The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine

The Banality of Brutality: British Armed Forces and the 
Repression of the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936ñ39*

MATTHEW HUGHES, Brunel University


Embodied in the documentation by which Britain accepted the
League of Nations mandate for Palestine in 1922 were clauses
facilitating Jewish immigration to the country. The Palestinians
were hostile to Jewish immigration and settlement, resulting in
recurring bouts of violence in the 1920s and early 1930s as the
Arabs attacked Jewish settlers and the British authorities. Jewish
immigration peaked in 1936, the year in which the Palestinians
began a full-scale, nation-wide revolt. The spark for the uprising
was an attack on 15 April 1936 on a convoy of taxis on the
Nablus to Tulkarm road in which the assailants murdered two
Jewish passengers.1  Portrayed in the press as an act of Arab
banditry, the assault was possibly the result of speciÆc targeting
of Jews by Arab ëIslamic patriotsí, followers of the late Shaykh Izz
al-Din al-Qassam, killed by British police in 1935.2 At the funeral
for one of the dead Jews in Tel Aviv, there was rioting; at the
same time, gunmen shot two Arab workers sleeping in a hut in a
revenge attack. An Arab general strike and revolt ensued that
lasted till October 1936 when British diplomatic efforts channelled
through the rulers of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan and Yemen
led to a ceaseÆre during which a Commission headed by Lord Peel
came to Palestine to determine the territoryís future. The Arabsí
rejection of Peelís conclusion in 1937 that Palestine should be
partitioned led to a second phase of the revolt from September

1937  to  late 1939:  the  violence  Ænally  petered  out  with  the
approaching  war  in  Europe.  For  long  stretches  of  the  revolt,
especially its second phase after 1937, the British lost control of
swathes of Palestine, including most major towns and, for about
Æve days in October 1938, the Old City of Jerusalem. The rebels
attacked Jewish settlers in Palestine, but as the revolt was an
attempt to divert British policy, they also targeted British soldiers,
colonial ofÆcials, police ofÆcers and Palestinians working for the
mandate  government.  To  suppress  the  revolt,  the  British
launched an intense and prolonged imperial policing operation in
aid  of  the  civil  authority  ó  or,  as  we  would  say  today,  a
counter-insurgency campaign, a term that became fashionable
after 1945ó which involved at its height in 1938 an immense
force built around two army divisions numbering some 25,000
servicemen.
How humane were the British authorities in their response to
the revolt? Did the British operate within the rule of law, and did
servicemen  avoid  what  today  would  be  called  human  rights
abuses?   Were   the   British   comparatively   enlightened   in
suppressing the revolt compared to, say, other European powers
operating in similar conditions? These are topical questions, not
3
least  as  the  military  history  literature  on  counterinsurgency
emphasises British success in this sphere, the ëhearts and mindsí
aspect to British counter-insurgency and British ë exceptionalismí
in which British armed forces ó ëgenerally more scrupulous than
mostí4  ó  worked  within  the  rule  of  law,  avoiding  the  abuses
against  non-combatants  that  supposedly  characterised  other
colonial and post-colonial powers. ëNo country which relies on the
law of the land to regulate the lives of its citizens can afford to

see  that  law  Øouted  by  its  own  government,  even  in  an
insurgency  situation.  In  other  words  everything  done  by  a
government  and  its  agents  in  combating  insurgency  must  be
legalí,  was  the  conclusion  of  a  leading  British  soldier  that
expressed the ideal of the British ëwayí in counter-insurgency,
and  an  issue  discussed  in  Sir  Robert  Thompsonís  inØuential
Defeating   Communist   Insurgency     (1965). 5   More   recently,
Caroline Elkins in her examination of Britainís suppression of the
6
ëMau Mauí revolt in Kenya in the 1950s wrote:

Decades had been spent constructing Britainís imperial image,
and that image contrasted sharply with the brutal behavior of
other European empires in Africa. King Leopoldís bloody rule in
the  Congo,  the  German  directed  genocide  of  the  Herero  in
South-West  Africa,  and  Franceís  disgrace  in  Algeria  ó  the
British reputedly avoided all of these excesses because, simply,
it was British to do so.
This was also the view of senior British military commanders in
Palestine at the time, one of whom remarked to a colleague, ëIf
the  Germans  were  in  occupation  in  Haifa  weíd  not  have  any
7
bloody trouble from the Arabsí.
The literature ó in Arabic,8  English9 and Hebrew10 ó on the
revolt is exiguous and skates over the issue of the conduct of
soldiers  in  the  Æeld,  excepting  some  of  the  Arabic-language
volumes,  which  record  contemporaneous  accounts  of  British
brutality. While the Arabic material is the most extensive, it is
dated, rarely uses British sources and is often printed primary
material.  The  Hebrew  literature  focuses  either  on  the  internal

dynamics within the Palestinian community or on Zionist military
training in this period, as opposed to any abuses committed by
British  troops,  Yuval  Arnon-Ohanna  and  Hillel  Cohenís  books
11
being good examples of examinations of intra-Arab relations.
Simeon Shoulís recent English-language doctoral thesis on British
imperial  policing  recognised  this  gap,  arguing  that  ëthere  has
been  to  date  a  general  reliance  Ö.  that  the  British  employed
minimal force. Where this is gainsaid, and brutality alleged, there
are only partial attempts to quantify the force employed Ö. There
has been a persistent failure to dig into the experience of many
people ìon the ground,î an accompanying over-reliance on ofÆcial
sourcesí.12  Shoul  is  right;  the  methodological  challenge  when
examining  the  conduct  of  British  armed  forces  in  Palestine  is
Ænding the evidence of abuse by soldiers and ofÆcials who were
reluctant to leave a record of abuses against non-combatants. For
both  perpetrator  and  victim,  so  often,  ëYou  donít  want  to
13
remember the bad stuffí, which is hidden away or forgotten.
What  was  the  legal  system  that  bound  and  directed  British
servicemen in Palestine after 1936, underpinning and legitimising
counter-rebel operations? Legally, British soldiers Æghting internal
insurgents conducted themselves as an aid to the civil power, an
issue articulated at the time by Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn
and Colonel H.J. Simson, building on the earlier work of Captain
C.E. Callwell.14  The Kingís Regulations and the 1929 Manual of
Military  Law  bound  soldiers  of  all  rank,  the  latter  a  bulky
hard-back volume updating the Army Discipline and Regulation
Act (1879)  and  Army  Act (1881),  the  key  points  of  which
appeared in abridged form in pocket-sized paper-back pamphlets
such as Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934 and the 1937 Duties in

the Aid of the Civil Power that ofÆcers could take with them on
operations. 15  The 1929  manual  was  precise  on  how  soldiers
should conduct themselves, forbidding, for instance, stealing from
and maltreatment of civilians. The 1929 regulations stated that a
soldier was also a citizen and subject to civil as well as military
law, and that an ëact which constitutes an offence if committed by
a civilian is none the less an offence if committed by a soldierí,
but it also provided a legal framework for shooting rioters and
allowed  for  ëcollective  punishmentsí  and     ëretributioní,  both
loosely deÆned terms in the 1929 volume and both of which are
relevant  to  what  happened  in  Palestine.16  Neither  the    1929
volume nor the subsequent 1934 and 1937 pamphlets provided
any concrete deÆnition for what constituted collective punishment
and  reprisals,  thereby  giving  Æeld  commanders  considerable
leeway  when  it  came  to  interpreting  the  rules.  The  law  for
soldiers was clear: they should use collective punishment and
retribution as a last resort and, if possible, that they should avoid
needless civilian suffering and any offence towards religion, race
or class, but the 1929 law clearly stated that where coercion was
required  or  where  terrorism  needed  to  be  checked,  collective
punishment  and  reprisals,  which  will  ëinØict  suffering  upon
innocent individualsí, were ëindispensable as a last resourceí.   17 As
the law stated, ëThe existence of an armed insurrection would
justify the use of any degree of force necessary effectually to
18
meet and cope with the insurrectioní.
In  Palestine,  in    1924ñ25,  the  British  had  formalised  the
principle of collective punishment in the Collective Responsibility
and Punishment Ordinances, building on the idea that Palestinian
village  life  was  a  collective  ësocial  system  based  on  mutual

protection rather than justiceí, a view in some measure endorsed
by  arrangements  such  as  the  collective  rural  fazëa (alarm)
security system whereby certain villages would help one another
in times of crisis.19 The British updated these ordinances in 1936
with the Collective Fines Ordinance, these local regulations being
compatible  with  the  personal  instructions  for  soldiers  detailed
above.
While  civil  proceedings  against  servicemen  for  individual
offences  during  any  military  operations  were  theoretically
possible, a strict reading of the military law in force with its broad
acceptance of group punishment and reprisal action meant that
tough  action  was  within  the  law.  Where  theft,  brutality  and
assault occurred, unlawful under the ëcivilí element of the law
governing conduct, soldiers  had little  to  fear  from  disciplinary
action  as  ëComplaints  about  military  were  frequent,  lawsuits
rarer, and successful lawsuits almost unheard of Ö in the colonies
the military had a freer hand than in Britain, and restraint of
excessive violence was far lighterí.20 Victims could take out civil
proceedings but before 1947 and the Crown Proceedings Act the
Crown was immune from prosecution, so these would have to be
against individual soldiers, and the victim would have to prove
that  the  soldiers  involved  were  acting  beyond  their  lawful
operational  orders.  This  was  not  practicable,  especially  when
soldiers had no identifying personal number or sign. One Arab
claimed that soldier ënumber 65í had beaten him, unaware that
all the men from that unit, the York and Lancaster Regiment,
formerly the 65th Foot, carried this number on the left side of
their helmets.21 Moreover, the establishment of military courts
and regulations in Palestine after September 1936 which could

ënot be challenged by the ordinary civil courtsí made any such
appeal almost impossible to succeed.22 This author has found only
one successful prosecution of servicemen in Palestine, that of four
British police ofÆcers who blatantly executed an Arab prisoner in
the street in October 1938, witnessed by a number of non-British
European residents, not Arabs, whose complaints never led to a
23
prosecution.
International conventions laying out rules of war, notably those
at Geneva (1864, 1906 and 1929; superseded by the Geneva
conventions of 1949) and the Hague (1899 and 1907; also the
Draft Rules on Air War of 1923) also constrained British forces in
Palestine.  While  the  fourth  convention  of  the 1949  Geneva
conventions dealt speciÆcally with the protection of civilians, the
international laws in place in 1936 dealt with the conduct of war
and the treatment of prisoners-of-war (POWs) rather than the
maltreatment of civilians. Britain classiÆed the Arab revolt as an
internal insurrection and not an international war and so denied
POW  status  to  Arab  Æghters.  Thus  it  treated  captured  Arab
guerrillas as civilian criminals subject to the ordinary civil law
modiÆed  by  any  conditions  of  martial  law,  such  as  the  death
penalty  for  carrying  ammunition  or  a  Ærearm,  and  for  whom
international  law  did  not  apply.  Anyone  found  with  arms  or
ammunition,  except  for  government-issued  licensed  shotguns
rationed out to compliant village mukhtars (headmen), was liable
for the death penalty, an anomalous position in a country where
rural villagers had riØes for hunting and personal protection. One
old man with no criminal record received a sentence of ten years
for having three rounds in a coffee pot ó which the police could
easily have planted during their search ó a sentence reduced on

appeal to four years. 24 The British during the revolt were careful
to  put  captured  suspects  before  the  courts,  before  hanging,
sentencing or  acquitting  them.  Later  on  in  the  revolt,  quickly
convened military courts passed rapid judgement ó and justice
soon followed, the convicted went very quickly to the gallows ó
but there was always the veneer of legal respectability.
While British forces in Palestine during the revolt operated as
an aid to the civil power, conditions in the country approached
martial law, a situation that further eased civil limits on soldiersí
behaviour as under a martial law regime ëacts might be carried
out which would normally be illegalí.25 The British never instituted
full (or ërealí ) martial law in Palestine, but in a series of Orders in
Council  and  Emergency  Regulations, 1936ñ37,  they  issued
ëstatutoryí martial law, a stage between semi-military rule under
civil powers and full martial law under military powers, and one in
which the army and not the civil High Commissioner had the
upper hand.26 The British by the 1930s had ruled out full martial
law in situations of ësub-warsí, excepting in the most extreme
cases, the reference here usually being to the ëIndian Mutinyí of
1857, but after the Arab capture of the Old City of Jerusalem in
October 1938, the army effectively took over Jerusalem and then
all of Palestine. In fact, since late 1937, the army had been in
charge with the ëfull power of search and arrest, independent of
the police, and the right to shoot and kill any man attempting to
escape  search  or  ignoring  challenges.  Grenades  may  be  used
during  searches  of  caves,  wells,  etc.  Since  November [1937]
co-operating   aircraft   have   been   ìbombed-up,î   and   pilots
instructed to machine gun or bomb ìarmed partiesî.í27 There was
de facto if not de jure martial law from late 1937 or early 1938.

To be fair, the British never removed civil authority in Palestine
from  the  decision-making  process,  but  by 1938  the  High
Commissioner  tempered  rather  than  directed  the  actions  of
British armed forces and when Sir Arthur Wauchope, the High
Commissioner in place for the Ærst phase of the revolt, looked for
a political solution to the revolt and challenged army efforts to
institute  martial  law,  he  antagonised  the  armed  forces  who
thought him too lenient and referred to him as ëwashoutí and
ëga-gaí.28 In March 1938, the Colonial OfÆce replaced him with the more compliant Sir Harold MacMichael.
In the examination that follows, can we distinguish between,
say, ëbrutalityí, ëtortureí and ëatrocityí, terms that are often used
interchangeably?  The  language  employed  is  signiÆcant.  For
instance, in 1991 one senior British ofÆcer objected to the BBCís
use  of  ëbrutalityí  when  describing  British  army  actions  in
Palestine,  suggesting  ëdeterminationí  as  a  substitute,  the  BBC
countering with an offer of ëharshnessí.29 The (British) dictionary
deÆnition of ëatrocityí raises the issue of ëmoral referenceí: an act
of ësavage enormity, horrible or heinous wickedness, an atrocious
deed, an act of extreme cruelty and heinousness with no moral
referenceí.30  For  the  Americans,  such  an  act  is  ëoutrageously wicked,  criminal,  vile  or  cruel,  heinous,  horribleí.31  Such deÆnitions could also apply to torture or extreme brutality.
International conventions such as article Æve of the 1948 UN
Universal Declaration of Human Rights32 and article three of the
1950 Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms33  do  not  deÆne  torture  as
much as outlaw the practice: ëno one shall be subjected to torture

or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishmentí, 34 the same
wording as was used in the 1987 European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.35 The 1984 United Nations (UN) Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment  deÆned (part  one,  article  one)  torture (but  not
brutality)  in  the  following  terms,  the  last  sentence  being
signiÆcant in relation to what happened in Palestine after 1936:36
Ö any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or  mental,  is  intentionally  inØicted  on  a  person  for  such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or
a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination  of  any  kind,  when  such  pain  or  suffering  is
inØicted  by  or  at  the  instigation  of  or  with  the  consent  or
acquiescence of a public ofÆcial or other person acting in an
ofÆcial capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

Similarly,  the  Council  of  Europeís   1950  Convention  for  the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (article
2) also raised the issue of the legal use of force: ëDeprivation of
life  shall  not  be  regarded  as  inØicted  in  contravention  of  this
article [right to life] when it results from the use of force which is
no more than absolutely necessary Ö in action lawfully taken for
37
the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrectioní.
The legal framework  of  reprisals  and collective punishments

directed British troops when they went on operations after April
1936. Punishment in the form of the destruction of Arab property
across urban and rural areas of Palestine was central to British
military repression after 1936, the countryside being badly hit
although there were some egregious house demolitions in urban
areas. Destruction and vandalism became a systematic, systemic
part of British counter-insurgency operations during the revolt,
and justiÆed by the legal measures in force at the time. Alongside
the  destruction,  soldiers  looted  properties,  something  not
ofÆcially sanctioned; indeed ofÆcers often tried to stop the men
pilfering. Alongside the blowing up of houses ó often the most
impressive ones in the village ó and the smashing up of Arab
villagersí  homes,  there  were  ëreprisalsí    in  the form of  heavy
collective Ænes, forced labour and punitive village occupations by
government forces for which villagers bore the cost. One Arab
rebel  noted  that  the  British  army  was  unable  to  ëstrikeí  the
Æghters,  so  it  had  to  resort  to  ërevengeí  and  ëcollective
punishmentí. 38    Using   air   support,   radio   communications,
intelligence,  collaborators  and  mobile  columns,  the  British
improved their tactics against the rebel bands, but as they never
were able to defeat an elusive enemy in open battle in rough
terrain, they adopted a two-pronged military approach, targeting
enemy Æghters and the civilians on whom they relied for support.
The level of damage varied depending on time, place and the
regiment involved, but it could be very severe. In 1940, after the
revolt was over, John Briance, a police ofÆcer who became the
head of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Palestine,
witnessed the ëburn scarsí of the West Yorkshire Regiment at the
village of Bayt Rima, north-west of Ramallah, ëA disgrace to the

