Ottomans, later
carried forward by the British, distanced him from the central government
and heightened his dependence upon local notables and moneylenders.
By the late 1930s and early 1940s much of the traditional Palestinian
Arab political leadership had been exiled or killed, leaving the peasant to
took to the British as paternalistic alternatives for the defense of Arab
rights. But HMG would not and could not meet the unrealistic
expectations of the Arab population that it would throttle the Jewish
National Home's development, provide financial relief to the agricultural
population, and create conditions necessary for self-determination.
Mandatory Government which gave little hope to the Palestinian peasant.
The introduction of administrative reform under the Ottomans, later
carried forward by the British, distanced him from the central government
and heightened his dependence upon local notables and moneylenders.
By the late 1930s and early 1940s much of the traditional Palestinian
Arab political leadership had been exiled or killed, leaving the peasant to
took to the British as paternalistic alternatives for the defense of Arab
rights. But HMG would not and could not meet the unrealistic
expectations of the Arab population that it would throttle the Jewish
National Home's development, provide financial relief to the agricultural
population, and create conditions necessary for self-determination.
14 Political Report for January 1923, remarks by Mr.
Moody of the Palestine Chief Secretariat, P.R.O., CO 733/42/8933.
Administration and
Use of Land
The introduction by the Ottoman central government of
new forms of
record-keeping toward the end of the nineteenth century seemed like an
innocuous enough innovation, but the initiation of a land registration
system in Palestine in 1871 had a particularly adverse effect ultimately
upon the peasants' economic and political future. With an avowed goal of
increased tax revenues, the reforms of the tanzimat neither reduced the
power of local notables nor did they appreciably augment revenue. The
peasantry had traditionally feared the central government and its
representatives because of its oppression through rapacious tax
demands and conscription. Land registration meant paying the cost for a
title deed, an additional tax valuation, and providing the government with
knowledge of a peasant's whereabouts and that of his family. Fellaheen
avoided registering their land for they sincerely believed that doing so
would obligate them for military service.'' Instead, land, when infrequently
registered, was regularly entered in the name of notables who were
predisposed to associate with the authorities and who were already
familiar with municipal government, the commissions, boards, and offices
of regional sub-district administration.
record-keeping toward the end of the nineteenth century seemed like an
innocuous enough innovation, but the initiation of a land registration
system in Palestine in 1871 had a particularly adverse effect ultimately
upon the peasants' economic and political future. With an avowed goal of
increased tax revenues, the reforms of the tanzimat neither reduced the
power of local notables nor did they appreciably augment revenue. The
peasantry had traditionally feared the central government and its
representatives because of its oppression through rapacious tax
demands and conscription. Land registration meant paying the cost for a
title deed, an additional tax valuation, and providing the government with
knowledge of a peasant's whereabouts and that of his family. Fellaheen
avoided registering their land for they sincerely believed that doing so
would obligate them for military service.'' Instead, land, when infrequently
registered, was regularly entered in the name of notables who were
predisposed to associate with the authorities and who were already
familiar with municipal government, the commissions, boards, and offices
of regional sub-district administration.
Land registered in whatever manner was usually recorded
as less
than the actual size to avoid larger tax assessments. As for the owner-
occupier, he usually retained the right to work his land, but sometimes as
than the actual size to avoid larger tax assessments. As for the owner-
occupier, he usually retained the right to work his land, but sometimes as
another's tenant to
maintain anonymity. Taxes were paid by notables or
estate managers so that records of payment were virtually nonexistent
among a population that was preponderantly illiterate. During the 1920s
and 1930s when written proof of tithe payment was required by the
British for consideration of statutory tenancy under the various
ordinances for agricultural tenants' protection, the peasants rarely had
such records and therefore were frequently denied compensation in land
or money for their displacement because of land sales. 16 The British
tried through a process of Land Settlement to fix proprietary rights on
land after 1928, but the peasantry lost faith in HMG for not moving
quickly enough to change the land regime and make sufficient funds
available to them. 17
estate managers so that records of payment were virtually nonexistent
among a population that was preponderantly illiterate. During the 1920s
and 1930s when written proof of tithe payment was required by the
British for consideration of statutory tenancy under the various
ordinances for agricultural tenants' protection, the peasants rarely had
such records and therefore were frequently denied compensation in land
or money for their displacement because of land sales. 16 The British
tried through a process of Land Settlement to fix proprietary rights on
land after 1928, but the peasantry lost faith in HMG for not moving
quickly enough to change the land regime and make sufficient funds
available to them. 17
15 A. Rizk (Palestine Department of Lands), Remarks on a
Note of the
Governor of Samaria on Werko and the Land Registry, February 2, 1923,
Governor of Samaria on Werko and the Land Registry, February 2, 1923,
P. 1, I.S.A., AG
755/L3/79/23.
16 See Kenneth W.
Stein, "Legal Protection and Circumvention for
Rights of Cultivators in Mandatory Palestine," in
Palestinian Society and Politics, ed.., Joel S. Migdal, Princeton, 1980, pp.
233-261.
17 The British made
a serious blunder in 1929 and lost considerable
credibility with a
peasantry reluctant to associate actively with the
government. HMG employed Land Settlement officials who
were carrying out land surveys and had gained the confidence
Land registration
provided some with tangible proof of ownership
while it denied others, of their own volition, that same
proof. A title deed
was physical evidence of ownership, a negotiable item which was used
as collateral for loans or exchanged to clear past indebtedness. Local
notables were able to accumulate vast amounts of land for themselves.
Peasants who did obtain title deeds or proof of registration under British
rule through the 1921 Beisan Agreement, for example, which confirmed
Arab cultivation rights on 75,000 acres in northern Palestine, readily sold
was physical evidence of ownership, a negotiable item which was used
as collateral for loans or exchanged to clear past indebtedness. Local
notables were able to accumulate vast amounts of land for themselves.
Peasants who did obtain title deeds or proof of registration under British
rule through the 1921 Beisan Agreement, for example, which confirmed
Arab cultivation rights on 75,000 acres in northern Palestine, readily sold
their newly allotted
parcels to Jewish purchasers. Many other landowners who had acquired
title deeds legally during the Ottoman period sold
these lands to Jewish immigrants during the Mandate. 19
these lands to Jewish immigrants during the Mandate. 19
The manner in which
land was used caused deterioration of
Palestine's rural
economy. Most harmful was the retention of cultivation
habits that limited output. These included traditional methods of
agriculture, lack of manuring and intensive farming, continuous cropping
without rotation, and an absence of regular irrigation. The cost and
scarcity of farm animals compelled the peasant to work hard but
inefficiently. He often tied himself to his plow, a practice which tired him
faster and made him less productive. Therefore his employment in a
habits that limited output. These included traditional methods of
agriculture, lack of manuring and intensive farming, continuous cropping
without rotation, and an absence of regular irrigation. The cost and
scarcity of farm animals compelled the peasant to work hard but
inefficiently. He often tied himself to his plow, a practice which tired him
faster and made him less productive. Therefore his employment in a
subsidiary
occupation as an agricultural laborer on another's land
became important.
Field crops with few exceptions were "broadcast,"
weeded by hand, then cut with a sickle, and trodden down by cattle on
the village threshing floor. The presence of weeds, dirt and other foreign
matter in the wheat and barley remaining made it unfit or at least less
competitive for export sale. In 1920, a hectare of wheat in Palestine
produced an average of 593 kg while the same area in Egypt yielded
1,793 kg. 20 Of course the Egyptian peasant did not suffer the same
economic and physical hardships endured by his Palestinian counterpart
during World War I. Likewise, Palestinian agriculture did not benefit from
the fertile soil built up over centuries by silting of the
weeded by hand, then cut with a sickle, and trodden down by cattle on
the village threshing floor. The presence of weeds, dirt and other foreign
matter in the wheat and barley remaining made it unfit or at least less
competitive for export sale. In 1920, a hectare of wheat in Palestine
produced an average of 593 kg while the same area in Egypt yielded
1,793 kg. 20 Of course the Egyptian peasant did not suffer the same
economic and physical hardships endured by his Palestinian counterpart
during World War I. Likewise, Palestinian agriculture did not benefit from
the fertile soil built up over centuries by silting of the
of the local population to administer the punishment meted
out to those
guilty of participation in the 1929 disturbances. See Sir Ernest Dowson to
guilty of participation in the 1929 disturbances. See Sir Ernest Dowson to
J. M. Martin, Secretary to the Palestine Royal
Commission, August 16, 1938, P.R.O., CO 733/ 361/75072/folio 33.
18 For a comparison
of land accumulation by urban notables in Syria and Iraq during the Ottoman
period, see, respectively, A. L. Tibawi, A History of Syria, London,
1969, P. 176, and Sir Ernest Dowson, An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related
Questions - Proposals for the Initiation of
Reform [in Iraq], London, 1932, pp. 20-24.
Reform [in Iraq], London, 1932, pp. 20-24.
19 See Stein, The
Land Question, pp. 62-64, 228-239.
20 E. R. Sawrer
(Director of the Palestine Department of Agriculture), A Review of the
Agricultural Situation in Palestine in 1921, Jerusalem, 1921; idem, A Review
of the Agricultural Situation in Palestine in 1922, Jerusalem, 1923;
idem, A Review of the Agricultural Situation in
Palestine in 1923, P.R.O., CO 733/46/31959.