British nameí, an incident also referred to by a British doctor in
Palestine at the time.39  Abuses went unreported as the British
heavily  censored  the  Palestinian  Arabic-language  newspapers,
while commanders such as Major-General Bernard Montgomery in
northern Palestine banished newspaper reporters so that his men
40
could carry on their work untroubled by the media.
During  army  searches,  soldiers  would  surround  a  village  ó
usually before dawn so that they could catch any suspects before
they Øed ó the men and women then divided off, held apart from
the houses, often in wired ëcagesí, while soldiers searched and
often destroyed everything, burnt grain and poured olive oil over
household food and effects.41 The men meanwhile were ëscreenedí
by passing hooded or hidden Arab informers who would nod when
a ësuspectí was found, or by British ofÆcials checking their papers
against  lists  of  suspects.  If  the  army  was  not  on  a  reprisal
operation but was following up an intelligence lead and looking
for a suspect or hidden weapons, any destruction was incidental
to the searching of properties ó troops also used primitive metal
detectors  on  such  operations.42  On  such  operations,  however,
brutality against villagers could occur as the army tried to extract
from them intelligence on the whereabouts of hidden weapons
caches or suspects, as happened at the village of Halhul in 1939.
In some cases, the brutality would then extend to the vandalism
of  property  as  a  means  of  gaining  information.  The  level  of
destruction  varied,  the  army  using  the  excuse  of  weapons
searches to justify any damage if there were complaints. Army
engineers would also demolish houses or groups of houses.
The destruction of property was alien behaviour for soldiers but
they did the job with gusto, once prompted. The ofÆcer entrusted

with  checking  on  destruction  in  one  village  reprimanded  a
corporal who left intact a beautiful cabinet full of glasses; the
ofÆcer then destroyed the cabinet and its contents.43 The British
designated some searches as ëpunitiveí, as one private recalled,
ëOh  yes,  punitive.  You  smashed  wardrobes  with  plates,  glass
44
mirrors in and furniture, anything you could see you smashedí.
The  local  District  OfÆcer  told  Colonel  J.S.S.  Gratton,  then  a subaltern with the Hampshire Regiment, that the unitís search of Safad (Zefat) was a punitive raid, and so they could
knock the place about. And itís very alien to a chap like you
or me to go in and break the chair and kick chatty in with all
the oil in and mixed it in with the bedclothes and break all the
windows and everything. You donít feel like doing it. And I
remember the adjutant coming in and saying, ìYou are not
doing  your  stuff.  Theyíre  perfectly  intact  all  those  houses
youíve just searched. This is what youíve got to do.î And he
picked up a pick helve and sort of burst everything. I said,
ìRight OK,î so I got hold of the soldiers and said, ìthis is what
youíve got to do,î you know. And I donít think they liked it
much but once theyíd started on it you couldnít stop them. And
youíd never seen such devastation.45
In such operations, away from ofÆcersí view, looting or the
taking  of  ësouvenirsí  was  inevitable,  and  periodic  personal
searches of men by NCOs under ofÆcersí orders failed to stop the
problem of endemic petty thieving. Looting was not ofÆcial policy,
as a special order to the two battalions entrusted with re-taking
the  Old  City  of  Jerusalem  in  October 1938  from  the  rebels
reveals:  ëAny  attempts,  even  the  most  minor,  at  looting,

scrounging or souveniring by individual troops or police will be
46
rigorously suppressedí.
The largest single act of destruction came on 16 June 1936 in
the Arab city of Jaffa when the British blew up between 220 and
240  buildings,47  ostensibly  to  improve  health  and  sanitation,
cutting  pathways  through  Jaffaís  old  city  with 200ñ300  lbs
gelignite charges48 that allowed military access and control. By
this act ó headlined in   al-Difaë as ëgoodbye, goodbye, old Jaffa,
the army has exploded youí ó the British made homeless up to
6,000  Palestinians,  most  of  whom  were  left  destitute,  having
been told by air-dropped leaØet on the morning of 16 June to
vacate their homes by 9 p.m. on the same day.49 Some families
were  left  with  nothing,  not  even  a  change  of  clothes.50  Such
callous vandalism shocked the British Chief Justice in Palestine,
Sir Michael McDonnell, who frankly condemned the action, for
which he was dismissed; the Arabs with glee printed up 10,000
51
copies of the courtís critical conclusions for public distribution.
Unable to express their opposition to the destruction of Jaffa, the
Palestinian  press  resorted  to  sarcasm,  reporting  how  the
ëoperation of making the city [Jaffa] more beautiful is carried out
through  boxes  of  dynamiteí.52  Particularly  recalcitrant  villages
would be entirely demolished, reduced to ëmangled masonryí, as
53
happened to the village of Mií ar north of Acre in October 1938.
On  other  occasions,  the  British  used  sea  mines  from  the
battleship  HMS  Malaya  to  destroy  houses.54  Sometimes  the
charges laid were so large that neighbouring houses came down
or Øying debris hit watching bystanders. British troops even made

55
Palestinians demolish their own houses, brick-by-brick.
Following a search and cordon of the town of Safad by the
Hampshire Regiment, the senior police ofÆcer, Sir Charles Tegart,
noted simply and euphemistically that the soldiersí did their work
thoroughlyí,  adding  that  local  villagers  had  little  sympathy,
feeling that the townsfolk of Safad now ëknow what has been
happening  to  usí.56  Hilda  Wilson,  a  British  school  teacher  in
Palestine, concluded that the reason for soldiersí destructiveness
was because they were ëbored stiffí and had no social amenities,
compounded  by  the  alienation  that  they  felt  serving  far  from
home:57
Soldiers are traditionally careless of other peopleís property Ö
so  what  can  be  expected  when  they  Ænd  themselves  in  a
distant  country  among  people  who,  they  are  told,  are  the
ìenemy.î  I  remember  one  occasion  when  the  troops  were
giving me a lift from Ramallah to Ain Sinia [properly ë Ayn
Sinya], and while sitting in the foremost lorry of the procession,
waiting in Ramallahís main street, I heard a sergeant further
down the line instructing men on what they were to do when
they reached their destination. They were to cordon the village,
and then proceed to drive the people out of their houses on to
the hillside. I shall never forget the ferocity he put into that
word ìdrive.î
Trapped between the hammer of rebel operations and the anvil
of the British army, Arab peasants demanded army protection
from the depredations of the rebels while also complaining about
servicemenís behaviour.58 In June 1936, Muslim religious leaders

wrote to the High Commissioner detailing how police ofÆcers on
operations ëstampedí on things, destroyed everything, ësmashed
doors,  mirrors,  tables,  chairs  wardrobes,  glass,  porcelainí  and
ripped  womenís  clothing  and  bed  linen.  Soldiers  mixed  in
margarine and oil with foodstuffs, they trampled on ëholy booksí,
and they destroyed wooden kitchen utensils, as well as glasses,
clocks, smoking pipes and basins.59 In the same month, another
protest  complained  about  police  and  soldiers  hitting  innocent
people,  insulting  their  dignity,  stealing  items  and  destroying
furniture,  goods  and  provisions.60  As  one  rebel  recounted, servicemen,61

Searched  houses,  each  one  by  itself,  in  a  way  that  was
sabotaging on purpose, and they looted some of the assets of
the  houses,  and  burnt  some  other  houses,  and  destroyed
provisions/goods. After putting Øour, wheat, rice, sugar and
others together, they added all the olive oil or petrol they could
Ænd. And in every search operation they destroyed a number of
houses of the village and damaged others. They also put signs
on other houses to destroy them in the future if there are any
incidents near the village, even if that incident is only cutting
telephone wires.
Britainís heavy-handed military methods combined with rebel
demands to weaken, perhaps to shatter, Palestinian rural village
society, creating in the process lawlessness, hunger and social
dislocation. This was unjust collective punishment. The collective
Ænes imposed were a heavy burden for poor Palestinian villagers,
especially  when  the  army  also  took  away  all  the  livestock,

smashed up properties, imposed long curfews and police posts,
blew  up houses and detained some or all of  the men folk in
distant detention camps. Rebels also Æned (or robbed) villages for
non-compliance with the revolt, £P1000 in one case, £P10ñ100
per  household  in  another.62  If  villagers  were  unable  to  pay
collective Ænes, they paid them in produce: ëAs usual police were
called to do the dirty work, collecting chickens, eggs and grain
63
from each family and taking them to Haifa for saleí.
Police  activity  went  beyond  the  forced  requisitioning  of
produce, as when the police went to a village after rebels had
killed some ëwogsí, at which point they indulged in indiscriminate
violence against villagers, not rebels. ëBy the time we arrived of
course they had vanished into the blue but we had orders to
decimate the whole place which we did, all animals and grain and
food were destroyed and the sheikh and all his hangers on beaten
up with riØe butts. There will be quite a number of funerals their
[sic] I should imagineí.64 When the police received a report that
rebels had blocked the road with trenches and roadblocks near
the village of Shafa ë Amr, they went to investigate.   ëThe local
inhabitants protested that they had been compelled to do this
sabotage by rebel gangs, but this excuse did not relieve them
from a Æne of £[P]700í, and they had to repair the road. 65 For
villagers, £P700 was a considerable sum of money to Ænd. By
comparison, in the late 1930s a British police ofÆcer of constable
rank earned a basic pay of £P11 rising to £P18 for an Assistant
Inspector a month ëall foundí, an attractive wage that drew police
recruits to Palestine. Fines varied but could be as high as £P5,000
and  they  had  to  be  paid  promptly  in  cash  or  in  the  form  of
produce  such  as  animals,  eggs  and  cereals;  in  the  village  of

a-Tira (or  Taybe/Tayyiba,  the  transliteration  from  Arabic  to
Hebrew to English is not clear), peasants responded to a Æne of
66
£P2,000  by  picking  up  what  they  could  carry  and  leaving.
Villagers were in permanent debt as village mukhtars attempted
to gather Ænes from their villagers who often had no livestock, no
men  folk  and  no  food.  The  rationale  for  Ænes  was  at  times
bizarre, with the authorities Æning villages for forest Æres in the
summer months, the assumption being that local peasants must
have  started  these  maliciously.67  Certain  villagers  were  also
required to produce bonds of up to £P100 and additional sureties
to ensure their good behaviour. Failure to pay could result in
68
imprisonment.
While the British improved their methods of tracking rebels, the
impact of military operations on villages changed little during the
revolt. When rebels killed an RAF ofÆcer in an ambush twelve
miles south of Haifa on 18 February 1938, badly wounding a
British woman passenger, the British brought up a tracker dog,
specially imported from South Africa, and the dog picked up the
scent:69

The trail was expected to lead up the Wadi Mughar to the bad
village of Igzim [in literary Arabic Ijzim], and B Company, less
one platoon, under Major Clay was detailed as dog escort. The
fourth platoon was given the task of rounding up 2,300 goats
and 200  sheep  for  conÆscation  as  a  punishment  on  the
inhabitants of the area in which the crime was committed. The
dog quickly took up the trail and moved up the Wadi Mughar to
Igzim, where it ìmarkedî a house on the northern end of the
village. It was then taken back to the coast road and put onto

another clue, again tracking back to the same village, but to a house  opposite  the  Ærst  one.  When  searched,  however,  the owners of both houses were absent. The whole village was then cordoned  and  searched,  while  reports  were  sent  to  Brigade Headquarters in Haifa on the result of the dogís tracking. Later in  the  morning  orders  were  received  to  demolish  the  two houses marked by the dogs Ö.
A  policeman  present  at  Ijzim,  Sydney  Burr,  recalled  the
brutality of the ësearchí, one that was so tough as to prompt a
complaint  about army behaviour from the Anglican mission in
Palestine.70 The use of Doberman tracker dogs specially brought
in from South Africa gave a spurious exactitude to an operational
method  that  relied  on  villagers  doing  the  work  of  the  British
army, suppressing the rebels on pain of the collective punishment
and reprisals that would inevitably ensue if there were any rebel
actions in the local area. Critics alleged that tracker dogs always
picked out some suspect on parade; on another occasion, the dog
followed a scent after a robbery to a distant village, leading the
police to an old blind man, and then barked at him proving that
he  was  the  robber.71  Once  the  tracker  dog  had  marked  a
Palestinian  or  a  dwelling,  the  police  invariably  ëfoundí  some
bullets  to  conÆrm  guilt,  and  the  courts  then  took  over  with
hanging  the  ultimate  penalty  for  the  possession  of  even  one
round.
The  authorities  punished  villages  because  they  were  the
nearest to an incident or because they thought that a particular
village was pro-rebel ó a ëbadí as opposed to a ëgoodí village,
terms  that  appear  with  regularity  in  the  British  Æles.  In  one

operation, police dogs led troops to a house in the village of Naim
(possibly al-Na í ima, Nain or Bani Na ë im) in which police ofÆcers
found two Arabs   ëof known bad characterí.72 They told the owner
of the house that unless he gave the police the information that
they required, they would destroy his house. After imposing a
collective  Æne  of £P50  on  the  village  mukhtars,  the  British
withdrew to return several days later, whereupon they loaded up
grain on lorries to the value of £P50 and made the villagers and
the owner of the house carry 200 lbs of explosives up to the
village  to  blow  the  house.  The  authorities  then  collected  the
73
inhabitants on the edge of the village to watch the explosion.
The British triaged villages, destroying Muslim Arab villages while
leaving intact neighbouring Druze villages that they viewed as
anti-revolt. As one police ofÆcer recalled, ëThe Druze are always
friendly and pleased to see the police and hate the Arabs like
poison. They are a much cleaner and better looking race and are
supposed  to  be  descendants  from  the  English  and  French
crusadersí.74  Soldiers reported that they had little trouble from
the Druze and Christian Arabs of Palestine, especially around the
predominantly Christian town of Nazareth.75  As the Hampshire
Regimental Journal described it: ëWe might mention Mughar is a
Christian  Arab  village  and  not  in  such  bad  odour  with  the
authorities as some villages, and consequently this time was not
searched Ö. The Druse are a friendly people and our relations
with them have been most cordialí.76 Yet the authorities Æned the
Christians of Nazareth and destroyed houses in 1939 after a rebel
raid, despite the local Christian clergy protesting their loyalty to
the government. ëThe terrorists will be glad that the Æ ne has
been imposed. Notices were said to have been left in the streets

calling  the  people  of  Nazareth  traitorsí  noted  the  Anglican
clergy.77 The sorting of villages was based on weak intelligence,
as police ofÆcersí letters home show: ëIt is very difÆcult to catch
the culprits as there is absolutely no information to work on and
you can receive no support from the population in the villages.
You may follow the police dogs into one village and upon this
vague clue you may smash the village and burn it down but the
next night the wires are cut in another part of the road ó and so
78
it goes oní.
A  British  doctor  in  Hebron  during  the  revolt,  Elliot  Forster,
recalled  the  effect  of  living  under  sustained  British  military
occupation. Accustomed to local life, Forster worked in Hebronís
St Lukeís Hospital and held surgeries in outlying villages. He lived
through periods of intense military operations as the army and
police fought local guerrillas. The rule of law collapsed as troops
ran amok, shooting Arabs at random simply because they were in
what was, in effect, a ëfree-Æreí combat zone. While some ofÆcers
tried to restrain the men, local Arabs moved about Hebron and
the surrounding countryside in fear of their lives, not from rebel
actions  but  because  of  the  violence  meted  out  by  marauding
troops and police. ëAnyone who sees the army nowadays runs like
a hare ó I do myself!í wrote Forster.79  In engagements with
rebels, the army would shoot Arabs near the battle zone, even
when these were old men and boys tending their Øocks. Forster
daily treated local people brought in to his hospital with gunshot
wounds. Candid as to when he was treating a real rebel, most of
the   time   he   was   tending   gunshot   wounds   inØicted   by
trigger-happy  British  troops.  He  included  a  well-documented
account of policemen executing in broad daylight in October 1938