Palestine in 1923, P.R.O., CO 733/46/31959.
Nile. As the Mandate
progressed the Palestinian fellah tended to resist
the minimal efforts undertaken by the British to instigate changes in
agricultural procedures that would have incorporated new farming
methods, or included mechanization for purposes of increasing crop
yields.
the minimal efforts undertaken by the British to instigate changes in
agricultural procedures that would have incorporated new farming
methods, or included mechanization for purposes of increasing crop
yields.
The Musha' Land
System
Probably more than any other single factor, the musha'
land system
held back the economic advancement of the Palestinian peasant.
According to virtually every land expert, its use was a severe impediment
to agricultural productivity and development; its practice contributed to
indebtedness, rural insolvency, a state of hopelessness, and eventually,
alienation of the peasants' land. 21 In 1933, between 46% and 63% of
the country's 8,252,900 cultivable dunams (a dunam equals a quarter of
held back the economic advancement of the Palestinian peasant.
According to virtually every land expert, its use was a severe impediment
to agricultural productivity and development; its practice contributed to
indebtedness, rural insolvency, a state of hopelessness, and eventually,
alienation of the peasants' land. 21 In 1933, between 46% and 63% of
the country's 8,252,900 cultivable dunams (a dunam equals a quarter of
an acre) were under
some form of musha' use. 22
The central concept in the musha' system was collective
ownership or
cultivation of common land which was periodically redistributed by lot
among various clans. The repartition of the same land area was
designed to insure a measure of equality in the distribution of land of all
qualities. Its goal was to maintain the integrity of a land area by ensuring
its ownership or use by a group as a whole rather than by an individual.
The variations of musha' use in Palestine were numerous, but certain
common points were general to its effect throughout Palestine.
cultivation of common land which was periodically redistributed by lot
among various clans. The repartition of the same land area was
designed to insure a measure of equality in the distribution of land of all
qualities. Its goal was to maintain the integrity of a land area by ensuring
its ownership or use by a group as a whole rather than by an individual.
The variations of musha' use in Palestine were numerous, but certain
common points were general to its effect throughout Palestine.
Periodic parcellation precluded one's willingness to
spend time, effort, or money on improving a plot which would be someone
else's within one, two, or five years. Long-term improvements on a parcel of
land were
rare, since few wanted others to benefit from their work. One peasant
was quoted as saying:
rare, since few wanted others to benefit from their work. One peasant
was quoted as saying:
I cannot plant a tree on my lands; next year they will
have passed to another's cultivation. I cannot fertilize my fields; another
shareholder will get the benefit next year, and why should I spend a pound per
bag on
21 Dowson,
"Land Tenure in Palestine", P. 35; Strickland Report, P. 11;
Granott, The Land System, P. 218; Arthur Ruppin, Syrien als
Wirtschaftsgebiet, Berlin, 1917, P. 31; Leon Schulman, Zur türkischen
Agrarfrage Palästina und die Fellachenwirtschaft, Weimar, 1916, P. 65.
Granott, The Land System, P. 218; Arthur Ruppin, Syrien als
Wirtschaftsgebiet, Berlin, 1917, P. 31; Leon Schulman, Zur türkischen
Agrarfrage Palästina und die Fellachenwirtschaft, Weimar, 1916, P. 65.
22 High Commissioner
Sir Arthur Wauchope to Phillip Cunliffe-Lister,
Secretary of State for the Colonies, April 15, 1933, P.R.O., CO
733/230/17249 (Part 1); see Stein, The Land Question, pp. 4, 14-15.
Secretary of State for the Colonies, April 15, 1933, P.R.O., CO
733/230/17249 (Part 1); see Stein, The Land Question, pp. 4, 14-15.
manure for another person's advantage? I cannot build a
stable for my horse or my cattle; it will belong to another next year. 23
Redistribution
meant that a peasant rarely left an area fallow, a
practice which would
have prevented the depletion of soil nutrients. Crop
rotation on musha'-held land was rare even between the summer and
winter growing seasons. Parcels allotted to a peasant were not
contiguous, causing inefficient use of his time. One was forced to move
from plot to plot to undertake all of the farming processes from preparing
rotation on musha'-held land was rare even between the summer and
winter growing seasons. Parcels allotted to a peasant were not
contiguous, causing inefficient use of his time. One was forced to move
from plot to plot to undertake all of the farming processes from preparing
the soil to
harvesting the crop.
Since the Ottoman Agricultural Bank offered loans only
on tracts that
were truly individually owned and registered, musha'-held land was rarely
given as collateral. There was no reference to a particular plot that a
musha' participant possessed; the land was held collectively and so
registered. 24 Obviously, the musha' system contributed to the lucrative
business and profits enjoyed by moneylenders who did not insist on title
deeds as collateral. Village and clan harmony was often strained during
parcellation. Tension, quarreling and sometimes violence developed over
the areas or parcels to be allotted. The redistribution procedure tended to
favor the stronger, more numerous, or socially more prominent in a
village at the expense of the poorer and weaker among the musha'
community. 25 It was reported by a Palestine judge that there was an
absence of village harmony during and after the allocation process.
Feelings of apathy and despair were rife among the fellaheen, because
many had little reason to look forward to a future on land that would pass
to another. 26
were truly individually owned and registered, musha'-held land was rarely
given as collateral. There was no reference to a particular plot that a
musha' participant possessed; the land was held collectively and so
registered. 24 Obviously, the musha' system contributed to the lucrative
business and profits enjoyed by moneylenders who did not insist on title
deeds as collateral. Village and clan harmony was often strained during
parcellation. Tension, quarreling and sometimes violence developed over
the areas or parcels to be allotted. The redistribution procedure tended to
favor the stronger, more numerous, or socially more prominent in a
village at the expense of the poorer and weaker among the musha'
community. 25 It was reported by a Palestine judge that there was an
absence of village harmony during and after the allocation process.
Feelings of apathy and despair were rife among the fellaheen, because
many had little reason to look forward to a future on land that would pass
to another. 26
Though the size of a land area associated with the
musha' system did
not change, the population increased. Over a period of time the same
amount of land was distributed among a larger number of qualified
villagers. The size of parcels or shares usually diminished according to
the male demographic increase. This had the effect of making the plots
so small or narrow that they were not worth farming. In turn population
increase in a musha' community heightened the possibility that the
musha' share-
not change, the population increased. Over a period of time the same
amount of land was distributed among a larger number of qualified
villagers. The size of parcels or shares usually diminished according to
the male demographic increase. This had the effect of making the plots
so small or narrow that they were not worth farming. In turn population
increase in a musha' community heightened the possibility that the
musha' share-
23 French, First
Report, P. 11; see also Albert Abramson, Southern
District Governor,
to Chief Secretary, February 7, 1924, I.S.A., M15/27A.
24 Jacob Thon, of the Palestine Land Development Company,
to the General
Secretary of the Zionist Executive, January 15, 1930, C.Z.A., S25/10396;
Shulman, Zur türkischen Agrarfrage, P. 65.
25 Ernest Dowson, "Progress in Land Reforms,
1923-1930," 1931, pp.
27-28, P.R.O., CO 733/221/97169-, idem, "Report on the Work of the
Ghor Mudawarra Demarcation Commission," March 19,1932, I.S.A.,
3548/file 1.
27-28, P.R.O., CO 733/221/97169-, idem, "Report on the Work of the
Ghor Mudawarra Demarcation Commission," March 19,1932, I.S.A.,
3548/file 1.
26 Gad Frumkin, The Path of a Judge in Jerusalem
(Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1954, P. 305.
holder would sell his shares or right to participate in
the parcellation process. 27
Finally, if the
musha' system had a positive quality it was that its
nature delayed or
postponed the sale of land to outsiders, but it did not
prevent such sales ultimately. The small number of parcels or shares
offered made it difficult initially for landbrokers, moneylenders, or
intermediary agents to aggregate them into large tracts enticing enough
for purchase. Over time, the poor economic condition of fellaheen forced
many of them to cede their participatory rights in the distribution process
to moneylenders who had liens on them. It was estimated in 1923 that
75% of musha' lands were not owned by fellaheen but by individuals who
lived in towns. 28
prevent such sales ultimately. The small number of parcels or shares
offered made it difficult initially for landbrokers, moneylenders, or
intermediary agents to aggregate them into large tracts enticing enough
for purchase. Over time, the poor economic condition of fellaheen forced
many of them to cede their participatory rights in the distribution process
to moneylenders who had liens on them. It was estimated in 1923 that
75% of musha' lands were not owned by fellaheen but by individuals who
lived in towns. 28
In the 1920s,
Jewish land purchase focused on tracts partially
occupied and
registered in the names of single owners. From January
1921 through December 1929, only a quarter of the total
area purchased
by Jews, 116,000 dunams, was previously musha'-held land. 29 But in
the 1930s more musha' shares were accumulated and eventually sold to
Jewish buyers. The practice of using broker intermediaries rather than
acquiring parcels or shares directly from musha' participants increased in
the 1930s for two major reasons: individual owners of larger areas were
not readily available, and Zionists preferred to avoid direct responsibility
for displacement of fellaheen in the land purchase process. All evidence
suggests that Zionist officials, Jewish National Fund operatives, and
by Jews, 116,000 dunams, was previously musha'-held land. 29 But in
the 1930s more musha' shares were accumulated and eventually sold to
Jewish buyers. The practice of using broker intermediaries rather than
acquiring parcels or shares directly from musha' participants increased in
the 1930s for two major reasons: individual owners of larger areas were
not readily available, and Zionists preferred to avoid direct responsibility
for displacement of fellaheen in the land purchase process. All evidence
suggests that Zionist officials, Jewish National Fund operatives, and
private Jewish purchasers sought the assembly of musha'
shares but refrained from buying them until they were combined into large
parcels by intermediaries. 30
Naturally caused
and man-made setbacks severely complicated
Palestine's rural
economy. Epidemic, plague, episodic rainfall, and
drought were part of Palestine's agricultural landscape
for centuries; their
frequency and intensity, in combination with human impositions, greatly
influenced the peasant's degree of subsistence and poverty. In the early
twentieth century, Palestine suffered two separate cycles of devastation,
frequency and intensity, in combination with human impositions, greatly
influenced the peasant's degree of subsistence and poverty. In the early
twentieth century, Palestine suffered two separate cycles of devastation,
27 Palestine
Director of Lands to Palestine Commissioner of Lands, April 13,1932,
I.S.A., 3573/ 1/folio 86; Dowson, "Land Tenure in
Palestine," P. 54.