an  Arab  suspect  travelling  in  a  police  vehicle  through  the
Manshiya district of Jaffa, an outrage witnessed by non-British
European  residents,  and  repeated  examples  of  troops  robbing
Arabs of money, including young children who were relieved of
their  pocket  money.80  The  execution  witnessed  by  non-British
Europeans did lead to an investigation and charging of four police
ofÆcers ó who received minimal sentences reduced on appeal ó
but  this  was  a  unique  case  of  servicemen  being  brought  to
justice.81  In  October 1938  troops  even  robbed  the  Anglican
Archdeacon of Jerusalem, maltreating in the process the Arab boy
82
whom the cleric had left to look after his affairs.
For the soldiers, their activities in Palestine were unremarkable,
their job being ëto bash anybody on the head who broke the law,
and if he didnít want to be bashed on the head then he had to be
shot. It may sound brutal but in fact it was a reasonably nice,
simple  objective  and  the  soldiers  understood  ití.83  Regimental
histories and contemporary regimental journals did little to hide
the  reprisals,  destruction  and  collective  Ænes,  recording  how
villages  were  ëbeaten  upí,  homes  burnt  and  men  detained  in
84
cages ëon orders from aboveí because of rebel activity nearby.
While  euphemisms  would  be  used  ó  ëthe  search  was  drastic
enough  to  shake  the  villagersí85  ó  regimental  journals  would
cheerily and sportily describe the trashing of a village, as with the
Essex Regiment at the ësackí (obvious pun intended) of Sakhnin,
25ñ26 December 1937, with physical force that stopped short of
outright torture or blatant wanton destruction ó or these were
not reported.86 The repeated complaints about the reprisals made
to the mandate authorities by Arab petitioners and the Anglican

clergy in Palestine, supported by Ærst-hand evidence, met with
87
denials and promises to investigate.
Beyond the ofÆcial policies designed to break the resolve of the
Palestinian peasantry, there were also unofÆcial acts of brutality
committed by rank-and-Æle servicemen. While these do not form
part of the story of ofÆcial reprisal and collective punishment,
they  contributed  to  the  terrorising  of  ordinary  Palestinian
civilians,  and  ofÆcers  operating  in  the  Æeld  with  the  men
sometimes  sanctioned  or  simply  accepted  a  level  of  casual
brutality by their men. While the ad hoc outrages committed by
servicemen were in some measure the soldiersí revenge against
attacks and a means of defeating the rebels, a willingness to
inØict suffering on others played its part in what happened. As
the commanding ofÆcer of the Essex Regiment noted at the end
of 1937, punitive search operations against Arab villages were
88
ëenjoyed by all ranksí.
For instance, it was common British army practice to make
local Arabs ride with military convoys to prevent mine attacks.
Often,  soldiers  carried  them  or  tied  them  to  the  bonnets  of
lorries, or put the hostages on small Øatbeds on the front of
trains, all to prevent mining or sniping attacks. ëThe naughty boys
who we had in the cages in these campsí were put in vehicles in
front of the convoy for the ëdeterrent effectí, as one British ofÆcer
put it.89 The army told the Arabs that they would shoot any of
them who tried to run away.90 On the lorries, some soldiers would
brake hard at the end of a journey and then casually drive over
the Arab who had tumbled from the bonnet, killing or maiming
him,  as  Arthur  Lane,  a  Manchester  Regiment  private  candidly
recalled:91

Ö when youíd Ænished your duty you would come away nothing
had  happened  no  bombs  or  anything  and  the  driver  would
switch his wheel back and to make the truck waver and the
poor wog on the front would roll off into the deck. Well if he
was  lucky  heíd  get  away  with  a  broken  leg  but  if  he  was
unlucky the truck behind coming up behind would hit him. But
nobody bothered to pick up the bits they were left. You know
we were there we were the masters we were the bosses and
whatever we did was right Ö. Well you know you donít want
him anymore. Heís fulÆlled his job. And thatís when Bill Usher
[the  commanding  ofÆcer]  said  that  it  had  to  stop  because
before long theyíd be running out of bloody rebels to sit on the
bonnet.

92
British troops also left Arab wounded on the battleÆeld to die
and maltreated Arab Æghters taken in battle, so much so that the
rebels tried to remove their wounded or dead from the Æeld of
battle.93 Lane, the soldier with the Manchester Regiment, was in a
clash with guerrillas in which several British soldiers had died and
he  provides  a  graphic,  disturbing  account  detailing  what
happened to the Arab prisoners captured after the Ære-Æght and
who were taken back to the military camp and tied to a post,
Ö   they were in a state and they were really knocked about .Ö
whoever had done it when they got them on the wagons to
bring them back to camp the lads had beat them up, set about
them  Ö  [the  interviewer  asks  him  with  what]  Ö.  Anything.
Anything  they  could  Ænd.  RiØe  butts,  bayonets,  scabbard
bayonets, Æsts, boots, whatever. There was one poor sod there
he was I would imagine my age actually and Iíd heard people

say in the past that you could take your eye out and have it cleaned and put it back and I always believed it but itís not so because this ladís eye was hanging down on his lip, on his cheek. The whole eye had been knocked out and it was hanging down and there was blood dripping on his face.

When  asked  why  the  soldiers  had  done  this,  Lane  replied
simply, ëSame as any soldier. I donít care whether heís English,
German, Japanese or what. Heís the victor heís the boss and you
accept the treatment that he gives you. I donít care what you
say.  That  was  repeated  to  me  later  [the  Japanese  took  Lane
prisoner in 1942]. But itís even today. Thereís a beast in every
man I donít care who he is. You can say the biggest queen or
queer  that  you  come  across  but  thereís  a  beast  in  him
somewhere and in a situation like that it comes outí.94 Lane then
described how the men destroyed their own tents, an act that the
commanding ofÆcer allowed so that his men could let off steam,
but in this trashing of their own camp the soldiers left untouched
the  Arab  detainees.  One  sergeant  ó  described  by  Lane  as
deranged ó led the Arab captives to the armoury to show them
all the weapons there and spoke to them in English, which the
Arabs did not seem to understand. He was on the point of letting
the Arabs go free through the gates of the camp when an ofÆcer
stopped him. Then before the army sent the Arabs to Acre jail,
the soldiers took them95

Ö around the back and any lads who were doing nothing at the
time we all gathered round and stood and formed two lines of
men  with  pick  axes,  pick  axe  helves,  some  with  bayonets,

scabbards you know with a bayonet inside, some with riØes,
whatever was there, tent mallets, tent pegs. And the rebels
were  sent  one  at  a  time  through  this  what  do  you  call  it?
Gauntlet and they were belted and bashed until they got to the
other end. Now any that could run when they got to the other
end went straight into the police meat wagon and they were
sent down to Acre. Any that died they went into the other meat
wagon and they were dumped at one of the villages on the
outside.
These excesses were soldiersí response to rebels wounding or
killing comrades in battles, with any prisoners, local village or
villagers becoming the target for a revenge attack, something
that Arabic sources also note.96 But British accounts also detail
soldiers bayoneting innocent Arabs97 and Arab Æghters in battle
being machine gunned en masse by men from the Royal Ulster
and West Kent regiments as they came out to surrender near
Jenin. ëAt one time the Ulsters and West Kents caught about 60 of
them [Arab guerrillas] in a valley and as they walked out with
their arms up mowed them down with machine guns. I inspected
them afterwards and most of them were boys between 16 and 20
from Syria Ö. No news of course is given to the newspapers, so
what  you  read  in  the  papers  is  just  enough  to  allay  public
uneasiness  in  Englandí.98  There  is  also  the  question  of  the
methods  used  by  Orde  Wingateís  ëSpecial  Night  Squadsí  that
mixed British servicemen with Zionist Æghters and pitted them
against the Arabs in Galilee ó ëextreme and cruelí noted one
colonial ofÆcial, Sir Hugh Foot, a force that tortured, whipped,
executed and abused Arabs according to another source ó but is

99
a subject beyond the scope of this article.
The  brutality  of  the  Palestine  police  and  prison  service  had
some ofÆcial sanction. Sir Charles Tegart, a senior police ofÆcer
ëheadhuntedí from India, authorised the establishment of torture
centres, known euphemistically as ëArab Investigation Centresí,
where  suspects  got  the  ëthird  degreeí  until  they  ëspilled  the
beansí, a major one in a Jewish quarter of West Jerusalem was
only closed after colonial ofÆcials such as Edward Keith-Roach
complained to the High Commissioner.100 Interrogators used what
101
we now know as the ëwaterboardingí torture at these centres.
Keith-Roach, to his credit, raised the issue that the ëquestionable
practisesí carried  out  by  CID  ofÆcers  on  suspects  were
counter-productive both in terms of the information gathered and
the effect on local peopleís conÆdence in the police.102 For the
Anglican Archdeacon in Palestine, police abuses were the cause of
the violence  rather than  a response to  it.103  He wrote to the
Mandate  Chief  Secretary  in  June 1936  detailing  the  daily
complaints from Arabs of beatings at the hands of rampaging
police ofÆcers, concluding with an account of a constable who was
reprimanded for bringing in a suspect unharmed ó    ëdeÆnitely
104
ordered to duff them upí was the police order.
The letters home of Palestine policeman Sydney Burr provide
an explicit personal account of police brutality ó ëit is the only
way  with  these  peopleí.105  Extra-judicial  executions,  torture,
beatings and general violence were commonplace for the British
Palestine police ofÆcers with whom Burr worked during the Arab
revolt.  Burr  discusses  the  ëthird  degreeí  dished  out  to  Arab
suspect along with general beatings and trashing of Arab shops

and houses in almost every letter home. Much of the brutality
was casual and wantonly destructive, described by the police and
soldiers in terms akin to a good, fair Æght ó rebel ëhunting is still
the great sportí ó enjoyed by all concerned.106 Most came in the
form  of  beatings  in  the  street  rather  than  in  sinister  torture
centres, but the effects could be severe, something than can be
overlooked  in  the  sporting-style  descriptions  given  in  many
memoirs:  ëit  was  a  good  fair  Æght  with  plenty  of  bottles  and
knives Øying about. They are greatly helped by their womenfolk
who specialise in dropping family utensils such as mangles and
bedsteads out of the window on our unfortunate headsí.    107 Thus,
another British police ofÆcer, Douglas Duff, recalled the effects of
a riØe-butt beating delivered by a colleague to an Arab in the
1920s:108

Ö our attitude was that of Britons of the Diamond Jubilee era,
to  us  all  non-Europeans  were  ì  wogs,  î  and  Western
non-Britons only slightly more worthy. When one of the Nablus
detachment produced an old cigarette tin containing the brains
of a man whose skull he had splintered with his riØe butt Ö. I
felt physically sick Ö the sight of that grog-blossomed face of
the gendarme with his can half-full of human brains proudly
brandishing  his  smashed  riØe-butt  as  proof  of  his  prowess,
altered something inside of me; people who owned skins other
than pink Western ones became human beings.
Duff  put  it  simply  when  talking  about  a  Muslim  Palestinian
crowd disturbance in 1922: ëHad our Arabic been better we might
have sympathised with them; though I doubt it, for most of us

were so infected by the sense of our own superiority over ìlesser
109
breedsî that we scarcely regarded these people as humaní.
Police ofÆcers in vehicles would try to knock down Arabs, ëas
running over an Arab is the same as a dog in England except we
do not report ití.110 Moreover, in the early life of the Palestine
police, many recruits were ex- ëBlack and Tansí and ëAuxiliariesí
from the Irish War of Independence (1919ñ21) and so came with
experience of that brutal conØict, imbuing the force with a tough
ethos when it came to policing the country. ëFor a time I was
seriously troubled at the ì Black and Tan î methods of the police,
of  which  I  had  overwhelming  evidenceí,  wrote  the  Anglican
Archdeacon in Jerusalem to his secretary.111 The toughness was,
at times, amusing, as when Burr received a handkerchief from
home, forcing him to write back, ëI am afraid I will not be able to
use it here, the old Black and Tans who were the beginning of
this force do not look upon such effeminate apparel in a kindly
light. They think the force is going to the dogs as it is. It is
because of the soft ways that are creeping into the police that the
Arabs are so deÆantí.112 There was also some fascist inØuence
within  the  police  force,  the  authorities  having  to  issue  orders
forbidding the practice of men giving each other the Nazi salute in
public. On another occasion, Jews complained when a riot squad
in Tel Aviv appeared with swastikas painted on their short riot
shields.113  British  police  ofÆcers  saw  their  service  as  akin  to
serving  in  the  French  Foreign  Legion,  many  making  explicit
reference to this ó ëa British Foreign Legion. With the faults as
114
wellí ó and some seem to have acted accordingly.

The   insouciance   of   the   police   was   such   that   they
ësmartened-upí  in  jail  a  prisoner  with  rubber  truncheons,  not
caring that a British clergyman who was waiting in the police
station  to  report  his  car  stolen  witnessed  this  action. 115  This
ësmartening-upí  might  be  the  same  instance  recorded  in  the
Anglican Jerusalem Mission Æles in which a clergyman witnessed
the  savage  beating  of  a  suspect  whose  teeth  were  already
knocked out before he was brought in for a sustained assault by
policemen and a man in civilian clothes who might have been a
military intelligence ofÆcer working with the police:116

A second man came in who was in plain clothes, but whom I
took to be one of the British Police, and I saw him put a severe
double arm lock on the man from behind, and then beat him
about the head and body in what I can only describe as a brutal
and callous way. Once or twice he stopped and turned to the
other people in the station, and in an irresponsible and gloating
manner said ìIím so sorryî ó ìIím awfully sorry.î And then
proceeded to punch the prisoner round the station again. A
third man came in. He was in plain clothes, and was wearing a
soft felt hat. He was, I think, British, and may have been a
member of the Police Force, but I thought at the time that he
was a soldier in civilian clothes Ö. But this man also made a
vicious and violent attack on the prisoner, and punched him
about the head and body Ö. I am gravely disturbed at the
possibility that one of the men who was in the station, and who
beat up the Ærst person who was brought in was not a member
of the police force, but a soldier ó this was the man who was
wearing a soft felt trilby hat Ö. I was for two years Chaplain to

a  prison  in  England,  and  in  the  course  of  my  duties  not
infrequently  witnessed  the  methods  which  police  and  prison
warders were compelled to use with men detained or serving
long terms of imprisonment, and can only say what I saw on
this  occasion  sickened  me  and  Ælled  me  with  the  gravest
misgivings.
The presence of authority did little to blunt police violence, the
Anglican  Bishop  in  Jerusalem  having  to  remonstrate  with  one
police  sergeant  ó  ëunder  the  inØuence  of  drink  or  mentally
disturbedí ó who was threatening a school boy travelling in the
bishopís car.117 Another police ofÆce remarked to the Bishop that
118
he had orders from the High Commissioner to assault Arabs.
When clergymen discussed these issues on the telephone, the
line went dead: ëWith regard to our telephone conversation this
morning I feel certain that someone was listening in and cut us
off just when you were discussing with me the serious aspects of
119
the situation in Palestineí.
On the receiving end, Palestinians made repeated complaints to
the authorities. One young man wrote to the British detailing the
treatment his father, ë Abd al-Hamid Shuman, a bank director,
had received at the hands of the police. Arrested on 20 February
1938 in Jerusalem, the British moved the father to Acre jail and
then al-Mazra ë a detention camp (near Acre) before he ended up
back in Acre prison hospital after what he claimed were severe
beatings by prison guards that left him unable to walk. 120 There
are other accounts in Arabic of suspects being tortured, of Arabs
being blown to bits in vehicles after being forced along roads in
which the British had placed mines, of British operatives placing

huge terrorist bombs in Haifa, of detainees being left in open
cages in the sun without sustenance, of men being beaten with
wet  ropes,  ëboxedí  and having their  teeth smashed,  and  men
having their feet burnt with oil.121 Those who were ëboxedí were
beaten  until  they  were  knocked  out,  ëneedlesí  were  used  on
suspects, dogs were set upon Arab detainees, and British and
Jewish auxiliary forces maltreated Arabs by having them hold
heavy stones and then beating them when they dropped them.
Guards  also  used  bayonets  on  sleep-deprived  men  and  made
122
them wear bells around their necks and then dance.
In petitions made through the Anglican mission, Arab detainees
in Palestineís prisons protested at the extreme treatment meted
out  by  guards.  Prisoners  jumped  to  their  deaths  from  high
windows  to  escape  their  captors,  had  their  testicles  tied  with
cord, were tortured with strips of wood with nails in, had wire
tightened around their big toes, hair was torn from their faces
and heads, special instruments were used to pull out Ængernails,
red  hot  skewers  were  used  on  detainees,  prisoners  were
sodomised, boiling oil was used on prisoners as were intoxicants,
there were electric shocks, water was funnelled into suspectsí
stomachs  and  there  were  mock  executions.123  As  one  British
resident  in  Palestine  concluded,  ëafter  the  murder      [on   26
September   1937  by  Arab  gunmen]  of  Mr      [Lewis]  Andrews
[Assistant  District  Commissioner  in  Galilee]  the  police  asked
permission to use torture to the prisoners to extract information
and that permission was granted from the Colonial OfÆce. Several
of the leading police ofÆcers in Jerusalem refused to countenance
it. One of them has since left the countryí.124 The Arabs claimed
that CID ofÆcers subjected suspects to such severe beatings that

they made false confessions. Thus, ëin order to extract from him a
fabricated  admission,  and  as  a  result  of  this  method [severe
inquisitorial proceedings and beating] he was compelled under
stress  and  force  and  in  order  to  overcome  such  an  atrocious
method against his body and spirit to admit that he gave to other
125
terrorists one time ó bomb, two bombs and a revolverí.
Two single incidents during the Arab revolt arguably meet the
deÆnition of an atrocity. Neither has been widely discussed, even
in  the  Arabic-language  literature,  but  they  have  appeared  in
printed  primary  records  and  in  television  programmes. 126  The
British army was responsible for both incidents. They occurred at
the  villages  of  al-Bassa,  in  the  Acre  district  by  the  Lebanon
border, in September 1938, and at Halhul near Hebron in May
1939. Contemporaneous Palestinian papers such as Filastin made
passing  mention  of  an  outrage  that  seems  to  be  the  one  at
al-Bassa,  but  there  was  nothing  in  Filastin  on  Halhul.    127  As
already mentioned, strict British censorship during the uprising
ensured that Palestinian (Arabic-language) papers were closed for
long periods of time and the Palestinian Arabic press was unable
to  make  critical  comment  on  British  military  activities  in  the
country after 1936.128 Indeed, the Zionist press ó such as the Palestine  Post,  Haaretz  or  Davaró  had  more  comment  on Britainís  repression  of  the  revolt  than  the  heavily  censored Arabic-language press.
The British killed some twenty villagers at al-Bassa, most if not
all in cold-blood, during an operation in which villagers were also
tortured according to Arabic sources. Up to Æfteen men died in
Halhul,  mostly  elderly  Palestinians (the  youngest  victim  was
thirty-Æve, the oldest seventy-Æve) who died after being left out

in the sun for several days in a caged enclosure with insufÆcient
water. Halhul villagers also claim that soldiers shot a local man at
a well during the same operation ó in fact, it seems that soldiers
129
beat the victim and then left him to drown in the well.
At  al-Bassa,  British  troops  claimed  that  they  had  been  the
victims of roadside bomb and mine attacks ó what today we
would call ëIEDsí. On the evening of 6 September 1938, an RUR
armoured  Æfteen-cwt  lorry  car  hit  a  mine  near  the  village  of
al-Bassa, killing four RUR soldiers ó Lieutenant John Anthony
Law, Lance-Corporals J. Andrews and C. Kennedy, and RiØeman
A. Coalter ó two of whom (Andrews and Coalter) died on the 6th,
with two dying from their wounds on the 7th (Kennedy) and the
9th (Law).130 The blast also seriously wounded two men. An RUR
ofÆcer  present  at  the  time,  Desmond  Woods,  recalled  what
happened next  in  an  oral  history  interview  given  many  years
later:131

Now I will never forget this incident Ö. We were at al-Malikiyya,
the other frontier base and word came through about 6 oíclock
in the morning that one of our patrols had been blown up and
Millie  Law [the  dead  ofÆcer]  had  been  killed.  Now  Gerald
Whitfeld [Lieutenant-Colonel  G.H.P.  Whitfeld,  the  battalion
commander] had told these mukhtars that if any of this sort of
thing happened he would take punitive measures against the
nearest  village  to  the  scene  of  the  mine.  Well  the  nearest
village to the scene of the mine was a place called al-Bassa and
our  Company  C  were  ordered  to  take  part  in  punitive
measures.  And  I  will  never  forget  arriving  at  al-Bassa  and
seeing  the  Rolls  Royce  armoured  cars  of  the 11th  Hussars

peppering Bassa with machine gun Ære and this went on for
about 20 minutes and then we went in and I remembered we
had lighted braziers and we set the houses on Ære and we burnt
the  village  to  the  ground.  Now  Monty  was  our  divisional
commander at the time, with his headquarters at Haifa, and he
happened to be out on his balcony of his headquarters, and he
saw a lot of smoke rising in the hills and he called one of his
staff ofÆcers and he said ìwonder what this smoke is in the hills
thereî and one of them said ìI think that must be the Royal
Ulster RiØes taking punitive measures against Bassa.î Well we
all  thought  that  this  was  going  to  be  the  end  of  our
commanding  ofÆcer  Gerald  Whitfeld,  because  you  know
certainly  if  it  happened  these  days  it  wouldíve  been.  Well
anyway Monty had him up and he asked him all about it and
Gerald Whitfeld explained to him. He said ìSir, I have warned
the mukhtars in these villages that if this happened to any of
my ofÆcers or men, I would take punitive measures against
them and I did this and I wouldíve lost control of the frontier if
I hadnít.î Monty said ìAll right but just go a wee bit easier in
the future.î
This is not the full story. Before or after destroying the village,
almost  certainly  the  latter,  RUR  soldiers  with  some  attached
Royal Engineers collected approximately Æfty men from al-Bassa
and blew some of them up in a contrived explosion under a bus.
Harry Arrigonie, a British Palestine policeman at al-Bassa at the
time, recalled what happened in his memoirs, with the British
ëherdingí about twenty men from al-Bassa ëonto a bus. Villagers
who panicked and tried to escape were shot. The driver of the
bus was forced to drive along the road, over a land mine buried

by the soldiers. This second mine was much more powerful than
the Ærst [i.e., the rebelsí mine] and it completely destroyed the
bus, scattering the maimed and mutilated bodies of the men on
board everywhere. The villagers were then forced to dig a pit,
132
collect the bodies, and throw them unceremoniously into ití.
Arrigonie  provides  grisly  photographs  of  the  maimed  bodies,
taken by British Constable Ricke, present at the incident, and he
claimed   that   the   ofÆcer   involved   had   been   ëseverely
reprimandedí.133  Recalling  the  same  incident,  a  senior  British
Palestine police ofÆce, Raymond Cafferata, wrote to his wife, ëYou
remember reading of an Arab bus blown up on the frontier road
just after Paddy [a slang term for the Irish] was killed. Well the
Ulsters  did  it  ó  a 42  seater  full  of  Arabs  and  an  RE  [Royal
Engineers] Sgt [Sergeant] blew the mine. Since that day not a
134
single mine has been laid on that roadí.
The  atrocity  at  al-Bassa  prompted  the  Anglican  Bishop  of
Jerusalem, the Rt. Rev. G.F. Graham Brown, himself a former
military man who had been battalion adjutant of the Kingís Own
Scottish Borderers in the First World War, to visit al-Bassa and
then  call  upon  Montgomery,  the  divisional  commander  for
northern  Palestine.  Keith-Roach,  the  senior  colonial  ofÆcial,
recounted the encounter between the bishop and the general: ëHe
had a long interview with Montgomery and came back absolutely
bewildered. To every question, he said, Monty had but one reply:
ìI shall shoot them.î ìThe man is blood mad,î the bishop moaned
135
across my ofÆce tableí.
A letter in Arabic of 8 September 1938 giving the Palestinian
side  of  events  extends  the  atrocity  to  include  premeditated
torture. The letter dates the rebel mine explosion to 10.30 p.m.

hours on  6 September,  following  which,  on  the  morning  of  7
September, soldiers came to al-Bassa. They shot four people in
the streets, in cafes and in the homes of the village, after which
the soldiers searched and looted the village, before gathering and
beating inhabitants with sticks and riØe butts. The British then
took one hundred villagers to a nearby military base ó Camp
Number One ó where the British commander selected four men
(the letter lists their names) who were tortured in front of the
rest of the group. The four men were undressed and made to
kneel barefoot on cacti and thorns, specially prepared for the
occasion. Eight soldiers then told off the four men and two per
Arab detainee set about beating them ëwithout pityí in front of the
group. Pieces of Øesh ëØew from their bodiesí and the victims
fainted,  after  which  an  army  doctor  came  and  checked  their
pulses. The army then took the group of villagers to another base
ó Camp Number Two ó while soldiers destroyed the village of
al-Bassa. All of this happened on the morning of 7 September,
with the army withdrawing at 1 p.m. on the same day. 136 While
this letter does not mention the villagers blown up on the bus,
another letter of 20 September 1938 refers to the British and
Jewish police blowing up arrested suspects in this fashion along
the Lebanese border, the British sending back to the villages the
mangled bits of bodies or quickly burying them.137 Thus, it seems
that  the  army  destroyed  the  village  on  the 7  September,
returning some days later with engineers and some police ofÆcers to  kill  more  villagers  in  one  or  more  mine  explosions  under vehicles Ælled with local Arabs.
An 11th Hussar NCO present at al-Bassa remembered how he
and his men had ëØattenedí    the village ó    ëblew the lotí    ó

before referring to a similar incident near Nablus where the 11th
Hussars after suffering casualties destroyed another village. 138 In
the  archives  there  are  other  cryptic  comments  from  British
ofÆcers to their destroying and burning villages but the vague
references to what happened and the reticence of British ofÆcers
fully to record what they were doing hampers further research.
The Rt. Rev. W.H. Stewart, the Anglican Archdeacon of Jerusalem
and, from 1938, Hon. Chaplain to the Palestine Police and so no
enemy  of  the  force,  wrote  of  dark  deeds  in  rural  areas  of
Palestine,  concluding,  however,  that  while  his  evidence  was
ëabsolutely trustworthy, is second hand and not such that I can
produceí.139 After al-Bassa, the press in Beirut noted that British
troops ëont fait plusieurs expÈditions punitives dans les villages de
la rÈgioní, suggesting that it was not an isolated reprisal but one
140
of a set of punishments inØicted on the Palestinians.
The second major incident was at Halhul in May 1939. Located
on the road between Hebron and Bethlehem, Halhul was, the
British  believed,  sympathetic  to  the  rebels.  The  Black  Watch
Regiment  surrounded and  took  over  the  village  in  May  1939.
What followed was an attempt to get villagers to hand over riØes,
a recurring British demand during village searches, by setting up
two wired cages. One was a ëgoodí cage in which there was plenty
of water, food and shelter from the sun, and one was a ëbadí cage
in  which  men  were  left  in  the  open  in  the  intense  heat  with
between half and one pint of water per day. In an interview with
a BBC ëTimewatchí team working on a 1991 programme on the
Arab  revolt  ó  what  it  called     ëthe  Ærst  intifadaí     ó  the
commanding ofÆcer of the Black Watch emphasised the voluntary
nature of the action; villagers could escape the heat simply by

handing over a riØe, after which they would be moved to the
ëgoodí cage. What he did not make clear is what the villagers
141
were to do if they did not have a riØe.
Again, a closer examination of the sources paints a less rosy
picture of the events at Halhul. Keith-Roach, in a private letter,
wrote that only a half pint of water was distributed, and he does
not  refer  to  a  ëgoodí  cage.  Instead,  after  the  military  high
command  had  given  the  commander  of  the  Black  Watch  the
green light, soldiers rounded up all the men of the village,142

Ö instructed that they be kept there [in an open cage] and he
gave them half a pint of water per diem. I saw the original
order. The weather was very hot for it was summer. According
to Indian Army Medical standards, four pints of water a day is
the minimum that a man can live upon exposed to hot weather.
After 48 hours treatment most of the men were very ill and
eleven old and enfeebled ones died. I was instructed that no
civil inquest should be held. Finally, the High Commissioner,
MacMichael,  decided  compensation  should  be  paid,  and  my
Assistant  and  I  assessed  the  damage  at  the  highest  rate
allowed by the law, and paid out over three thousand pounds
to the bereft families.
The British doctor, Forster, talks of two cages, one for the men
and one for the women, and makes no mention of an option to
escape the cages. They were there just for punishment. ëWe may
yet   teach   Hitler   something   new   about   the   conduct   of
concentration campsí was Forsterís acerbic conclusion.143 An Arab
whose father died at Halhul claimed that between eleven and

fourteen men died after two weeks in the sun with no food and
water, one at a village well where ësoldiers kept pushing him and
he  was  killedí.144  The  same  man  recalled  electric  generators/
Øoodlights/heaters  running  all  night  to increase  the  detaineesí
privations, some being so hungry that they ate dirt. A woman
from Halhul noted that ten men died, two at the well incident, the
British only releasing the men after the villagers produced forty
old Turkish riØes, and that this was after eight daysí captivity.
The same woman also recalled the night-time lights, and how the
soldiers beat them and threw away food that the women brought
for their captive menfolk. ëWithout guns those men will never be
releasedí, one British ofÆcial (local British ruler) told her. 145 Other
Arab accounts talk of the use of ëcagesí for three days ëat leastí in
146
military operations in other villages.
In   correspondence   surrounding   a   Thames   Television
programme on Palestine,147 both Geoffrey Morton (formerly of the
Palestine police) and Sir Thomas Scrivener (a former Assistant
District  Commissioner  in  Palestine)  challenged  the  idea  that
villagers  were  denied  water  in  village  searches,  with  Morton
questioning the ësenile oldí peasant that Thames TV had ëdragged
iní to recount his tale. It is not clear if these relate to Halhul or
are  more  general  comment  but  Thames  Televisionís  reply  is
interesting:148

The  problems  of  the  oral  tradition   (confusing  hearsay  with
personal experience) made us doubt it, too, and the sequence
was cut when our Zionist adviser told us that these stories
originated as black propaganda in Nazi Germany. One of my
colleagues, however, undertook a personal search in the Public

Record OfÆce and found the original papers. As soon as this
incident took place, Government House informed the Secretary
of  State  that  people  had  died  during  an  arms  search.  The
Secretary of State asked for full details because of the danger
of Nazi propaganda, and payments of £2,000 were made to the
bereaved families.

The mention of compensation suggests that this could be a
reference  to  the  Halhul  incident  of  May 1939.  One  of  the
survivors of the cages at Halhul recounted to Forster, the Hebron doctor, the events of May 1939:149
On my return this morning I found man had been admitted
suffering from the effects of his internment at Halhul. He is a
Hebron man who had the misfortune to be caught in the round
up. He has not suffered permanently and is not seriously ill.
The point is that he strikes me as being a quiet and reliable
witness. He denies the lurid stories that were set forth in the
two [Arab] petitions you showed me this morning, and says
that apart from one man who was drowned in a well only the
ten men we know of died from exposure. The death of this man
in the well was bad enough, but again he says the horrible
story told in the petition is not true. The man was suffering
badly from thirst and in order to get a drink he told a false
story of a riØe hidden in a well. He was let down into the well
and drank his Æll, but on being hauled up empty handed he was
struck with the butts of riØes. He had a knife and managed to
cut the cord on which he depended, fell back into the well and
was drowned. My patient said the Ærst few days were terrible,

and the allowance of water was pitifully small. He says that he
and others did in fact drink their own urine. During the latter
part of his internment ó he was there twelve days in all ó
things  were  somewhat  better.  As  is  usual  with  the  oriental
petitioner, these folk seem to spoil their case with exaggeration
and  falsehood.  In  this  present  case  surely  the  unvarnished
truth was terrible enough.
There are other references to similar excesses in the primary
sources. Forster mentioned a ëworseí atrocity at the village of
Bayt Rima, another example of the tangential comments to other
incidents  for  which  there  is  some  corroborating  evidence:
ëApparently the military authorities declared that they had issued
strict  instructions  against  ìfrightfulnessî.  I  donít  know  if  this
makes  things  better  or  worse.  Ballard [a  military  ofÆcer  in
Hebron] says a man at Beit [Bayt] Rima died after a beating by
an  ofÆcer.    ìHeís  a  known  sadistî  is  the  explanationí. 150  The
Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem wrote of ëserious chargesí against
soldiers  in  operations  at  Bayt  Rima  and  Michmash,  following
which  the  Bishop  protested  to  senior  ofÆcers.151  The  Anglican
Mission  in  Jerusalem  listed  twenty-two  villages  and  towns  in
which troops inØicted single or multiple outrages, sometimes over
152
a  period  of  many  months. In 1977,  a  local  man,  Qasim
al-Rimawi (likely a rebel and, later, ë Abd al Qadir al-Husayniís
secretary and a Jordanian cabinet minister), claimed that three
villagers were tortured to death by troops at Bayt Rima during a
thirteen-day search involving 2,000 troops.153 In November 1938,
the army also set up fake executions for villagers in Halhul in the
hope of getting them to hand over weapons, as a major recalled

with ëenormous prideí in a conversation with Forster. 154 There is a
reference  in  the  regimental  journal  of  the  RUR  to  ësevere
reprisalsí following the death of soldier in a landmine attack on
the ëYirka trackí (usually Yarka, a Druze village about six miles
south-east of Acre) in February 1939.155 ëThe Royal Ulster RiØes
treated the Arabs very Ærmly indeed but by Jove it paid dividends
but of course you canít do those sorts of things todayí, was how
156
one RUR ofÆcer put it.
After a soldier was blown up by a mine near the village of Kafr
Yasif in February 1939, soldiers burnt down seventy houses, blew
up forty more and, reportedly, then told nine villagers from the
neighbouring village of Kuwaykat to run after which the soldiers
157
gunned them down. ëI do not think the circumstances differ
from those with which we are familiarí, noted a local Anglican
Chaplain.158 Under pressure from the Anglican clergy, the army
provided  some  relief  to  the  homeless  villagers,  the  Anglican
Chaplain in Haifa concluding:159