Palestine," P. 54.
28 Hilmi Husseini, Inspector of Lands, Northern
District, to Director of Lands, July 14, 1923, I.S.A., 3317/6.
29 Sir John
Chancellor to Lord Passfield, January 17, 1930, P. 52,
P.R.O., CO 733/182/77050 (Part 1); "Statistics
Prepared by the Palestine
Land Department for the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 1945,"
Land Department for the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 1945,"
I.S.A., 3874/1.
30 Colonel Frank
Kisch, head of the Palestine Zionist Executive, to the
Zionist Executive,
December 16, 1928, C.Z.A., S25/1336; Jacob Thon, "A Few Remarks on Land
Laws," 1936, C.Z.A., S25/9851; minutes of the
Jewish National Fund Directorate meetings, June 15, 1939 and March 3,1940, C.Z.A., KKL10.
Jewish National Fund Directorate meetings, June 15, 1939 and March 3,1940, C.Z.A., KKL10.
one from 1913 to
1920 and the other from 1926 to 1939. Both periods witnessed hardship in the
rural sector. The ravages of nature and physical destruction worsened the
economic condition of the majority Arab rural population in Palestine west of
the Jordan.
Adequate numbers of sheep, cattle, and mules were
critical to the livelihood of the Palestinian peasant. But from 1913 through
1920 a combination of epidemics and confiscation by the Turks created
enormous livestock shortages (see Table).
enormous livestock shortages (see Table).
Palestine Animal Census for
Years Ending 1909, 1920, 1926, 1934, 1937 31
1909 1920 1926 1934 1937
Sheep 174,000 262,588 290,584 188,267 207,000
Goats 238,500 271,733 341,289 380,511 361,000
Camels 43,290 8,800 27,319 32,033 28,000
Oxen and
Goats 125,000 108,500 180,015 130,804 175,000
In 1913, there was a serious epidemic which reduced
sheep flocks,
cattle stock, and the number of transport oxen. The Turks
commandeered huge camel stocks in 1915 and 1916. In 1916 they
requisitioned large flocks of sheep near Beersheba and in 1917 the hill
regions from Nablus to Hebron suffered a scarcity of sheep. During
World War I, army mules were made available to cultivators to replace
those seized by the Turkish army. However, many of them never became
acclimatized to their new agricultural work conditions and died shortly
after their purchase. Mules needed thereafter were brought from Syria,
since few were bred in Palestine. 32 Further depleting the supply of field
and grazing animals was the decrease in forage available. For food
supply needs peasants chose to grow wheat rather than provide forage
for their animals. Later in the 1930s herds were further reduced because
of heavy slaughtering to satisfy the meat demands of a rapidly increasing
population. In 1925, for example, large numbers of sheep, bullocks,
cows, and calves were slaughtered for
cattle stock, and the number of transport oxen. The Turks
commandeered huge camel stocks in 1915 and 1916. In 1916 they
requisitioned large flocks of sheep near Beersheba and in 1917 the hill
regions from Nablus to Hebron suffered a scarcity of sheep. During
World War I, army mules were made available to cultivators to replace
those seized by the Turkish army. However, many of them never became
acclimatized to their new agricultural work conditions and died shortly
after their purchase. Mules needed thereafter were brought from Syria,
since few were bred in Palestine. 32 Further depleting the supply of field
and grazing animals was the decrease in forage available. For food
supply needs peasants chose to grow wheat rather than provide forage
for their animals. Later in the 1930s herds were further reduced because
of heavy slaughtering to satisfy the meat demands of a rapidly increasing
population. In 1925, for example, large numbers of sheep, bullocks,
cows, and calves were slaughtered for
31 Statistics culled
for this table were taken from the "Land Settlement
Commission Report," May 1921, P.R.O., CO 733/18/9614; Great Britain,
Commission Report," May 1921, P.R.O., CO 733/18/9614; Great Britain,
Report by HMG on
the Administration under Mandate of Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year
1924, P.R.O., Colonial No. 12, 1925, P. 49; and Animal Census returns provided
in the Annual Reports of the
Palestine Department of Agriculture.
Palestine Department of Agriculture.
32 E.R. Sawrer, A Review of the Agricultural Situation
in Palestine in 1923, P.R.O., CO 733/46/31959.
urban consumption;
the absence of plow and grazing animals put a
premium price on those available, imposing an additional
burden on the peasants' meager resources. 33
Just as there was a depletion of livestock, so also was
there a severe
shortage of manpower during and immediately after the war. Younger
village members left lands they habitually worked in order to escape
military service. In many areas of Palestine only old people, children, and
women remained. As a consequence, fields were either partially plowed
and sown, or left untended. In the Gaza area, all the inhabitants were
evacuated by the Turkish military authorities for a period of time, thereby
interrupting cultivations. 34
shortage of manpower during and immediately after the war. Younger
village members left lands they habitually worked in order to escape
military service. In many areas of Palestine only old people, children, and
women remained. As a consequence, fields were either partially plowed
and sown, or left untended. In the Gaza area, all the inhabitants were
evacuated by the Turkish military authorities for a period of time, thereby
interrupting cultivations. 34
A locust invasion in 1915-1916 greatly reduced the
barley and wheat
crops. Centuries of neglect and deforestation in favor of growing meager
cereal crops had decreased the size of Palestine's forests. The Forest
Law introduced by the Ottoman Government in 1860 to augment
afforestation only served as a device for the extortion of additional
revenues and was reported to have hastened the process of forest
destruction. 35 But the Turkish army laid waste the vast olive groves of
Palestine. The onset of World War I halted the shipment of coal into
Palestine, thus necessitating the use of an alternative fuel for the
locomotives that moved the Turkish army and its matériel northward.
More than 60% of olive and other trees were felled by the Turks with two
immediate consequences: loss of olive oil necessary for the Nablus soap
industry, and shortages of an essential part of the peasants' diet. 36
There were residual effects as well. Deforestation meant that in the early
1920s local feelings were prohibited except by license. In a rare case of
agreement, British officials, the Palestine Zionist Executive and the
Supreme Muslim Council supported nursery development and
reforestation. 37
crops. Centuries of neglect and deforestation in favor of growing meager
cereal crops had decreased the size of Palestine's forests. The Forest
Law introduced by the Ottoman Government in 1860 to augment
afforestation only served as a device for the extortion of additional
revenues and was reported to have hastened the process of forest
destruction. 35 But the Turkish army laid waste the vast olive groves of
Palestine. The onset of World War I halted the shipment of coal into
Palestine, thus necessitating the use of an alternative fuel for the
locomotives that moved the Turkish army and its matériel northward.
More than 60% of olive and other trees were felled by the Turks with two
immediate consequences: loss of olive oil necessary for the Nablus soap
industry, and shortages of an essential part of the peasants' diet. 36
There were residual effects as well. Deforestation meant that in the early
1920s local feelings were prohibited except by license. In a rare case of
agreement, British officials, the Palestine Zionist Executive and the
Supreme Muslim Council supported nursery development and
reforestation. 37
33 Palestine Government, Department of Agriculture,
Forests, and Fisheries, Annual Report for 1925, P. 2.
34 E.R. Sawrer, A
Review of the Agricultural Situation in Palestine in
1921, P. 7; Palestine Zionist Executive, "Report on
Trade and Industry," May 29, 1922, C.Z.A., Z4/1126; H. M. Kalvarisky, a
Jewish land-
purchasing agent,
in She'ifotaynu, 1918, pp. 10-20.
35 Great Britain, Report on the Palestine
Administration, July 1920-July 1921, Palestine, 1922, pp.107-109.
36 Major General Sir
Walter Lawrence to Commander-in-Chief of the
Egyptian Expeditionary Force, May 13, 1919, [.S.A., M101; Franz Carl
Endres, Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung Palästinas als Teiles der Turkei,
Berlin, 1918, P. 14; Alfred Bonne, 'Die sozial ökonomischen
Strukturwandlungen in Palästina," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und
Sozialpolitik 63 (1930), P. 326; Edwin Samuel, A Lifetime in Jerusalem,
London, 1970, P. 65.
Egyptian Expeditionary Force, May 13, 1919, [.S.A., M101; Franz Carl
Endres, Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung Palästinas als Teiles der Turkei,
Berlin, 1918, P. 14; Alfred Bonne, 'Die sozial ökonomischen
Strukturwandlungen in Palästina," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und
Sozialpolitik 63 (1930), P. 326; Edwin Samuel, A Lifetime in Jerusalem,
London, 1970, P. 65.
37 Great Britain,
Report on the Palestine Administration for 1922,
Palestine, 1922, pp. 44-45; Report on the Palestine
Administration for 1923 (P.R.O., Colonial No. 5), Palestine, 1924.
Devastation caused by the fighting in Palestine during
World War I
adversely affected the rural economy and the peasants' financial
situation. The economy in general suffered from a severe decline in
currency value and available capital. The inhabitants of Gaza bartered
pottery for cereal from northern Palestine. The more densely populated
area from Nablus to Jerusalem barely provided enough agricultural
produce for local consumption. 38 Administratively, the headlong Turkish
retreat brought about the destruction of sub-district land registers and
agricultural bank records, leaving virtually no complete and accurate
picture of land rights.
adversely affected the rural economy and the peasants' financial
situation. The economy in general suffered from a severe decline in
currency value and available capital. The inhabitants of Gaza bartered
pottery for cereal from northern Palestine. The more densely populated
area from Nablus to Jerusalem barely provided enough agricultural
produce for local consumption. 38 Administratively, the headlong Turkish
retreat brought about the destruction of sub-district land registers and
agricultural bank records, leaving virtually no complete and accurate
picture of land rights.
From 1920 to 1922
there was insufficient rainfall for agricultural
needs. The dumping
of Syrian wheat on the Palestine market caused a
fall in local wheat prices which in turn exacerbated the peasants'
economic condition. In the Northern District of Palestine, villagers
everywhere were preoccupied with the difficulty of obtaining money to
pay their debts. The Director of Agriculture, writing from Haifa, quoted the
Governor of the Galilee as saying that cultivators were "being compelled
to sell their wives to pay their tithes," while others in the Acre sub-district
were using their agricultural loans to pay the tithe on the last crop that
had failed. 39 Traditional cultivation was severely interrupted by the war,
compelling many fellaheen, even before the onset of large-scale Jewish
immigration and land purchase, to turn toward alternative livelihoods.
Many peasants from the countryside were drawn to the towns and urban
areas by projects undertaken by the British to bolster their strategic
control over Palestine, and to the building trades stimulated by Jewish
industrial and residential construction. 40
fall in local wheat prices which in turn exacerbated the peasants'
economic condition. In the Northern District of Palestine, villagers
everywhere were preoccupied with the difficulty of obtaining money to
pay their debts. The Director of Agriculture, writing from Haifa, quoted the
Governor of the Galilee as saying that cultivators were "being compelled
to sell their wives to pay their tithes," while others in the Acre sub-district
were using their agricultural loans to pay the tithe on the last crop that
had failed. 39 Traditional cultivation was severely interrupted by the war,
compelling many fellaheen, even before the onset of large-scale Jewish
immigration and land purchase, to turn toward alternative livelihoods.
Many peasants from the countryside were drawn to the towns and urban
areas by projects undertaken by the British to bolster their strategic
control over Palestine, and to the building trades stimulated by Jewish
industrial and residential construction. 40
Less apparent but
nonetheless important in the rural economy's
evolution after the
war was the modification of internal trade routes.
Predominantly east-west marketing patterns were changed.
Customary
marketing outlets and credit relationships were altered. Previously, two
relatively independent economic districts had existed: one in the north
with Haifa as the outlet port, and one in the south with Jaffa serving as
the point of embarkation for goods. Acre, Nazareth, Safed, and Tiberias
acted as the
marketing outlets and credit relationships were altered. Previously, two
relatively independent economic districts had existed: one in the north
with Haifa as the outlet port, and one in the south with Jaffa serving as
the point of embarkation for goods. Acre, Nazareth, Safed, and Tiberias
acted as the
pp. 38-39; Report
by HMG on the Administration under Mandite of
Palestine and Trans-Jordan for the Year 1924 (P.R.O.,
Colonial No. 12), Palestine, 1925, pp. 45-46.
38 Reginald Wingate, "Agriculture and Supplies in
Palestine," February 7, 1917, P.R.O., FO 371/3049/41442.
39 Director of
Agriculture to Chief Secretary, August 7, 1922, I.S.A.,
3852/492;
"Political Report for November 1922," P.R.O., CO
733/28/63733; Herbert Samuel, "The Situation in
Palestine," P.R.O., CAB 24/140-1877.
40 See Palestine Government, Report of the Department of
Agriculture and Forests for the Years 1931 and 1932, Palestine, 1933; Bonne,
"Die sozial ökonomischen Strukturwandlungen in Palästina," P. 322.
market centers for
the northern hinterlands, while Jerusalem, Ramle,
Gaza, and Hebron
served the same purposes in the south. However, the
British presence, through intensive road-building, not only integrated
these two distinct centers' but blended others into them as well. The
impact of these changes brought world markets closer to Palestine's
hinterlands, made it extremely difficult for nascent Palestinian industry to
compete with items produced abroad, and initiated new trading patterns
and partners. Prohibitive tariffs placed on agricultural produce intended
for Egypt forced growers in Palestine to concentrate on smaller and less
lucrative markets or on Syria. 41 Changing trade patterns, new tariffs, a
British presence, through intensive road-building, not only integrated
these two distinct centers' but blended others into them as well. The
impact of these changes brought world markets closer to Palestine's
hinterlands, made it extremely difficult for nascent Palestinian industry to
compete with items produced abroad, and initiated new trading patterns
and partners. Prohibitive tariffs placed on agricultural produce intended
for Egypt forced growers in Palestine to concentrate on smaller and less
lucrative markets or on Syria. 41 Changing trade patterns, new tariffs, a
suffering rural economy, indebtedness, and financial
attraction to urban areas made some fellaheen transients and others per diem
laborers in Palestine after World War I.
The second major period of decline in the rural economy
commenced
in the late 1920s and lasted until 1939. From 1926 on Palestine's
agrarian sector suffered a series of crises that tested many peasants'
patience and broke their resolve: a cattle pestilence in 1926: some
degree of drought in 1927, 1928 and 1931-1933; infection of 80% of the
local dairy herds in 1930; four consecutive years of locust plague from
1928 through 1931; field mice depredations in 1928, 1930 and 1931-
1933; the starvation of flocks in Gaza and Beersheba in 1932; partial
in the late 1920s and lasted until 1939. From 1926 on Palestine's
agrarian sector suffered a series of crises that tested many peasants'
patience and broke their resolve: a cattle pestilence in 1926: some
degree of drought in 1927, 1928 and 1931-1933; infection of 80% of the
local dairy herds in 1930; four consecutive years of locust plague from
1928 through 1931; field mice depredations in 1928, 1930 and 1931-
1933; the starvation of flocks in Gaza and Beersheba in 1932; partial
failure of the olive
crop from 1932 through 1935; massive migrations of
starlings in 1932-1933, causing devastation of the germinating crops;
insufficient seed grain and pasturage in 1933 through 1935; and physical
disturbance and rural insecurity from 1936 through early 1939. 42
starlings in 1932-1933, causing devastation of the germinating crops;
insufficient seed grain and pasturage in 1933 through 1935; and physical
disturbance and rural insecurity from 1936 through early 1939. 42
In terms of output, these successively poor years had
the following
effects: in 1930, damage to almost a million dunams in 350 villages,
which meant a loss of 65% of the wheat crop; in 1931 diminished
production of summer and winter crops; severe crop failures in 1932
including loss of 60% of the durra crop, 80% of the olive crop, and 85%
of the sesame crop.
effects: in 1930, damage to almost a million dunams in 350 villages,
which meant a loss of 65% of the wheat crop; in 1931 diminished
production of summer and winter crops; severe crop failures in 1932
including loss of 60% of the durra crop, 80% of the olive crop, and 85%
of the sesame crop.
41 Ibid.;
"Administrative Report for October 1920," P.R.O., CO
733/7/57950; Mr. Pevsnet, aid to a Jewish land-purchasing
agent, to Dr.
Arthur Ruppin, an agricultural expert in the Jewish Agency, June 1, 1930,
Arthur Ruppin, an agricultural expert in the Jewish Agency, June 1, 1930,
C.Z.A., S25/7448.
42 Palestine
Government, Annual Report of the Department of
Agriculture and
Forests from 1927 to 1930, Palestine, 1931, pp. 7, 130;
League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission-Minutes, Fifteenth
Session, remarks by High Commissioner Sir John Chan- cellor, July 5,
1929, P. 91; Great Britain, Report by His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of
the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-
Jordan (hereafter Report by HMG) for the Year 1928, P.R.O., Colonial
No. 40, P. 65; Great Britain, Report by HMG.for the Year 1930, P.R.O.,
Colonial No. 59, pp. 182-183; and B. Dinier et al. (eds.), History of the
Maganah (Hebrew), vol. 2, part 1, Tel Aviv, 1964, P. 303.