On the whole I cannot help wondering at the way the Arabs
trust us and believe us and believe that in the end we will try
and do what is right. Some of the villages which have recently
been hardly [sic] hit seem to go as far as possible in making
allowances.  Sometimes  they  appear  to  accept  the  severest
treatment as the inevitable result of acts of violence by the
gangs, even though they themselves are not responsible. And
they do not hold the government responsible for actions taken
by  the  military  authorities,  though  we  know  that  the
government canít disclaim responsibility. The people at Kafr

Yasif  were  very  eager  to  point  out  that  the  troops  who destroyed their houses were not English but Irish.
Following the reprisal attack on Kafr Yasif, local Arabs gathered
outside the German Consulate shouting ëWe want Hitler ó We
160
want Mussolinií.
Arab  sources  make  claims  of  police  assassination  squads
abducting  and  killing  villagers,161  the  RAFís  use  of  ëincendiary
bombsí on villages near Bad al-Wad west of Jerusalem resulting
in ëburntí bodies, artillery Æ ring on villages at night   ësowing fear
among the hearts of women and childrení, women being attacked
by  soldiers,  bias  in  favour  of  the  Jews,  and  desecration  of
mosques and Korans.162 Arab leaders complained to Wauchope,
the High Commissioner, that police and soldiers were ëdesecrating
mosques,  stealing  personal  property,  destroying  Korans  and
beating  people  upí.163  In  retaliation,  Palestinians  targeted
ofÆcials, often those who were especially brutal or pro-Zionist,
one early victim being the British police inspector, Alan Sigrist,
ësentenced to deathí by local Jerusalemites, and shot along with
his guard by two assassins in his car on 12 June 1936 outside St
Stephenís Gate by the Old City in Jerusalem.164 Notorious for his
savage truncheon-wielding attacks on Arabs, including beating up
the staff of the al-Difaë newspaper ofÆce in May 1936, Sigrist
launched indiscriminate assaults on Arab passers-by, including a
well-dressed District OfÆcer who refused to pick up nails left by
rebels hoping to puncture tyres.165 After Sigristís shooting, British
soldiers captured and, allegedly, maltreated one of his wounded
attackers, kicking and beating him with riØe butts in the back of a

truck,  after  which  he  died. 166  Another  high-proÆle  victim  was
Lewis Andrews, Assistant District Commissioner in Galilee, shot
leaving church on 26 September 1937, accused of supporting
Zionism; on 24 August 1938, a gunman shot dead British acting
Assistant District Commissioner W.S.S. Moffat, ëknown for his bad
167
behaviourí.
There  were  some  complaints  of  soldiers  molesting  women,
usually the claim that they touched womenís breasts: ëthe wife of
Asfur Shihadeh [ ë Asfur Shihadeh] of Bir Zeit [Bir Zayt] while on
her way to the village spring for water was stopped by a soldier
who proceeded to search her and feel her breasts Ö. On the same
day, July 6th, 5 women of Bir Zeit [Bir Zayt] were fetching water
from the spring to the north of the village. The troops rushed,
searched them and shamelessly handled their breasts and bodies
in spite of their cries and protestsí.168 Similarly, there was an
account of an attempted assault by troops who ëattempted to
attack the honour of the wife of Issa Rabah [ ë Isa Rabah] but she
refused and yelled for help and consequently was rescued from
the  claws  of  the  civilised  troops  by  her  village  women
neighboursí.169 Again,   ëIn another case the soldiers went in and
found an unmarried girl in bed they forcibly took off her vest
played with her breasts and tried to assault her but her shrieks
attracted the neighbours and this was preventedí.170 At a search
at Tulkarm, soldiers made women line up in front of them and
bare their breasts to prove that they were not men.171 There was
also an accusation of an assault against a girl, directed at British
troops: ëSophiye Ibrahim Hamoud [Hamud] aged 12, raped by
the army. She received a dangerous wound on her head which

broke the skullí. 172  Finally, there was a serious sexual assault
allegation but this was against three Arab policemen, not British
soldiers: ëThey beat me with their riØe butts ó laid me on the
ground. One sat on my chest and kept my mouth shut, etc., while
another assaulted me ó then the men changed places; all three
173
had me in turní.
The issue of sexual violence is opaque; but, in general, the
Arabs complained about British physical force, not sexual assault
against women. It seems that sexual violence was not common
and some of the allegations might have resulted from soldiersí
clumsy attempts to search frightened women. Servicemen shot
dead  stone-throwing  women,  but  they  were  careful  to  avoid
sexual offence ó as were the Israelis after 1948 who, again, used
174
inherited British repressive methods against the Palestinians.
When  it  came  to  searching  local  women,  female  ëwardressesí
attached to British units were deployed to search women villagers
down to their ëprivate partsí.175 On another occasion, an army
ofÆcer complained of police   ëmismanagementí in failing to bring
along a female ësearcherí on an operation, suggesting that female
searchers were used in the Æeld.176 There were, however, very
few female police searchers, some Arab/Armenian, some Jewish,
for the whole of Palestine, so outside the major towns women
should not have been searched unless a woman searcher was
present, impracticable in fast-moving operations. The British used
Jewish and Armenian women as searchers ó ëno British woman
would lower herself to do ití ó but, for example, in October 1938
in Jerusalem they had just two Arab women for this task, one at
the Jaffa Gate and one at the Damascus Gate.177 In June 1936,

when  the  British  wanted  to  search  women  escaping  the
destruction of old Jaffa, they sent seven women from the prison
service in Jerusalem down to Jaffa for the job, commandeering a
local  building  especially  for  the  purpose.178  The  British  police
claimed  that  the  Arab  rebels  hid  their  ëstuffí  with  Palestinian
women,  the  Arabs  countering  that  hidden  goods  were  simply
valuables   or   money   that  they   did  not   want  stolen   by
179
servicemen.
Nor  did  the  British  army  act  as  one,  regiments  behaving
differently on operations. Arab propaganda played on the fact
that  Scottish  regiments  were  especially  unpleasant.  One  Arab
leaØet, written into (clumsy) English for distribution to soldiers,
made clear the link between abuses and Scottish troops deployed
to Palestine:180

One can never imagine inhuman deeds than bombing up the
houses over their inhabitants of innocent ladies and children, of
robbing  passengers,  then  shooting  them,  of  ruining  whole
villages  and  scattering  their  inhabitants  to  die  of  cold  and
thirst; and of obliterating the ladies of those killed persons in
order  that  they  might  terrify  the  peaceful  citizens.  These
savage  actions  are  mostly  committed  by  ìROYAL  SCOTCH
REGIMENTS,î in so many places of Palestine; and hundreds of
photographs are kept for future generations to behold these
actions of ìROYAL SCOTCH REGIMENTS.î

This  is  corroborated  by  police  ofÆce  Burr  who  noted  that
Scottish regiments were the ëworst offendersí when it came to
causing trouble, and ëif an Arab sees anybody in a kilt they run a

mile.  In  the  trouble  last  year  they  used  the  bayonet  on  the
slightest  excuseí.181  The  Arabs  were  aware  of  regimental
differences, with Arab students in London in May 1939 protesting
speciÆcally  against  Black  Watch  soldiers  following  the  Halhul
outrage.182 Following the death of two Black Watch soldiers by
the  Jaffa  Gate  in  Jerusalem  on 5  November  1937,  General
Archibald Wavell remarked on the restraint shown by the Black
Watch  on  a  subsequent  operation  against  Silwan,  the  village
south of the city blamed for the attack, although he admitted that
a suspect died ëfalling over a cliffí.183 OfÆcially, after tracker dogs
led the authorities to the village, one villager ended up hospital
after falling off a cliff, while soldiers shot dead one man and
wounded  another.  Then  the  authorities  sealed  the  village
forbidding villagers to leave without a permit, made all males
report every evening to the police and made the village pay for a
twenty-man  police  post.184  Yet,  the  private  diary  of  a  North
Staffordshire Regiment ofÆcer tells a different tale, recording how
Black Watch men beat to death twelve Arabs in Silwan with riØe
butts after the death of their comrades.185 Why would this ofÆcer
lie to his private diary? Palestine policemen recalled that Scottish
regiments were especially tough when it came to dealing with the
Arabs, and several later counterinsurgency excesses after 1945ó
at Batang Kali village in Malaya in 1948 (Scots Guards), the Aden
ëCraterí in 1967 (Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders) and the Falls
186
Road in 1970 (Black Watch) ó involved Scottish regiments.
While Black Watch (Scottish) troops were involved in actions at
Halhul and Silwan, other Scottish regiments behaved properly, as
Forster noted concerning the change in the Hebron garrison from

the  Queenís  Own  Cameron  Highlanders  to  the  Cameronians
(Scottish RiØes),   ëa far less aristocratic affair [and disbanded in
the 1960s] but worth about six times their predecessors. Soon
after  their  arrival  a  village  patrol  was  ambushed  and  a  truck
blown up by a land mine Ö. The Cameronians bore no malice and
for the rest of their stay became very popular with the people.
Gilmour [Captain  G.H.  Gilmour,  the  ofÆcer  at  the  ambush]
encouraged his men to go, in properly conducted parties, to look
at  the  suq  and  the  mosqueí.187  Moreover  English  county
regiments could also act very robustly.188 While certain regiments
recruited  heavily  from  certain  regions,  these  differences  were
fundamentally regimental and not regional, and were a function
of   the   internal   dynamics   and   leadership   within   different
regiments.  All  of  the  servicemen  in  Palestine  were  regular
volunteers,  so  there  was  continuity  at  the  grass-roots  level,
especially as the different regiments drew recruits from broadly
similar  socio-economic  backgrounds  who  then  experienced  a
shared training and soldiering regimen. But regiments were not
the same, some had weaker or tougher leadership cadres and
command structures, and different traditions of soldiering, and so
brutality was more or less likely to occur when men went on
189
operations against guerrillas.
On occasion, servicemen took the law into their own hands, not
least  as  they  did  not  appreciate  that  the  judicial  system
supported  their  work  in  the  Æeld  against  the  rebels  as,  while
military courts with no jury did sentence to death Arabs brought
before them, they also acquitted suspects or handed out lesser
sentences. For instance, of eighty-two persons tried in the period
from 20 May to 31 July 1938, the courts acquitted thirty-six,

found one not guilty due to insanity and the average length of
sentence was  three  and  a half years.  The  British  handed  out
nineteen death sentences, of which they commuted seven. 190 One
British military prosecutor recalled how a judge acquitted a sniper
caught with a riØe and ammunition on a legal technicality, and
that Jewish evidence would never be sufÆcient to convict an Arab:
ëThe  Arab  Bar  appreciate  the  impartiality  of  the  military
prosecutorsí.191 On the other hand, a policeman relating the trial
of a Jewish rebel in the 1940s, described military justice as akin
192
to ëkangaroo courtsí.
The perceived leniency of the courts might help to explain the
numbers  of  Arab  suspects  shot  while  ëtrying  to  escapeí,  a
recurring phrase in police Æ les and which policeman Burr admits
were assassinations by colleagues who were tired of the legal
system and so ëshot out of handí suspects.193 Briance confessed
to  his  mother  that  colleagues  shot  on  the  spot  an  arrested
rebel.194  Troops  also  shot  captives,  including  the  Palestinian
suspected of assassinating acting Assistant District Commissioner
Moffat in August 1938 in his ofÆce in Jenin. The British quickly
apprehended  the  assassin  after  the  murder  ó  he  was,
apparently,  a  blond  hunchback  and  so  rather  visible  ó  after
which he was shot trying to escape, despite his disability and
being surrounded by Æt, young British soldiers.195 Then again, the
Arabs   nicknamed   Moffatís   assassin,   ëMuhammadí,   ëgazelleí
196
because he was so swift.
Arabic sources paint a harrowing picture of the judicial system.
Abu Gharbiyah secured a press post that allowed him access to
the workings of the military tribunals set up in 1937 and presided

over by three military judges. His accounts of the workings of
these  military  as  opposed  to  civil  courts  highlight  a  judicial
system  in  which  proceedings  and  the  passing  of  the  death
sentence could take less than an hour. The commanding ofÆcer of
the  Essex  Regiment  noted  how  the  courts  worked  at  ëhigh
pressure.  The  Arab  is  slow  to  learní.197  The  supreme  British
commander ó at this time General Archibald Wavell ó conÆrmed
one  sentence  the  same  evening  and  the  British  hanged  the
convicted man the next day. The whole sequence from the start
of the trial to execution took forty-eight hours. Abu Gharbiyah
noted with irony how he and his comrades, ëcheered for British
justice!í198 On another occasion, a family of nine from Gaza came
before  the  court  charged  with  possession  of  one  gun.  The
judgement took fewer than two hours, with the family of nine
standing  throughout  with  British  guards  pointing  weapons  at
them. The judges found six children guilty and sentenced them to
life imprisonment, sent two children who were minors to jail for
seven   years,   while   they   condemned   the   chief   accused
(presumably the father) to death.199 Abu Gharbiyah claimed that
in 1938 military tribunals passed 2,000 ëlongí sentences and 148
death sentences, the latter not borne out by the ofÆcial Ægures of
those hanged. Finally, the British detained tens of thousands of
Arabs, many of whom had no connection with the rebellion but
were just unfortunate enough to be villagers in areas of rebel
activity, or were sent into detention after ëscreeningí procedures
whereby hooded Arab informers working with the British checked
over villagers, a widespread practice in later counterinsurgency
campaigns.
According to ofÆcial British Ægures, the army and police killed

more than 2,000 Arabs in combat, while 100ñ112 were hanged,
and 961 died because of ëgang and terrorist activitiesí.200 Building
on  the  British  statistics,  Walid  Khalidi  cites  Ægures  of 19,792
casualties for the Arabs, with 5,032 dead, broken down further
into 3,832  killed  by  the  British  and 1,200  dead  because  of
ëterrorismí, and 14,760 wounded.201 The accounts of the Æghting
in  Palestine  in  which    ëunofÆcialí    deaths  were  high  bear  out
Khalidiís statistical examination. If we accept an overall Ægure of
5ñ6,000 Arabs killed during the revolt, how many died because of
non-British  actions?  Yuval  Arnon-Ohanna  produced  Ægures  of
between 3,000 and 4,500 Arabs killed due to intra-Arab Æghting,
often  against  suspected  collaborators  or  because  of  Æghting
between  the  Nashashibi  and  Husayni  families,  a  point  he
emphasised in his critical examinations of Palestinian Arab unity
and  social  cohesion  during  the  revolt.202  More  recent  Hebrew
work  by  Hillel  Cohen  questions  ArnonOhannaís  scholarship,
claiming that he misread Arabic sources, lowering the Ægure of
Arabs killed by Arabs to 900ñ1,000, providing a total that is more
sympathetic  to  the  Arab  cause  as  it  puts  less  emphasis  on
203
intra-Arab clashes.
What  are  we  to  make  of  these  Ægures?  The  non-Jewish
population of Palestine in 1939 comprised 927,133 Muslim, plus
116,958 Christian and 12,150 ëotherí non-Jewish, giving a grand
total of non-Jews of 1,056,241.204 If we accept a total of 3,832
Arabs killed by the British, this results in percentages of 0.36%
non-Jewish killed. Khalidi shows that the comparable percentages
for Britain and the US, taking the higher total Ægure of dead of
5,032,  would  have  resulted  in  200,000  British  and  1,000,000