League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission-Minutes, Fifteenth
Session, remarks by High Commissioner Sir John Chan- cellor, July 5,
1929, P. 91; Great Britain, Report by His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of
the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-
Jordan (hereafter Report by HMG) for the Year 1928, P.R.O., Colonial
No. 40, P. 65; Great Britain, Report by HMG.for the Year 1930, P.R.O.,
Colonial No. 59, pp. 182-183; and B. Dinier et al. (eds.), History of the
Maganah (Hebrew), vol. 2, part 1, Tel Aviv, 1964, P. 303.
From 1931 through
1933 there was a 37% drop in domestic wheat
output in Palestine. This forced the administration to
issue loans for seed,
plow oxen, and forage, and to remit the tithe from 1931 through 1934. In
Jenin in early 1934, Arab journalists reported that 60% of the stock and
90% of the offspring perished due to scanty grazing, inclement weather,
and drought; in Nablus the cold weather and lack of pasturage took their
toll of 60% of the remaining stock. This resulted in the government's
plow oxen, and forage, and to remit the tithe from 1931 through 1934. In
Jenin in early 1934, Arab journalists reported that 60% of the stock and
90% of the offspring perished due to scanty grazing, inclement weather,
and drought; in Nablus the cold weather and lack of pasturage took their
toll of 60% of the remaining stock. This resulted in the government's
remission of the
animal tax. In the early 1930s there was a steady
decline in the price
of domestic wheat and cereals, primarily because of the dumping of
Syrian wheat on the Palestine market and worldwide overproduction.43
The social and
political consequences of these setbacks from 1926
through 1935 were
varied, profound and, above all, perforce long-lasting.
They all pointed to dual conclusions: further impoverishment of the
fellaheen and Bedouin population; and the continued inability of the
peasant to gain control over his own destiny. These repeated agricultural
They all pointed to dual conclusions: further impoverishment of the
fellaheen and Bedouin population; and the continued inability of the
peasant to gain control over his own destiny. These repeated agricultural
setbacks compelled
some to sell their cattle unprofitably. This meant that
less land was plowed in following seasons. Similarly, the shortage of
seed grain in subsequent years made many fellaheen even more
dependent upon moneylenders; the absence of grain meant defaulting on
lands one owned in order to pay debts. For some fellaheen, the most
immediate relief was the sale of all or a part of their remaining small plots
of land to brokers, intermediaries, or directly to Jewish purchasers. 44
less land was plowed in following seasons. Similarly, the shortage of
seed grain in subsequent years made many fellaheen even more
dependent upon moneylenders; the absence of grain meant defaulting on
lands one owned in order to pay debts. For some fellaheen, the most
immediate relief was the sale of all or a part of their remaining small plots
of land to brokers, intermediaries, or directly to Jewish purchasers. 44
Land sales
statistics from the Palestine Lands Department for the
period from June 1,
1934 to August 31, 1936 confirm in fact an upsurge
in small transactions precisely at the time when financial pressures on
the rural population were most severe. The statistics show that the
average land sale by Arabs to Jews was 51.8 dunams; that 75% of the
sales transactions in this period involved 100 dunams or less, and
averaged 15.5 dunams. These figures do not reveal the extent of land
brokerage or intermediary activity by those who accumulated smaller
parcels of land and sold them as units larger than 100 dunams. But the
Palestine Arab press is filled with
in small transactions precisely at the time when financial pressures on
the rural population were most severe. The statistics show that the
average land sale by Arabs to Jews was 51.8 dunams; that 75% of the
sales transactions in this period involved 100 dunams or less, and
averaged 15.5 dunams. These figures do not reveal the extent of land
brokerage or intermediary activity by those who accumulated smaller
parcels of land and sold them as units larger than 100 dunams. But the
Palestine Arab press is filled with
43 Great Britain,
Report by HMG for the Years 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934,
1935, 1936, 1937, and 1938, P.R.O., Colonial Nos. 75, 82, 94, 104,
112,129, 146 and 166; telegram from High Commissioner Sir Arthur
Wauchope to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, August 10, 1932,
1935, 1936, 1937, and 1938, P.R.O., Colonial Nos. 75, 82, 94, 104,
112,129, 146 and 166; telegram from High Commissioner Sir Arthur
Wauchope to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, August 10, 1932,
P.R.O., CO
733/224/97270; Filastin, February 24, 1934; Al-jami'ah al-
'Arabiyyah, March 4, 1934; Palestine Government,
Official Communique
No. 11/340, March 25, 1934; and Stein, The Land Question, pp. 142-146.
No. 11/340, March 25, 1934; and Stein, The Land Question, pp. 142-146.
44 High Commissioner Wauchope to the Secretary of State
for the
Colonies, May 28, 1932, P.R.O., CO 733/224/97270, and August 14,
1933, P.R.O., CO 733/245/17493; and Stein, The Land Question, pp.
173-192.
Colonies, May 28, 1932, P.R.O., CO 733/224/97270, and August 14,
1933, P.R.O., CO 733/245/17493; and Stein, The Land Question, pp.
173-192.
mention of such activity and the detrimental impact:
these land sales
were destined to have upon the Arab community in Palestine. 45
were destined to have upon the Arab community in Palestine. 45
The social bonds that had made Palestinian Arab rural
society so
hierarchical and firmly connected to the notable urban elite, changed
noticeably because of the rural economy's decline. Landowners with
tenants and agricultural workers lost a portion of their labor supply since
more attractive urban alternatives in Jewish and British development
enterprises were available. As musha' and small parcels were
consolidated in anticipation of their sale, the economic weight of some
landowners with predominant influence in a village area declined as land
was ultimately transferred to Jewish ownership. Several owner-occupiers
sold all or part of their holdings, forcing the Palestine administration to
prepare legislation in 1935 to protect the owner against disposing of
hierarchical and firmly connected to the notable urban elite, changed
noticeably because of the rural economy's decline. Landowners with
tenants and agricultural workers lost a portion of their labor supply since
more attractive urban alternatives in Jewish and British development
enterprises were available. As musha' and small parcels were
consolidated in anticipation of their sale, the economic weight of some
landowners with predominant influence in a village area declined as land
was ultimately transferred to Jewish ownership. Several owner-occupiers
sold all or part of their holdings, forcing the Palestine administration to
prepare legislation in 1935 to protect the owner against disposing of
areas necessary for his own self-sufficiency. Many who
sold directly to Jewish buyers or had land sold out from under them by landowners or
through intermediaries often moved to towns and urban areas. Ruralurban
migration particularly increased in the 1931-1936 period because of the waning
viability of the agricultural economy.46
From the early
1930s on, the Palestine Arab press repeatedly
condemned a troika
of culprits: the British, the Zionists, and the Arab
political leadership. When the value of the pound sterling fell in 1931
because England left the gold standard, local merchants raised their
prices. Filastin of January 1, 1932 criticized "our merchants [who] take
advantage of it [the price rises] at a time when the fellah, the laborer, and
the artisan are on the verge of starvation"; on February 7, 1932 this
paper stressed that the peasants' poverty was not due to heavy taxation
but to the nightmare of exorbitant interest which the merchants and
moneylenders charge the simple fellah; Al-jami'iah al-'Arabiyyah of
August 5, 1932 noted that
political leadership. When the value of the pound sterling fell in 1931
because England left the gold standard, local merchants raised their
prices. Filastin of January 1, 1932 criticized "our merchants [who] take
advantage of it [the price rises] at a time when the fellah, the laborer, and
the artisan are on the verge of starvation"; on February 7, 1932 this
paper stressed that the peasants' poverty was not due to heavy taxation
but to the nightmare of exorbitant interest which the merchants and
moneylenders charge the simple fellah; Al-jami'iah al-'Arabiyyah of
August 5, 1932 noted that
the fellah is the milking cow of the Government, 'Whom
it does not pity, and he is the servant of the leaders who do not care for him.
The fellah
45 Schedule of
Jewish Land Purchase, I.S.A., 3874/7 For example, Al-
jami'ah al- 'Arabiyyah, September 7, 1934, condemned land brokers and
landowners who sold their land to Jews. It stated: "By selling land, they
sell the blood and remains of their fathers"; and the same paper on
January 16, 1935 attacked illegal brokerage of land by those doctors and
lawyers who sought profit and disregarded every national cause.
jami'ah al- 'Arabiyyah, September 7, 1934, condemned land brokers and
landowners who sold their land to Jews. It stated: "By selling land, they
sell the blood and remains of their fathers"; and the same paper on
January 16, 1935 attacked illegal brokerage of land by those doctors and
lawyers who sought profit and disregarded every national cause.