Americans  killed. 205  Put  this  way,  the  Ægures  do  look  more
dramatic than they do when seen as absolute totals, and it is for
this  reason  that  the  same  statistical  method  was  applied  by
pro-Zionist historians when detailing Israeli casualties during the
1948ñ49  Arab-Israeli  War,  showing  that  they  suffered  more
206
casualties than Britain did in the Second World War.
By late 1938, once the Munich crisis had passed, the British
had deployed two full-strength divisions to Palestine. The British
government was keen to resolve the Palestine revolt before war
broke out with Germany and so allowed these forces to increase
the tempo of their operations. ëThe military command in Palestine
and the High Commissioner were able to do more or less as they
likedí because of the threat from Germany, recalled one ofÆcer in
Palestine at the time.207 With such a large deployment, some level
of human rights abuse was inevitable, especially as successful
counter-insurgency demanded some degree of brutality. Did the
reprisals and collective punishment allowed by the 1929 Military
Law that the British used in Palestine in the 1930s constitute the
ësevere pain or sufferingí demanded by, say, the UN deÆnition of
torture? This article has uncovered evidence of blatant torture ó
and  recognised  as  such  at  the  time  ó  but  most  of  what  it
describes  is  premeditated,  systematic,  ofÆcially  sanctioned
brutality  in  the  form  of  collective  punishments  and  reprisals
directed  primarily  at  property  not  people.  There  are  fewer
instances   of   unpremeditated   and   extreme   ëwildí   reactive
rank-and-Æle brutality. These could reØect soldiersí anger at a
guerrilla attack ó notably if rebels killed or wounded a comrade
in an attack ó and a subsequent desire for revenge. UnofÆcial
torture  and  brutality  were  illegal  then  and  now  ó  pace  the

arguments of those such as Alan Dershowitz legitimising the use
of  torture  against  terrorist  suspects.208  The  ofÆcially  directed
brutality was legal at the time, leaving aside the moral outrage
that such action would now provoke. Britainís concern to follow
the law ó modiÆed as necessary ó meant that her actions were
usually within the law.
While  some  incidents  such  as  al-Bassa  meet  the  dictionary
deÆnition of an atrocity, these outrages were not the systematic
excesses that one would expect to see in a police state in which
service  personnel  could  act  without  ëmoral  referenceí.  In  her
charged attack on British imperialism, Elkins described Kenya in
the 1950s  as  ëBritainís  Gulagí,  not  a  phrase  that  is  readily
applicable to Palestine in the 1930s, at least not with the records
currently available.209 Army actions at Halhul and al-Bassa saw
the deaths of around thirty-Æve people, tragic, wrong and illegal,
but in a three-year insurgency evidence that restraint and ëmoral
referenceí  rather  than  unalloyed  wickedness  guided  military
operations. That recognised, other outrages similar to those at
al-Bassa  and  Halhul  undoubtedly  occurred  ó  this  article  has
touched on some of them ó although the numbers of dead in
each incident were small. Cumulatively, however, these boost the
Ægure of thirty-Æve dead to something much greater, especially if
one considers the recurring incidence of single or several Arabs
shot dead while running from troops, although troops were legally
empowered to shoot ësuspectsí who were running away following
a verbal challenge.
The  question  is  partly  how  one  measures  the  severity  of
excesses,  partly  what  one  looks  for  in  the  archival  material.
Wilson, the British teacher in the village of Bir Zayt, noted that

the British soldiers whom she met daily behaved very correctly
towards both herself and the local Palestinian community. 210 Of
course, that Bir Zayt was a Christian Arab village in which there
were female British teachers could also explain the troops ëgentler
behaviour, but when soldiers detained some local Arabs and took
them into captivity in Ramallah prison, they did little to them
beyond  making  them  mend  some  buildings.  The  Arabsí  main
complaint to Wilson was that the better-educated ones resented
their gaolers leaving them in a cell with ordinary peasants. The
extent of British military violence towards the suspects was to
manhandle  them  through  the  door  into  the  basement  cell  in
which the soldiers detained them. Once released, their soldier
gaolers gave the local men cigarettes and then a lift home. 211 The
villagers were ënot specially indignant, taking it rather as part of
lifeís  general  unpleasantness.  ìTurkish  soldiers  before 1918,î
they said, ìEnglish soldiers now. All soldiers are alikeî.í212 Forster,
typically  very  critical  of  the  British  army,  also  commented  on
positive  changes  in  British  behaviour  in  Hebron  ó  ëmilitary
thieving has stoppedí ó showing that there was no consistent
213
pattern of abuse.
Local Arab women came to see Miss Hulbert, one of Wilsonís Bir
Zaytís  teaching  colleagues,  crying  and  complaining  about  the
British  detaining  their  menfolk  for  road  repairs:  ëìThey  are
beating  them!  The  soldiers  are  beating  our  men!î  ìBeating!î
exclaimed Miss Hulbert. ìHow do you mean ó like this?î giving
an energetic pantomime of two-handed whacking with a stick.
ìOh no no!î replied the women. ìOnly like thisî ó demonstrating
the mildest of pats and pushes; obviously no more than would be
necessary to show the men where to go or what to do ó not

surprising when soldiers and villagers cannot speak each otherís
languageí.214 Whom are we to believe? Both Forster and Wilson
are credible witnesses, both spoke some Arabic and both were
sympathetic  to  the  Palestinians  amongst  whom  they  lived.
Similarly, the account above from ë Abd al-Hamid Shumanís son
regarding  his  fatherís  maltreatment  at  al-Mazra  ë  a  detention
camp is not supported by one of Shumanís fellow detainees, ë Abd
al-Hamid al-Sa í ih, who remembered calling in take-away food,
jogging, sun-beds, educational classes, and a prison governorís
ëhumane  gesture    Ö    worthy  of  praise  and  I  thank  him  for
215
thisí.
British troops acted correctly and with humanity, contradicting
the negative accounts detailed above. ëIf we wounded a terrorist
or anything like that well I mean he was usually looked after as
well as one of our own chaps. I donít think there was any great
sort of animosityí, or, ëBritish soldiery were very bad at brutality;
we used it half-heartedly or even not at allí.216 The Arab revolt
raises methodological issues when faced with masses of primary
evidence pointing in opposite directions. Soldiersí memories of
the  conØict  vary  greatly,  acts  of  great  kindness  sitting  oddly
alongside brutality towards vulnerable people, sometimes in the
same soldierís record, all evidence of the peculiar experience of
soldiering and the later process of memory and historical record.
Similarly, Arabic accounts are not consistent and do seem, at
times, exaggerated. Perhaps the issue is whether one is looking
to   support   or   to   deprecate   the   British   army,   its
counter-insurgency methods, and imperial rule generally.
Casual   racism   certainly   inØuenced   servicemenís   conduct
towards the ëwogsí ó ëThere is apparently only one method of

handling the Arabs with the exception of the Bedouin, that is by
ruthless white dominationí, or ëthe Arab was a slightly half-witted
younger brotherí217 ó but there was none of the racial hatred
that, say, white settlers directed at the black Africans involved in
the ëMau Mauí revolt in Kenya. Moreover, soldiers disliked Jew
and Arab in equal measure. One police ofÆcer remarked on the
ërealí Arabs of the desert, like ëchalk and cheeseí compared to the
ëcraven, cowardlyí Palestinians, before going on to describe Jews
as  ëpoor  soldiersí  lacking  initiative  and  ëgutsí  who  were  also
ëill-mannered, arrogantí and ësubversiveí.218 For the British troops,
ëby and large the Arab was a clean Æghterí and they respected
him accordingly.219 While servicemen commented on the dirt in
Arab areas, they rated the rebels as worthy opponents, they saw
the Arabs as a once-powerful culture and service in the Holy Land
impressed them. ëI think we British rather admire the Arabsí, was
one  ofÆcerís  far  from  isolated  comment.220  Servicemen  were
disinterested  when  it  came  to  the  Arab-Zionist  conØict  in
Palestine, excepting that the Arabs in the 1930s were the rebels
and so were the enemy. Towards the Arabs, there was little of
the  prejudice  shown  after 1945,  when  anti-Semitism  among
servicemen was rife, perhaps because while the Arabs failed in
their revolt, the Zionists were successful in their struggle against
the British.
As  for  the  Palestinian  villagers,  they  were  so  desperate  to
escape the rebels who came by night for sustenance and the
troops who came by day to punish them that many Øed their
homes, creating an internal refugee crisis requiring ofÆcial relief
221
and soup kitchens, the latter organised by the Muslim waqfs.
By the end of the revolt, Palestinian villagers were referring to

the  guerrillas  not  as  mujahidin  in  a  holy  war  but  as  rebels
(thuwwar).222  While  grossly  unfair,  the  targeting  of  non-
-combatants worked, the British suppressing the revolt by 1939,
leaving them free to deploy their troops for the coming war in
Europe. Britain directed operations against the Palestinian Muslim
population  along  with  the  rebel  bands  that  the  army  hunted
down, when it could Ænd them and bring them to battle. As with
later successful counterinsurgency campaigns such as Malaya in
the 1950s, British forces discriminated in Palestine, targeting the
Muslim  community  while  working  with  or  treating  leniently
friendly groups in Palestine such as the Yishuv ó the pre-1948
Jewish community in Palestine ó and, arguably, the Druzes and
the  Christian  Palestinians,  the  latter  a  sensitive  subject  that
deserves more examination. Support for the Yishuv during the
revolt is beyond the remit of this article, but Britainís recruitment
of  thousands  of  extra  Jewish  supernumerary  police  ó  14,411
according to one source ó was one sign of her recognition of the
relative value of the different communities in Palestine. 223 When
inØicting  reprisals  and  instituting  collective  Ænes,  the  British
treated the Jews softly, avoiding, for instance, house demolition
of Jewish homes in Tiberias following the death of an Arab in a
224
land mine attack.
After 1936 in Palestine, the British established a systematic,
systemic, ofÆcially sanctioned policy of destruction, punishment,
reprisal  and  brutality  that  fractured  and  impoverished  the
Palestinian population. Most of this repression was legal to the
letter of the military law and the emergency regulations in force
in Palestine after 1936.  The army maintained that destruction
was not its primary aim during operations even when this was its

operational  method,  suggesting  that  soldiers  knew  that  such
actions were questionable morally if not legally ó servicemen
also  had  orders  banning  photographing  of  demolitions. 225  The
authorities (re)constructed  the  law  to  give  soldiersí  actions
legality. The British had to balance what was lawful, what was
morally right, and what worked, and these were not compatible.
The regulations in force after 1936 made, as a pro-Arab British
resident of Haifa wrote, ëlawful things which otherwise would be
unlawfulí.226 Lawlessness was the law. Servicemen were guided
by  a  legal  system  that  meant  that  they  could  accept  the
premisses of their government that allowed for brutal actions,
and they could do so with all the energy of good bureaucrats
obeying orders ó hence the phrase ëbanality of brutalityí in the
title  to  this  article,  a  tilt  to  Hannah  Arendtís  study  of  Adolf
227
Eichmann.
Where  the  British  army  tortured  and  illegally  executed
Palestinians,  these  were  the  casual,  uncontrolled  actions  of
servicemen  operating  outside  of  the  law  and  without  explicit
orders. That noted, while there was no discernible army chain of
command  guiding  a  system  of  extreme  brutality  directed  at
persons, and which broke civil law, police ofÆcers and prison staff
might  have  directed  torture  that  was  systematic  or  even
systemic. Looking at the Arab revolt as a whole, extreme acts of
personal  abuse  were  probably  not  systematic,  and  almost
certainly  not  systemic.  Admittedly,  the  British  high  command
tolerated the less blatant abuses committed by its men in the
Æeld,  but  senior  ofÆcers  based  in  Haifa  and  Jerusalem  were
sensitive to charges of abuse, politically if not morally, and so it
was junior ofÆcers in the Æeld who were intimately involved in

any excesses. The Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem put it succinctly,
writing how outrages ëare not ofÆcially sanctioned although they
have  not  been  ofÆcially  regrettedí.228  Whether  there  was  an
unwritten code from on high sanctioning grass-roots level gross
abuse is unproven, and probably impossible to prove, precisely
because those involved were unwilling to leave a written record of
such  orders.  For  the  Anglican  Bishop,  those  in  the  ëhighest
positions of authorityí deplored the deaths of innocent civilians,
suggesting  that  civil  and  military  forces  acted  as  a  brake  on
counter-rebel operations.229 Britainís forces of repression were not
united, with the army, for instance, working with the Shai, the
Zionist intelligence branch, handing it Arab material to translate,
sidelining   the   colonial   administration   that   opposed   army
230
ëmethodsí that were outside ëusual police activitiesí.
Britain lost control of Palestine in the late 1930s during the
Arab  revolt.  Faced  with  similar  disturbances,  other  imperial
powers  responded  much  more  harshly  than  the  British  did  in
Palestine, as even a cursory glance at other twentieth-century
counter-insurgency campaigns shows, whether it is the Spanish
in the Rif mountains, the Germans in Africa before the Great War
and during the Second World War, the Japanese in China, the
Italians in Libya, the French in Algeria, the Americans in Vietnam,
the  Portuguese  in  Africa  or  the  Soviets  in  Afghanistan.  These
actions   included   systemic,   boundless   violence,   large-scale
massacres of civilians and POWs, forced starvation, overt racism,
gross  torture,  sexual  violence  and  rape,  the  removal  of  legal
process,  the  use  of  chemical  and  biological  weapons  against
civilians,  ethnic  cleansing,  extermination  camps  and  genocide.
This does not excuse British abuses in Palestine but it provides

some comparative context. Put simply, in Palestine the British were often brutal but they rarely committed atrocities. Indeed, by moderating its violence, Britain was probably more effective as an imperial power. Perhaps this is the best that can be said for the British ëwayí in repressing the Arab insurgency in Palestine: it was, relatively speaking, humane and restrained ó the awfulness was less awful ó when compared to the methods used by other colonial   and   neo-colonial   powers   operating   in   similar circumstances, an achievement, of sorts.

*This  article  has  been  completed  during  tenure  of  the  US  Marine  Corps
Universityís Major-General Matthew C. Horner Chair of Military Theory, funded by
the Marine Corps University Foundations through the gift of Mr. and Mrs. Thomas
A. Saunders. The author also acknowledges the support of the British Academy, the American University in Beirut, and the following individuals: Martin Alexander, Ian Beckett, Joanna Bourke, Zeíev Elron, David French, Itamar Radai, Najate el-Rahi, Helen Sader, Avi Shlaim and Asher Susser.

1. al-Jamië a al-Islamiyya [The Islamic Community] (Jaffa), 16 Apr. 1936 records three killed.
2. A. Schleifer, ëIzz al-Din al-Qassam: Preacher and Mujahidí, in E. Burke et al.,
eds., Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East (Berkeley, 2006), 139.
3. I. Beckett and J. Pimlott, eds., Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency
(New York, 1985); I. Beckett, Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies:
Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750 (London, 2001); J. Ellis, From the
Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary and Counter-Insurgency
Warfare,  from  the  Romans  to  the  Present (London, 1995);  D.  Galula,
Counter-Insurgency Warfare (London, 1964); F. Kitson, Low Intensity Operations
(London, 1971);  T.  Mockaitis,  British  Counterinsurgency, 1919ñ60 (London,
1990); J. Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London, 1967); M. Shafer,
Deadly  Paradigms:  The  Failure  of  US  Counter-Insurgency  Policy (Princeton,
1988); R. Taber, War of the Flea (New York, 1965); Sir R. Thompson, Defeating
Communist  Insurgency (London, 1965);  C.  Townshend,  Britainís  Civil  Wars:
Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century (London, 1986).
4.  J.  Pimlott,  ëThe  British  Experienceí,  in  I.  Beckett,  ed.,  The  Roots  of