46 Census for
Palestine, 1931, vol. 1, P. 51; Great Britain, Palestine
Royal Commission Memoranda Prepared by the Government of
Palestine, Memorandum No. 2, "Regional Distribution of Population,"
Royal Commission Memoranda Prepared by the Government of
Palestine, Memorandum No. 2, "Regional Distribution of Population,"
P.R.O., Colonial
No. 133, London, 1937, P. 4. The point of increased
urbanization is
particularly well made by Rachelle Taqqu, "Peasants into
Workmen: Internal Labor Migration and the Arab Village Community
under the Mandate," in Palestinian Society and Politics, pp. 261-281.
Workmen: Internal Labor Migration and the Arab Village Community
under the Mandate," in Palestinian Society and Politics, pp. 261-281.
then is compelled
to leave his village when he finds nothing
to cat; either he goes to the town to work or to obtain a
living somehow even through crime. The following factors
lead to this: 1) lack of funds, 2) lack of means of irrigation,
to cat; either he goes to the town to work or to obtain a
living somehow even through crime. The following factors
lead to this: 1) lack of funds, 2) lack of means of irrigation,
3) poor means of
agriculture, 4) heavy taxes, 5) absence of
an agricultural
bank, 6) [and being] badly nourished...
Al-jami'ah al-Islamiyyah of February 16, 1934 described
the following scenario for the Arab laborer:
[he] seeks employment but can not find it; he has no
work because the Jews took over all the work; the fellaheen are driven froria
the land because the Zionists bought it from the rich landlords. The fellaheen
are drawn to the towns to seek jobs which they do not get. They- have nothing
to do eventually but become gangsters.
Finally, Al-Difa' of January 7, 1936 noted that
"among the leaders of the Arabs in Palestine, private interests are
paramount."
The immediate economic consequences of these
successively poor
years meant a reduction in diary and meat products, higher fodder prices
because of insufficient domestic forage and pasturage, importation of
livestock mostly from Syria, and the almost total devotion of time by
available Palestine administration officials to alleviation of these severe
and immediate problems. Curiously, those engaged in citriculture were
not affected by the successively poor agricultural yields in the dry farming
sector; in fact, during the mid-1930s only 1935-36 was a particularly poor
year in terms of citrus output. In 1937 the local citrus growers suffered
setback for three unrelated reasons: an unusually high percentage of rot
in the harvest due to excessive rains; irregular shipments due to the
disturbances in Palestine; and competition with Spanish fruit which
inundated the English market causing a drop in the price of citrus
imported from Palestine. The onset of World War II created major
problems for the Palestine citrus industry, particularly in terms of shipping
produce to European markets; it was thereafter transported via railroad
and through Egypt, or sold directly to the British army.47
years meant a reduction in diary and meat products, higher fodder prices
because of insufficient domestic forage and pasturage, importation of
livestock mostly from Syria, and the almost total devotion of time by
available Palestine administration officials to alleviation of these severe
and immediate problems. Curiously, those engaged in citriculture were
not affected by the successively poor agricultural yields in the dry farming
sector; in fact, during the mid-1930s only 1935-36 was a particularly poor
year in terms of citrus output. In 1937 the local citrus growers suffered
setback for three unrelated reasons: an unusually high percentage of rot
in the harvest due to excessive rains; irregular shipments due to the
disturbances in Palestine; and competition with Spanish fruit which
inundated the English market causing a drop in the price of citrus
imported from Palestine. The onset of World War II created major
problems for the Palestine citrus industry, particularly in terms of shipping
produce to European markets; it was thereafter transported via railroad
and through Egypt, or sold directly to the British army.47
Continuing vicissitudes of nature adversely affected the
rural economy
from 1936 to 1939. Insufficient and untimely rain!; limited wheat and
cereal production in various regions of Palestine. In 1936, a hot dry
from 1936 to 1939. Insufficient and untimely rain!; limited wheat and
cereal production in various regions of Palestine. In 1936, a hot dry
47 Moshe Shertok
(Sharett) of the Jewish Agency to J. M. Martin,
Secretary to the
Royal (Peel) Commission, May 28, 1937, C.Z.A.,
S25/4653; Palestine Government, Annual Reports of the
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for the Years Ending March 1941 and
March 1942, Palestine, 1941 and 1942 respectively.
khamsin damaged the
summer yields, particularly the olive crop,
livestock and plow
animals were in short supply, and a deficiency of seed
restricted planting in October after a temporary cessation of the
disturbances which had begun in April. The shortage was so great that
local merchants sought seed grain as far north as Aleppo and Homs.48
restricted planting in October after a temporary cessation of the
disturbances which had begun in April. The shortage was so great that
local merchants sought seed grain as far north as Aleppo and Homs.48
By comparison, 1937
was an excellent year since production and prices
of wheat were higher, and rainfall was adequate. However, drought in
December 1937 and early 1938 caused losses in Hebron and
Beersheba.49 Wheat production dropped to 44,000 tons, only one-third
of the previous year's yield.50 The end of the riots, the demand for
foodstuffs in Palestine, and minimal natural interruptions helped to
increase agricultural production. The wheat output in 1939 reached an
all-time high. In comparison to the earlier years of the 1930s, prices were
better for agricultural produce in general, but wheat and barley harvests
increased only marginally for a burgeoning population. The closure of the
Mediterranean to merchant shipping, the reduction of competitive
imports, and the granting of seed loans to cultivators helped to revitalize
the rural economy."
of wheat were higher, and rainfall was adequate. However, drought in
December 1937 and early 1938 caused losses in Hebron and
Beersheba.49 Wheat production dropped to 44,000 tons, only one-third
of the previous year's yield.50 The end of the riots, the demand for
foodstuffs in Palestine, and minimal natural interruptions helped to
increase agricultural production. The wheat output in 1939 reached an
all-time high. In comparison to the earlier years of the 1930s, prices were
better for agricultural produce in general, but wheat and barley harvests
increased only marginally for a burgeoning population. The closure of the
Mediterranean to merchant shipping, the reduction of competitive
imports, and the granting of seed loans to cultivators helped to revitalize
the rural economy."
To be sure, the
wrenching level of economic destitution of the early
1930s was not matched in the last years of the decade.
Nonetheless, the
rural economy was bruised, damaged, and in part paralyzed during the
intermittent unrest from 1936 to 1939. Indeed, those disturbances were
primarily directed at political targets; they focused on the destruction of
Jewish enterprises, crops, and civilian settlements, British outposts and
personnel, and generally HMG's policy of continuing to foster support for
the Jewish National Home. Yet, those peasants who participated in the
numerous bands that emerged during the Arab Revolt were also
rural economy was bruised, damaged, and in part paralyzed during the
intermittent unrest from 1936 to 1939. Indeed, those disturbances were
primarily directed at political targets; they focused on the destruction of
Jewish enterprises, crops, and civilian settlements, British outposts and
personnel, and generally HMG's policy of continuing to foster support for
the Jewish National Home. Yet, those peasants who participated in the
numerous bands that emerged during the Arab Revolt were also
motivated by
personal anger, fear, frustration, and distress.52
The 1936-1939
disturbances were as much a rebellion against an
imposed political
policy as they were a civil war aimed at Arab brokers,
48 Palestine
Government, Annual Report of the Department of
Agriculture and Fisheries for the Year Ending March 1937,
Palestine,
1937.
1937.
49 Palestine
Government, Annual Report of the Department of
Agriculture and Fisheries for the Year Ending March
1938, Palestine, 1938, and League of Nations, Permanent Mandates
CommissionMinutes, Thirty-fourth Session, June 10, 1938, P. 58.
50 Great Britain, Report by HMG for the Year 1938,
P.R.O.., Colonial No.
166, pp. 276-278; League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission-
166, pp. 276-278; League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission-
-Minutes,
Thirty-sixth session, June 13, 1939, pp. 77-78.
51 Palestine
Government, Annual Report of the Department of
Agriculture and Fisheries for the Year Ending March
1940, Palestine, 1940, pp. 1-3, and Leo Herrmann, The Palestine Agricultural
Economy under War Conditions, Tel Aviv, 1944, pp. 1-7.
52 See Shai
Lachman, "Arab Rebellion and Terrorism in Palestine, 1929-
1939: The Case of Sheikh lzz al-Din al-Qassam and His Movement," in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia Haim, Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel, London, 1982, pp. '74, 77-86.
1939: The Case of Sheikh lzz al-Din al-Qassam and His Movement," in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia Haim, Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel, London, 1982, pp. '74, 77-86.
intermediaries,
land agents, merchants, urban professionals, and self-
anointed politicians. Many of these notables had previous and current
dealings with Jewish land purchasers. Violence was vented on this
segment of Arab society because of obvious inconsistencies between
displays of antagonism against Zionism and private collaboration with
Jewish nation-builders. Many Palestinian Arab political leaders sold land
to Jews before, during and after the disturbances to gain a measure of
economic relief when other sources of capital were unavailable.53 The
political implications of this slow but steady disconnection from land were
not immediately gauged; the most urgent priority was providing for
oneself and one's family.
anointed politicians. Many of these notables had previous and current
dealings with Jewish land purchasers. Violence was vented on this
segment of Arab society because of obvious inconsistencies between
displays of antagonism against Zionism and private collaboration with
Jewish nation-builders. Many Palestinian Arab political leaders sold land
to Jews before, during and after the disturbances to gain a measure of
economic relief when other sources of capital were unavailable.53 The
political implications of this slow but steady disconnection from land were
not immediately gauged; the most urgent priority was providing for
oneself and one's family.
Arab merchants, particularly manufacturers,
were hurt as the result of
a loss of labor and an inability to move goods to the borders for export
during the protracted Arab strike. The devaluation of the Syrian currency
in late 1936 came as an additional blow. Shopkeepers who were forced
to keep their businesses closed for prolonged periods of time depleted or
exhausted their savings. Foreign manufacturers lost confidence in their
customers in Palestine, a development which impaired trade and
a loss of labor and an inability to move goods to the borders for export
during the protracted Arab strike. The devaluation of the Syrian currency
in late 1936 came as an additional blow. Shopkeepers who were forced
to keep their businesses closed for prolonged periods of time depleted or
exhausted their savings. Foreign manufacturers lost confidence in their
customers in Palestine, a development which impaired trade and
lessened the
availability of imported goods.54
The fellaheen were not immediately and uniformly harmed
by the
revolt. In spite of marketing difficulties due to a transport strike, and an
Arab boycott of the Jewish buyers, the peasant was basically self-
sufficient and left with excess produce on his hands from 1936 through
the middle of 1938. But the disturbances in the rural sector adversely
affected its economy and indirectly the peasant in six ways. First,
retention of produce meant disposing of crops locally at very low prices
or losing more perishable ones. Second, the urban population's reduced
purchasing power pushed the peasant deeper into debt. Third, during
later periods of the strike, villagers were intimidated and forced to feed
the members of the armed bands. Work animals, seed, vegetables, oil,
wheat, and other provisions were requisitioned by those engaged in the
unrest. Many fellaheen sat idle either for lack of seed and plow animals
or because they had no desire to produce a crop if it were going to be
revolt. In spite of marketing difficulties due to a transport strike, and an
Arab boycott of the Jewish buyers, the peasant was basically self-
sufficient and left with excess produce on his hands from 1936 through
the middle of 1938. But the disturbances in the rural sector adversely
affected its economy and indirectly the peasant in six ways. First,
retention of produce meant disposing of crops locally at very low prices
or losing more perishable ones. Second, the urban population's reduced
purchasing power pushed the peasant deeper into debt. Third, during
later periods of the strike, villagers were intimidated and forced to feed
the members of the armed bands. Work animals, seed, vegetables, oil,
wheat, and other provisions were requisitioned by those engaged in the
unrest. Many fellaheen sat idle either for lack of seed and plow animals
or because they had no desire to produce a crop if it were going to be
taken from them.
53 Minutes of the
Jewish National Fund Directorate meetings, July 6, 1938 and August 8,
1938, C.Z.A., KKLIO; Abraham Granovksy, The
Struggle for Land in the Years of the Disturbances (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1939, pp. 3-5. Stein, The Land Question, Appendix 3, "Partial List of
Palestinian Arab Politicians and Notables Involved in Land Transfers to Jews, 1918-1945," pp. 228-238.
Struggle for Land in the Years of the Disturbances (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1939, pp. 3-5. Stein, The Land Question, Appendix 3, "Partial List of
Palestinian Arab Politicians and Notables Involved in Land Transfers to Jews, 1918-1945," pp. 228-238.
54 Dr. R.
Rutenstreich (Jewish Agency), "Economic Condition of
Palestine,
1936," December 30, 1936, C.Z.A., S25/9783-, Mr. G.
Agronsky (Jewish Agency), "Palestine Arab Economy
Undermined by
Disturbances," January 20, 1939, C.Z.A., S25/10091; see also C.Z.A.,
S25/9902.
Disturbances," January 20, 1939, C.Z.A., S25/10091; see also C.Z.A.,
S25/9902.
Fourth, crops and
land were damaged by rioters. Fifth, some
government
agricultural and horticultural stations were attacked by
armed bands who
periodically wasted and burnt crops, shot mules, and destroyed property. And
sixth, insecurity in the rural sector reduced
government revenue, in turn leading to a decrease in the already meager administration efforts to provide agricultural credit. 55
government revenue, in turn leading to a decrease in the already meager administration efforts to provide agricultural credit. 55
The disturbances also affected the rural Jewish economic
sector. A
depression had preceded them from the late fall of 1935. The revolt
brought about an immediate decrease in Jewish immigration and
therefore a decline in the inflow of capital from abroad; the total output of
factories was reduced because of the general insecurity and the decline
in demand for goods; Jewish workers in the building trades were laid off,
and some of them were forced to return to agriculture, thus replacing
Arab laborers in rural employment. The instant inability to obtain
agricultural produce necessitated a reallocation of land use in Jewish
rural communities. A sense of self-reliance was demanded of the Jewish
community because of the Arab boycott and transport problems. A
measure of Jewish self-sufficiency continued after the outbreak of World
War II as Jewish urban areas slowly became direct outlets for agricultural
produce from kibbutzim and moshavim. 56 A demand developed for
locally manufactured goods because of a decline in imports. This was a
stimulus to Jewish industrial development. The disturbances around Jaffa
port forced Tel Aviv's port to grow as an alternative; half of Palestine's
citrus exports passed through the latter by early 1939. The riots resulted
in a drop in Jewish capital investment. Arabs from the depressed rural
sector were able to find fewer jobs in the urban building trades. Similarly,
British expenditures in seeking an end to the revolt meant a consequent
reduction in the number of public works projects and less staff in
government departments. Hundreds of government posts were not filled
and other workers were dismissed because they could not operate
depression had preceded them from the late fall of 1935. The revolt
brought about an immediate decrease in Jewish immigration and
therefore a decline in the inflow of capital from abroad; the total output of
factories was reduced because of the general insecurity and the decline
in demand for goods; Jewish workers in the building trades were laid off,
and some of them were forced to return to agriculture, thus replacing
Arab laborers in rural employment. The instant inability to obtain
agricultural produce necessitated a reallocation of land use in Jewish
rural communities. A sense of self-reliance was demanded of the Jewish
community because of the Arab boycott and transport problems. A
measure of Jewish self-sufficiency continued after the outbreak of World
War II as Jewish urban areas slowly became direct outlets for agricultural
produce from kibbutzim and moshavim. 56 A demand developed for
locally manufactured goods because of a decline in imports. This was a
stimulus to Jewish industrial development. The disturbances around Jaffa
port forced Tel Aviv's port to grow as an alternative; half of Palestine's
citrus exports passed through the latter by early 1939. The riots resulted
in a drop in Jewish capital investment. Arabs from the depressed rural
sector were able to find fewer jobs in the urban building trades. Similarly,
British expenditures in seeking an end to the revolt meant a consequent
reduction in the number of public works projects and less staff in
government departments. Hundreds of government posts were not filled
and other workers were dismissed because they could not operate
normally on account
of insecurity.57
55 Great Britain, Report by HMG for the Years 1937, 1938,
and 1939, pp. 275-278, 263-265, and 276-278 respectively; Agronsky, "Palestine
Arab Economy Undermined by Disturbances," C.Z.A., S25/10091.
56 Moshe Smilansky, Chapters in the History of the Yishuv
(Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 68, 69, 80, 99, 109, 118.
57 Great Britain,
Report by HMG for the Years 1937, 1938, and 1939, pp. 275-278, 263-265,
and 276-278 respectively; Agronsky, "Palestine Arab Economy Undermined by
Disturbances," C.Z.A., S25/10091; and D.
Gurevich, A. Gertz and R. Bachi, The Jewish Population of Palestine,
Jerusalem, 1944, P.11.
Gurevich, A. Gertz and R. Bachi, The Jewish Population of Palestine,
Jerusalem, 1944, P.11.
Conclusions
The rural economy
of Palestine was in a depressed state when the
British military
entered the country in 1917, and it had worsened by 1939
when World War II commenced. In the course of time, numerous factors
combined steadily to dislodge the peasant from land his ancestors may
have worked. Adherence to traditional agricultural practices, the usury of
self-seeking Arab grain merchants and moneylenders, the musha' land
system, and unproductive cultivation habits stymied the advancement of
the fellaheen. Local natural phenomena such as unpredictable drought or
floods, and the destruction of crops by vermin added to their plight. The
imposition of administrative and political policies and the consequences
bf external events upon Palestine indirectly influenced the rural economy
in an adverse manner. The effect on the peasants of no consistent
when World War II commenced. In the course of time, numerous factors
combined steadily to dislodge the peasant from land his ancestors may
have worked. Adherence to traditional agricultural practices, the usury of
self-seeking Arab grain merchants and moneylenders, the musha' land
system, and unproductive cultivation habits stymied the advancement of
the fellaheen. Local natural phenomena such as unpredictable drought or
floods, and the destruction of crops by vermin added to their plight. The
imposition of administrative and political policies and the consequences
bf external events upon Palestine indirectly influenced the rural economy
in an adverse manner. The effect on the peasants of no consistent
financial commitment
by the British during the Mandate to assist the rural
population is all too evident. Only in times of crises and immediate threat
to internal security, either through economic decline or physical
disturbance, was temporary attention paid to the majority rural
population.
population is all too evident. Only in times of crises and immediate threat
to internal security, either through economic decline or physical
disturbance, was temporary attention paid to the majority rural
population.
In the early 1930s, the British did assist the rural
population and the peasant cultivators in particular through financial support.