Counter-Insurgency: Armies and Guerrilla Warfare, 1900ñ45 (London, 1988), 11.
5. F. Kitson, Bunch of Five (London, 1977), 289.
6. C. Elkins, Britainís Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya (London, 2005),
306.
7. Conversation, Lt-Gen A. Wavell to Brig J. Evetts, in P.C. Munn, 4503, tape 3, I[mperial] W[ar] M[useum] S[ound] A[rchive].
8.  Naji  ë  Allush,  Al-Muqawama  al-ë  Arabiyya  Æ  Filastin, 1917ñ48  [The  Arab
Resistance  in  Palestine, 1917ñ1948 ] (Beirut, 1969);  Muhammed  ë  Izzat
Darwazah,   Mudhakkarat Muhammad ëIzzat Darwazah: Sab ëa wa tisëuna ë aman Æ
l-hayat [The Diaries of Mohammed ë Izzat Darwazeh: 97 Years in a Life ] (Beirut,
1993);  Bahjat  Abu  Gharbiyah,  Fi  Khidamm  al-nidal  al-ë  arabi  al-Æ  lastini:
mudhakkarat al-munadil Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah [In the Midst of the Struggle for
the  Arab  Palestinian  Cause:  The  Memoirs  of  Freedom-Fighter  Bahjat  Abu
Gharbiyah (Beirut, 1993); Ghassan Kanafani, ë Thawrat 1936ñ1939 Æ Filastin:
KhalÆyyat, tafasil wa tahlil í [ëThe 1936ñ39 Revolt in Palestine: Background,
Details and Analysisí],    Shuíun Filastinyya [Palestinian Matters] 6 (Jan. 1972),
45ñ77; Kayyali, Wathaíiq al-muqawama al-Filastiniyya al ëArabiyya didd al-ihtilal
al-Baritani  wa  al-Sahyuniyya [Documents  of  the  Palestinian  Arab  Resistance]
(Beirut, 1968); W. Khalidi and Suweyd, Al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya wa al-Khatar
al-Sahyuni [The Palestinian Problem and the Zionist Danger ] (Beirut, 1973);
Khayriyya  Qasmiyya,  ed.,  Filastin  Æ-Mudhakkarat  al-Qawuqji [Palestine  in  the
Memories  of  Fawzi  al-Qawuqji]  (vol.  ii) (PLO  Research  Centre  and  Jerusalem
Publishing House, 1975); Khalil al-Sakakini, Kadha Ana Ya Duniya [Such Am I, Oh
World!] [1955] (Beirut, 1982); Subhi Yasin, Al-Thawra al-ëArabiyya al-Kubra (Æ
Falastin) 1936ñ1939 [The Great Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936ñ1939] (Damascus
Shifa ë Amru Haifa, 1959); Akram Zu ë aytir,   Wathaíiq al-Haraka al-Wataniyya
al-Filastiniyya, 1918ñ39: Min Awraq Akram Zuëaytir [Documents of the Palestinian
National  Movement, 1918ñ39:  From  the  Papers  of  Akram  Zuëaytir  ] (Beirut,
1979);  Akram  Zu  ë  aytir,  Al-Harakah  al-Wataniyah  al-Filastiniyya, 1935ñ39:
Yawmiyyat Akram Zuëaytir [The Palestinian National Movement, 1935ñ39: Diaries of Akram Zuëaytir ] [1980] (Beirut, 1992).
9. T. Bowden, The Breakdown of Public Security: The Case of Ireland, 1916ñ21
and  Palestine,  1936ñ39 (London,  1977);  J.  Norris,  ëRepression  and  Rebellion:
Britainís Response to the Arab Revolt in Palestine of 1936ñ39í, Journal of Imperial
and  Commonwealth  History,  xxxvi (2008), 25ñ45;  Pimlott, ëThe  British
Experienceí ; S. Shoul,   ëSoldiers, Riots and Aid to the Civil Power in India, Egypt
and Palestine, 1919 ñ 39í, (Univ. of London Ph.D. thesis, 2006); C. Smith, ë Two

(University of Cambridge D.Phil. thesis, 1989); C. Townshend, ëThe Defence of Palestine: Insurrection and Public Securityí,   ante, ciii (1988), 917ñ49.
10. H. Cohen, Tzva ha-Tzlalim [An Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaborators in
the Service of Zionism ] (Jerusalem, 2004) (translated into English, 2008); Y.
Eyal, Ha-Intifada ha-Rishona: Dikuy ha-Mered ha-Aravi al yedey ha-Tzava ha-Briti
be-Eretz Israel, 1936ñ39 [The First Intifada: The Suppression of the Arab Revolt
by the British Army, 1936ñ39] (Tel Aviv, 1998); and (translated into English) Y.
Porath, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: from Riots to Rebellion. Volume
Two, 1929ñ39 (London, 1977).
11. Y. Arnon-Ohanna, Herev mi-Bayit: ha-Maëavak ha-Pnimi ba-Tnuë a ha-Le ë
umit  ha-Falastinit, 1929ñ39 [The  Internal  Struggle  within  the  Palestinian
Movement, 1929ñ39] (Tel  Aviv, 1989);  Arnon-Ohanna,  Falahim  ba-Mered
ha-Aravi be-Eretz Israel, 1936ñ39 [Felahin during the Arab Revolt in the Land of Israel] (Tel Aviv, 1978); Cohen, Tzva ha-Tzlalim.,í48ñ1936 Revolts in Palestine: An Examination of the British Response to Arab and Jewish Rebellion.
12. Shoul, ëSoldiers, Riots and Aid to the Civil Powerí, 10. See also S. Shoul,
ëSoldiers, Riot Control and Aid to the Civil Power in India, Egypt and Palestine,
1919ñ39í,  Journal  of  the  Society  for  Army  Historical  Research,  xxxvi (2008),
120ñ39.
13. US veteran quoted in C.M. Cameron, American Samurai: Myth, Imagination
and the Conduct of Battle in the First Marine Division, 1941ñ1951 (Cambridge,
1994), 258.
14. C.E. Callwell, Small Wars: Their Principles and Practices (London, 1896); C. Gwynn, Imperial Policing (London, 1934); H.J. Simson, British Rule and Rebellion (Edinburgh, 1937).
15. War OfÆce, Issued by Command of the Army Council, Manual of Military Law
(London, 1929); War OfÆce, By Command of the Army Council, Notes on Imperial
Policing, 1934 (War OfÆce, 30 Jan. 1934); War OfÆce, By Command of the Army
Council, 5 August 1937, Duties in the Aid of the Civil Power (War OfÆce, 1937).
16. Manual of Military Law, 1929, 103.
17. Manual of Military Law, 1929, 331ff, 343; Notes on Imperial Policing, 1934, 12, 39ñ41.
18. Manual of Military Law, 1929, 255.
19. Y. Miller, ëAdministrative Policy in Rural Palestine: The Impact of British Norms
on Arab Community Life, 1920ñ1948í, in J. Migdal, ed., Palestinian Society and
Politics (Princeton, 1980), 132; S. Fathi el-Nimri, ëThe Arab Revolt in Palestine: A
Study Based on Oral Sourcesí, (Univ. of Exeter Ph.D. thesis, 1990), pp. 128ñ30.

20. Shoul, ëSoldiers, Riots and Aid to the Civil Powerí, 18ñ19.
21. The Tiger and Rose: A Monthly Journal of the York and Lancaster Regiment, xiii (1936), 390.
22. ëPalestine: Martial Law Order Issuedí, Palestine Post, 30 Sept. 1936, 1.
23. Manshiya Exploits by the Three British Policemen in Mufti during the Night of the 23ñ24 Oct. 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 2, MEC; J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 5, MEC.
24.  El  Abd  Abu  Shabaan  of  Nazareth,  Free  Translation  of  a  Letter  in  Arabic
Received from a Reliable Friend in Nazareth, 27 Feb. 1938 in J & E Mission papers,
GB  165-0161,  Box  66,  File  3  M[iddle]  E[ast]  C[entre],  St  Anthonyís  College,
Oxford.
25. Shoul, ëSoldiers, Riots and Aid to the Civil Powerí, 18.
26. Simson, British Rule, 96ff, 103.
27. Essex Regiment Gazette, vi/46 (Mar. 1938), 282.
28. Letter, Burr to Parents, 24 Feb. 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, I[mperial] W[ar]
M[useum] D[epartment of Documents]; The Disturbances of 1936ó Cause and
Effect (General Political No. 5), US Consulate General to State Department, 6 June
1936,  signed  Leland  Morris,  US  Consul  General, 867N.00/311, 8,  N[ational]
A[rchives and] R[ecords] A[dministration II, College Park, MD, USA].
29. ëHackett Protests at BBC Palestine Filmí, Daily Telegraph, 26 Mar. 1991.
30. Oxford English Dictionary (1983).
31. Funk and Wagnalls College Standard Dictionary (1946).
32.  Available  at  http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html (accessed 20  Sept.
2008).
33.   Available   at   http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (accessed 20 Sept. 2008).
34. Ibid.
35.   Available   at   http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/126.htm (accessed 20 Sept. 2008).
36. Available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/treaties/cat.htm (accessed 20 Sept. 2008).
37.   Available   at   http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (accessed 20 Sept. 2008).
38. Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-nidal, 59.
39. Diary, 13 Dec. 1940, Briance papers, in possession of Mrs Prunella Briance; Diary, 14 May 1939, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, 119ñ20, MEC.
40.  See  Musafa  Kabha,  The  Palestinian  Press  as  Shaper  of  Public  Opinion,

1929ñ1939: Writing Up a Storm (London and Portland, 2007), 227ff.
41. For an account of a village search, see Diary of School Year in Palestine, 1938ñ39, by H.M. Wilson, about 31,000 words, Wilson papers, GB 165-0302, 36ff, MEC; also the correspondence and pictures in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 3, MEC.
42. D.S. Daniell, The Royal Hampshire Regiment, Volume 3 (Aldershot, 1955), 34.
43. ëPalestine: The First Intifadaí (BBC: Timewatch, 27 Mar. 1991).
44. Fred Howbrook, 4619, 2, IWMSA.
45. Col J.S.S. Gratton, 4506, 14ñ15, IWMSA.
46. Special Order by Brig I.C. Grant, CO, 20th Infantry Brigade, Oct. 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 4, MEC.
47.  A.W.A.A.  Rahman,  British  Policy  Towards  the  Arab  Revolt  in  Palestine,
1936ñ39  (London:  Doctoral  Dissertation, 1971),  pp. 140ñ42;  Arnon-Ohanna,
Falahim, p. 33; Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-nidal, 60ñ1; al-Difaë [The Defence] (Jaffa), 17 June 1936.
48. The Wasp: The Journal of the 16th Foot, viii/5 (Mar. 1937), 267.
49. al-Difaë, 17 June and 23 July 1936; Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-nidal,
60ñ1.
50. Filastin [Palestine] (Jaffa), 19 June 1936.
51.  E.  Keith-Roach,  Pasha  of  Jerusalem:  Memoirs  of  a  District  Commissioner under the British Mandate (London, 1994), p. 185; Eyal, Ha-Intifada, p. 110; Khalidi and Suweyd, Al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya, 234.
52. Filastin, 19 June 1936.
53.  N. Bethell, The Palestine Triangle (London, 1980), 49. See also Col W.V. Palmer, ëThe Second Battalion in Palestineí, in H.D. Chaplin, ed., The Queenís Own Royal West Kent Regiment (London, 1954), 102.
54. Letter, Burr to Parents, 9 Sept. 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.
55. Monthly News Letter No. 2, 2nd Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment, 1ñ30 Sept. 1936 in Abdul-Latif al-Tibawi papers, GB 165-1284, MEC.
56. Diary, 22 Jan. 1938, Tegart papers, GB 165-0281, Box 4, MEC.
57. Diary, Wilson papers, GB 165-0302, 28ñ9, MEC.
58. Report dated 5 May 1939, 10 pages in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, 3, MEC.
59. Memorandum of Protest from the Religious Scholars to the HC about the
Police  Aggression  against  Mosques  and  Houses, 1  June  1936  in  Zu  ë  aytir,
Wathaíiq al-Haraka, 436.
60. Memorandum of the AHC to HC to Protest on the Laws and the Behaviour of

the Authorities, Jaffa, 22 June 1936 in Kayyali, Wathí iq al-Muqawam, 407ñ11 (from Filastin newspaper, 22 June 1936).
61. Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-nidal, 60.
62. Report dated 5 May 1939, 10 pages in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, p. 1, MEC; Haaretz [The Land] (Tel Aviv), 18 Aug. 1938.
63. J. Binsley, Palestine Police Service (Montreux, 1996), 99.
64. Letter, Burr to Parents, n.d. [Dec. 1937], Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.
65. Palmer, ëSecond Battalioní, 100. At this time, £P1 was equivalent to £1 UK
sterling.
66. Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-nidal, 60ñ1; Haaretz (Evening Issue), 22 Dec.
1937.
67.  Disturbances  of 1936:  Events  from  May 6  to  May 16,  Report  by  US
Consulate-General in Jerusalem, signed by C.G. Leland Morris, 16 May, sent to
State Department, 867N.00/292, NARA II.
68. See the Æles in M4826/26, I[srael] S[tate] A[rchive], Talpiot, Jerusalem.
69. Palmer, ëSecond Battalioní, 85; Haaretz, 20 Feb. 1938.
70. Letter, Burr to Parents, 24 Feb. 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD; J & E
Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 3, MEC and material in ibid., Box 66,
File 2.
71. Request for Intercession, Abdulla Family by Attorney for Convicts, 7 July 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 3, 3, MEC. On the unreliability of dogs as trackers, see ibid.
72. The Hampshire Regimental Journal, xxxii/12 (Dec. 1937), 383.
73. Ibid.
74. Z. Lockman, Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine,
1906-48 (Berkeley, 1996), 251; K. Firro, A History of the Druzes (Leiden, 1992),
337, 340ñ1; T. Swedenborg, Memories of Revolt: The 1936ñ39 Rebellion and the
Palestinian National Past (Minneapolis, 1995), 91ñ2; el-Nimri, ëThe Arab Revolt in
Palestineí, 184ñ6.  For  quotation,  Letter,  Burr  to  Parents,  24  Feb.  1938,  Burr
papers, 88/8/1, IWMD. See also Lt-Col G.A. Shepperd, 4597, 47, IWMSA and Sir
Gawain Bell, 10256, IWMSA.
75. See, for instance, Maj-Gen A.J.H. Dove, 4463, 30, IWMSA.
76. The Hampshire Regimental Journal, xxxiii/2 (Feb. 1938), 51 and ibid., xxxiv/2 (Feb. 1939), 31.
77. Bishopís Visit to Nazareth, 4 May 1939 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, MEC.
78. Letter, Briance to Mother, 8 Jan. 1937, Briance papers, in possession of Mrs

Prunella Briance.
79. Diary, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, 74, MEC.
80. Diary, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, 6, 74ñ5, 78ff, 105, MEC.
81. Manshiya Exploits by the Three British Policemen in Mufti during the Night of the 23ñ24 Oct. 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 2, MEC; J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 5, MEC.
82. Diary, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, 74, MEC.
83. Maj-Gen H.E.N. Bredin, 4550, 10, IWMSA.
84. C. Graves, The Royal Ulster RiØes. Vol. 3 (Mexborough, 1950), 28ñ9.
85. The Hampshire Regimental Journal, xxxiii/1 (Jan. 1938), 22.
86. Essex Regiment Gazette, vi/46 (Mar. 1938), 292ñ5.
87. See the correspondence in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 3,
MEC.
88. Extracts from the COís Quarterly Letter for Period ending 31 Dec. 1937 in Essex Regiment Gazette, vi/46 (Mar. 1938), 282.
89. G.A. Shepperd, 4597, 64, IWMSA. Quote from D. Woods, 23846, IWMSA.
90. Woods, 23846, IWMSA.
91. A. Lane, 10295, 18, IWMSA.
92. F. Howbrook, 4619, 35ñ6, IWMSA.
93. Letter, Percy Cleaver [Palestine police] to Aunt, 10 Feb. 1937, Cleaver papers, GB 165-0358, MEC.
94. Lane, 10295, 23ff, IWMSA.
95. Ibid., 26ñ7.
96. A Notice of the OfÆce of the Arab Revolt about the Tragedy of ë Atil [ ë Ateel], 11 Dec. 1938 in Zu ë aytir, Wathaíiq al-Haraka, 529 (see also 545).
97. Binsley, Palestine Police Service, 104ñ5.
98. Letter, Burr to Parents, Mar. 1938 [date pencilled in], Burr papers, 88/8/1,
IWMD.
99. H. Foot, A Start in Freedom (London, 1964), 51ñ2.; T. Segev, One Palestine, Complete (New York, 2000), 430ñ1; R. Catling, 10392, 16ñ17, IWMSA; Æles in S25/10685, 3156, 8768 C[entral] Z[ionist] A[rchive], Jerusalem.
100. Keith-Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem, 191; E.H. Tinker, 4492, 34ñ5, IWMSA; Smith, ëTwo Revolts in Palestineí, 114ñ19; (Judge) Anwar Nusseibeh, 28 Mar. 1977, Thames TV Material (not on open access), Lever Arch Æle: Nigel Maslin, I[mperial] W[ar] M[useum] F[ilm] A[rchive].
101. Segev, One Palestine, 416ñ17.
102. Typed two-page document by Edward Keith-Roach, untitled or dated, at the

end of which is added pencilled comment, Keith-Roach papers, in possession of Mrs Christabel Ames-Lewis.
103. Letter, Archdeacon to Stanley Baldwin, 16 July 1936, J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 1, MEC.
104. Letter, Archdeacon to Chief Secretary, 2 June 1936, J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 1, MEC.
105. Letter, Burr to parents, n.d., Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.
106. ëA Gunnerís Impression of the Frontierí, Quis Separabit, x/1 (May 1939), 45.
107. Letter, Burr to Parents, 22 April 1938, Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.
108. D.V. Duff, Bailing with a Teaspoon (London, 1953), 46.
109. Ibid., 36.
110. Letter, Burr to Alex, n.d. [Dec. 1937], Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.
111. Letter, Stewart to J.G. Matthew, 9 June 1936, J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 1, MEC.
112. Letter, Burr to Parents, n.d. [April 1937], Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD. 113. Letter, Burr to Jill, n.d., Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.
114. Alexander Ternent, 10720, 18, IWMSA.
115. Letter, Burr to Father, n.d. [Dec. 1937], Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD. See also the correspondence on police abuses in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 3, MEC.
116.  David  Irving  (Anglican  Chaplain, Haifa) to  the Lord  Bishop  in Jerusalem (Graham Brown), 29 Dec. 1937 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, 21ñ3, 29ff, MEC.
117. Note by George Francis Graham Brown, Bishop in Jerusalem, 19 April 1939 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, MEC.
118. Bishop in Jerusalem to Major Wainwright (Palestine Police), 18 Apr. 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, 95, MEC.
119. Margaret Dixon, Government Welfare Inspector, to Lord Bishop [Graham
Brown], 3 Feb. 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, MEC.
120.  Letters  of  Protest  to  the  British  Government  about  the  Torture  of  Abd al-Hamid Shuman and the Detainees in Acre Prison, 29 April and 23 June 1938 in Zu ë aytir,   Wathaíiq al-Haraka, 478.
121. A Letter from the Fighter Arrested, Subhi al-Khadra, 20 Sept. 1938 in Zu ë aytir,   Wathaíiq al-Haraka, 505ñ6. See also, ibid., 548.
122.  Statement  about  the  Torture  of  Arabs  Arrested  in  Military  Camps  and Prisons, 1938ñ39 in Zu ë aytir, Wathaíiq al-Haraka, p. 548. See also the accounts in ibid., 579, 594, 601 and Yasin, Al-Thawra al-ëArabiyya, 47.