They provided funds for mixed-crop farming, drought-resistant seeds, better
stock, and fodder. Relief was provided through government loans and tax
remissions. But the insufficient quantity and quality of this aid only
increased the embitterment of a destitute rural population toward Britain and her support of the Jewish National Home.
remissions. But the insufficient quantity and quality of this aid only
increased the embitterment of a destitute rural population toward Britain and her support of the Jewish National Home.
A second British policy option to assist the
peasantry was pursued
from the late 1920s onward: the devising and application of a series of
legislative curatives for the rural indebted sector of the population. The
from the late 1920s onward: the devising and application of a series of
legislative curatives for the rural indebted sector of the population. The
British believed
naively that they could change social behavior and
customary practices
steeped in tradition. The Palestinian peasant had little knowledge of due
process, but when given the opportunity took
advantage of newly introduced laws and ordinances which furthered his interest. In 1928, the process of Land Settlement was aimed at
determining boundaries, but fellaheen were continuously reluctant to participate in identifying land rights, especially when their registration of land increased the fees they were required to pay; boundary delimitation was important to the British but not to the peasants.
advantage of newly introduced laws and ordinances which furthered his interest. In 1928, the process of Land Settlement was aimed at
determining boundaries, but fellaheen were continuously reluctant to participate in identifying land rights, especially when their registration of land increased the fees they were required to pay; boundary delimitation was important to the British but not to the peasants.
The Protection of Cultivators Ordinances of 1929 and
1933, when not
circumvented routinely, protected only the smaller agricultural class of
tenants, not the larger group of small owner-occupiers. The
Imprisonment for Debt Ordinance in 1931 limited the number of times
one could be imprisoned for inability to pay a debt, and reduced the
number of debtors in prison, but did little to relieve the long-term
indebtedness of the fellaheen. The Mortgage Debt Ordinance of 1931
kept a tenant on his land in case of foreclosure, and angered the landlord
who sought to upgrade or sell his holding. The 1932 Land Disputes
Possession Ordinance gave a squatter or tenant without a title deed
rights to remain on land he did not own. He in turn developed a
perception that possession of land was more important than an owner's
title. The Landless Arab inquiry from 1931 to 1936 was aimed at
resettling Arabs displaced because of Jewish land purchase. However, it
enumerated only 899 persons in this category, resettled less than 100 of
them, and raised fellaheen expectations that land once sold to Jews
would be returned to the original owners by the Palestine administration.
The Usurious Loan Ordinance of 1934 outlawed moneylending at an
interest rate exceeding 9% per annum, but there was little enforcement of
this Iaw. And the proposed ordinances to partition musha' land in 1933
and protect small landowners in 1936 were never enacted.
circumvented routinely, protected only the smaller agricultural class of
tenants, not the larger group of small owner-occupiers. The
Imprisonment for Debt Ordinance in 1931 limited the number of times
one could be imprisoned for inability to pay a debt, and reduced the
number of debtors in prison, but did little to relieve the long-term
indebtedness of the fellaheen. The Mortgage Debt Ordinance of 1931
kept a tenant on his land in case of foreclosure, and angered the landlord
who sought to upgrade or sell his holding. The 1932 Land Disputes
Possession Ordinance gave a squatter or tenant without a title deed
rights to remain on land he did not own. He in turn developed a
perception that possession of land was more important than an owner's
title. The Landless Arab inquiry from 1931 to 1936 was aimed at
resettling Arabs displaced because of Jewish land purchase. However, it
enumerated only 899 persons in this category, resettled less than 100 of
them, and raised fellaheen expectations that land once sold to Jews
would be returned to the original owners by the Palestine administration.
The Usurious Loan Ordinance of 1934 outlawed moneylending at an
interest rate exceeding 9% per annum, but there was little enforcement of
this Iaw. And the proposed ordinances to partition musha' land in 1933
and protect small landowners in 1936 were never enacted.
Several impressions were left upon the fellaheen
population by the
combined British policy of too little financial aid and these legislative
initiatives. Hopes about British willingness to assist the peasantry were
raised and eventually shattered. Extra-legal rights were encouraged.
There was an increasing atmosphere of officially sanctioned
permissiveness and disregard for law. By late 1935, resentment
developed against the British in many Arab villages, but British policy
only contributed to a longer process of rural disenchantment and
discontentment.58
combined British policy of too little financial aid and these legislative
initiatives. Hopes about British willingness to assist the peasantry were
raised and eventually shattered. Extra-legal rights were encouraged.
There was an increasing atmosphere of officially sanctioned
permissiveness and disregard for law. By late 1935, resentment
developed against the British in many Arab villages, but British policy
only contributed to a longer process of rural disenchantment and
discontentment.58
The rural economy never recovered from
either the destruction left by
the Turkish army during World War I or the numerous natural setbacks
which had plunged the fellah into inextricable debt by the early 1930s.59
Other causes and events had a negative and corrosive impact upon the
the Turkish army during World War I or the numerous natural setbacks
which had plunged the fellah into inextricable debt by the early 1930s.59
Other causes and events had a negative and corrosive impact upon the
rural economy and
the peasants' precarious viability: insecurity of Medi-
terranean shipping caused by World War I, the imposition of tariff
restrictions by Syria and Egypt, the dumping of foreign wheat on the
Palestine market, the worldwide depression in the 1930s, the war in
Abyssinia in 1935, the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt, and the slowing of
Mediterranean trade because of World War II. All these factors conspired
to limit the peasant's economic development. In 1925 Sir Herbert Samuel
said that "large numbers of the Arab peasantry are exceedingly poor"; in
terranean shipping caused by World War I, the imposition of tariff
restrictions by Syria and Egypt, the dumping of foreign wheat on the
Palestine market, the worldwide depression in the 1930s, the war in
Abyssinia in 1935, the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt, and the slowing of
Mediterranean trade because of World War II. All these factors conspired
to limit the peasant's economic development. In 1925 Sir Herbert Samuel
said that "large numbers of the Arab peasantry are exceedingly poor"; in
58 League of
Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission-Minutes, Twenty-fifth Session, May 31,
1934, P. 14; High Commissioner Wauchope to the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, P.R.O., CO 733/297/75156 (Part 1).
59 E. Keith-Roach, Acting District Commissioner, to
Chief Secretary, February 5, 1932, I.S.A., M3880/2.
1931, Chaim
Arlosoroff, the head of the Jewish Agency, noted that "the Bedouin of the
south are on the threshold of starvation"; and in 1932 Moshe Smilansky,
working for the Jewish Agency, remarked that "in the Arab village
nauseating poverty prevails.60
The quality and
quantity of the peasant's crop yields determined his well-
being. They affected the peasant's level of financial insolvency, the
landlord's rent, the land manager's fees, the moneylender's loan
schedules, and the government's taxes. But during the first four decades
of the twentieth century, virtually everyone connected with Palestine's
Arab rural sector suffered. The rural economy penultimately alienated the
peasant from his land. The ultimate cause of his displacement was the
magnetic attraction of British and Jewish capital through public works
projects and land sales respectively. There were alternatives to a
protracted and untenable financial state. An unwelcome option to an
increasingly unmanageable rural environment was present. For those
with a traditional long-term attachment to their land it was difficult but
necessary to sell portions of their holdings. There was an unavoidable
drift away from rural occupations. An ineluctable pull toward urban areas,
particularly in the 1930s, developed. The Palestinian peasantry became
displaced in part by forces beyond their control. This process started in
the late Ottoman period, gained momentum from economic causes and
political factors during the British Mandate, and was catalyzed by Jewish
nation-building.
being. They affected the peasant's level of financial insolvency, the
landlord's rent, the land manager's fees, the moneylender's loan
schedules, and the government's taxes. But during the first four decades
of the twentieth century, virtually everyone connected with Palestine's
Arab rural sector suffered. The rural economy penultimately alienated the
peasant from his land. The ultimate cause of his displacement was the
magnetic attraction of British and Jewish capital through public works
projects and land sales respectively. There were alternatives to a
protracted and untenable financial state. An unwelcome option to an
increasingly unmanageable rural environment was present. For those
with a traditional long-term attachment to their land it was difficult but
necessary to sell portions of their holdings. There was an unavoidable
drift away from rural occupations. An ineluctable pull toward urban areas,
particularly in the 1930s, developed. The Palestinian peasantry became
displaced in part by forces beyond their control. This process started in
the late Ottoman period, gained momentum from economic causes and
political factors during the British Mandate, and was catalyzed by Jewish
nation-building.
60 Great Britain,
Report by the High Commission on the Administration of
Palestine, 1920-1925, P.R.O., Colonial No. 15, Palestine, 1935, P. 18;
Chaim Arolosoroff, Jerusalem Diary (Hebrew), n.d., P. 29; minutes of the
Jewish Agency meeting on the French Report, June 22, 1932, remarks
Palestine, 1920-1925, P.R.O., Colonial No. 15, Palestine, 1935, P. 18;
Chaim Arolosoroff, Jerusalem Diary (Hebrew), n.d., P. 29; minutes of the
Jewish Agency meeting on the French Report, June 22, 1932, remarks
by Moshe Smilansky,
C.Z.A., S25/7599.
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