123. See, Palestine Prisons for Howard League for Penal Reform, 6 Apr. 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, 76ff, MEC and Allegations of Ill-treatment of Arabs by British Crown Forces in Palestine (translated from the Arabic by Frances Newton, 19 June 1939) in ibid., 141ñ3.
124.  The  Alleged  Ill-treatment  of  Prisoners  by  Frances  Newton (sent  to  the
Howard League for Penal Reform), 15 Apr. 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, 94, MEC.
125. Statement of Mutah Said Lababidi of Hama, Syria, Resident of Jerusalem in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 4, 1, MEC.
126. ëPalestine: The First Intifadaí (BBC: Timewatch, 27 Mar. 1991); Segev, One
Palestine, 421ñ2; ëPalestine: Promises and Rebellioní (London: Thames TV, three parts, 1977ñ78).
127. Filastin, 15 Sept. 1938, 1ñ2 was closed during the al-Bassa incident. al-Difaë was closed 13 Aug. to 13 Sept. 1938, after which it said nothing about al-Bassa. The press outside of Palestine brieØy discussed al-Bassa:    al-Nahal [The Day] (Beirut), 9 Sept. 1938, 5 LíOrient (Beirut), 9 Sept. 1938, 2.
128. See Kabha, The Palestinian Press as Shaper of Public Opinion, 227ff.
129. ëPalestine: The First Intifadaí (BBC: Timewatch, 27 Mar. 1991); Allegations
of Ill-treatment of Arabs by British Crown Forces in Palestine (translated from the Arabic by Frances Newton, 19 June 1939) in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, 145, MEC; ëPalestine: Promises and Rebellioní (London: Thames TV, three parts, 1977ñ78).
130. Dates conÆrmed by the menís headstones in the Ramle British war cemetery. Palestine Post, 11 Sept. 1938, 1; Filastin, 15 Sept. 1938; H. Arrigonie, British Colonialism: 30 Years Serving Democracy or Hypocrisy (Bideford, 1998), 35ñ6. 131. Woods, 23846, IWMSA.
132. Arrigonie, British Colonialism, 35ñ6.
133. Ibid., 36.
134. Letter, Cafferata to Wife, 22 Oct. 1938, Cafferata papers, in possession of Mr John Robertson.
135. Keith-Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem, 194ñ5.
136.  Letter  from  Acre  about  the  English  Soldiersí  Atrocities  in  the  Village  of
al-Bassa, 8 Sept. 1938 in Zu ëaytir,   Wathaíiq al-Haraka, 503ñ4.
137. A Letter from the Fighter Arrested, Subhi al-Khadra, 20 Sept. 1938 in ibid.,
505ñ6.
138. Charles Tinson, 15255, IWMSA.
139. Letter, Stewart to J.G. Matthew, 9 June 1936, J & E Mission papers, GB

165-0161, Box 61, File 1, MEC.
140. LíOrient (Beirut), 9 Sept. 1938, 2.
141. ëPalestine: The First Intifadaí (BBC: Timewatch, 27 Mar. 1991).
142. Typed two-page document by Edward Keith-Roach, untitled or dated, at the end of which is added pencilled comment, Keith-Roach papers, in possession of Mrs Christabel Ames-Lewis.
143. Diary, 13 May 1939, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, 119, MEC.
144. Account Translated from Arabic of Hassan el-Quader, Thames TV Papers, GB 165-0282, Box II, File 5, MEC. This is a jumbled Æle and there is ambiguity about whether this witness is from Halhul.
145. Account Translated from Arabic of Woman Resident of Halhul, Thames TV Papers, GB 165-0282, Box II: File 5, 16ñ18, MEC.
146.  Account  Translated  from  Arabic  of  Unnamed  Arab  Villager,  Thames  TV Papers, GB 1650282, Box II: File 4, 12, MEC.
147.  ëPalestine:  Promises  and  Rebellioní, (London:  Thames  TV,  three  parts,
1977ñ78).
148. Letter, Nigel Maslin to Sir Thomas Scrivener, 29 Aug. 1978, Thames TV
Material (not on open access), Lever Arch File: British Letters S-T, IWMFA.
149.  Forster [unsigned]  to  Anglican  Bishop  in  Jerusalem [Graham  Brown],
ConÆdential, Not to be Quoted or Referred to in Public, 25 May 1939 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, MEC.
150. Diary, 14 May 1939, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, 119ñ20, MEC.
151.  Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem to Miss Trevelyan, 29 May 1939 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, MEC.
152. J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, Files 1-2, MEC.
153. Dr Qassam al-Rimawi, Amman, 19 Sept. 1977, Thames TV Material (not on open access), Lever Arch Æle: Nigel Maslin, IWMFA.
154. Diary, 5 Nov. 1938, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, 93, MEC.
155. Quis Separabit: The Regimental Journal of the Royal Ulster RiØes, x/1 (May 1939), 28.
156. Woods, 23846, IWMSA.
157. Anglican Chaplain [signature illegible], Haifa, to Bishop [Graham Brown], 28 Feb. 1939 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, MEC. See also Swedenborg, Memories of Revolt, 108.
158. Anglican Chaplain [signature illegible], Haifa, to Bishop [Graham Brown], 28
Feb. 1939 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, MEC.
159. Ibid.

160. Ibid.
161. British sources claim that the executions were false ó shots Æred wide to
give villagers the impression that they had executed someone and so force them
to divulge information: G. Morton, Just the Job: Some Experiences of a Colonial
Policeman (London, 1957), 104; Frank Proctor, 16801, IWMSA.
162.  Atallah  Bey  to  Dr  Tannous, 1  Mar.  1939, P361/5, ISA; Letter  from  the
Amman Ladiesí Committee, 28 July 1936, RG65 P3221/18, ISA; 1 Aug. 1936
entry, RG65 P3221/18, ISA; 8 Aug. 1936 entry, RG65 P3221/18, ISA; 19 Aug.
1936 entry, RG65 P3221/18, ISA; 5 Sept. 1936 entry, RG65 P3221/18, ISA; T.
Mayer, ëEgypt and the 1936 Arab Revolt in Palestineí,   Journal of Contemporary
History,  xix (1984), 275ñ87,  277;  Rahman,  ëBritish  Policy  Towards  the  Arab
Revolt in Palestineí, 148.
163. Smith, ëTwo Revolts in Palestineí, 26. 164. Haaretz, 14 June 1936.
165.  al-Sakakini,  Kadha  Ana  Ya  Duniya,  pages  covering 13  June  1936;  Abu
Gharbiyah,  Fi  Khidamm  al-nidal, 72ff;  al-Sirat  al-Mustakim [The  Right  Path]
(Jaffa), 1 June 1936.
166.  al-Sakakini,  Kadha  Ana  Ya  Duniya,  pages  covering 13  June  1936;  Abu
Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-nidal, 72ff.
167. Zu ë aytir, Al-Harakah al-Wataniyah, 438. Haaretz, 25ñ26 Aug. 1938; Davar [Thing/Issue], 25 Aug. 1938.
168.  Points 7ñ8 in President of Bir Zeit Council in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 1, MEC.
169. S.O.S. From Halhool, The Martyr Village [stamped 22 May 1939] in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 1, MEC.
170.  Report by Frances Newton dated 27 June 1938 on Search in Balad esh
Sheikh of 24 June 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 3,
MEC.
171. Segev, One Palestine, 421.
172. Allegations of Ill-treatment of Arabs by British Crown Forces in Palestine (translated from the Arabic by Frances Newton, 19 June 1939) in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 5, 144, MEC.
173. Report on Visit to ëAzzun, 12 May 1938 and ëAzzun, 16 May 1938 [account of assault on ëAysha bint Hasan al-Faji, wife of   ëAbd al-Fattah al-Jammal í, aged about 16ñ18] both in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 66, File 1, MEC. Quote from 16 May report, 1.
174.  C.G.T.  Dean,  The  Loyal  Regiment  (North  Lancashire)  1919ñ53 (Preston,

1955), 66.
175.  Report by Frances Newton dated 27 June 1938 on Search in Balad esh
Sheikh of 24 June 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 3,
MEC.
176.  Diary, 19  Oct. 1937,  Major  White,  Relating  to  Service  in  Palestine,
1974-04-24-8, N[ational] A[rmy] M[useum].
177.  J.M.  Thompson  (Government  Welfare  Inspector)  to  Archdeacon,  23  Oct. 1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 4, MEC.
178. al-Difaë, 18ñ19 June 1936.
179.  Quote  from  Diary,  Wilson  papers,  GB  165-0302,  MEC,  p.  12.  See  also Interview, Ted Horne (formerly Palestine police), Barton-on-Sea, 9 Sept. 2006; Roger Courtney, Palestine Policeman (London, 1939), 88; Diary, Wilson papers, GB 165-0302, MEC, 12ñ13.
180.  Addressed to British  Regiments in Palestine. Arab  Revolutionary  Council,
Southern Syria, Palestine, signed Aref Abdul Razik, Commander-in-Chief of the
Arab Forces in Palestine, 19 Nov. 1938, 41/94, Haganah Archive, Tel Aviv. See
also Diary, Wilson papers, GB 165-0302, MEC, 12; Letter, Briance to Mother, n.d.
[Aug. 1936], Briance papers, in possession of Mrs Prunella Briance; Courtney,
Palestine Policeman, 88.
181. Letter, Burr to Parents, n.d [27 May 1937], Burr papers, 88/8/12, IWMD.
182. Mary Trevelyan, Warden, The Student Movement House, London to Anglican
Bishop in Jerusalem, 23 May 1939 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62,
File 1, MEC.
183. J. Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier. To June 1941 (London, 1964), p. 194. See also E. and A. Linklater, The Black Watch (London, 1977), 175.
184. Haaretz, 7ñ8 Nov. 1937.
185.  Diary, 7  Nov. 1937,  Major  White,  Relating  to  Service  in  Palestine,
1974-04-24-8, NAM.
186.  Interview, Ted Horne (formerly Palestine Police), Barton-on-Sea, 9 Sept.
2006.
187. Diary, Oct. 1936, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, 1ñ2, MEC.
188.  Interview, Ted Horne (formerly Palestine Police), Barton-on-Sea, 9 Sept. 2006; Letter, Burr to Parents, n.d. [late 1937], Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.
189. See D. French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, and the British People c.1870ñ2000 (Oxford, 2005).
190. Appendix. Analysis of Cases tried by Military Courts, Palestine, 20 May ñ 31
July 1938, Haining papers, Despatches, GB 165-0131, MEC; and the other court

statistics in the same Æle.
191. Col A. Ingham-Brokke, 13 Oct. 1976, Thames TV Material (not on open access), Lever Arch Æle: Nigel Maslin, IWMFA.
192. Jack Denley, Thames TV Papers, GB 165-0282, Box I, File 20, 17, MEC.
193. Letter, Burr to Parents, 19 Dec. 1937, Burr papers, 88/8/1, IWMD.
194. Letter, Briance to Mother, 14 May 1938, Briance papers, in possession of Mrs Prunella Briance.
195. Telegram to Secretary of State, n.d., S25/22762, CZA, Jerusalem; Haaretz, 26 Aug. 1936.
196. Zu ë aytir, Al-Harakah al-Wataniyah, 438.
197. Extracts from the COís Quarterly Letter for Period ending 31 Dec. 1937 in Essex Regiment Gazette vi/46 (Mar. 1938), 280.
198. Abu Gharbiyah, Fi Khidamm al-nidal, 113ñ14.
199. Ibid., pp. 115ñ16; Bishop in Jerusalem to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 26
Feb. 1938  in  J  &  E  Mission  papers,  GB 165-0161,  Box 64,  File 4,  MEC;
correspondence in Gaza Æle in ibid., Box 66, File 1.
200. W. Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest (Beirut, 1971), 846ñ9.
201. Ibid., 846ñ9; Swedenborg, Memories of Revolt, xxi; Khalidi and Suweyd, Al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya, 239ñ40.
202. Arnon-Ohanna, Herev mi-Bayit, 286ñ7; Arnon-Ohanna, Falahim. 203. Cohen, Tzva ha-Tzlalim, 142ñ5.
204.  Statistics  from  A  Survey  of  Palestine.  Prepared  in  December 1945  and
December 1946 for the Information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry [1946ñ47] (Washington, 1991), i, 141; A.M. Lesch, Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917ñ37: The Frustration of a National Movement (Ithaca and London, 1979), 56. 205. Khalidi, ed., From Haven to Conquest, 846ñ9.
206. E. Karsh, Fabricating Israeli History: The ëNewí Historians [1997] (London, 2000), 22ñ3.
207. Maj-Gen H. Bredin, Thames TV Papers, GB 165-0282, Box I, File 22, 5ñ6,
MEC.
208. A. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works (London, 2002), 144. 209. Elkins, Britainís Gulag.
210. Diary, Wilson papers, GB 165-0302, MEC. 211. Ibid., 27ñ31.
212. Ibid., 32.
213. Diary, 14 Nov. 1938, Forster papers, GB 165-0109, 95, MEC. 214. Diary, Wilson papers, GB 165-0302, 27, MEC.

215. Shayk ëAbd al-Hamid al-Saíih,   Filastin; la Salat Tahta al-Hirab: Mudhakkarat
al-Shaykh  ëAbd  al-Hamid  al-Saíih [Palestine;  No  Prayer  Under  Bayonets:  The
Memoirs of Shaykh ë Abd al-Hamid al-Saíih ] (Beirut, 1994), 44ñ8.
216. Maj-Gen H.E.N. Bredin, 4550, 11, IWMSA; Gen Sir John Hackett, 4527, 50,
IWMSA.
217. Letter, Briance to Home, June 1936, Briance papers, in possession of Mrs Prunella Briance; Bredin, 4550, 11, IWMSA.
218. Courtney, Palestine Policeman, 41, 50.
219. Lord Birdwood, The Worcestershire Regiment, 1922ñ50 (Aldershot, 1952),
16.
220. Capt C.P. Norman, 4629, 8ñ9, IWMSA.
221. Correspondence in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 61, File 3, MEC; Addressed by the Bishop in Jerusalem at the Council Meeting on 10 Jan. 1939 in ibid., Box 62: File 1; Letter, Archdeacon Stewart to Canon Gould, 17 July 1938 in ibid., Box 61: File 1.
222. Keith-Roach, Pasha of Jerusalem, 202.
223.  Asa  Lefen,  Ha-Shai:  Shorasheha  Shel  Kehilat  ha-Modiíin  ha-Israelit  [The Roots of the Israeli Intelligence Community] (Tel Aviv, 1997), 273.
224. Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem to Miss Trevelyan, 23 June 1939 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, MEC.
225. Report dated 5 May 1939, 10 page, in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, 2, MEC.
226. Frances Newton to Mrs Erskine, Secretary of Arab Centre in London, 5 Apr.
1938 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 65, File 4, MEC.
227. H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New
York, 1963), 231.
228. Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem to Miss Trevelyan, 23 June 1939 in J & E Mission papers, GB 165-0161, Box 62, File 1, MEC.
229. Anglican Bishop in Jerusalem to Miss Trevelyan, 29 May 1939 in ibid.
230.  Y.  Slutsky,  ed.,  Sefer  Toldot  ha-Haganah [Book  of  the  History  of  the
Haganah] vol. 2, part 2, Me-Haganah le-Maíavak [From Defence to Struggle] (Tel Aviv, 1963), 991; Lefen, Ha-Shai, 44ff.